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STATEMENTS 
1. Water control in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal command area is contested. For 
comprehensive analysis of this contestation it is necessary to understand the linkages 
between water control's technical/physical, organisational and socio-economic/ 
political dimensions. (this thesis) 
2. There is no anarchy on the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal. 
(this thesis; cf. Hart, 1978; Wade, 1990) 
3. While social constructivist analyses of design processes in farmer managed irrigation 
systems have generally focused on the role that farmers/water users play in these 
processes, social constructivist analyses of design processes in Indian canal irrigation 
need to take the mechanisms that exclude farmers/water users from design as a 
central theme. (this thesis, chapter 4) 
4. The class-related spatial distribution of land and water in the Tungabhadra Left Bank 
Canal command area shows that in canal irrigated contexts spatial relations as 
structured by the lay-out of the canals, are an integral part of the relations of 
production. (this thesis, chapters 5 and 6) 
5. a) The issue of water rights is underemphasised in policy and academic discussions 
on canal irrigation in India. (Saleth, 1996) 
b) Analyses of rights and entitlements to canal irrigation water should focus on the 
interlinked nature of the relations that determine resource access. 
(this thesis, chapter 6) 
6. The technical and managerial creativity of field-level Irrigation Department engineers 
is larger than generally acknowledged. Because that creativity is seen by the engineers 
themselves and by outsiders as a coping or making-out strategy, and because it is 
located in a hierarchical bureaucracy with a prescriptive management style, its 
potential to function as a resource in management reform remains untapped. 
(this thesis) 
7. The state and characteristics of outlet structures and the features of rotation schedules 
express the balance of power between the different actors involved in water control. 
(this thesis, chapters 7, 8 and 9) 
8. In the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal irrigation system rent-seeking is not the main 
mechanism in water distribution practices. Analyses of the relationship between 
Irrigation Department officials and farmers/water users in other South Indian canal 
irrigation systems that describe this relationship as one of constant and antagonistic 
confrontation, mediated by bribe payments and political pressure, can therefore not 
be generalised. What needs to be developed is theory that explains the conditions of 
possibility of different configurations of state-water users relationships in canal 
irrigation systems. 
(this thesis, chapter 7; cf. Wade, 1982a, 1990 and Ramamurthy, 1995) 
9. Populism supports the persistence of the protective irrigation model at policy level 
and unequal distribution at irrigation system level, but the recent initiatives of the 
Andhra Pradesh government suggest that it can also provide an ideological basis for 
an irrigation management reform agenda. 
(this thesis, chapters 3 and 10; Peter, 1998) 
10. The paradigmatic difference in the study of natural resources management between 
the Irrigation and Water Engineering group and the Erosion and Soil and Water 
Conservation group is one of the factors that hinders the emergence in Wageningen 
Agricultural University of an interdisciplinary approach to integrated water resources 
management in tropical regions. 
11. Those who make a point of criticising neo-marxist analyses of capitalism for its 
structuralist, functionalist, determinist, linear or otherwise epistemologically 
undesirable characteristics, tend to undervalue the empirical evidence produced by 
neo-marxist authors regarding the ontological force of capitalist development. 
(cf. Long and van der Ploeg, 1994) 
12. Those who want to stay in touch with the realities of Indian everyday life are well 
advised to regularly travel by bus. 
Peter P. Mollinga 
On the waterfront. Water distribution, technology and agrarian change in a South Indian 
canal irrigation system 
Wageningen, 16 October 1998 
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PREFACE 
The completion of a Ph.D. thesis is an appropriate moment for the acknowledgement of intellectual 
debts. Ph.D. research work often is a phase in which ideas and approaches get consolidated by 
prolonged focus on a single theme. My theme was the combination of the social and technical analysis 
of irrigation, on the basis of a study of water distribution in a canal irrigation system in South India. 
Through this intensive study a position from which further work will be done has been defined. 
Before that standpoint and perspective become a black box it is useful to recognise the imprint of 
different people, ideas and events on it. 
The intellectual trajectory of this book probably started in the early years of my study at 
Wageningen Agricultural University. In 1979 the richtingsgroepbestuur (the board of the student 
organisation for the study programme) of which I was a member organised a day for public discussion 
entitled Tropische Cultuurtechniek: meer dan techniek alleen (Irrigation and water engineering: more 
than technology alone). The poster showed a bulldozer threatening to run over farmers, who ran away 
with their hands in the air. This awareness of the social dimensions of my technical profession has 
remained my leading motive. 
In terms of research the next major step was the fieldwork on water management in small lift 
irrigation systems in the Senegal river valley in 1983, done together with Ton Meijers. The research 
showed that the agency assumption that the valley farmers, who had an irrigation experience of only 
a few years, wasted irrigation water, was unfounded. We found quite sophisticated farmer-made 
systems of water distribution rules, which had gone unobserved by intervention agencies. This field 
experience for once and for all convinced me of the knowledgeability and capability of farmers, 
before I even knew that phrase. 
Then followed a period in which irrigation had disappeared somewhat behind the horizon. My 
membership of the Imperialisme Kollektief, followed by a 2'A year period at the Studium Generate 
department was a most inspiring period. We organised an international congress on Technology and 
agrarian underdevelopment (1985) and the first Political economy of agriculture in the Third World 
course (1987). The politics of the former activity was to argue and lobby for a chair at Wageningen 
Agricultural University on Technology and Development, an aim that was achieved many years later. 
Of the latter it was to reform the Wageningen development-oriented curriculum into a more 
interdisciplinary and problem-oriented direction. The course was institutionalised, but the success of 
the overall reform effort has been at best partial. The intense interaction with the comrades and 
colleagues from the IK and SG has profoundly shaped my academic and political preoccupations. 
We had also come into contact through these activities with the Development Policy and Practice 
research group at the Open University in Milton Keynes, U.K. In 1988 and 1989 Jos Mooij and I 
spent a wonderful 1 Vi years of study and writing on the themes of agrarian change, technology and 
the state. The work with the DPP group put the sometimes somewhat idiosyncratic debates in 
Wageningen in perspective, and added critical realism and labour process theory to my intellectual 
repertoire. I thank the DPP group and specifically David Wield, Ben Crow, Henry Bernstein and 
Terence J. Byres for their support and supervision. The latter's references to Ishikawa's and Boyce's 
work on irrigation in Asia triggered my interest in the water control concept. 
At the end of the period in Britain the return to irrigation took place. I took up the challenge 
to combine my social science interests with my irrigation background. A research proposal was 
written and submitted to WOTRO, through the department where I had graduated. Lucas Horst and 
the late Jacques Slabbers provided all the necessary support. A group of like-minded colleagues 
greatly stimulated each other's work in this formative period. The closest exchange was with Geert 
Diemer, Paul Hoogendam, Wim Kloezen and Joost Oorthuizen. 
That intellectual advance is a collective process also expressed itself in the support group that 
was formed with a set of fellow Ph.D. researchers: Roland Brouwer, Kees Jansen, Jos Mooij and 
Marina Endeveld. We helped each other through the difficult process of proposal writing and 
fieldwork, and later the thesis writing. We also organised, together with Henry Bernstein, the 
Agrarian Questions. The politics of farming anno 1995 conference in Wageningen. 
With regard to the research itself, I thank the Institute for Command Studies and Irrigation 
Management, Bangalore, and particularly its director, the late Dr B.K. Narayan, for providing the 
institutional affiliation that allowed me to do the research, and for the practical assistance extended. 
The permission of the governments of Karnataka and India to do the research is gratefully 
acknowledged, as well as the financial support at different stages of the project by the Open 
University at Milton Keynes, Wageningen Agricultural University and WOTRO (the Netherlands 
Foundation for the Advancement of Tropical Research). 
I owe a lot to my research assistants, R. Doraiswamy and M. Sudharshan. They took up their 
work on the condition that they would camp in the research area for a full agricultural year on an 
almost permanent basis. The work and living conditions in Raichur district were not easy. All three 
of us had lost weight and gone through several attacks on our physical health by the end of that year. 
But they had also secured a continuous data set on water distribution, agricultural practices and other 
issues that was crucial for the research. Through the social relations and networks they built in the 
communities and offices we worked in, trust was created that made the research more enjoyable and 
increased the quality of the data collected. I was very fortunate that R. Doraiswamy could also join 
the new research project that started in 1996. 
Four Dutch students did M.A. or M.Sc. thesis research during the fieldwork period. They were 
Alex Bolding, Annet Smits, Kees van Straaten and Rick Verhoeven. The value of their work will be 
clear from the reference made to it in different chapters. The students also provided a very welcome 
sounding board and opportunity for discussion, which stimulated my own fieldwork. 
A lot of information given by farmers and officials was collected with the promise of privacy, 
and therefore I must thank them anonymously. This academic research project, like many others, 
depended on their willingness to devote time to and share personal experience with an outsider, 
without a return of the favour through practical contributions by the researcher to the solution of the 
problems discussed. The hospitality and openness experienced in the field underlines the feeling of 
privilege associated with doing research in India. 
In terms of practical assistance in the data collection a special mention has to go to the 
documentation service of the Deccan Herald and the Department of Economics and Statistics, both 
in Bangalore. Many government offices in Raichur district and Bangalore provided valuable statistical 
material. Without the help of the librarians and Xerox machine operators of the Institute for Social 
and Economic Change and the University of Agricultural Sciences (Bangalore), the Andhra Pradesh 
State Archives and Osmania University (Hyderabad), the India Office Library and Records (London), 
Karnataka University and the University of Agricultural Sciences (Dharwad), the Raichur Research 
Station, Mysore University, and Jawaharlal Nehru University (New Delhi) my reference list would 
have been a lot shorter, and my understanding a lot more limited. K.K.S. Murthy of Select Bookshop 
(Bangalore) contributed to my sense of history and collection of old irrigation books. 
I thank my supervisors Lucas Horst and Ben Crow for their support, guidance, confidence and 
patience during the fieldwork and writing phase. Colleagues and students of the Irrigation and Water 
Engineering group I thank for providing a context for discussion and development of the ideas in the 
thesis. I apologise that its finalisation has taken so long. 
Frans van Ernst and P.J. Kostense made most of the drawings. Indira Simbolon took a burden 
of my shoulders by typing and editing the list of references. 
Dr Ramachandraswamy and Sharda taught me the basics of the Kannada language. Though I 
must have disappointed them by not taking sufficient time to fully master the language, my limited 
command of it has been very useful in the research and for living in Karnataka in general. The classes 
in their house are remembered with great pleasure. Subash Menon was a friend from almost day one. 
On the first day we met he helped me to steer my unaccompanied luggage through customs, and he 
and Radhika have continued to extend their help and hospitality since then. 
I thank my parents for stimulating my inclination to study, and for not questioning how I spent 
my study time. Last and foremost I acknowledge the invaluable support of Jos Mooij, my partner in 
many endeavours. Without our companionship this research would probably never have taken place. 
Wageningen, 24 July 1998 
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ayacut 
bhatta 
CAD 
CADA 
cusec 
DES 
DOA 
DRLAD 
duty (in acres/cusec) 
GOAP 
GOHYD 
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GOI 
GOKAR 
GOMAD 
GOMYS 
GONOH 
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IIC 
IIMI 
ID 
jowar 
kabbu 
kharif 
KWDT 
Mandal Panchayat 
Mandal Pradhan 
MLA 
MP 
MOAI 
MOI 
MOIP 
MOWR 
PC 
PD 
PWD 
rabi 
sowcar 
taluk 
TBP 
TMCft. 
UI 
VCP 
Zilla Parishad 
irrigated or irrigable area 
rice (paddy) 
Command Area Development 
Command Area Development Authority 
cubic foot per second 
Directorate of Economics and Statistics 
Department of Agriculture 
Development and Rural Local Administration Department 
design parameter that indicates how many acres of a crop can be cultivated 
with a constant discharge of irrigation water of 1 cusec 
Government of Andhra Pradesh 
Government of Hyderabad 
member of the village elite/big man 
Government of India 
Government of Karnataka 
Government of Madras 
Government of Mysore 
Government of the Nizam of Hyderabad 
cotton 
Irrigation Consultative Committee 
Indian Irrigation Commission (of 1901-03) 
International Irrigation Management Institute 
Irrigation Department 
sorghum 
sugarcane 
first season of the agricultural year; starts May/June when the monsoon 
rains begin (mungaaru in Kannada) 
Krishna Water Disputes Tribunal 
elected council of a group of villages 
president of the Mandal Panchayat 
Member of the Legislative Assembly (State parliament) 
Member of Parliament (Union parliament) 
Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation 
Ministry of Irrigation 
Ministry of Irrigation and Power 
Ministry of Water Resources 
Planning Commission 
Planning Department 
Public Works Department 
second season of the agricultural year; starts August/September towards the 
end of the rainy season (hingaaru in Kannada) 
rich and influential farmer who is also a moneylender 
administrative subdivision of a district 
Tungabhadra Project 
Thousand Million Cubic feet 
Unauthorised Irrigation 
Violation of Cropping Pattern 
elected district council 
INTRODUCTION 
Raichur is not Hollywood, but it surely is a theatre of dramatic events. Eventfulness is a 
major attraction of research on water distribution in large scale canal irrigation systems. 
South India's protective irrigation systems are cases of scarcity by design, and the encounters 
of water, technology and people that take place in them, are often spectacular. A difference 
between a Hollywood waterfront and the one in Raichur District - the stage of this script -
is the absence of a happy end. There are no Marlon Brandos, or Raj Kumars, who come to 
the rescue of deprived tailenders. A simple dividing line between the 'good guys' and the 
'bad guys' also does not exist. We do find complex patterns of social interaction and 
struggle, by actors with multiple interests and divided loyalties, around the distribution of a 
resource crucial for agricultural production. The outcomes of this struggle have strong 
implications for the livelihoods of water users, their relations with each other and the 
governing institutions of the state, and the political, economic and agro-ecological dynamics 
of the region. If water distribution is a play, it is a deadly serious one. 
1.1 SUBJECT OF THE BOOK 
This book discusses irrigation water distribution in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal. This 
reservoir-fed canal system is located in Raichur District1*, Karnataka State, India (see map 
1.1). Part of interior South India, it is a drought prone area with low and erratic rainfall, that 
suffered from recurrent famines in the past.2) To protect rainfed crops against drought and 
the population against famine, a large scale irrigation system was constructed in Raichur 
District. The system is operational since 1953. By means of a 227 kilometers long main 
11
 From November 1997 Raichur district has been divided into two districts: Koppal district and 
Raichur district. When I refer to Raichur district in this book I mean the undivided district. 
21
 Average rainfall in the district is approximately 600 mm, varying between almost zero and 1300 
mm in different years. Rain mainly falls in the period May/June to September/October. The mean 
daily maximum temperature is 40°C in May and the mean daily minimum is 29°C in December. Peak 
temperatures in the summer months can go up to 45-46°C. Soils are mainly the moisture retentive 
'black cotton' soils (vertisols). Food crops grown in rainfed agriculture were predominantly coarse 
grains (sorghum and millet) and pulses. Cotton was the main commercial crop. See Mysore State 
Gazetteer (1970) for more background information on Raichur District and the Tungabhadra Left 
Bank Canal, including a list of famines. 
1 
2 ON THE WATERFRONT 
canal, 87 secondary canals called distributaries, and thousands of pipe outlet structures the 
system aims to spread water thinly over a command area of 240,000 hectares. 
The intended supply of small amounts of water to as many villages and farmers as 
possible has not materialised. Instead of single-season supplementary irrigation of crops like 
sorghum, millet and groundnut, there is a high incidence of double cropping and intensive 
irrigation of rice and sugarcane. The cultivation of these economically remunerative but very 
thirsty crops implies a highly unequal distribution of irrigation water and of the economic 
benefits of irrigated agriculture. The Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal is an extreme but not 
exceptional case of uneven agrarian development under irrigated conditions. 
Access to water, or more precisely, control over water allocation and distribution, is a, 
if not the, key variable in the pattern of agrarian change in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal 
command area. The description and analysis of the contestation of water control by the 
different people involved in irrigation forms the core of this book. This contestation takes 
place at different levels of the irrigation system (outlet, distributary, and main canal), and 
has technical/physical, organisational/managerial, as well as social, economic and political 
dimensions. An attempt is made to integrate these different levels and dimensions of water 
control into a single analysis. 
1.2 MAIN CONCERNS 
Two concerns are - thus - central to this book. The first, practical and specific concern is to 
understand what is happening in canal irrigation in South India in order to address the 
question how these systems can develop into more efficient and equitable operations. The 
second, academic and general concern is to contribute to the further development of 
interdisciplinary analysis of irrigation. The legitimation of this academic concern is again a 
practical one. I believe that an interdisciplinary approach is a necessary (but certainly not 
sufficient) condition for successful transformation of existing irrigation practices. 
Choosing this formulation, I explicitly locate this book in the science of irrigation as an 
applied field. In the final analysis, the purpose of the book is to seek solutions to real world 
problems, and not the erection of theories as an aim in itself. At the same time the book is 
highly critical of the 'normal professionalism' in irrigation, in which every discipline 
perpetuates its own problem definitions and its own standard solutions, without taking much 
notice of other perspectives (Chambers, 1988). 
Chambers' critique of irrigation professionalism still has great relevance, but some of the 
gaps in irrigation analysis have started to be filled since the publication of his book. A 
number of approaches and conceptual frameworks have been forwarded that take a more 
systemic look at irrigation. Examples are Uphoffs notion of socio-technical systems (Uphoff, 
1991), recent efforts to systematise performance assessment analysis (Small and Svendsen, 
1992), the* neo-institutional economics framework for understanding collective action in 
irrigation (Ostrom, 1990), and the inclusion, in many parts of the world, of institutional 
components in previously exclusively technical interventions (for India see for example 
Maloney and Raju, 1994; Sivamohan and Scott, 1994). These developments in theory and 
practice imply increased recognition of the multi-dimensionality of irrigation. 
It is the contention of this book that despite this movement towards more integrated 
approaches in the mainstream of irrigation studies, most frameworks fail to conceptually link 
the technical, organisational and socio-economic/political dimensions of irrigation 
satisfactorily. In chapter 2 this statement is substantiated through a discussion of three 
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Map 1.1: Location of the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal irrigation system in Raichur district, 
Karnataka State, India 
TUNGABHADRA PROJECT 
D93 D97 
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boundary 
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Source: Jurriens, Ramaiah and van Alphen (1988:23) (slightly adapted) 
conceptual problems in current approaches. These are: 
1) the treatment of irrigation technology as a black box in both social and technical 
science approaches to irrigation, 
2) the simplified concept of human agency commonly used in irrigation analyses, and 
3) the absence of a concept of social power in most analytical frameworks. 
An approach to remedy these defects is developed in the same chapter and elaborated in 
the rest of the book. The approach's conceptual focus is 'water control in sociotechnical 
systems'. Water control is defined as politically contested resource use. The critique and the 
alternative approach also reflect on models for irrigation intervention. The concept of 
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government-controlled planned intervention is questioned and a 'policy as process' 
perspective advocated instead. 
1.3 METHOD 
The method chosen to address the concerns outlined above is the intensive study of one 
particular case, the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal irrigation system (on the case study method 
see Yin, 1984). 
One reason to opt for the case study method were the characteristics of available studies 
on canal irrigation management in South Asia. There is ample documentation on how South 
Asian canal irrigation systems should be managed, and no dearth of reports listing the many 
problems that occur in canal irrigation systems. There are surprisingly few detailed and 
comprehensive studies on the way the systems are actually managed, operated and 
maintained, how these phenomena should be explained, and what the wider effects of these 
irrigation practices are.3) Policy initiatives for management reform in canal irrigation may 
as a result bear little relation to the practicalities of irrigation on the ground (or rather, on 
the canals). A larger number of 'grounded' studies could provide a more realistic basis for 
policy debates on the desired transformation of these systems. Within the given time frame 
of the research one intensive case study was the maximum achievable. 
Another reason to opt for the case study method was that this research ventured into 
relatively new and unknown terrain, both substantively and methodologically. The research 
was complex in different ways. Irrigation systems, particularly large ones, are by nature 
complex in the sense that they are composed of heterogenous elements, which are part of a 
whole structured through levels and in other ways. The research was complex in the sense 
of difficult because it wanted to study water control's different dimensions, implying a call 
on conceptual frameworks and methodologies from different disciplines. The causal 
connections that needed to be brought to the surface were, at least to this researcher, far 
from obvious. 
The research started at the local level with the investigation of water distribution in three 
tertiary units. These were units comparable in complexity and size with the small scale 
systems investigated earlier by the author and his colleagues.4' For reasons of intellectual 
stimulation, tertiary units were chosen in a head end and a tail end distributary of the system: 
distributaries 24 and 93, at a distance of about 100 kms apart.5> Units were chosen with 
some degree of water scarcity. The assumption was that social interaction would particularly 
31
 This study would not have been impossible without the existence of a number of studies that do 
approach the ideals of empirical 'thickness' and comprehensiveness. References are given in 
chapter 2. 
41
 The research for this book was based in the Irrigation and Water Engineering research group at 
Wageningen Agricultural University, the Netherlands. With regard to the investigation of water 
distribution practices, the group gained experience in smaller scale, farmer-managed irrigation 
during the 1980s (reported in Diemer and Slabbers, 1992 and Diemer and Huibers, 1996). My own 
experience was with small scale (20 ha) lift irrigation in the Senegal river valley, done together with 
Ton Meijers (Meijers and Mollinga, 1991). Colleagues who started to work in larger systems from 
a similar perspective in the late 1980s and early 1990s were van der Zaag (1992), van Bentum 
(1995) and Pradhan (1996). 
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 These numbers are the numbers of non-existing distributaries, but they indicate the approximate 
location of the distributaries in the system (see map 1.1). 
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be visible in situations of medium scarcity, and much less in situations of abundance or very 
severe scarcity (see Wade, 1988a; Uphoff, Wickramasinghe and Wijayaratna, 1990). Tertiary 
units were so selected that the group of water users consisted of 40 to 50 households in each 
of the two locations. Forty to fifty was a number considered large enough to be able to 
identify different categories of farmers/water users, and not too big to be researchable 
through intensive research (see Sayer, 1984 on the concept of intensive research). Tertiary 
units with a mixed population of local and settler farmers were selected. 
After basic insight in the situation in the tertiary units had been gained, the research 
moved up the canals. It followed the water and the water users from these units to division 
points along the canals, to the offices of Irrigation Department officials, to the houses of 
politicans, to the markets where farmers sell their produce, to the villages, to the shops of 
seed and fertiliser traders, and even to the halls of the Karnataka High Court and Parliament. 
The intention was to map as comprehensively as possible the set of practices, relations and 
institutions that the farmers from the tertiary units were engaged and embedded in, as far as 
these were relevant to understand water control.6' The inspiration by social-anthropological 
research techniques should be evident (see for example Long, 1989). 
A major methodological problem of this approach is located in the phrase 'as far as these 
were relevant to understand water control'. Without a fully developed conceptual model or 
substantive theory, and without much empirical data on comparable situations, the 
identification of relevant relations and phenomena was very time-consuming and stressful. 
In fact, far too much data was collected on some aspects, and perhaps not enough on others. 
More generally speaking, professionally oriented interdisciplinary research on irrigation 
has at least two gaps to bridge. The first is the conceptual gap between the technical and the 
social sciences, and the second is the gap between theory and practice, or knowledge and 
action. 
The first gap is most easily bridged. The research was designed like most academic work. 
It took a societal issue as its research object, but was not directly linked to intervention or 
change processes, and did not have the ambition to conclude with a set of prescriptions for 
action. It could fully focus on making conceptual contributions to further the cause of 
interdisciplinary irrigation science. 
Research designs that allow impartial and reflexive analysis have their merits, particularly 
in conflictuous contexts like water distribution, and in cases where the approach to 
intervention is part of the problem. However, this distance to the research object also makes 
it more difficult, if not impossible, to bridge the second gap, that between knowledge and 
action. This gap exists for all academic research that is designed as indicated above, but it 
is particularly acute in the case of interdisciplinary research. This risks to speak to none of 
the disciplines it seeks to integrate, in both the academic and the action oriented world.7) 
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 Because of time and scale reasons the evidence collected at the lower levels of the system is 
'thicker' and on higher levels it is 'thinner'. Going upwards, some of the institutions and practices 
were black-boxed to keep the fieldwork manageable. The order of presentation of the research 
material on water distribution runs parallel to the order of investigation. What has become invisible 
in the organisation of the book is that the conceptual framework was developed to a large extent 
while struggling with the empirical material, and not before it, as the chapter sequence now 
suggests. 
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 A typical mechanism in universities is that research groups with an interdisciplinary mandate are 
institutionally marginalised by giving them the same position as the disciplinary groups. They thus 
become, as it were, a new discipline. The pressures for this come from the other groups (an 
(continued...) 
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It also makes relatively large demands on the readers of the texts that it produces, because 
interdisciplinarity assumes familiarity with a number of professional and academic fields. 
By its size alone, a scholarly work of more than 300 pages can hardly be expected to have 
much of an impact on the reality that it describes and analyses. The gap between theory and 
practice can only be bridged by setting knowledge to work in concrete action. However, the 
desire to bridge the knowledge-action gap has affected the mode of presentation of this book. 
Except in chapter 2, I have tried to avoid the use of conceptual jargon in the main text. 
I have attempted to present the empirical material in a theoretically structured and coherent 
manner without labouring the theoretical underpinnings. I try to let the facts speak, while 
being aware that the facts never speak for themselves. 
In addition, the theoretical focus single-mindedly is the development and application of 
a conceptual framework for the interdisciplinary analysis of water distribution in canal 
irrigation. One of the problems in interdisciplinary research is the temptation to engage in 
and try to contribute to the disciplinary debates from which insights and concepts are 
eclectically drawn. I have tried to stay object-focused in theorisation and not to diverge into 
disciplinary preoccupations. I clarify my position in the different disciplinary fields where 
necessary, through references and short discussions in footnotes and boxes, and more 
generally in chapter 2. Theoretical conclusions can be found in the concluding sections of the 
empirical chapters and in the concluding chapter of the book. 
I hope that this way of dealing with theory and conceptual jargon has made the book more 
accessible to its main target group, irrigation professionals and students, than it would 
otherwise have been. 
1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK 
After this introduction, the book in chapter 2 opens with a discussion of the conceptual 
framework that it employs for its analysis. This discussion leads to the formulation of the 
central research question of the book. 
Chapter 2 not only provides the basis for the analyses presented subsequently, but is also 
an effort to summarise more generally the approach of the Wageningen-based research group 
to the study of the management and use processes in actually existing irrigation systems. In 
many respects, the ideas in it are the result of a collective learning process, rather than my 
own individual ideas. Obviously, this is not an effort to dodge responsibility for the content 
of the chapter. 
Then follow three contextual and historical chapters. In chapter 3 the phenomena of 
protection and localisation are discussed. Protection refers to the design characterictics of the 
large scale canal irrigation systems constructed in the dry areas of South Asia since colonial 
times. The chapter discusses the regionally specific forms that protection against drought and 
''(...continued) 
integration role is quickly perceived as an overseeing and evaluation role) and from the 
interdisciplinary groups themselves (the need to consolidate work space that was often acquired 
with great difficulty). Examples are departments of gender studies and technology and development 
groups. Mechanisms in the action oriented world can be derived from Chambers' discussion of 
normal professionalism (Chambers, 1988). One of the conclusions that I have drawn from this is 
that transformation towards interdisciplinarity has to start from within the disciplines rather than 
be advocated from the outside. 
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famine has taken. It situates the case study and suggests its wider relevance. Localisation is 
the form of government land use planning that was tried in South India to control water use 
(and secure its spread) by means of legal-administrative control of the cropping pattern in 
irrigation systems. Insight in the features and failure of localisation are essential to 
understand present water distribution problems. 
Chapter 4 discusses the different steps and phases in the evolution of the idea to construct 
a large scale irrigation system in the Tungabhadra valley. This story starts in the mid-19th 
century. The chapter discusses the long-drawn negotiation of the main design characteristics 
of the system, which include its location, total available water, the size of the command area, 
the cropping pattern to be adopted and the alignment of the main canal. 
In chapter 5 the socio-economic context of water distribution is discussed. The chapter 
shows the quite dramatic impact of irrigation on agricultural development in Raichur district 
(expansion, intensification and commoditisation). The settlement of farmers from the coastal 
areas of neighbouring Andhra Pradesh is discussed in some detail because of its importance 
for the process of growth and social differentiation. After the presentation of a typology of 
farming households-enterprises, the chapter concludes with a discussion of the geographical 
dimensions of access to water and social differentiation at pipe outlet command area and 
distributary level. 
These three contextual and historical chapters serve as background and introduction to the 
core of the book, the analysis of water distribution practices at different levels in chapters 
6 to 9. In chapter 6 the reproduction of unequal water distribution at pipe outlet command 
area (tertiary unit) level is discussed for each of the three outlet command areas that were 
investigated. The chapter identifies some of the mechanisms through which rich and middle 
peasants manage to reproduce their dominance over small and poor peasants. Water 
distribution relations are interlinked with credit and employment relations, in which small and 
poor peasants have dependent positions. But, this relation is two-sided and leaves some room 
to manoeuvre for the deprived. 
Water distribution practices at distributary level are discussed in two chapters. In chapter 
7 the institutional dimensions of water distribution are the focus. The chapter discusses the 
different organisational forms, particularly rotation schedules at distributary and 
subdistributary level, for the mediation water of scarcity. It also looks at the strategies of 
different actors involved - farmers, Irrigation Department staff and politicians - to cope with 
the struggle over scarce water. 
In chapter 8 the focus is the irrigation distribution technology, particularly the design and 
construction of the pipe outlet structures that connect the distributary canals with the farmers' 
fields in the tertiary unit. This point of contact is analysed as the contested material interface 
of water users and the state. It is argued that the interactions of these groups shape as well 
as are shaped by the technical characteristics of the distribution device. 
The last chapter on water distribution practices is chapter 9. It is located at the main canal 
level. The chapter describes the changing arrangements for distribution of water in the main 
canal over the four main canal management divisions. It discusses institutional responses 
within the irrigation bureaucracy to scarcity at main canal. It shows that irrigation 
bureaucracies may be more flexible and prone to change than images of rigid hierarchical 
empires tend to suggest. But at the same time it shows that the problem to achieve 
institutional change at this level remains quite enormous. 
In the concluding chapter, chapter 10, the main focus is management reform in protective 
irrigation. The chapter first discusses the constraints and opportunities for management 
reform that can be derived from the analysis in preceding chapters. This discussion is also 
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a summary answer to the central research question. After that the different perspectives that 
exist on the need for management reform and the problems that need to be solved are 
discussed. The third entry into the management reform issue is a discussion of the process 
of irrigation reform policy formulation and implementation in Karnataka. The chapter and 
the book conclude with a research agenda for management reform. 
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Conceptual groundwork for interdisciplinary irrigation studies 
The objective of this chapter is to provide the conceptual basis for the analysis of water 
distribution practices in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal in subsequent chapters. The 
chapter is also an attempt to present a theoretical starting point for interdisciplinary analysis 
of irrigation more generally. Interdisciplinarity in this book particularly refers to the 
integration of technical and social science perspectives on irrigation. 
Theoretical endeavours to develop conceptual frameworks usually start with detailed 
reviews of the literature in the field. I will not present such a review here because a number 
of reviews that identify the gaps and limitations of the irrigation literature already exist (see 
for example Chambers, 1988; Jurriens and de Jong, 1989). Recently, Ramamurthy wrote a 
review of the irrigation literature from a perspective very close to the one adopted in this 
book (Ramamurthy, 1995). Moreover, her review underpins a study of irrigation practices 
in a South Indian canal irrigation system. There is no need to repeat her excellent 
contribution. 
A general conclusion that can be drawn from these reviews and critiques is that there seem 
to be very few bridges across the gap between the technical and social irrigation sciences. 
A more appropriate metaphor for the connection between the two disciplinary shores would 
be that of a ferry, across a river with hazardous currents, allowing only intermittent presence 
on either side, but no continuous traffic and intermingling of ideas. More plainly put, I want 
to suggest that an interdisciplinary approach to irrigation requires a critique of some of the 
main theoretical premises of the professional irrigation literature, and, to a lesser extent, of 
some of the academic irrigation literature's premises (the distinction is explained below). The 
premises I have in mind are the following. 
1. The conceptualisation of technology. 
2. The understanding of human agency and practice. 
3. The (absence of a) concept of social power. 
A consequence of this evaluation of the irrigation literature is that in order to develop an 
interdisciplinary framework for irrigation studies it is necessary to draw on a number of 
literatures that have very little to do with irrigation. In this chapter I will liberally perform 
such acts of appropriation. 
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Section 2.1 gives a summary evaluation of the professional irrigation literature as an 
introduction to the rest of the chapter. In the remaining sections I outline the conceptual basis 
of the approach used in this book. Section 2.2 argues that irrigation systems are inherently 
sociotechnical systems and therefore require a sociotechnical approach for their analysis. On 
the basis of that discussion I design a descriptive model of irrigation systems as structurally 
embedded irrigation activities at different system levels (section 2.3). The concept of practice 
discussed in section 2.4 theoretically elaborates the notion of irrigation activities. The 
discussion provides a set of operational concepts, based on a particular concept of human 
agency, for the concrete investigation of the day-to-day happenings in sociotechnical 
irrigation systems. In section 2.5 the main concept of the book is introduced: water control. 
Three dimensions of it are identified: technical, organisational, and socio-economic/political. 
Through a discussion of the concept of social power water control is defined as a case of 
politically contested resource use. In section 2.61 formulate and discuss the central research 
question of the book. It is the first step away from the general conceptual discussion in the 
preceding sections towards substantive theory on the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal case. In 
section 2.7 1 conclude the chapter with a description of the structure of the book in terms of 
the central research question. 
2.1 THE PROFESSIONAL IRRIGATION LITERATURE: A SUMMARY 
EVALUATION 
With professional irrigation literature I refer to three bodies of intellectual work: the 
irrigation engineering, irrigation economics and irrigation management literatures. The 
adjective professional derives from the close linkage of these three literatures with donor and 
government funded irrigation practice and intervention." An alternative description would 
therefore be the intervention or action-oriented literature. 
The irrigation engineering literature is mostly disciplinary work on the hydraulics of 
canals and structures, construction engineering, crop water requirements, irrigation 
efficiencies, and other topics.2* 
Economics, particularly neo-classical economics, has always been very important in 
government-sponsored and government-managed irrigation. In colonial times it was used to 
calculate the financial returns to government investment in irrigation (see chapter 3). It is 
now similarly used for calculating benefit/cost ratios and internal rates of return to evaluate 
the feasibility of irrigation projects, and the role of irrigation in economic development.31 
More recently the discipline of economics has become more important in the field of 
11
 Examples are the Water Management Synthesis Project in Pakistan, the Command Area 
Development (CAD) programme in India, and the National Irrigation Agency (NIA) experience in the 
Philippines. The location of the International Irrigation Management Institute (IIMI) in the CGIAR 
(Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research) network, and the location of IPTRID (the 
International Programme on Technology Research in Irrigation and Drainage) - till recently - in the 
World Bank also illustrate the intervention orientation and donor association. For critical discussion 
of some of the implications of the strong intervention and donor orientation, see Bloemen and de 
Moor (1983) and Heybroek and Witter (1981). 
21
 Indian irrigation textbooks that cover these issues and which are used in this book are Ellis (1950) 
and Mahbub and Gulhati (1951). 
31
 The size of the irrigation economics literature is substantial. For India see Dhawan (1988) and 
Bharadwaj (1990) for an overview and references. 
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irrigation studies through the use of approaches like rent seeking analysis and game theory 
for understanding institutional processes (Repetto, 1986; Ostrom, 1990). 
The irrigation management literature has emerged since the 1970s as a response to the 
disappointing performance of the irrigation systems that were newly constructed in the 1950s 
and 1960s in a massive wave of irrigation investment (for a review focusing on South Asia, 
see Chambers, 1988). In the 1970s and early 1980s most attention went to the organisation 
of water distribution and maintenance and the organisation of water users in water users 
associations at the local, tertiary unit or outlet command area level. More recently main 
system management and the irrigation bureaucracies have also become a focus in research. 
Performance assessment is now a main theme, linked to irrigation management transfer and 
decentralisation, and the introduction of market principles (volumetric pricing, tradable water 
rights) in management. Here there is a strong link with irrigation economics.4' 
In addition to the professional irrigation literature there is what could be called a more 
academic literature on irrigation. It is much less linked to irrigation intervention practices. 
I refer to historical, geographical, social-anthropological, political-economic and other studies 
on irrigation, aiming to understand ongoing processes more than directly desiring to change 
them.5' An alternative, but not very elegant description would be the understanding-oriented 
irrigation literature. These studies are usually independently conducted by universities and 
research institute staff. Though there are definitely linkages between the 'professional' and 
the 'academic' literatures on irrigation (both in persons and in ideas), they have to a large 
extent remained two separate worlds. 
Summarised at the most general level, my criticism of the premises of the professional 
irrigation literature consists of three points.6' 
1) The treatment of technology as a black-box. This means that engineers as well as social 
scientists tend to consider technology as something that may be used or abused, but which 
is inherently neutral. Irrigation engineers tend to be unaware of and/or uninterested in the 
way technologies are shaped by and in their turn shape institutional and other social 
relations. The little space the 'social perspective' has found in the irrigation engineering 
debate is in the discussion of technology-management interactions (for discussion see 
Horst, 1996; Levine, 1980; Pradhan, 1996). But opening the black box of irrigation 
technology is a much broader exercise, as will become clear below. An appreciation of 
41
 See for example Murray-Rust and Snellen, 1993; Nijman, 1993; Rosegrant and Binswanger, 
1994; Small and Svendsen, 1992; Vermillion, 1996. 
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 For India, such academic studies include - focusing on canal irrigation - Gorter (n.d), Jairath 
(1984), Pandian (1990), Ramamurthy (1995), van Schendel (1991), Sengupta (1991), Stone 
(1984), Wade (1988a) and Whitcombe (1972). 
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 I limit myself to ontological points, that is premisses regarding the nature of irrigation reality. I 
leave aside the epistemological and methodological premiss of the dominantly positivist approach 
to investigation and explanation in the professional irrigation literature. For a critique of positivism 
see Sayer (1984). There is an emerging debate in India between different methodological 
paradigms, as dominant in economics and social anthropology (see Bardhan, 1989). For irrigation 
in India, the first occasion that I know of where these contrasting paradigms were (largely 
implicitly) discussed, was the 1995 conference in Madras on 'The political economy of water in 
South Asia. Policy problems and proposals'. Explicit formulations of the listed points of criticism 
are found mostly in the work of people working at the interface of the professional and academic 
spheres. Some references are given below. 
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the social dimensions of technology is generally also absent in the economics and 
management professional literature on irrigation.7* 
2) A limited concept of human agency. With concept of human agency I refer to the basic 
idea about what motivates people's behaviour, and how that behaviour should be analysed. 
In the irrigation economics and management literature the concept of human agency is 
usually that of the utility maximiser or optimiser and the rational decision maker, 
weighing the costs and benefits of alternative choices. In contrast to this I suggest that* 
human behaviour is a much more complex affair, which requires less idealised and* 
simplified models".*1 
3) The absence of the social relations of power. Institutional and other social relations are 
seldomly perceived as relations of power in the professional irrigation discourse. Human 
relations and institutions are thought of in assumedly more neutral terms like 
(ineffectiveness, (inefficiency and (ir)rationality.9) Social interaction is often modelled 
as decision-making (Nijman, 1993) or communication (Scheer, 1996), without 
incorporation of notions like interests, conflict and struggle. In contrast I argue that social 
power is a crucial element in understanding relations among people (and between people 
and things for that matter)..This book tries to show that the technological and institutional 
forms of water distribution must be understood as the embodiment of particular 
configurations of power relations.10* 
In part of the academic irrigation literature the second and third points are quite 
commonplace, and this literature can therefore be usefully employed to enrich the 
professional irrigation debate. The first point, on technology, is the more problematic one. 
In most academic studies of irrigation, technology is equally treated as a black box.u> I will 
devote considerable space to the argument that this cripples attempts at a comprehensive 
understanding of irrigation. 
In the following sections the validity of this critique will be argued for in reverse so to 
speak. I outline a framework which incorporates the three criticisms given above. I suggest 
that the presented framework allows more comprehensive analysis of irrigation situations. 
The proof of that pudding lies in the reading of the full book. 
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 See for example Diemer and Huibers (1996) for a summary critique of the the professional 
irrigation literature on this point. Also see Diemer and Slabbers (1992). 
81
 See for example Anderson (1980) and Giddens (1984) for general discussion of the concept of 
human agency. For a discussion of concepts of human agency used in performance assessment 
models, see Mollinga (1994). For critiques of neo-classical and neo-institutional economics 
regarding their concepts of human agency, methodological individualism and the failure to analyse 
social relations of power see Bardhan (1991), Callinicos (1987), Hodgson (1988) and Sen (1977). 
Also see Zey (1992). For critiques of the neo-classical economy approach to irrigation/water 
resources see Green (1996) and Morris (1996). 
91
 For a review of Indian irrigation economics making this point, see Bharadwaj (1990). She argues 
for the development of a 'social relations perspective' in Indian irrigation economics. Dhawan 
(1993) is a very critical discussion of Bharadwaj's review. 
101
 For general critiques of the irrigation literature which incorporate one or more of the three points 
discussed, also see Manzungu and van der Zaag (1996), Sengupta (1985) and Vincent (1997). 
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 An example of this is Attwood (1985), to which Bolding, Mollinga and van Straaten (1995) was 
written as a response. In the South Asian context Wade is one of the few social science irrigation 
analysts who addresses the technology issue (see Wade, 1990). Also see Pfaffenberger (1988) and 
Sengupta (1993). 
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technologies not only mediate people's relationships with bio-physical processes, but also 
shape the people-people relationships that are part of irrigation.14' The social dimensions 
can be specified in three points: social requirements for use, social construction and social 
effects. 
Social requirements for use 
Irrigation technologies put demands on the management structure of the irrigation system in 
which they are used. To illustrate this point for large canal systems, the device by means of 
which water is 'handed over' from the irrigation agency managing the main system to 
farmers managing the local irrigation units, can be taken as an example. 
The outlet or division structures that connect the main system and the local irrigation unit 
can be designed in different ways. These different designs allow different types of operation 
and regulation of supply. Fixed, non-adjustable structures are easy to handle, require no 
water level measurements, cannot easily be mismanaged, require few management staff, but 
have low operational flexibility and, at least on paper, lead to low water-use efficiencies. 
Gradually adjustable structures on the other hand are complex to handle, require regular 
water level measurements, can easily be tampered with, require high staffing levels, but have 
high operational flexibility, and, at least in theory, lead to high water-use efficiencies (see 
Horst, 1987). The design of the outlet structure thus shapes the management structure. 
This point can be theoretically formulated and generalised by stating that irrigation 
technologies have social requirements for use.15) This means that particular social conditions 
have to be fulfilled for the technologies to work effectively, and that different technologies 
require different enabling conditions. 
Social construction 
Irrigation technologies are developed and designed with particular forms of cooperation and 
management in mind. The purposes that technologies have to serve, and the institutional 
forms through which these purposes should be achieved, are reflected in the technical design 
characteristics of irrigation artefacts. Two historical examples regarding canal irrigation are 
the genesis of the Romijn outlet structure in the colonial period in the Dutch East Indies to 
protect the interests of the sugar planters (ter Hofstede and van Santbrink, 1979), and the 
search for tamper-proof modular outlets in British India in order to introduce market 
principles and volumetric supply in water distribution in canal irrigation (Bolding, Mollinga 
and van Straaten, 1995).16) 
This point can be theoretically formulated and generalised by stating that irrigation 
technologies are socially constructed. This means that (i) technology development and design 
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 People-people relations are an inherent part of irrigation because irrigation systems in most cases 
involve more than one user. Cooperation among users, and often of users and government or other 
agencies' personnel, is necessary to make use of the infrastructure. Even in single-user cases like 
individual well irrigation, there is interdependence of different individual users at the regional or 
watershed level. This becomes clear when over-extraction of groundwater takes place. 
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 For this and the following two concepts see Mollinga and Mooij (1989) and Kloezen and Mollinga 
(1992). Lacroix (1981:162) and van der Ploeg (1991:108) use the French term mode d'emploi, 
which expresses the same meaning as social requirements for use. 
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 Other examples of social construction of irrigation technology can be found in van Bentum 
(1992, 1995), de Bont (1992), Dia et al. (1996), Froentjes and de Ruiter (1991), Gerbrandy and 
Hoogendam (1996), Horst (1996), Maat and Mollinga (1994) and Meijers (1992). Also see 
Pfaffenberger (1988). 
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are social processes in which different stakeholders interact (communicate, negotiate, take 
decisions, struggle, etcetera), and (ii) that the nature of that process and the different 
perceptions and interests of the stakeholders shape the technical characteristics of the 
technologies (together with the properties of the materials used and the nature of the 
(bio)physical mechanisms involved). 
Social effects 
The third way in which irrigation technologies are social objects is most simply put by stating 
that irrigation technologies have social effects. Through its effects on crop production, 
people's health and other things, irrigation affects people's livelihoods.17' These effects are 
technology-dependent. For example, irrigation allows more intensive cropping systems, and 
may thus generate economic growth and employment. Individually controlled sprinkler 
irrigation systems enabling intensive cultivation of horticultural crops will have different 
growth and employment effects than continuous flow gravity canal systems spreading water 
thinly for supplementary irrigation of foodgrains like sorghum and millet. Another example 
is that some types of irrigation allow the spread of an important resource over large numbers 
of people and may therefore be important tools for politicians to reproduce political support 
in their constituencies. The latter is one of the crucial features of protective irrigation systems 
(see chapters 3 and 7). 
These three concepts, the social requirements for use, social construction and social effects 
of irrigation technology, provide the basis for a definition of irrigation systems as 
sociotechnical systems.18' A comprehensive understanding of irrigation requires addressing 
both dimensions simultaneously, and not consecutively and separately, as is usually done. 
The absence of a hyphen between socio and technical is deliberate. 
2.3 A DESCRIPTIVE MODEL OF IRRIGATION SYSTEMS 
After establishing the sociotechnical nature of irrigation systems, I now turn my attention to 
the question how these systems can be modelled. It can be deduced from the discussion above 
that irrigation systems consists of a heterogeneous set of elements, and that they need to be 
studied in context. The questions that need to be addressed are the following. 
1) What are the constituent elements of irrigation systems and what are the relations between 
them? 
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 For discussion of a 'livelihood perspective' on irrigation, see Chambers (1994). Also see Guijt 
and Thompson (1994), who make the additional point that water is supplied not only to crops and 
people, but also to landscapes. This brings the issue of the ecological sustainability of irrigation into 
focus. The best known debates on the social effects of irrigation are that on the so called green 
revolution (Anderson et a/,, 1982; Byres, 1981; Harriss, 1985) and, more recently that on the 
effects of large dam projects (Dhawan, 1990; Singh, 1997). 
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 The term sociotechnical is most appropriate at the irrigation system level. At the watershed level 
it would perhaps be more appropriate to speak of a socio-natural system (Bennett, 1990) or a 
socio-ecological system (Gallopin, 1994, quoted in Singh and Titi, 1995:18, footnote 1). At the 
level of the farm the term socio-agronomical system might be used. On social agronomy, see 
Chayanov (1925) and van der Ploeg (1993), and for an application in irrigated agriculture, van 
Bentum (1995: chapters 8 and 9). This book discusses irrigation at the irrigation system level, and 
not at the watershed or catchment and farming system level. 
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2) How does the 'context' in which these systems function affect the irrigation activities 
going on within the systems (and vice versa)l 
A labour process perspective 
My starting point for answering these questions lies outside the domain of irrigation. More 
than a century ago Marx undertook to analyse how the 'forces of production' and the 
'relations of production' were connected to each other in capitalist manufacturing and 
industry, and how this interrelation structured societal change. He developed a general 
concept of the labour process in which both the technical and the social elements of 
production found a place. He proposed that every labour process, that is every human 
activity aiming to produce a useful product, consisted of three elements: (i) the personal 
activity of man, i.e. work itself, (ii) the subject of that work, and (Hi) its instruments (Marx, 
1977/1867:chapter 7). 
When we regard an irrigation system as a labour process with the objective to bring water 
from A to B in order to grow agricultural crops, Marx's elements can be translated and 
represented as in figure 2.1 (additional elements of labour process theory are referred to in 
section 2.6). 
Figure 2.1 Elements of irrigation 
water 
as a labour process 
/ people / \ [ forms of } 
\ organisation / 
irrigation \ 
technology I 
Irrigation activities 
The triangle of people, technologies and water summarises in a single formula all activities 
that take place in irrigation systems. Further operationalisation is possible by looking in more 
detail at exactly which activities are part of irrigation. Uphoff has provided a useful and 
comprehensive description of irrigation activities. He distinguishes three types, each 
subdivided into four activities: control structure activities (design, construction, operation, 
maintenance), water use activities (acquisition, allocation, distribution, drainage); and 
organisational activities (decision making, resource mobilisation, communication, conflict 
management) (Uphoff, 1986:38-40, 42). Other classifications of activities and processes in 
irrigation are also available (see Chambers, 1988; Huppert, 1989). The exact classification 
one favours depends on the purpose of the analysis in which it is used, and the overall 
approach to irrigation. The general point is that irrigation consists of many different activities 
that need to be executed in combination. 
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System levels 
A further element of the descriptive conceptualisation of irrigation systems is that they consist 
of a number of levels. Hydraulically, irrigation systems are made up of different levels of 
canals, which are connected by the outlet and division structures discussed above. Figure 2.2 
shows differences among irrigation systems in terms of their number of levels. 
The levels-model can be extended upward by seeing irrigation systems as parts of a 
watershed, and watersheds as parts of regional, continental and world wide agro-ecological 
systems. Downward the model can be extended by including the different levels of the 
drainage system, from field drain to ocean. In short, the whole hydrological cycle can be 
seen as a system with many levels.19' 
Figure 2.2: Levels in irrigation systems 
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The sociotechnical point is that these levels are not only hydraulic or ecological levels, 
but also social levels. At each of the levels there are different institutions in relation to water 
flow at that level. These range from national and international policy making and legislation, 
to collective action at canal system level, to intra-household cooperation in field irrigation. 
The social levels are organisationally linked just like hydraulic levels are technically and 
physically linked. For example, the connection of a secondary and a tertiary canal is not only 
a division structure with gates and locks, but also the person of the water distributor, who 
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 The hydrological cycle is actually a circulation system with different 'compartments'. The levels 
metaphor applies when only part of the cycle is considered. 
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may have different institutional attributes in relation to his or her appointment and payment 
by and accountability to farmers, the government, or other irrigation agencies. 
The notion of levels as relatively autonomous domains of irrigation activity invites the 
application of systems theoretical approaches to irrigation. There have however been very 
few applications of systems theory to irrigation that attempt to capture its sociotechnical 
complexity. One of the conceptual (and practical) issues is that there is no simple coincidence 
of hydraulic and social levels. How these precisely interconnect, and how their intersection 
is the subject of renegotiation in irrigation activities, is an empirical question, and not one 
of theoretical assumptions.20' 
The context 
As noted above, irrigation activities are not self-contained, isolated activities, but they are 
part of wider processes. Irrigation activities as we encounter them in practice have a number 
of conditions of possibility. With conditions of possibility I refer to the circumstances that 
enable the conduct of irrigation activities. 
There are material and social conditions of possibility. The rainfall pattern and soil 
fertility are examples of material conditions of possibility. We notice this when rain does not 
fall and rivers and groundwater aquifers dry up, or when soils become saline or suffer from 
erosion. Other examples are the existence of passable roads in the irrigation system in order 
to make gate adjustment and other management activities possible, and working telephones 
to make frequent communication between different administrative divisions in the system 
feasible. When the right material conditions are not fulfilled, irrigation as usual can no longer 
take place. 
There are also many social conditions of possibility. Some examples are the following. 
* A farmer who uses a pumpset to lift groundwater to his fields can only do this when he 
has a right to put a pumpset in his field, and extract water from the groundwater aquifer 
below it. This right is part of the legal system of property rights in a society (for a legal-
anthropological perspective on law and property rights, see Benda-Beckmann and van der 
Velde, 1992). 
* When water is very expensive farmers may use it judiciously, while they may not be very 
particular about water use efficiency when it comes free of cost. The price of water 
depends on several factors, among them government water pricing policy (see for example 
Shah, 1993 and Moench, 1994). 
* When farmers who happen to have land in the same irrigation system need to cooperate 
to distribute water among themselves, this may be easier or more difficult depending on 
differences in class, caste, gender, ethnic and other social relations (for references see 
chapter 5). 
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 One recent attempt to develop a comprehensive model of irrigation systems is Small and 
Svendsen's model of irrigation as a whole consisting of nested subsystems (the irrigation, irrigated 
agriculture, agricultural economic, rural economic and politico-economic subsystems), relating to 
each other through inputs and outputs (Small and Svendsen, 1992). The model seems to be 
influential. It appears on the cover of the guidelines for preparation of operational plans for irrigation 
systems in India (INCID, 1994). Elsewhere I have discussed the limitations of this type of modelling 
(Mollinga, 1994). Two problems are the ontological separation of the different subsystems and the 
fixity of their boundaries. 
CONCEPTUAL GROUNDWORK 19 
The different conditions of possibility for irrigation activities can be generically classified 
in three categories.21' 
1) The agro-ecological system and technical infrastructure (climate, weather, vegetation, 
soil, topography, technologies other than the irrigation system itself). 
2) The agrarian structure (markets for labour, land, technology, credit, inputs and outputs, 
and social relations like class, gender, ethnicity, religion, caste and kinship at household, 
village/community and other levels). 
3) The state and the institutions of civil society (government line agencies like the Irrigation 
Department, the legal system, policy making institutions, development NGOs, social 
movements, education and training institutes, international donor and lending agencies, 
local government institutions, and others). 
The discussion above is summarised in figure 2.3 which gives a graphical representation 
of structurally embedded irrigation activities. 
Figure 2.3: Irrigation activities in context 
FOO = forms of organisation 
T = technology 
The descriptive model, summarised in figure 2.3, gives a partial answer to the two 
questions posed at the beginning of this section. It identifies the constituent elements of 
irrigation systems, the activities that take place in them, the levels at which these occur, and 
it gives a generic classification of the elements of the context in which the systems function. 
No theoretical claims are attached to this classification. See section 2.6 for more discussion. 
J 
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The descriptive model is a static model because it does not elucidate the nature of the 
relationships between the elements, activities and levels, and how these shape each other. 
How to understand the dynamics of irrigation systems is outlined below in two steps. The 
first is to look at irrigation systems as embedded practices, and to explicate the concept of 
practice. The second step is to introduce the concept of water control. 
2.4 IRRIGATION AS A PRACTICE 
An explication of the concept of practice provides the first part of a framework for analysing 
the sociotechnical structure and dynamics of irrigation activities in irrigation systems. I start 
with a definition of the concept, after which it is operationalised.22> 
"The production or constitution of society is a skilled accomplishment of its members 
(...)" says Giddens (1976:102). This skillful product emerges through "regularised types of 
acts", that is, human practices (ibid.:15). Practices are thus what people do, in a structured, 
and structuring, fashion. Social interaction is the type of practice in which people encounter 
each other. 
The concept of practice provides a practical programme for investigation of actually 
existing irrigation, and it will be used as such in this book. It also contains a number of basic 
propositions on the nature of human agency and social interaction. These propositions are not 
themselves the subject of theorisation in this book. They are presented in some detail below 
because the adopted perspective is not commonly used in irrigation studies. In four 
subsections I discuss the characteristics of the human behaviour that drive practices, the 
means mobilised to conduct them, where practices take place, and how they are structured 
and what is at stake in them. 
Human agency 
Implicit in the definition of practice given above is a concept of human agency which says 
that people are knowledgeable and capable actors. People are active players in creating new 
social and material environments, even when they have to operate within a context that is 
only partially of their own making, and with motivations that are only partly conscious 
(Giddens, 1984:chapter 2; Bourdieu, 1977:chapter 2; also see Long, 1989). 
It is not unimportant to stress the knowledgeability and capability of the actors involved 
in large scale canal irrigation management. Water users are not infrequently described as 
illiterate, uneducated and wasteful. Irrigation officials are often talked about in pejorative 
terms as well, as being unmotivated, poorly trained and corrupt. Such a perspective on the 
main players in water management hardly allows serious consideration of their actions, skills, 
concerns and perspectives. It hinders both analysis of water management as it actually 
occurs, and the grounding of interventions on such analysis. 
The knowledgeability and capability of people does not mean they can do what they like 
(or like what they like, as Bourdieu, 1977 stresses). Actors are always positioned (and 
positioning themselves) in a particular context. The relationships in which an actor finds 
him/herself both constrain and enable his/her possibilities for action. Social position also 
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 In the technical irrigation discourse practice is sometimes used as 'water application practices', 
with surface irrigation, sub-irrigation and overhead irrigation as the basic categories (Withers and 
Vipond, 1974:35). This is not the meaning adopted here. The term is sometimes also used to 
describe the theory of irrigation or water distribution practices, rather than actually existing 
practices, or the two are not clearly separated (see for example contributions in IWRS, 1 982). 
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refers to the set of dispositions of actors. Bourdieu describes these as "a subjective but not 
individual system of internalised structures, schemes of perception, conception and action" 
(Bourdieu, 1977:86). The disposition concept tries to link the external conditions and internal 
motivations of action.23' 
Again this is not an unimportant point to make in irrigation studies. Strongly dominant in 
social science approaches to irrigation is the perspective from economics of people as 
individual utility maximisers (see section 2.1 above). Farmers are often portrayed as profit 
maximisers, irrigation officials increasingly as rent maximisers. These are images of rather 
one-dimensional men in a world of individuals where positioning is regulated through the 
(imperfect) market. Studies like those of Merrey on the role of izzat (honour) in Pakistan 
Punjab's local irrigation organisation, and van der Zaag's study on the behaviour and 
strategies of the canalero (water guard) in a Mexican canal system, show that people's 
position in water management is a much more complicated affair (Merrey, 1983; van der 
Zaag, 1992). The rationality of actors' behaviour cannot be reduced to a single variable. 
Strategies and resources 
What practices are and what human agents do can be illuminated by several additional 
concepts. The first is that of strategy. People devise plans to achieve their objectives. As 
Giddens points out, the analysis of social interaction is the "analysis of strategic conduct", 
focusing on "strategies of control within defined contextual boundaries" (Giddens, 1984:288-
293). A large part of this book is devoted to the analysis of strategic action of the different 
actors involved in water management in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal. This includes the 
activities of farmers 'above the outlet' (Chambers, 1988), the management styles of the 
Irrigation Department canal level officials, and the role of politicians as resource brokers. 
Actors employ resources in their strategic conduct. People use particular means to achieve 
their ends. Callon aptly calls the resources that people mobilise and deploy intermediaries 
(Callon, 1992). Intermediaries are the things that a person puts between him/herself and the 
objects and other persons s/he wants to relate to. Callon classifies the different types of 
intermediaries in four categories: 1) texts (language, policy documents, administrative forms, 
manuals and textbooks, laws, ordinances, etcetera), 2) artefacts (material objects, including 
technologies), 3) people, and 4) money. 
For physical relationships the concept of intermediaries is easy to understand. When an 
irrigator wants to regulate a water flow in a stream or canal or on his/her field, s/he puts 
artefacts like weirs, drops, division structures, pipes, siphons, pumps and/or sprinkler 
installations between him/herself and the water. The relationship between people and water 
is mediated by technologies. 
Such mediation also exists in the case of social relationships. For example when a farmer 
wants to communicate with a government irrigation official to improve water supply, s/he 
may talk to the official personally, speak with him/her on the telephone, offer to pay the 
official a bribe, write the official a letter or petition, file a case against the 
official/department at the local court, or ask a local politician to exert pressure on the 
official. 
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 For further discussion see Giddens (1984:chapter 2) and Bourdieu (1977:chapter 2). Also see 
Haraway (1991) on 'situated actors'. The concept of lifeworld is close to that of dispositions (Long, 
1989). For application of these ideas to irrigation see Diemer (1990), Ubels (1989), van der Zaag 
(1992) and Scheer (1996). 
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In these different instances of communication and interaction the intermediaries are 
different. When the farmers talks to the official personally the intermediary is language: the 
spoken word. When they talk on the telephone the technology of the telephone system is the 
additional intermediary. In the case of bribe payment the intermediaries are language and 
money. When writing a letter, written text and the postal service are the intermediaries. The 
court case brings in several people as intermediaries like police officers, advocates and 
judges. The politician who can influence the behaviour of government officials is another 
example of a person acting as an intermediary. The intermediary in the relationship between 
the farmer and the politician may be the vote at election time, and that between the politician 
and the official, the former's power over the latter's transfer (Wade, 1982a). The 
intermediaries in the transfer relation are texts (administrative rules for example) and money 
(payments by officials to politicians to influence their transfer for example). 
Arenas and domains of interaction 
Practices take place in arenas. Arena is a metaphor more than an analytical concept. It wants 
to convey the image of the spectacle of daily life going on in delimited social, spatial and 
time 'areas'. These areas may conceptually more precisely be described as domains of 
interaction (Villarreal, 1994). These are "(...) areas of social life wherein practices are 
routinely organised within specific locales and where certain authorities, values and identities 
are recognised, reproduced and transformed." (ibid.:59) Further description of the concept 
can be found in box 2.2. 
Box 2.2: Domains of interaction 
"Activities within domains involve a heterogeneity of relationships -that could be labeled 
political, economic, religious or emotional- and they intertwine power relations that draw upon 
diverse normative frames." (Villarreal, 1994:59) 
"Interaction within a domain is usually focused around certain activities (...), or it can centre 
around the functioning of an institution (...)." (ibid.59) 
"The notion of domain, as I see it, is more concrete [than Bourdieu's concept of field]. It 
implies a quite precise location in time and space, it entails linkages to institutions, and it 
involves specific actors who engage in particular struggles. (...) Interaction within a domain 
(...) entails specific links to institutions, resources, relevant outsiders, and to diverse projects. 
It is within these areas of social life that power networks are created and strategies are 
repressed, channelled or isolated. Within domains of interaction practices of control and 
authority are given form and legitimated and normative frames are transformed in accordance 
with shared understandings. But because we are speaking of interaction, of the negotiation 
and struggle between different 'forces', domains are not isolated from other domains. They 
must not be seen as autonomous fields of social action. Actors pull with them codes and 
interpretations pertaining to other domains relative to their lifeworlds and revalorise them 
within a specific domain." (ibid..201) 
The boundaries within which practices take place are technological, social, and are defined 
by time and space. Technological and social boundaries were referred to above in the 
discussion of irrigation systems levels: hydraulic units also constitute social domains of 
interaction. In this subsection I concentrate on the time-space dimensions of irrigation and 
their relevance for social interaction, which were not yet discussed. 
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The time-space coordinates of irrigation plus the nature of water, "this infuriating 
substance which moves about and changes form" (Chambers, 1988:41), often makes the 
technical and institutional organisation of water management highly differentiated and 
complex, particularly in systems with many users.24> Irrigation water is not a resource that 
can be collected by water users at central distribution points, like people can buy stamps in 
post offices, rice and sugar in fair price shops, or fertiliser at .fertiliser outlets. Irrigation 
water has to be delivered at the doorstep, or rather the field bund. In creating a service 
network for this, agencies that assume responsibility for water distribution have to adapt their 
technical and institutional infrastructure to the undulations of both space and time. 
The spatial dimensions of irrigation include the following elements. Because crop 
production is generally soil-based, the use of irrigation water implies that irrigation systems 
have to spread water widely geographically, particularly of course in large-scale systems. A 
further aspect of this is that soil quality generally varies over the command area of an 
irrigation system. This creates different demands for water in different parts of the system. 
If additionally farmers grow different crops in different parts of the system, and the weather 
is locally variable, many complications for tuning supply to demand exist. 
The time dimension of irrigation is twofold. It relates to (i) the rhythms of the climate and 
the weather, and (ii) the growth cycle of crops. The rhythms of the climate and the weather 
influence the timing of both the supply of and the demand for irrigation water. The rainfall 
pattern influences the discharge of the river from which an irrigation system may take its 
water. It also influences the demand for irrigation water when it falls in the command area 
of the irrigation system (see Pandian, 1987 for an excellent analysis of rainfall as a means 
of production; also see Berkoff, 1990, Burns, 1993 and Wade, 1995 for discussion of the 
importance of agro-ecological characteristics for irrigation organisation). Temperature may 
influence river discharge through its effects on snowmelt, and crop water requirements 
through its effects on evapotranspiration. The growth cycle of crops also influences demand 
for irrigation water because crops have different water requirements in different parts of the 
growth cycle (Doorenbos and Pruitt, 1977). Ideally, water supply should be adapted to all 
these variations. 
The characterising feature of irrigation therefore is the need to achieve an often highly 
locally specific (up to the level of plots and parts thereof) temporal allocation of water in 
space (Carlstein, 1982:269-286; also see Moore, 1989:1738-1741). Irrigation requires 
specific technologies and institutions to deal with these time and space characteristics. 
Concretely, a large number of control points is needed, spread over a large area, implying 
a surveillance system with personel that is spread out, and moving around a lot to check all 
the control points. The system also has to be able to respond effectively, both technically and 
institutionally, to local and general changes in the supply of and demand for water. 
The space-time characteristics of irrigation and the qualities of water are not just the 
setting, or the 'given' set of constraints within which irrigation has to take place. Time, 
space, and the properties of water are strategically used, contested and adapted by people 
when they conduct the activity of irrigation. Some examples that appear in this book are the 
flexibility of the geographical boundaries of the irrigation system (through re-use of drainage 
water for irrigation and the installation of lift irrigation in tail-end areas), the adoption of 
crop varieties with different maturation times in response to expected water availability, the 
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 Differentiation and complexity refers to actually existing management practices. Management 
models are often wonders of uniformity and simplicity. 
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creation of in-field and on-farm storage of water to irrigate rice nurseries during canal 
closure periods, the shift of domains of authority of farmers and government officials during 
the day and the night, the shifts in what are head end and what are tail end areas over a 
period of several decades, and the complex and diverse systems of turn-taking in outlet 
commands. 
It can be concluded that the boundaries of domains of interaction are not fixed but 
flexible, technologically, institutionally as well as in time and space. The boundaries 
themselves may be negotiated in the practices going on within them. 
Rules and routines; interfaces and issues 
A further feature of practices is that they have regular patterns. They consist of routines, and 
are structured by rules (Giddens, 1984). These imply cooperation and coordination of action. 
Some of the routines described in this book are: forms of rotational water distribution among 
farmers at outlet level, forms of conflict management at distributary level, and management 
routines within the Irrigation Department at main system level. Institutionalisation thus is a 
central aspect of practices. 
At the same time practices are characterised by discontinuities or interfaces. Long defines 
social interface as "a critical point of intersection or linkage between different social systems, 
fields or levels of social order where structural discontinuities, based upon differences of 
normative value and social interest, are most likely to be found (Long, 1989:1-2). At these 
interfaces "the goals, perceptions, interests, and relationships of the various parties may be 
reshaped as a result of their interaction, (ibid.:2). This interaction may be constructive and 
consensual, but it may also be antagonistic and divisive. Rules may be disregarded, routines 
may break down, and as a result the institutionalisation of practices may be undermined. 
Rules and routines can not be taken for granted, but have to be reproduced continuously. 
An example of an important interface in canal irrigation is the already mentioned outlet 
structure, where the transfer of water from the government managers to the farmer users is 
physically designed to take place. It is a discontinuity because it is the meeting point of the 
different interests of different (groups of) water users and the government management, and 
the varying perceptions of equity, efficiency and other normative categories that regulate the 
different actors' behaviour. 
The discontinuities and interfaces in water management define quite concrete issues around 
which interaction takes place. The basic issue in large-scale canal irrigation is that of 
resource distribution: who gets how much water and when.25) Derived from this are issues 
like the opening and closure dates of the canal system, the setting of gates at control points, 
water levels to be maintained in canal sections, crops to be grown and not to be grown, and 
the repair and maintenance of canals and structures. 
These very practical issues are not 'just' practical issues, but they are part of more general 
issues, like the reproduction of the social relations that define the agrarian structure, the 
incidence of poverty, the intensification of agriculture, the maintenance of ecological 
sustainability, and the form of political representation and democracy. The outcomes of water 
management practices therefore have to be measured not only in terms of the physical pattern 
of water distribution or other indicators internal to the system, but also in terms of their 
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 How quantity and timing are expressed and measured varies. Sometimes there is very little exact 
knowledge on this. This lack of exact knowledge doesn't necessarily mean however that 
distribution is less of an issue. The contrary may very well be true. 
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effects on the wider process of rural transformation of which irrigation is part (see 
Chambers, 1994). 
2.5 WATER CONTROL 
In this section I discuss how the concept of water control can be usefully employed to analyse 
the processes within irrigation systems and their connections with the wider context in which 
they are embedded. The concept of practice provided the methodological means for that; the 
concept of water control is the basis for substantive theorisation. 
In the irrigation literature water control is a very commonly used term. It is used in the 
engineering literature, the literature on organisation and management, as well as in the 
academic social science literature analysing irrigation from a rural development perspective. 
In neither of these literatures large conceptual claims are attached to the term. However, the 
complementarity of meanings in these different discursive domains makes water control an 
excellent candidate to play the leading conceptual part in an interdisciplinary approach to 
irrigation. The first role water control can play as a concept is to bring the different 
dimensions of irrigation as treated in the different literatures under one heading. The second 
role is to theorise the relationships between these different dimensions. The discussion below 
follows this order. 
Three dimensions of water control 
In the engineering literature water control refers to the physical control of water flow by 
means of irrigation technology. A recent publication by the Worldbank is called Modem 
water control in irrigation (Plusquellec, Burt and Wolter, 1994). It provides a classification 
of different methods of technical water control in irrigation systems (see box 2.3). It also 
describes the different irrigation technologies available for equiping an irrigation system. 
Plusquellec, Burt and Wolter's contribution is one in an international debate on different 
design principles for canal irrigation systems. Apart from the high-tech oriented 'modern 
Box 2.3: Water control (technical) 
"Several control strategies are being used in irrigation schemes throughout the world: 
* Proportional control 
* Adjustable flow-rate control 
* Upstream control 
* Downstream control 
* Remote monitoring 
* Remote control 
This list is not complete because each method inclused several subclassifications. For 
example, proportional control may be nonadjustable or adjustable. Downstream control may 
be centralized or local, and local downstream control may be on sloping or level-top canals 
or pipelines. The term 'upstream control' describes a control method that maintains a 
constant water level upstream of a check structure or, less frequently, a method that 
maintains a constant flow through the check structure." (Plusquellec, Burt and Wolter, 
1994:35) 
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water control' view, there are concepts of 'structured design' (Shanan et al., 1986) and 
'proportional division' from source to field (Horst, 1996). The use of water control in the 
sense of water control technology is also common in the social science literature (see for 
example Burns, 1993; Mitchell and Guillet, 1993). 
In the irrigation management literature water control is used in a broader sense than its 
technical meaning alone. In that literature water control also refers to managerial control of 
the water distribution process, and other organisational processes in the irrigation system. 
Some quotations are given as examples in box 2.4.26) 
To control and to manage are almost synonyms. Webster's New Dictionary of Synonyms 
gives the following description of the two verbs. "Conduct, manage, control, direct are 
comparable when they mean to use one's skill, authority, or other powers in order to lead, 
guide, command, or dominate persons or things. (...) Manage usually implies the handling, 
manipulating, or manoeuvering of a person or persons or a thing or things so as to bring 
about a response or submission to one's wishes or attempts to use, guide, lead, or command. 
(...) Control stresses the idea of authoritative guidance and suggests a keeping within set or 
desired bounds (as of accuracy, efficiency, propriety, or discipline); it implies a regulating 
or restraining often by getting or keeping the upper hand." (Webster's, 1984:174) 
Box 2.4: Water control (organisational) 
"(...) by organizational control I mean that the group of farmers are in control of distribution 
and conflict resolution within their group, and that the group has the right and the ability to 
negotiate with other entities over the delivery of water to their group." (Hunt, 1990:144) 
Huppert defines four basic management functions: planning, organising, leading and 
controlling. Controlling is defined as the "the continuous monitoring and adjustment of all 
activities of an organisation in line with pre-determined plans and standards." (Huppert, 
1989:35) 
"On the 22nd August 1973, the learned Advocate General of Andhra Pradesh conceded 
that this Tribunal has no power to direct the vesting of the control and administration of the 
Rajolibunda headworks and the common canals within Mysore State limits in the Tungabhadra 
Board. However, he prayed that it should make suitable recommendations for vesting control 
and administration of the aforesaid works in a joint control body." (GOI/KWDT, 1973-1:54) 
"Water control as used in this paper is defined as the ability of farmers to plan adequately 
and in time for cropping decisions by having the required volumes of water available at the 
appropriate time and places for crop needs plus increments sufficient for leaching 
requirements and evaporation losses. As defined, proper water control ensures that end users 
will have a relatively high degree of predictability of water supplies for making cropping 
decisions and meeting crop needs. (...) Effective water control is a function of several 
complex sets of variables. Along with the physical, technical and economic factors, complex 
social and institutional factors are also worthy of serious study." (Lowdermilk, 1990:155) 
Irrigation management, or water control in the organisational sense, thus is about the 
regulation and control of human behaviour, particularly with regard to the forms of 
cooperation necessary to make irrigation systems function. 
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 Also see Vaidyanathan (1983) and Freeman (1989) for use of 'water control' in discussions of 
irrigation organisation. 
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Box 2.5: Water control (socio-economic and political) 
North India 
"The relevant power structures engaged in controlling and directing the supplies of water 
were typically those of the cultivating body within the village itself, and the picture which 
emerges from the enquiry into water-course management conducted in the early 1870s (...) 
is one of petty elites often able to reinforce their multi-faceted advantages within the village 
through their control over the allocation of scarce water. These village elites were not unduly 
affected as government control extended down the hierarchy of distribution channels and 
progressively confined local control to within the village boundaries." (Stone, 1984: 202) 
West Bengal (India) and Bangladesh 
"[Irrigation, or, more broadly, water control, constitutes the key technological constraint to 
agricultural growth (...). This hypothesis is confirmed by strong relationships between water 
control variables and various aspects of agricultural performance. (...) The irrigation-yield 
correlations tend to rise through time, implying that irrigation's leading role has been 
strengthened with the increase in fertiliser use and the introduction of HYVs. (...) In the light 
of this, it is remarkable that water control in West Bengal and Bangladesh remains so little 
developed. [T]he agrarian structure in Bangladesh and West Bengal has impeded water control 
development, by adversely affecting the possibilities for resolution of the associated public 
goods problems (...). The alternative to costly and often ineffective attempts at bureaucratic 
control of water allocation would be control by organisations of the irrigators themselves, 
who are in a much better position to monitor and enforce agreements and have strong 
incentive to do so. One possible reason for the general failure of such institutions to emerge 
at the local level is that inequalities among water users make it more difficult to achieve social 
control. It may be easy to enforce compliance from relatively small and powerless cultivators, 
but effective limitation of water use by richer and more powerful individuals is another 
matter." (Boyce, 1987:198-199, 229, 233) 
Mexico 
"The irrigation law of 1926 was pushed through by President Plutarco Eli'as Calles. This law 
nationalised private irrigation systems, and established the National Irrigation Commission 
(CNI). (...) Starting in 1930, it created a series of irrigation districts. (...) From its foundation 
the CNI was highly political. The creation of new irrigation projects was politically motivated, 
as the central government, located in Mexico City, manoeuvered to tighten its control over 
regions that had resisted national control. (...) Projects along the border with the United 
States were initiated to strengthen Mexico's position in bilateral conflicts over water and even 
territorial sovereignty. (...) The trend towards increased state control was slowed by a law 
passed in 1947 that allowed for private holdings of irrigated land. The new law sanctioned 
the expansion of private agriculture in irrigation districts, as well as the transfer of water 
rights when land was confiscated by the state for redistribution. (...) This law allowed the 
private sector greater opportunity to control irrigated land and water resources. (...) Today 
in Mexico, irrigation districts are one of the most important units of administration of 
agriculture and water resources. The districts are run by a committee of the CNI that is 
responsible for decisions about crops to be planted, distribution, types of fertilisers and 
insecticides to be used by farmers, and maintenance of the system. Yet the [Ministry of 
Water Resources] and the Ministry of Agriculture generally set the policies and have veto 
power over committee decisions. (...) President Jos6 Lbpez Portillo, in a major bureaucratic 
restructuring, combined the two [ministries] in 1977 (...). The reorganisation (...) [was] 
plagued by problems of compartmentalisation, centralisation, and competitive planning and 
budgeting (...). [D]espite the rhetoric, little power was transfered to the local level. The 
control of irrigation districts continues to be dictated from Mexico City. (Enge and Whiteford, 
1989:5-7) 
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A further extension of the scope of irrigation studies lies in the attention for water control 
in the socio-economic and political sense. This usage of water control addresses the 
conditions of possibility of technical and managerial water control. 
Box 2.5 gives examples from historical work on irrigation in India and Bangladesh, in 
which it is argued that the socio-economic differentiation of farmers prevented the emergence 
of effective forms of cooperation among water users. 
An example of water control in the political sense is also given in box 2.5. The case is 
pre-turnover Mexico, where, as in many other parts of the world, irrigation served as a 
means for the state goverment to politically and economically control peasant farmers. 
From the examples given in box 2.5 it can be concluded that the relation between 
technical and managerial control on one hand, and socio-economic and political control on 
the other, is two-sided. Socio-economic and political conditions influence what happens inside 
irrigation systems, and irrigation practices within irrigation systems have implications for the 
evolution of these conditions (also see section 2.6). 
The three dimensions of water control are summarised in table 2.1. 
Table 2 .1: Three dimensions of water control 
Dimension 
Technical control 
Organisational control 
Socio-economic and 
political control 
Association/meaning 
Guiding-manipulating-
mastering of physical 
processes 
Commanding-managing of 
people's behaviour 
Domination of peopleCs 
labour) 
Regulation of social 
processes 
Disciplines 
(Civil) engineering, soil mechanics, 
hydraulics, hydrology, agronomy, 
meteorology, agro-ecology 
Management science, extension 
science, public administration, 
organisation sociology 
Political economy, economics, rural 
sociology, political science, social 
anthropology, gender studies, agrarian 
history 
Water control: politically contested resource use 
The three different dimensions of water control described above represent three different 
abstractions from a single phenomenon: irrigation as it confronts us in everyday life. This 
means that they describe different features of a single object.27' In more practical terms: 
you can't have changes in one dimension without changes in the other two.281 
To theorise these intimate dimensional relations further, it is necessary to take a closer 
look at the concept of control. Its associations as a verb have already been discussed above. 
As a noun, its synonyms are authority, jurisdiction, command, sway, dominion, and, 
analytically most important I want to suggest, power (Webster's, 1984:188, 624). 
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 In fact, the three dimensions are each aggregations of a series of different abstractions. 
Abstraction is here used as in Sayer (1981). He notes that different abstractions cannot "simply 
[be] 'added up', but need to be synthesised; that is, their combination qualitatively modifies each 
constituent element." Ubid.-J) The social and the technical dimensions of irrigation need to be 
defined in each other's terms. 
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 See Bolding, Mollinga and van Straaten (1995) for detailed empirical illustration. 
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In the most general sense power refers to the transformative capacity of human action: the 
application of means to achieve outcomes (Giddens, 1976:110). Or in a dictionary definition: 
the ability to exert effort for a purpose, the ability to act or be acted upon, to effect 
something, or to affect or be affected by something.(Webster's, 1984:623).29) In this general 
sense power refers to both bio-physical and social processes. 
But power has a more specific meaning as well. 
'Power' in the narrower, relational sense is a property of interaction, and may be 
defined as the capability to secure outcomes where the realization of these outcomes 
depends on the agency of others. It is in this sense that men have power 'over' others: 
this is power as domination. (Giddens, 1976:111) 
Social power is - thus - not only found in the context of irrigation practices, where perhaps 
it is most easily recognised (as wider relations of economic and political power for example). 
It is also internal to irrigation practices, and necessarily so. 
Theoretical and empirical evidence of the importance of this meaning of social power in 
irrigation can be found in different places. Wittfogel's grand effort to develop a theory of 
hydraulic societies has been convincingly criticised, but has left us with the insight that 
irrigation can be very important for state power and its legitimation (Wittfogel, 1957; 
Worster, 1985; Ramamurthy, 1995). The experience of the green revolution, with irrigation 
as a leading input, even when that experience is varied, has sensitised us to questions of 
social differentiation and, in India, the increasing political power of the class of large farmers 
(Byres, 1981; Brass, 1995). 
At a lower level of aggregation there are some dramatic examples of power struggles 
around irrigation systems. These include land issues in the Bakolori project, Nigeria (Adams, 
1988), gender relations in the Jahaly Pacharr project in Gambia (Carney and Watts, 1991), 
the displacement of tribal people in the Narmada valley project, India (Dhawan, 1990; Singh, 
1997), and struggles around planned intervention, commoditisation and livelihoods in the 
Mahaweli Ganga project in Sri Lanka (Schrijvers, 1985; Siriwardena, 1989). 
At the micro-level there are several examples of the importance of relations of class (and 
caste) power in Indian canal irrigation (Thorner and Thorner, 1962; Jairath, 1984, Gorter, 
n.d., 1989; Ramamurthy, 1995). Similar case studies exist for other parts of the world (see 
for example Konings, 1981; Wallace, 1981; Barnett, 1981). 
The events described in this literature are not exceptional cases where things got out of 
hand, but only the more spectacular examples of the general importance of social relations 
of power in irrigation. The different interests of the different people involved in irrigation 
may translate into conflict and spectular or tragic events, or they may not. In both cases they 
structure the unrolling of irrigation as a social process. 
I thus arjue that it is the concept of power that binds the three dimensions of water 
control together.' Put differently, management institutions and technical artefacts can be 
understood as the embodiments of particular social relations of power, and, the other way 
around, socio-economic and political power in irrigation takes concrete shape in particular ,. 
forms of organisation and technologies.30' 
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 Synonyms of power in this general meaning are force, energy, strength, might, and puissance 
[Webster's, 1984:623). In the context of irrigation power is most often used to refer to hydro-
electric power generated at dams or canal drops. This -obviously- is not the meaning used here. 
3011 do not argue that irrigation can be understood by solely looking at the social relations of power. 
That would be a form of reductionism. Giddens argues that the study of social interaction involves 
(continued...) 
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In dynamic, process terms the implication of the argument is that irrigation practices are 
inherently political practices. Political is used in this expression in the sense of Kerkvliet's 
'everyday politics' (as contrasted to formal, party and state politics). Kerkvliet defines 
politics as 
the debates, conflicts, decisions, and cooperation among individuals, groups and 
organisations regarding the control, allocation, and use of resources and the values and 
ideas underlying these activities. (Kerkvliet, 1990:11) 
On the basis of this definition of politics water control can be defined as an example of 
politically contested31' resource use.32> 
2.6 THE CENTRAL RESEARCH QUESTION 
The concepts and the descriptive model that were presented above are what the subtitle of 
this chapter says: conceptual groundwork for more detailed theorisation of specific irrigation 
situations. Any move beyond this general conceptual ensemble requires more precise 
specification of the research object, and the dimensions of it that will be the focus of 
analysis. 
As indicated in chapter 1 already, this book is a case study of the Tungabhadra Left Bank 
Canal irrigation system, which is a protective irrigation system located in the semi-arid and 
drought prone part of South India. The focus of analysis are the water distribution practices 
30l(..-continued) 
looking at the interplay of meanings, norms and power (Giddens, 1976:104, 161). Of these three, 
the concept of power is conspicuously absent in irrigation studies, which is the reason to 
emphasise it so strongly here. The integration of the first two elements, meanings and norms, in 
irrigation studies is ongoing, be it from rather different perspectives than Giddens'. 'Meanings' are 
increasingly part of the irrigation discourse, for example in the emphasis in many policy initiatives 
on the importance of perspectives of users for designing efficient and sustainable irrigation systems 
(see for example Maloney and Raju, 1994; Sivamohan and Scott, 1994). 'Norms' are present in 
the growing discussion on rules and rule-making in irrigation (see for example Ostrom, 1 990, 
1992). For an interesting analysis of the cognitive and ideological dimensions of agrarian change 
in western Maharashra triggered by the introduction of modern agricultural technology, including 
irrigation, see Appadurai (1990). 
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 The term contested is preferred over negotiation on one hand and struggle on the other. 
Negotiation mainly has consensual associations, struggle those of open conflict. Contestation is 
the more encompassing term. Political contestation is perhaps a tautology. The felt need to include 
political in the formulation reflects the lack of analyses of 'politics' in irirgation studies. 
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 The description of water control as a case of contested resource use places the study of water 
control in a current of interdisciplinary studies on natural resources that tries to transcend the 
dichotomy between human culture and behaviour and the physical environment which sustains 
them (Bennett, 1990:435; for these approaches see for example Dahlberg and Bennett, 1986; 
Moran, 1990; Smith and Reeves, 1989; Maass and Anderson, 1978; for a call for the integration 
of a human ecology and political economy perspective on irrigation, see Meinzen-Dick, 1989:7). 
This literature speaks of socio-natural systems, where I speak of socio-technical systems. Apart 
from applicability to different levels (see footnote 18), this difference in terminology illustrates the 
greater emphasis on the technological mediation of (wo)man's interaction with the natural world 
in the socio-technical approach than in the broader socio-natural approach. In political ecology/eco-
socialist approaches to the relation between society and the environment technology plays a more 
important role, but these have -to my knowledge- not been applied to irrigation (see Pepper, 1993; 
Johnston, 1996). 
CONCEPTUAL GROUNDWORK 31 
in this system at outlet command area, distributary canal, and main canal level. 
Notwithstanding the fact that protective irrigation is found across the subcontinent from 
Pakistan to South India, and that water distribution may be considered to be the core process 
in these systems, this focus implies that the domain of generalisation for the findings and 
explanations in this book is highly circumscribed. 
The focus of analysis within this circumscribed domain is summarised in the central 
research question of the investigation. It goes as follows.33' 
How do the pattern of commoditisation, the form of state regulation and the 
characteristics of the technical infrastructure shape, and how are they in turn 
shaped by, the forms of organisation of water distribution in the Tungabhadra 
Left Bank Canal irrigation system? 
In terms of the descriptive model outlined above, the focus is on water distribution 
practices, with special emphasis on forms of organisation and technology, and two of the 
three contextual elements: the agrarian structure and the state and institutions of civil society. 
Water, the third element of water distribution practices (see the descriptive model above) is 
treated automatically, because it is the subject of both technology's and people's behaviour. 
The third type of structure, the agro-ecological environment, is treated as a given, and its 
relation with irrigation not the subject of theorisation.34) In other words, my analysis of 
water distribution as politically contested resource use does not include a 'political ecology' 
perspective, but limits itself to the longer standing concerns of agrarian political economy, 
commoditisation and regulation (the latter two concepts are explained below).35' 
The 'shaping and being shaped by' formulation is a reference to the complex debate on 
the relation between practices and human agency on one hand and social (and other) structure 
on the other. Water distribution practices on one hand, and commoditisation and regulation 
on the other, have a complex relationship of mutual shaping. In Marx's words, water 
distribution practices, as the concrete research object, are a "concentration of many 
determinations, hence unity of the diverse" (Marx, 1973:101), and the relation between 
practices and the structures in which they are embedded is seen as one of reproduction and 
transformation.36' 
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 The shortest research question that could be formulated is: what are the characteristics of water 
control in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal? The question as formulated in the main text is a first 
step away from the general concept of water control towards its operationalisation in substantive 
theory for a particular time, place and research object. 
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 This among other things would have required a broader focus on water. That focus is now 
limited to irrigation water, or water as far as it is used for irrigation. 
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 For references on the 'political ecology' perspective see footnote 32. The reason to leave it out 
of the scope of the research has to do with my own interest, expertise and the manageability of 
the field research. For some discussion of the ecological dimensions of irrigation in the Tungabhadra 
Left Bank Canal command area, see chapter 5, section 5.1. 
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 As Bourdieu notes "the truth (...) of interaction is never entirely contained in the interaction" 
(Bourdieu, 1977:81), but also lies in the structures that condition that interaction, and that are 
reproduced and transformed through it. This is what Giddens calls 'the duality of structure', and 
what informs Bhaskar's 'transformative model of social activity' (Giddens, 1976, 1984; Bhaskar, 
1979a, 1979b). I follow Bourdieu's and Bhaskar's usage of the structure concept rather than 
Giddens'. Giddens' main point is that practices have a structure (Giddens, 1976:121). The more 
difficult issue is how different structured practices relate to each other. The position I take on this 
issue is that there are different hierarchically ordered social levels with emergent properties at each 
of the levels (for relevant discussion see Levins and Lewontin, 1985; Rose, 1987; Giddens, 1984; 
(continued...) 
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The 'mutual shaping' point also applies to the relations of the elements within water 
distribution. Water, technology and people are internally related. This means that the 
properties of each of the elements as evident in existing water distribution practices, can not 
be defined or understood without reference to the other elements.37' In the research question 
the shaping role of technology is emphasised. 
To conclude this section I discuss the concepts of commoditisation and regulation, which 
unlike the other elements of the research question have not yet been elaborated. 
The commoditisation concept is taken from the neo-marxist debate on the agrarian political 
economy. It analyses agrarian change as a process of capitalist development (or the 
development of capitalism in agriculture), emphasising class relations, accumulation and 
social differentiation. I do not engage with the debate on capitalist agrarian development in 
India at a general level, or try to defend a particular position in that debate. I use this 
literature38' heuristically to describe the general features of the development of the agrarian 
economy in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal command area and to develop a categorisation 
of farming households-enterprises (see chapter 5). The latter is important to understand the 
relations between head enders and tail enders and large and small farmers in water 
distribution (see particularly chapter 6). My emphasis is what I call the geography of social 
differentiation. I want to show that in this canal irrigation system the pattern of social 
differentiation is shaped, in a rather complex manner, by the way the irrigation technology 
has structured the social and physical landscape.39' 
My usage of the concept form of regulation is equally heuristic. Its reference is the 
regulation school of thought in political economy, which emphasises that accumulation and 
other economic processes require or presuppose particular forms of social regulation, that is 
36l(...continued) 
Bhaskar, 1989). Giddens (1984) argues that the 'organic' model cannot be applied to social reality; 
Bhaskar wants to argue for a "qualified anti-positivist naturalism" (Bhaskar, 1979a: 108; also see 
1979b: 124-137) It can be noted that this view does not imply any form of structural determinism 
(which is the target for example in the discussion of structure in Long and van der Ploeg, 1994). 
For concrete research the important point is not so much this general ontological standpoint, but 
the question, in a particular context, which institutions are (not) transformed and transformable 
through local practices, and how. 
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 For the concept of internal relations see Sayer (1984). Examples of internal relations for each 
of the three elements are the following. The concept of water scarcity can not be defined in bio-
physical or locational terms only, but has to include social factors like demand and history. The 
hydraulic characteristics of outlet structures acquire their meaning under specific conditions of 
scarcity and state-water user relationships. And lastly, the characteristics of forms of organisation 
cannot be understood from a socio-organisational logic only, but analysis has to include the 
structuring factor of infrastructural design. 
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 For India contributions that I have found inspiring, apart from those referred elsewehere in the 
book, were Banaji (1 977), Bhaduri (1983) and Breman (1993). General literature from the 'peasant 
debate' that has shaped my thinking includes, apart from the classic marxist authors, Bernstein 
(1979), Bolhuis and van der Ploeg (1985), Brass (1986), Friedland, Barton and Thomas (1981), 
Goodman, Sorj and Wilkinson (1987), Guyer (1984), Long et al. (1986), Meillassoux (1981), 
Neocosmos (1982), Mann and Dickinson (1978), Richards (1985), and Whatmore ef al. (1987). 
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 In the original formulation of the research project 'pattern' had a much more ambitious content 
(see Mollinga, 1989). The starting intention was to identify different patterns of commoditisation 
associated with different modes of water distribution. 'Pattern' referred to different patterns of 
capitalist agrarian development. To develop this line of enquiry a comparative approach across 
systems and regions is required. 
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particular sets of institutions.40' More concretely, I use the concept to simultaneously refer 
to Benevenuti's TATE (Technological and Adminstrative Task Environment) concept, and 
Burawoy's concept of the political and ideological apparatuses of production (Benvenuti, 
1975, 1991; Burawoy, 1985). Both authors, like the regulationists, seek to understand the 
technological and institutional processes and mechanisms in which productive activities are 
embedded, and which govern their internal dynamics.41) Both concepts invite the researcher 
to very specifically identify the modes of technological and institutional regulation that exist 
in a particular situation, and urge the researcher not to make a priori assumptions about 
determinant institutions. The concepts also stimulate the researcher to look for a diverse set 
of forms of regulation. As will be shown, the forms of regulation relevant for water 
distribution practices are many. 
2.7 CONCLUSION 
To conclude this theoretical chapter I describe the structure of the remainder of the book in 
terms of the central research question. 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 introduce the main theoretical themes of the book. Chapter 3 analyses 
localisation and protection as forms of state governance, that is a particular form of 
regulation. Chapter 4 introduces the theme of the social dimensions of irrigation technology 
by a historical sketch of the design process of the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal system and 
its outcome in terms of design characteristics. Chapter 5 discusses the pattern of 
commoditisation in the command area of the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal. After sketching 
401
 See Koning (1994) for the application of regulation theory in the context of agriculture. On the 
concept of regulation in agriculture also see Frouws (1995). 
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 Benvenuti's framework is valuable because it was specifically developed to analyse agricultural 
production, and because it emphasises the regulating role of technologies. Technologies are 
conceptualised as an ordering principle or language, constituting a system of prescriptions, that 
express or embody particular social relations of power. Burawoy's framework is particularly 
interesting because of its discussion of the connections between processes internal to production 
(the micro-apparatuses of domination) and external to production (the regulating or dominating 
institutions), and because of its emphasis on the politics of production. With the latter expression 
he refers to the political and ideological effects of the organisation of work outside the direct 
sphere of productive activity. In production men and women transform raw material into products, 
reproduce particular social relations, and also an experience of those relations (Burawoy, 1985:7-
8). Both Benvenuti's and Burawoy's analysis are (primarily) set in the context of relatively strongly 
regulated production processes: European farm enterprises in Benvenuti's case, and factory regimes 
under colonialism, capitalism and socialism in Burawoy's case. Though my approach to the analysis 
of water distribution practices is modelled on this work, the context is a different one. The 
regulating capacity of the state managers of India's canal irrigation systems is not very large, and 
the state administration is certainly not the hegemonic actor. Water users do not "participate in and 
strategise [their] own subordination" or are "accomplices in [their] own exploitation" in the same 
manner as Burawoy analyses for factory workers (Burawoy, 1985:10). It should also be noted that 
irrigation and water distribution are only part of farming households-enterprises' livelihood and 
accumulation strategies, and the analysis of water distribution therefore does not capture the full 
social experience of the actors involved. However, the general point made by Benvenuti and 
Burawoy (in slightly different ways) that the organisation of production has political meaning, and 
that those directly involved in it are knowledgeable and capable actors pursuing particular projects 
in their participation in the reproduction and transformation of the structure of regulation, can be 
applied to water distribution very well. 
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the main features of the economic boom related to irrigation it discusses the geography of 
social differentiation in the command area. 
These three themes reappear and are concretised in the chapters on water distribution 
practices, chapters 6 to 9. Elements of all three themes are found at all system levels at 
which water distribution is discussed, but the emphasis is different at each of the levels. 
The theme of commoditisation is prominent in chapter 6 on unequal water distribution at 
the outlet command area level. It shows how elements of the agrarian structure, particularly 
credit and employment relations structure access to irrigation water. The social differentiation 
of water users plays a role in all chapters implicity because the farmers who are 
'economically and politically sound' at the outlet level are the ones who play the dominant 
role, as far as water users are concerned, at higher levels of the system. 
The theme of regulation and governance particularly appears in chapters 7 and 9. In 
chapter 7 the topic is state-water users relations at the distributary canal level, and the role 
of politicians in the mediation of this relationship. The forms of organisation that emerged 
in the interactions between these actors are discussed. The chapter gives a different 
interpretation of the state-water users-politicians relation than the increasingly popular 
management-by-bribe-and-political-pressure perspective. In chapter 9 institutional processes 
within the Irrigation Department are discussed which emerged in response to the escalation 
of water distribution conflicts. This chapter amends, to some extent, the picture of the 
Irrigation Department as a inflexible hierarchical organisation. It shows that opportunities for 
reform are sometimes utilised, but also that there are fundamental constraints for a paradigm 
shift in the approach to management. 
Lastly, the social dimensions of irrigation technology theme particularly figures in chapter 
8. There the material linkage between water users and the state, the pipe outlet structure, is 
the focus of attention. It is shown that the outlet structure is both the site and the subject of 
the struggle between the different actors involved in water distribution, and that its design 
and construction features both constrain and enable the emergence of particular forms of 
organisation. 
PROTECTION AND LOCALISATION 
State governance and South Indian canal irrigation 
This chapter has two objectives. The first is to explain the concepts of protection and 
localisation and describe the contours of protective irrigation as a specific type of irrigation. 
The second is to discuss, in general terms, protective irrigation policy and practice as an 
instance of state governance. 
Protective irrigation is a specific form of large scale canal irrigation found in the semi-
arid, drought prone areas of the Indian subcontinent. In protective irrigation systems water 
is scarce by design. These systems were and are built for supplementary irrigation of crops 
that require little water to mature, or for partial irrigation of cultivators' landholdings. The 
protective design necessitates rationing of irrigation water. The rationing method conceived 
in South India, and first applied in the Tungabhadra valley, is called localisation. It is a 
strategy for controlling water distribution through the legal prescription of the cropping 
pattern. By mainly prescribing so called 'irrigated dry' crops and allowing irrigation in one 
agricultural season only, available water can be spread over a large area and a large number 
of people. 
The term protective irrigation emerged as an element of British colonial irrigation policy 
in the 19th century. Protective irrigation undertook to supply limited quantities of water to 
subsistence-oriented peasants growing traditional food crops. In the occasion of drought, 
crops and livelihoods would be safeguarded, famine and social instability prevented, and 
colonial rule secured. After Independence protective irrigation became part of the new 
government's policy for agricultural development, emphasising both growth and equity 
objectives: production and productivity increase, and the spread of the benefits of 
development over different sections of the population and different regions. In the colonial 
as well as in the post-Independence period protective irrigation systems are an attempt by 
their government owner to regulate the pattern of agrarian change and to legitimate state 
power by means of a particular form of resource distribution. 
Theories of the Indian state and politics have hardly been applied to irrigation, and 
existing approaches tend to focus on a single dimension of a complex and contradictory 
reality. There is a dearth of detailed studies of actual state governance practices in irrigation 
as elsewhere (Sathyamurthy, 1998). 
This chapter is organised as follows. I start, in section 3.1, with a discussion of the three 
different meanings carried by the concept protective irrigation: (i) as a general term denoting 
insurance against drought and famine by irrigation, (ii) as a financial-administrative class of 
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works in colonial irrigation policy, and (Hi) as a specific type of irrigation. Of the latter, the 
technical, organisational and socio-economic characteristics are given. In section 3.21 discuss 
the localisation concept. First, the origins of the concept are traced in Madras Presidency. 
This is followed by a brief discussion of the diversity in ways of implementing localisation. 
The section is concluded with a discussion of the monitoring of localisation. 
The first two sections show that a big difference between designed and actual use of 
protective irrigation systems exists in many cases, and has done so for a considerable period 
of time. This divergence between theory and practice of protective canal irrigation systems 
raises the question why the model has remained a central element of Indian irrigation policy 
till today - because that it has. The explanation is largely a political one. The political logic 
of populism preserves the model of protective irrigation in policy and in design. This 
interpretation is discussed in section 3.3. The chapter concludes, in section 3.4, with a 
summary of the main points of the previous sections, and a discussion of some theoretical 
problems in the interpretation of protective irrigation as a form of state governance. An 
interpretation of protective irrigation policy and practice in state-theoretical terms is not 
straightforward. 
3.1 PROTECTIVE IRRIGATION 
Protection in general 
The British colonial rulers of India began to construct irrigation systems in the first half of 
the 19th century (Whitcombe, 1972; Stone, 1984). The first canals in the alluvial plains of 
the North Indian rivers and in the deltas of South India were improvements and extensions 
of existing canals. The first large wholly new canal system was the Ganges Canal, opened 
in 1854. At Independence in 1947, 13.6 million hectares of canal irrigation had been created. 
Canal irrigation was an important instrument of colonial rule. As Stone states, 
It was intended to serve the perceived interests of its masters (...). In its design, modes 
of operation, and intended effects, canal irrigation was ultimately a cultural expression, 
representing the priorities and aspirations of its western architects, and was inextricably 
bound up with some of the most vital aspects of colonial rule. (Stone, 1984:8) 
The contribution of irrigation to the sustenance of colonial rule had many dimensions. 
(...) on a policy level it was simultaneously linked with famine prevention, revenue 
stability, the settling of unruly tribes, expansion of cultivation, extended cultivation of 
cash crops, enhanced taxable capacity, improved cultivation practices, and political 
stability. (ibid.:9) 
These different dimensions were mutually reinforcing, but also contradictory. The 
stabilisation of crop production and the expansion of cultivation contributed to the prevention 
of famine, but maximising revenue and extending cash crop cultivation worked against it 
(Ramamurthy, 1995:151-152).'> 
Protection against famine was an important objective of colonial irrigation policy. Some 
have argued that this objective was little more than window dressing for the real, surplus 
extraction, objectives of colonial irrigation (Whitcombe, 1972 has this flavour). However, 
the social costs of political instability could be very high (as in the 1857-58 Mutiny or First 
War of Independence), and the financial costs of famines and famine relief measures as well 
11
 For an analysis of colonial revenue and other policies as a cause of famine, see Dutt (1 900) and 
B.M. Bhatia (1991). For critical discussion, see for example McAlpin (1983). 
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(see for example Famine Commission, 1880 and Indian Irrigation Commission (IIC), 1903). 
Famine prevention was a real objective, that is an objective with real effects, important for 
the legitimation of colonial state power.2) 
The presence of irrigation was thought to protect a region against drought and famine. The 
Famine Commission wrote that 
[i]t has hitherto been held in the Irrigation Department that an area is protected, of 
which a third part is or can be irrigated in a season of drought by a canal drawn from 
a permanent river, or by wells not liable to dry up. (Famine Commission, 1881-
Appendix V:l) 
The emphasis on protection not only implied a minimum percentage of area irrigated, but 
also a maximum. The Indian Irrigation Commission (1901-03) considered that irrigation 
"completely protectfs] from famine an area which (...) may be said to vary from twice to 
four times the area annually irrigated." (IIC, 1903-1:22) In order to maximise protection at 
a regional level irrigation had to be extended over an area as large as possible. In North 
India a standard of 42.5% of the cultivable area was set in the 1870s as the maximum 
claimable proportion of irrigated area for a village (Stone, 1984:204). 
In this first, oldest and most general usage of the term protective irrigation no particular 
type (canal, tank, well) or scale of irrigation is implied, nor any other financial or agronomic 
characteristic.3) 
Protective irrigation as an administrative-financial class of works 
In the last quarter of the 19th century protective irrigation acquired a second, more specific 
meaning. It became the counterpoint of productive irrigation, a concept developed in the 
same period. 
After a disastrous attempt at canal irrigation development through private companies 
around 1860 (Atchi Reddy, 1990), the Government of India decided (i) that canal irrigation 
should be a state activity, and (ii) that it was to be financed from loans (see Banerji, 
1995:73-79 for a detailed account). The latter was decided because the earlier system of 
government financing of irrigation from the general revenues did not allow quick expansion 
of canal irrigation. The loans policy was effected from 1868-9 (Famine Commission, 1880-
11:146). Canal irrigation became a commercial investment on which profit was expected to 
be made. This was formalised in 1879 when a Select Committee of the House of Commons 
introduced a 'productivity test'. A criterion was designed to decide whether investment in a 
21
 It is not fully correct in my view to characterise colonial irrigation policy as the combination of 
charity and commerce as Ramamurthy does at one point (Ramamurthy, 1988:5). The imperial 
desire to provide famine protection is not primarily informed by charitable feelings (though this is 
definitely part of the discourse), but by cost and political considerations. Ramamurthy herself 
quotes Buckley (1904:321) who says that canal irrigation is not only a "profitable property, a 
sound financial investment (...) far better, [it is] an active force ever potent to tie the populations 
to their rulers, to render them happy in their homesteads and contented with their surroundings; 
a condition which cannot but tend to political advantages and security" (Ramamurthy, 1988:16). 
In Ramamurthy (1995) the same quote concludes an argument similar to the one presented here 
(pp.1 50-1 58). In Buckley (1905), which I referred, the quote appears on the same page. 
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 The IIC (1901-03) designed a formula by which the degree of protection of a particular area could 
be calculated. In Madras Presidency efforts were made to base irrigation investment decisions for 
protective irrigation on a classification of districts by means of their different degrees of 
protectedness and the returns to be expected, involving detailed debate on the formula to be used 
for this (see Madras Board of Revenue, Proceedings 24.8.1931). 
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particular irrigation system was warranted or not. The criterion calculated the net financial 
results of the project as a percentage of the total capital outlay. This rate was set at different 
levels between 3.75% and 6.5% in different periods (Public Works Committee, 1879; see 
GOI/MOIP, 1972-1:249-251 for discussion and figures). The systems that passed the test and 
were sanctioned were called productive irrigation systems.4' 
The investment criterion reinforced the already existing focus in canal irrigation 
development on the alluvial plains of the North and the deltas of the South. In these areas 
system construction was relatively cheap, because no reservoirs were needed or possible, and 
construction was easy in that terrain because it was regular and flat. However, some of the 
most drought and famine prone areas were located in the interior areas of India, particularly 
in the Deccan region5', where many streams rivers are not perennial or have very low 
baseflows, and the terrain is irregular and undulating. Irrigation systems in this region were 
more expensive to build and therefore less remunerative. Some of the most drought and 
famine prone areas thus remained unprotected. 
The Famine Commission of 1878-80, appointed after the severe famine of 1876-78, drew 
attention to the indirect benefits of irrigation. 
It has been too much the custom, in discussioas as to the policy of constructing 
[irrigation] works, to measure their value by their financial success (...). The true 
value of irrigation works is to be judged very differently. First must be reckoned the 
direct protection afforded by them in years of drought, by the saving of human life, 
by the avoidance of loss of revenue remitted, and of the outlay incurred in costly 
measures of relief. But it is not only in years of drought that they are of value. In 
seasons of average rain-fall they are of great service and a great source of wealth, 
giving certainty to all agricultural operations, increasing the out-turn per acre of the 
crops, and enabling more valuable descriptions of crops to be grown. From the Punjab 
in the north to Tinnevelly at the southern extremity of the peninsula, wherever 
irrigation is practised, such results are manifested; and we may see rice, sugar-cane, 
or wheat taking the place of millets or barley, and broad stretches of indigo, stretching 
at a season when unwatered lands must lie absolutely unproductive. (Famine 
Commission, 1880-11:150). 
Although this statement was incomplete6', the Famine Commission's plea for consideration 
of the indirect benefits of irrigation had some impact. A Famine Relief and Insurance Fund 
(Famine Fund for short) was created in 1882. Half of the yearly contribution of 15 million 
Rupees (supplied from the general revenues) could be used for 'protective works'. First 
railways and irrigation had to share the 7.5 million Rupees, but later it was fully used for 
irrigation (Famine Commission, 1898:325-331; also see IIC, 1903-1:61, 80). The irrigation 
systems constructed under this administrative heading were called protective irrigation 
systems. These were systems that could not pass the productivity test, but were still 
constructed for reasons of famine prevention.7' 
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 The term 'productive public works' was used for the first time in 1876; in the period between 
1869 and 1 876 these were called 'extraordinary public works' (Famine Commission, 1880-11:147). 
51
 The Deccan or Deccan Plateau is the dry peninsular upland area of India. The most important 
rivers crossing it are the Godavari, Krishna (with Tungabhadra as a tributary) and the Cauvery. 
61
 The problem of 'unwanted water' in black cotton soil areas was already apparent at this time (see 
section 3.2). 
71
 The qualification 'productive' or 'protective' was given at the time of sanctioning the project, and 
did not necessarily coincide with actual performance (see IIC, 1903-1:81 for an example). The IIC 
(1901-03) argued for a different classification system on the ground of the confusion thus caused, 
but without success. 
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During the last two decades of the 19th century few protective irrigation systems were 
constructed.8' It was only after a series of further famines that protective irrigation policy 
was put on a firmer footing. The Indian Irrigation Commission (1901-03) was explicitly 
appointed to "report on the irrigation of India as a protection against famine" (IIC, 1903-1:1). 
In the resolution through which the commission was appointed it was stated that 
[a]s regards new works (...) the main question is not whether they will be likely to 
prove directly remunerative, but whether the net financial burden which they may 
impose on the State in the form of charges for interest and maintenance will be too 
high a price to pay for the protection against famine which they may be relied on to 
afford. (IIC, 1903-1:2) 
The Indian Irrigation Commission (1901-03) went much further than the Famine Commission 
of 1878-80 in relaxing the sanctioning criterion for protective irrigation (IIC, 1903:36-38). 
As can be seen from table 3.1, the construction of protective irrigation systems accelerated 
in the first decades of the 20th century.9' 
Table 3 . 1 : Area of productive and protective canal irrigation in undivided India in the 
colonial period (excluding Princely States) 
Productive 
irrigation 
(million hectares) 
Protective 
irrigation 
(million hectares) 
Protective irrigation 
as a % of the total 
1878-79"' 
1900-01" 
1947"' 
1.88 
4.40 
11.4 
0 
0.14 
2.17 
0 
3 
16 
a) Source: IIC (1903-1:25) 
b) Source: GOI/MOIP (1972:261) 
Protective irrigation in this second, administrative-financial meaning remained in use till 
well after Independence (GOI/MOIP, 1972:251). In 1964 a different investment criterion was 
introduced, the benefit/cost (B/C) ratio. Since then the term protective irrigation is no longer 
formally part of the irrigation planning discourse, but remains in use in the first meaning 
already discussed and the third meaning, to be discussed directly below.10' 
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 Banerji (1995:73-126) discusses in detail the stagnation of irrigation development generally in 
the last quarter of the 19th century (after the 1869-1876 period of growth). This stagnation was, 
according to his analysis, the combined result of the introduction of famine insurance taxes in the 
late 1870s and of making the States responsible for raising loans (and sufficient revenue to meet 
the interest charges). 
91
 This increase should probably not only be explained from an increasing concern with famine 
prevention, but also with the gradual exhaustion of opportunities for construction of systems as 
remunerative as those of the 19th century. The increase in protective irrigation construction may 
also be the result of a general push for increasing irrigation investment by the Public Works 
Department from a concern for departmental reproduction and expansion. However, substantiation 
of this hypothesis requires research outside the scope of this book. 
'
o l
 The replacement of a financial results criterion by a benefit/cost ratio reflects the broader 
concerns of irrigation policy (in terms of agricultural growth and development generally) in the post-
Independence compared to the colonial period. For detailed discussion of Indian irrigation policy 
(continued...) 
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Protective irrigation as a particular type of irrigation 
The two meanings of protective irrigation discussed above, already suggest a number of 
elements of the third meaning: protective irrigation as a specific type of irrigation. Protective 
irrigation systems are large scale canal systems, found in the semi-arid, drought prone 
regions of the Indian subcontinent, particularly the Northwest and the Deccan. These systems 
aim to spread available water thinly over a large area and number of farmers. 
This aim is not only a thing of the past, but also of the present. Irrigation policy 
documents provide evidence for this. In the report of the Irrigation Commission (1972) the 
principles of irrigation policy in water scarce/land abundant areas are described as follows. 
In areas other than those with ample water resources (...) our policy should aim at 
securing the maximum crop production per unit of water. (...) the policy should be to 
benefit as large a section of the community as possible and at the same time enable 
farmers to obtain reasonable yields. Surface irrigation systems should be designed to 
irrigate compact blocks, the blocks being dispersed over a large area to benefit large 
numbers of farmers. The number of irrigations can be fewer than are required for high 
yields. (GOI/MOIP, 1972:112-113). 
The National Commission on Agriculture (1976) expressed an identical view (GOI/MOAI, 
1976-VI:24-25). More recently, the Government of India's National Water Policy document, 
published in 1987, states that "[t]he irrigation intensity should be such as to extend the 
benefits of irrigation to as large a number of farm families as possible, keeping in view the 
need to maximise production." (GOI/MOWR, 1987:9) The concept of protection remains a 
prominent feature of Indian irrigation policy. 
The general aim of protective irrigation translates into specific, and related, technical, 
organisational and socio-economic characteristics, which make it a type. The model of 
protective irrigation described below is based on scattered evidence and interpretative 
reading. It is an invitation to further research because systematic documentation on protective 
irrigation systems is lacking (see Jurriens and Mollinga, 1996 and Jurriens, Mollinga and 
Wester, 1996 for more detailed discussion). It is therefore also impossible to give an accurate 
quantitative estimate of the area covered by protective irrigation systems in this third 
meaning. My guesstimate is that protective irrigation comprises about 40% (11 million 
hectares) of India's 27.8 million hectares of canal irrigation.11' 
Technical design characteristics 
Canal irrigation systems are commonly designed for supplying the full water requirements 
of the crops to be grown in the system, and as a contiguous, one-piece command area. The 
first design principle maximises the yield of the crop per unit area. The second minimises 
the construction costs per hectare, because the total canal length and the number of structures 
""( . . .continued) 
after Independence, see Ramamurthy (1995). In 1983 the internal rate of return criterion was 
introduced (Report of the Committee on Pricing of Irrigation Water, 1992/1994:2.11). 
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 The figures used for this calculation were taken from the Eighth Five Year Plan document 
(GOI/PC, 1992-11:86), and refer to the potential of major and medium irrigation utilised at the end 
of the Seventh Plan (1990). I assumed that all major and medium canal irrigation in Punjab, 
Haryana, Rajasthan, Gujarat, Maharashtra and Karnataka and half of Andhra Pradesh's, is of the 
protective kind, and that the resulting overestimation for these States is compensated by not 
considering Tamil Nadu, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and other States. In addition to Indian 
protective irrigation, most of Pakistan's large scale irrigation (14 million hectares; Sufi, Ahmad and 
Zuberi, 1993) is also of the protective kind. 
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required are minimised. Neither of these principles apply to protective irrigation. Typical 
design characteristics of protective irrigation systems are low irrigation intensities and high 
duties.12) By planning irrigation of part of the irrigable area under the canals only, and by 
limiting irrigation on a particular piece of land to one crop per year, the water is spread over 
a large area, and only part of the area commanded by the canal is irrigated. By designing a 
large area to be irrigated per unit discharge, supplementary irrigation is implied. The 
intention is to avoid crop failure on as large an area as possible, rather than to irrigate for 
maximum yield per unit area. 
A further design characteristic is that protective systems are completely supply oriented. 
This means that water supply into the system is not determined by actual, and fluctuating 
demands in the field. Fine-tuning supply to demand, which is needed to maximise yield, is 
not the aim. For safeguarding the crop, the exact timing of irrigation turns is not too 
important, as long as these turns are regular and reliable.13' The supply orientation 
combined with the desire to keep the systems as cheap as possible (because they were 
'unproductive' systems yielding little revenue) has led to a minimum of regulating devices 
for controlling water levels between the intake of the system (weir or dam) and the outlet 
command areas at the farmers level.14' The systems are designed for continuous flow and/or 
'automatic' distribution (that is distribution with no or very little necessity for adjusting 
outlets over the season). In this way, the management intensity (number of personnel per acre 
or unit length of canal), and costs, can be kept low.15' 
Organisational characteristics 
The low management intensity just mentioned is a first organisational characteristic. A 
second characteristic is that of hierarchy. The supply orientation of protective systems fits 
well with the top-down organisational structure of the Irrigation Department (see figure 3.1 
for the organisational tree plan of the Irrigation Department in the Tungabhadra Left Bank 
Canal command area). The organisational structure is based on the principle of upward flow 
of information (data on crops, water levels, etcetera) and a downward flow of instructions 
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 Irrigation intensity expresses the intensity of use of the command area of an irrigation system. 
When irrigation intensity is 60%, 60% of the land is cultivated with an irrigated crop once per year 
(or 30% is double cropped, etcetera). When it is 200%, all land is cultivated twice with irrigated 
crops per year. Duty is the South Asian concept that expresses the area that can be irrigated with 
a unit discharge of water. It is usually given in acres per cusec (cubic foot per second). It is the 
inverse of 'irrigation allowance', which is usually expressed in l/s.ha (liters per second per hectare). 
131
 Perry calculated, using the FAO CROPWAT software, yield losses of crops like wheat and cotton 
in Northwest India, when fixed water delivery schedules are used instead of flexible water delivery 
schedules responding to varying crop water requirements. He concluded that "any losses in 
production per unit area are likely to be very small for traditional field crops, and outweighed by 
offsetting gains in terms of easier system management and higher returns to water" (Perry, n.d.:1). 
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 There are no cross-regulators in protective irrigation systems. For the main canals there may also 
have been the consideration of navigation. In the colonial era many of the large canals were 
designed as water transport routes. The Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal was also designed in this 
manner (see chapter 4). Weirs would have implied locks, which are expensive and slow down 
travel. 
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 I have not come across a systematic comparison of staffing levels in canal irrigation systems 
across the world. Wade (1988b:493) found that the density of irrigation staff in Korean irrigation 
systems is five to eight times higher than in the Indian protective systems. Merrey (1998) compares 
Egypt's and Pakistan's staffing levels. The levels in Pakistan (mostly protective irrigation) are much 
lower. 
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Figure 3.1: Organisational tree plan of the Irrigation Department in the Tungabhadra Left Bank 
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(see Wade, 1982a on the theory and practice of bureaucratic organisation in the Irrigation 
Department). The organisational structure has little managerial flexibility, but this is also not 
necessary in a system of continuous, and in reservoir systems constant, flows, where supply 
is not influenced by actual demand. 
The third important organisational characteristic is the institutional form of the rationing 
of irrigation water, which, as explained above, is a defining feature of protective systems. 
Different strategies of protective water control have been designed in different regions. The 
literature suggests the following threefold regional division of government water control 
strategies in protective irrigation (see GOI/MOIP, 1972-1:113-115; Wade, 1976; Basu and 
Shirahatti, 1991; Jurriens and Mollinga, 1996; Jurriens, Mollinga and Wester, 1996). 
/ : Punjab, Haryana, Rajasthan (India) and Pakistan: In this region the warabandi system of 
rotational water distribution is in operation (Reidinger, 1974; Malhotra, 1982). In this 
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system, farmers receive -in turns- a time share of the available supply proportional to the size 
of their landholding. A share is insufficient to irrigate all a farmer's land to full crop water 
requirements. Proportional division structures and semi-modular outlets distribute shortages 
and surpluses over the command equitably.16' The turns have acquired legal status, and 
juridical sanctions for disregarding them exist (see Jacob and Singh, 1972). In this region 
rationing is effected through directly controlling water distribution. Crop choice is the 
privilege of the farmer. 
//: Maharashtra and Gujarat: Common to Maharashtra and Gujarat is rationing through a 
crops-plus-water contract system. In the first decade of the 20th century the so called block 
system was introduced in present Maharashtra. The system was intended to be the first step 
in the introduction of volumetric delivery and pricing of water (distribution through the 
invisible hand of the market). It evolved into a permit/lease system for allowing the 
cultivation of particular combinations of crops in blocks of land for a number of years, 
mostly six. Farmers were allowed to plant one-third of the block with sugarcane, and two-
thirds with 'dry' food crops, while the government assured water delivery for a period of six 
years. The reservation of two-thirds of the block for 'irrigated dry' foodgrains expresses the 
protective dimension of the block system. The block system is thus a crops-plus-water 
contract system.17' 
The water distribution system that belongs to the block system is the sjeh pali system 
(Gandhi, 1979; also see Gandhi and Dhamdhere, 1982). This is a time-based rotation system, 
like the warabandi system, with the difference that the time share of a particular block is 
calculated on the basis of the surface area of that block and the 'duty normally obtained' for 
the mix of the cropping pattern (Gandhi, 1979:400, 401). 
In Gujarat the system used is that of yearly or season-wise applications of farmers for the 
cultivation of particular crops, to be sanctioned by the Irrigation Department (see Gorter, 
n.d.:88-92 on the Ukai-Kakrapar project; also see Patel and Gulati, 1994).,8) 
///; Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu: In interior South India the system of 
'localisation' was introduced around Independence to achieve protective water control. 
Localisation is a form of agricultural land use planning in which the government allows and 
disallows the cultivation of particular crops on particular pieces of land. Because the 
localisation pattern is fixed, the pattern of water distribution can also be the same over the 
years. Localisation thus is an effort to regulate water distribution indirectly through 
controlling the cropping pattern. Localisation is discussed in detail in section 3.2. 
Socio-economic characteristics 
Economically, protective irrigation strives for high output per unit of water. A protective 
cropping pattern of light crops increases the total agricultural output of the irrigation system, 
as compared to concentrated irrigation. It can also be shown that the labour requirements per 
unit water of a protective cropping pattern are higher than that of a 'wet' cropping pattern 
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 Originally the systems were mostly run-of-the-river systems with fluctuating discharges in 
relation to changes in river discharges due to the rainfall and snow melting pattern in the 
Himalayas. 
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 For further discussion and references, see Bolding, Mollinga and van Straaten (1995). 
,8
' Gorter also mentions the existence of rotational forms of water distribution at different levels 
of the system in the rabi season (Gorter. n.d.:89). 
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(see Dhawan, 1989 and Rath and Mitra, 1989 for calculations and discussion). It can be 
argued that from a national economic perspective protective irrigation makes sense because 
(i) it increases agricultural output given the availability of a limited quantity of water, (ii) it 
can generate more employment than 'wet' irrigation, and (Hi) it spreads the benefits of 
irrigation over a large number of producers (also see chapter 10). 
The type of agrarian structure implicit in the model of protective irrigation originally was 
family farming primarily oriented towards subsistence production. Protective irrigation 
emphasises supplementary irrigation of 'irrigated dry' crops, particularly traditional food 
crops. It aims to stabilise existing production systems, secure subsistence and, on top of that 
support a limited commercial element. As Perry (n.d.:2) notes, the systems were intended 
to "stabiliz[e] incomes and provid[e] a secure, if limited base for further economic 
development". 
It should be noted however that while the objective to spread water and benefits has 
remained central to protective irrigation, the contemporary context is no longer famine 
protection and subsistence farming. Also in protective irrigation the economic objective has 
shifted towards the increase of production and productivity, not only of subsistence crops but 
also of commercial crops. The Irrigation Commission of 1972 writes that "The emphasis has 
now shifted from the protective use of irrigation, to irrigation as a means of attaining greater 
production of food, fibers and oilseeds. Irrigation development must necessarily play a very 
important role in India's quest for self-sufficiency." (GOI/MOIP, 1972:4; also quoted in 
Ramamurthy, 1995:173) However, because in protective irrigation systems maximisation 
should be done per unit of water rather than land, and because 'irrigated dry' crops tend not 
to be the most remunerative, the form of production implicit in the concept of protective 
irrigation remains one characterised by relatively extensive farming, a low degree of 
commoditisation and a substantial subsistence component. The water control strategies 
described above thus are not only a matter of controlling water flows, but also of regulating 
the dynamics of agrarian change.19' 
Table 3.2 gives a summary of the technical, organisational and socio-economic 
characteristics of protective irrigation, and those of non-protective/productive irrigation as 
a counterpoint. It should be noted that this division in two types is a simplification, but one 
that is useful for a first understanding of protective irrigation. 
A basic contradiction 
Protective irrigation's stated objective to maximise the overall production in the command 
area of the irrigation system (and spread that over all farmers) contradicts the individual 
production and income maximisation strategies of farmers. The reason is that the 
maximisation of (cash crop) output per unit of land is a more obvious strategy for individual 
farmers than the maximisation of the (subsistence) crop output per unit of water. Rice and 
sugarcane are two important cash crops that happen to consume a lot of water. There are 
strong economic incentives for farmers to grow these crops, including low water prices, 
stable markets and produce price protection. Farmers therefore do not adhere to protective 
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 The 'peasant mode of production' that I posit to be implicit in the concept of protective irrigation 
fits into the populist framework of which protective irrigation has become part (see section 3.3). 
However, I hesitate to emphasise this point because there is hardly any explicit discussion on the 
form of production that is implicit in the concept of protective irrigation. This is perhaps because 
the realities of the agrarian structure profoundly contradict the implicit model. 
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Table 3.2: Technical, organisational and socio-economic characteristics of protective and 
productive irrigation31 
Technical characteristics 
Irrigation intensity 
Duty (acres/cusec) 
Crops 
Operational design 
Organisational characteristics 
Water availability 
Cropping pattern 
Water flows 
Socio-economic characteristics 
Yield optimisation per 
Benefits 
Major objective 
Farm labour 
Orientation 
PROTECTIVE IRRIGATION 
Low (around 100%) 
High (low water supply) 
Low water demanding 
(sorghum, millet, oilseeds, 
etcetera) 
Supply oriented 
Planned scarcity, requiring 
rationing 
Prescribed/controlled by 
government (except under 
warabandi system) 
Constant 
Unit of water 
Spread 
Food security/poverty 
alleviation 
Emphasis on family labour 
Towards subsistence 
PRODUCTIVE IRRIGATION 
High (200% and more) 
Low (meeting crop water 
requirements) 
High water demanding (rice, 
sugarcane) 
Demand oriented 
Planned sufficiency, no 
rationing needed 
Farmer's choice 
Varying with demand 
Unit of land 
Concentrated 
Agricultural growth 
Emphasis on wage labour 
Towards the market 
a) Different versions of this table can be found in Mollinga (1992) and Jurriens and Mollinga 
(1996). 
cropping patterns. There is a strong tendency towards concentration of irrigation water on 
rice and sugarcane lands, resulting in unequal water distribution and unequal spread of the 
economic benefits of irrigation.20' 
In the next section I discuss the origins of localisation, how it was implemented and the 
way in which it is monitored. This discussion will make clear why localisation was unable 
to prevent excess appropriation of water and unequal spread of its benefits. 
3.2 LOCALISATION 
The government water control strategy in the protective irrigation systems in Karnataka, 
Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu is called localisation. It was already explained above that 
localisation is a form of agricultural land use planning that aims to control water distribution 
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 The difference between 'wet' and 'irrigated dry' crops is not always the same as that between 
cash and food/subsistence crops. Rice is both a food crop and a cash crop. The same is true of the 
'irrigated dry' crop wheat. The lower water consumption of wheat as compared to rice may explain 
part of the relative success of the warabandi system in Northwest India. 
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in an irrigation system through the legal prescription of the cropping pattern. Juridical 
procedures exist to prosecute those farmers that violate the localisation pattern.21' 
The main elements of localisation in Karnataka are the following. 
1) Irrigation is allowed in part of the irrigable command of an irrigation system, and 
excluded in another part. 
2) Limitation of the irrigation of a localised piece of land to one season (with some limited 
allowance of two-seasonal and perennial crops). 
3) The prohibition or strong limitation of water-consumptive crops, particularly rice and 
sugarcane, in favour of light crops like sorghum, millet, cotton and oilseeds. 
In this section I first discuss the origins of localisation, and after that the procedures for its 
implementation and monitoring in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal. 
The origins of localisation2® 
Localisation was first implemented in the Tungabhadra valley (GOI/MOIP, 1972:115). The 
earliest discussion of the term localisation that I have been able to trace is connected to the 
Tungabhadra Right Bank Low Level Canal (Raghavan, 1947b).23> In that document an 
exercise in 'experimental localisation' is reported for Yemmiganur village of Bellary 
taluk.24) It was the basis for the later real localisation when the canal was under 
construction. For the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal the possibility of localisation was created 
by the 1948 Hyderabad Irrigation Act.2i) In 1956 the Hyderabad rules for localisation were 
formally issued (see Appendix 3.1), but localisation in the Left Bank Canal command area 
had already started in 1952 (GOMYS, 1958-9:139). 
Perhaps however, the premiere of localisation did not take place in the Tungabhadra 
project, but in the neighbouring Kurnool-Cuddapah (KC) Canal as early as 1949.26> 
Whichever canal may have been first, the Tungabhadra valley is the cradle of localisation. 
How and why it was conceived is much less clear. 
Satnarayan Singh has suggested (in NWMP/PMU, 1992-G-05(E)) that localisation has 
emerged from the necessity in irrigation system design to demarcate the area to be irrigated 
(the so called ayacut). He quotes Ellis' Irrigation Manual to illustrate this point. 
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 For Karnataka, see sections 27 to 32 of the Karnataka Irrigation Act, 1965. The word 
localisation does not actually appear in the Act. The formulation is that the government can 
prescribe the crops to be grown by publishing a notification in the Official Gazette. However, the 
terms localisation and localised cropping pattern are commonly used. 
221
 I thank Mr. Satnarayan Singh (S.E. Ret.) for very generously giving me access to the material 
on localisation that he has collected, and for sharing his views and questions on the subject with 
me. I also thank Robert Wade for allowing me to read a draft chapter on this topic. 
231
 This is one of a series of three reports (Raghavan, 1947a, b and c) on the cropping pattern and 
other aspects of the planning of the right bank low level canal of the Tungabhadra project. The 
reports were commissioned in 1945 by the Government of Madras Presidency as part of the design 
process of the canal on the right bank. 
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 A taluk is an administrative subdivision of a district. 
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 Under article 67/31, see GOHYD/Law Department (1956:1097-1160). 
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 In a 1956 government order issuing rules for localisation in the KC Canal (G.O.Ms.No.334 dated 
6.2.1956 of the Government of Andhra, Public Works and Transport Department, Kurnool; 
reprinted in GOAP, 1982-11:87, and in NWMP/PMU, 1992:G-05(E), p. 114) it is mentioned that in 
1949 a Special Collector was appointed to be in charge of the localisation work in that canal. This 
early localisation in the KC Canal is confirmed in the draft text by Robert Wade referred to in 
footnote 22. 
PROTECTION AND LOCAUSA TION 47 
Delimitation ofayacut. -Whenever a new canal is excavated for irrigation, it is essential 
to prevent haphazard development of area of cultivation, which might ultimately lead 
to waste of water. This can best be done by circumscribing the actual irrigable extent 
by having it regularly defined. This was done in a very systematic manner in the Grand 
Anicut Canal area of the Cauvery Delta. Block maps showing the contour levels for 
the whole ayacut were first prepared. This facilitated the localizing of the ayacut in the 
most suitable areas and securing the best alignments for channels and field bodhies in 
the interests of economy and efficiency. Village sites, roads, cart tracks, drainage 
courses, grazing grounds, cremation places, freshing floors and lands for other 
communal purposes, that might reasonably be required in years to come were all 
examined and specifically and permanently excluded from project ayacut. The areas so 
reserved came to about 3 per cent to 5 per cent of the whole area of the village. (Ellis, 
1950:263; emphasis added) 
This paragraph is not found in the 1931 edition of the manual (Ellis, 1931:249), suggesting 
that between 1931 and 1950 the 'delimitation of ayacut' became a more formalised practice. 
In Barber's History of the Cauvery-Mettur Project the process is described in detail (Barber, 
1940:429-438). It consisted of four steps: a) the cadastral survey of the proprietary areas, 
b) the preparation of a Record of Rights, c) the reservation of land for communal purposes, 
and d) the determination of the ayacut.21) 
Localisation is this procedure with two additional elements: (i) the exclusion of part of the 
command area from irrigation and (ii) the prescription of the crop to be grown. The two 
additions transform localising into localisation, and make it an instrument for implementing 
protective irrigation.28' The answer to the question how, why and by whom these additions 
were made, lies hidden in the records of the Public Works and Revenue Departments of 
Madras Presidency and Hyderabad State. At present, I can only offer hypotheses. 
First, it can be observed that localisation originated in the colonial period, and that the 
Revenue Department played an important role in its elaboration (the rules in Appendix 3.1 
were issued by the Revenue Department). One retired irrigation engineer that I interviewed 
on this, characterised localisation as a "regimental, magisterial" form of governance, 
conceived by a government that could not imagine that its subjects would not do as told. On 
the Hyderabad State side this may have been particularly strong because of the feudal 
politico-administrative system prevailing before Independence (for descriptions see Leonard, 
1971, 1978; Ramakrishna Reddy, 1987; Ray, 1988).29) It can be hypothesised that 
localisation is as it were an inversion of the land revenue settlement and assessment 
procedure. Settlement and assessment involved registering how land was actually used 
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 The delimitation exercise for the Cauvery-Mettur scheme was necessary because the 1924 
agreement between the Mysore and Madras governments, on the sharing of the Cauvery waters, 
limited the command area of the Cauvery-Mettur project to 301.000 acres. This was planned as 
a contiguous area for cultivating rice. Localizing did not (yet) refer to limiting water use by 
controlling the cropping pattern. 
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 In several of my interviews with retired Irrigation Department engineers, a distinction was made 
by them between localisation proper (the delimitation of the ayacut, the area to be irrigated) and 
what they called crop localisation, that is fixing the cropping pattern. This may support Satnarayan 
Singh's suggestion. 
291
 It could be argued that this top-down attitude was reproduced in a different form in the post-
Independence approach of planned development. Ramamurthy (1995:175) notes the attraction of 
the 'scientific' approach of localisation to technocratically minded planners. This is I think a correct 
observation, relevant till the present day, but it does not explain why South Indian 
engineers/planners opted for localisation while in other regions different avenues were chosen. 
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(irrigated or not, crop, soil quality), to fix the rate of land revenue. When this is done before 
irrigation arrives, the procedure becomes an instrument of prescription and control. 
A second factor that may explain the genesis of localisation is the unfamiliarity of Madras 
Presidency engineers with local level irrigation. In contrast to their colleagues in North India, 
they had little involvement with water distribution at the local level. This was mostly 
arranged by farmers themselves in village units (see Famine Commission, 1881-Appendix 
V). 
Furthermore, the irrigation of 'irrigated dry' crops, which puts new demands on water 
management, was a new thing. There was little practical experience with it in South India. 
Ellis mentions that in 1916-17 over 93% of the irrigated area under government canals in 
Madras Presidency was rice land (Ellis, 1931:3). In Hyderabad State large-scale canal 
irrigation as such was a new thing for the government. The Nizamsagar project, built in the 
1920s and 1930s, was the only experience with large canal systems at the time the 
Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal was conceived, and this was a rice scheme. 
A third factor that may have been important, and on which there is some more evidence, 
is the debate that was going on in the 1930s, particularly on the Madras side, on the 
feasibility of 'irrigated dry' cultivation in black cotton soil areas. This debate had two 
elements. The first was the lack of interest of farmers in irrigation of 'irrigated dry' crops 
in black cotton soil areas, except in years when the rains failed totally. The Kurnool-
Cuddapah Canal in Madras Presidency and the Nira Left Bank Canal in Bombay Presidency 
were examples of this (Wallach, 1985; Attwood, 1987). The second element of the debate 
was the suitability for irrigation of black cotton soils. This class of vertisols (Krishnappa et 
al., 1985, 1986) was feared by soil scientists and other experts to be prone to waterlogging 
and salinisation when irrigated. Many farmers were also reluctant to irrigate these soils for 
fear of destruction of the top-soil structure, and for the possibility of excessive weed growth 
as a result of irrigation. An agricultural research station was established on the Madras side 
in 1937 to do experiments and settle the matter. It was concluded that the irrigation of black 
cotton soils had both a considerable yield effect and that there was no danger of waterlogging 
and salinity provided irrigation was done judiciously: no over-irrigation and good 
drainage.30' 
The conclusion that the irrigation planners of the time seem to have drawn from this is 
that irrigation of black cotton soils required strong water control. The two elements of the 
debate provided two different reasons for this. The lack of interest implied that farmers 
would have to be convinced to take up irrigation. This was translated in making irrigation 
compulsory once the land was localised. Or more precisely, it was considered to make the 
payment of the high, irrigated rate of land revenue compulsory on land that was localised, 
whether it was actually irrigated or not (see Gopalan, 1934:64; Raghavan, 1947c).31) In this 
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 Debate on this issue has been going on for a long time (see for example IIC, 1 903; Mann, 1931; 
Mehta, 1933; Venkata Ramiah, 1937; Raghavan, 1947a; Krishna, Desai and Krishnamurthy, 1959; 
Patil and Venkata Rao, 1965; UAS, 1973; Kenchana Gowda, 1978). In 1972 the Irrigation 
Commission recommended "further studies (...) on the suitability of black soils for irrigation in 
different regions and climates" (GOI/MOIP, 1972:115-116). 
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 In the Karnataka Irrigation (Levy of Water Rates) Rules, 1965 it says in rule 3A that "where 
water is supplied, made available or used for growing any crop or the irrigation of any land but no 
crop is actually grown water rate shall be levied at the rates prescribed (..) as if the concerned crop 
was grown." 
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way the government hoped to induce the development of irrigated agriculture. From this 
perspective localisation was a means to enforce irrigation, rather than to limit it. 
The second element, the need for judicious irrigation of 'irrigated dry' crops on black 
cotton soil, translated into extensive soil surveys of the area to be irrigated (Mehta, 1933; 
Venkata Ramiah, 1937). The core criterion for the selection of an area for irrigation was soil 
quality, combined with topographical position. The latter was particularly important for 
proneness to waterlogging and salinisation. For each soil-topographical category (called 
grades), particular crops were thought to be suitable and unsuitable.32' This view of the 
irrigability of black cotton soil provided a rationale for tight control of the cropping pattern. 
The origins of localisation are likely to lie in top-down, directive concepts of state 
governance, combined with a set of specific regional factors. However, the enigma that the 
choice of localisation presents can only be fully solved through further historical research. 
The implementation of localisation 
The preparation of the localisation pattern in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal seems to have 
raised few problems.33' Interviews with persons involved in localisation in the 1950s 
suggest that the procedure as described in the rules (see Appendix 3.1) was closely followed. 
It seems to have been a genuine top-down process with very little local participation. There 
are only a few indications that the localisation pattern in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal 
was subject to local pressures and considerations. One example is the discussion on the 
length of the main canal and whether to irrigate on its left side (in the Krishna basin) after 
reaching the ridge between the Tungabhadra and Krishna rivers at Mile 103 (see chapter 4). 
Another example of local influence is the agitation of Sindhanur farmers in the early 1960s 
for additional localisation of rice.34) 
One of the most intriguing questions with regard to the local shaping of the localisation 
pattern, is how it was decided at village level to exclude and include particular areas in the 
localisation scheme. The discretion of the Revenue Officer as defined in the localisation rules 
(see Appendix 3.1) was enormous. Criteria like 'economic condition', 'adequacy of existing 
resources' and 'capacity to develop lands without outside assistance' left a lot of room for 
interpretation. Considering that Raichur district was a very poor area (see chapter 5), these 
criteria must have implied a bias for localisation of the land of the more well to do 
farmers.35' On the other hand, it is unlikely that many farmers were very keen on getting 
their lands localised in the early years, as they were hesitant about the blessings that 
irrigation would bring.36' 
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 These soil surveys were land evaluation avant la lettre. Later it was concluded that almost all 
crops could be grown on almost all soils (see for example Sreeramakrishnaiah, 1979). Farmers' 
cultivation practices provided the empirical evidence for this. 
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 I have also found no references in the literature to problems in the localisation process in other 
systems. 
341
 This information comes from interviews with a retired engineer and agricultural department 
officer. Also see GOMYS/DRLAD (1962:36; 1963:46). 
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 This bias existed in other domains. The first loans for tractors that were supplied went to 'big 
(wo)men' from the district (see GOMYS, 1960-1:129 and 1961-2:50). 
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 Evidence of this reluctance is the report of a field visit to a canal in Gangavathi taluk in the head 
end of the system around 1960 (Nair, 1961:46-51). In a village where water had been available 
for two years only three out of 100 farmers had taken up irrigation, and had made seven out of 
(continued...) 
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Localisation, smoothly prepared or not, creates certain problems. A problem that exists 
in all variations of localisation is its permanence. The Irrigation Utilisation Commission of 
Andhra Pradesh characterised localisation as highly inequitable because it excludes part of 
the irrigable command area from irrigation, and thereby condemns part of the farm(er)s to 
rainfed agriculture only (GOAP, 1982). The report recommends to introduce the North 
Indian 'water rights for all' system. 
Also within the localised command area permanence is a problem. Someone whose land 
is localised for 'irrigated dry' crops will never be allowed to cultivate sugarcane, rice or 
garden crops, while a direct neighbour may be allowed to do so for perpetuity. One can 
easily imagine that farmers consider such differences arbitrary and unacceptable, and see no 
reason to follow the localisation pattern in their crop choice. 
Because there is no homogeneity in the way localisation has been implemented in different 
canal irrigation systems, the seriousness and implications of some other problems inherent 
to localisation vary from system to system. A few examples can illustrate this.37' 
In the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal the localised area under each distributary canal forms 
a contiguous area. In principle all land that is commanded by a distributary canal is localised, 
except high patches, a zone around villages as protection againt malaria, and land reserved 
for other purposes. When the area to be localised had to be limited, the distributaries were 
shortened.38' 
On the other side of the river in the Tungabhadra Right Bank Low Level Canal, a very 
different pattern is found. There distributary canals run for long distances through areas of 
non-localised land to reach localised patches near villages. These villages and the block(s) 
of localised land belonging to them sometimes lie at kilometres distance from the distributary 
canal. Compared to the Left Bank Canal the possibilities to extend irrigation beyond the 
localised area are large (see Boss, 1998). 
Another example of diversity in the implementation of localisation is that in the 
Tungabhadra system rice is among the localised crops. In Karnataka this is not the case in 
systems that were built later, and rice is not or hardly grown in these systems.39' Absence 
of rice will obviously make a huge difference for the inequality of water distribution and the 
occurrence of waterlogging and salinisation. 
A third example of diversity concerns the separation in time of the irrigation of different 
areas. Localisation involves irrigation of part of the command area in the kharif season and 
part in the rabi season. The rationale of this separation is that it reduces the canal capacity 
needed, and thereby the construction costs, compared to the situation that all this land would 
be irrigated in one season. It also spreads agricultural labour requirements over the year. 
In the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal this separation of kharif and rabi irrigation is often 
found in the same outlet command area. Outlet command areas which have 'irrigated dry' 
36l(...continued) 
535 acres irrigable. The agitation referred to above of the Sindhanur farmers a few years later 
shows that the attitude of at least some farmers quickly changed. 
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 However, a fuller treatment of this would require comparative research across systems. 
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 This was necessary in tail end distributaries to stay within the limit of the total sanctioned area. 
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 It has been suggested to me that this exclusion of rice in newer systems is a lesson learnt from 
the Tungabhadra system. Its absence in practice has to do with the shorter opening period of the 
main canal (not exceeding 8 months), the absence of migrant farmers (see chapter 5), and it is also 
attributed to the type of (black cotton) soil found in these other project areas. I have not been able 
to verify the latter explanation. 
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crops localised usually have 50% in kharif and 50% in rabi. It is not easy to see how in one 
outlet command area some people will abstain from irrigation and wait till the next season, 
while others do irrigate.40' 
In the Tungabhadra Right Bank Low Level Canal the kharif/rabi separation has been 
designed in a more implementable way. Blocks the size of a number of outlet command areas 
have been localised for the same season(s). In the 'off season the outlet gates are not only 
closed but cemented. It is very clear to farmers which part of the command area of a 
distributary is irrigable in kharif and which in rabi. 
Monitoring localisation 
The problems discussed above suggest that monitoring the implementation of localisation is 
not an easy matter. In older systems like the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal, chances of 
successful monitoring were further reduced by effectively leaving farmers free to cultivate 
the crops they preferred well into the 1960s, and probably the early 1970s. No sanctions 
seem to have existed in the early years for non-adherence to the localisation pattern.41' This 
was a period when the construction of the canal system was unfinished, not all land was 
made suitable for irrigation, and therefore water was abundant. It was also a period when 
India needed to boost its food production. That the government did not pursue the 
implementation of localisation with great vigour in this period and allowed farmers to 
maximise production per unit land, is therefore quite understandable. 
Legal procedures to control the cropping pattern were first introduced under the Mysore 
(later Karnataka) Irrigation Act of 1965. The Act made divergence from the localisation 
pattern an offence. Two types of offences are distinguished: (i) violation of cropping pattern 
(VCP), that is, the cultivation of a different irrigated crop than localised, and (ii) 
unauthorised irrigation (UI), that is, the cultivation of an irrigated crop in non-localised area. 
Implementation started from approximately 1970. A newspaper report from 1971 on a 
New Type of "Offences" in Raichur Dt. states that in 1970 there were only 85 VCP and UI 
cases, but that in 1971 there were over 2000, mostly in Gangavati and Sindhanur taluks.^ 
The report claims that this impelled the creation of a new police station in Gangavati.43) 
Penalties can be imposed for each of the two offences. For UI these can range between ten 
and thirty times the water rate of the crop grown and for VCP between five and ten times 
(see sections 28(5) and 32(4) of the Karnataka Irrigation Act, 1965). 
The determination of the VCP and UI penalties is a joint responsibility of the Revenue 
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 In GOMYS (1962-63:46) it is mentioned that in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal the area 
localised for 'irrigated dry' crops is not yet designated for the kharif and rabi seasons, and that this 
needs to be done. This means that in the early years of the project there were no directions given 
to farmers for the season in which to grow 'irrigated dry' crops. In GOMYS (1962-3:43) it is 
mentioned that the demarcation will be made in the ayacut register. One wonders how it was 
thought to be made in the field. 
411
 As far as I know no rules or regulations as described below were created under the Hyderabad 
Irrigation Act, 1948. 
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 The four most important taluks for the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal command area are, from 
head to tail, Gangavati, Sindhanur, Manvi and Raichur (see map 1.1 for the location of the taluk 
headquarters). 
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 The source of this information is an undated newspaper report from the files of a former 
secretary of the distributary 24 Distributary Committee. 
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Department and the Irrigation Department. The Village Accountant and the Irrigation 
Inspector have to prepare a so called 'demand list' for each village after joint inspection of 
all the irrigated survey numbers. On the basis of the crop grown and the localisation pattern 
the water rate and eventual penalties are determined. The rates and penalties are collected 
by the Revenue Department as part of the collection of land revenue. (Appendix 3.2 gives 
a table with the water rates for different crops.) 
Field observations and discussion with informants show that the 'joint inspection' is often 
not done jointly. The Irrigation Inspector does this work mostly on his own. He often collects 
information not through observation, but by talking to farmers in their houses.44' This may 
lead to systematic under-reporting of the irrigated area with rice and sugarcane, because the 
water rates for these crops are higher than for 'irrigated dry' crops.45> 
There are enormous arrears in collection; farmers rarely pay the VCP and UI 
penalties.46' There are two reasons for non-payment by farmers. The first, general reason 
is the phenomenon of waivers of arrears in land revenue, agricultural loans, and the like. 
Waivers are part of the populist framework of relationships between the state and farmers 
(see below). The individual farmer has little incentive to respond to requests by the 
government and other institutions to fulfil his financial obligations, and government officials 
have little incentive to pursue this fulfilment. 
The second reason for the non-payment of penalties is the working of the legal system. 
Under the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 the Village Accountant can issue a notice to 
a defaulter for the payment of penal water rates. In case the defaulter does not pay within 
seven days, the Deputy Commissioner (the chief Revenue Department official in the district) 
can instruct the Village Accountant to bring to sale the defaulter's moveable property (Rule 
112 of Land Revenue Rules). In one of the first court cases on the payment of penal water 
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 One of my research assistants witnessed an inspection of the pipe outlet ayacut in which we 
were doing research, which, considering the absence of clear marking stones of survey numbers 
in the field and the lack of a detailed ayacut map, was much too casual to qualify as precise 
observation. The event may have been due to our presence. Considering the area an Irrigation 
Inspector is supposed to cover, it is also very difficult practically to do the inspection work fully 
through direct observation as intended, and complete the enormous amount of paperwork 
connected to it. 
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 There is obviously room for corruption here. Several informants (local journalists, advocates, 
(former) goverment officials) reported to me that in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal rice farmers 
regularly bribe Irrigation Department officials in order to reduce the area noted down as rice land. 
However, the water rate is very low compared to the value of the crop. The value of an acre of 
paddy may be over Rs.8000 (1992 figures), while the land revenue is Rs.40 (for sugarcane the 
figures are Rs. 15,000 and Rs.150). The penalties that can be avoided by underreporting rice and 
sugarcane are substantial however. Still, I have difficulty to imagine that the Irrigation Inspectors 
that I met are capable to extort money or other favours from the self-conscious head end rice and 
sugarcane farmers on a large scale. Farmers do not depend on the Irrigation Inspector for other 
services (such as they do on the Village Accountant: for birth and death certificates, no due 
certificates for loans, etcetera). I witnessed well-to-do farmers crumple notices to pay penalties in 
front of the Irrigation Inspector, and throw them in the canal. See chapter 7 for further discussion 
of the issue of corruption. 
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 The payment of water rates is better, but also not full. GOKAR/PD (1976:28) gives the collection 
rates for 1976: 36.3% of the water rate was collected, and 0.3% of the penalties. A recently 
appointed Expert Committee on the reform of irrigation policy in Karnataka gives a total figure for 
1995-96 of Rs.370 million for water rates, maintenance cess and penalties together. Of this, 
approximately Rs.200 million were water rates. Less than Rs.100 million of the total amount was 
actually collected (Interim Report, 1996). 
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rates in 1974, it was decided that "it is implicit in Section 32(4) [of the Karnataka Irrigation 
Act] that the holder of the land against whom a demand for water rate at an enhanced rate 
is to be made is entitled to an opportunity to show cause against the proposed levy of penal 
water rate".47) This means that farmers can contest the penalties imposed in a civil court. 
For the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal alone hundreds, and probably thousands of cases have 
been filed against the imposition of penal water rates since the 1970s.48' There seems to be 
no example of the government having won such a case. 
The strict procedures as they are laid down in Laws and Rules, give many opportunities 
to argue that these were not strictly followed. An example is the condition that notices for 
payment should be signed for receipt by the individual farmer or by an adult male member 
of his family, or otherwise be sent by registered post. Another weakness on the government 
side is that it does not issue notices to all violators, and consequently farmers who have been 
served notices can argue that they are not treated fairly. Yet another possibility is that the 
government withdraws cases after intervention by members of parliament representing the 
concerned farmers. 
In 1989-90, the Irrigation Department in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal stepped up its 
legal offensive by pursuing non-payment of penalties as a criminal case.49' The procedure 
is that the Executive Engineer of the Irrigation Department lodges a complaint with the 
Police Department, which investigates the complaint, and files it at the court. The Irrigation 
Department prepared the cases by issuing notices that prohibited the cultivation of rice in 
rabi, by registering the survey numbers in which rice nurseries were raised, by blocking the 
field channel to these plots, by observing that this block was removed and the farmer 
continued to grow the nursery, and then lodging a complaint. 
One of the weak points of this legal mechanism is that criminal cases require evidence of 
independent witnesses (other than Irrigation and Police Department officers). It is very 
difficult to find witnesses, and even more difficult to make them testify. This, combined with 
the standard tactic of advocates to delay cases as much as possible, makes proving the 
violation very difficult. 
Criminal cases are relatively immune to political interference. In principle, once they are 
under way, they cannot be stopped. The only possibility is that the State Cabinet sends a 
request for withdrawal of the case to the Director of Prosecution indicating that in the 
Cabinet's view there are convincing reasons to conclude that the grounds on which the case 
was originally urged no longer exist.i0) This happened to a number of criminal cases in the 
head end region of the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal in autumn 1991. MLAs had been 
successful in convincing the State Cabinet that the cases should be withdrawn. 
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 Writ Petition 3139 of 1973 at the Bangalore High Court, decided on 19.2.74 (reported in 
Kamatak Law Journal 1974(2)). I thank Mr. B.S. Raikote for discussing this matter with me and 
pointing me to the relevant cases. 
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 The cases seem to come in batches: around 1977, around 1981-82, and around 1988-89. 
These must have been years that the Irrigation Department and Revenue Department made special 
efforts to collect penalties. For 1988-89 this may have been a response to the serious water crisis 
in that year (see chapter 9). 
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 The following is based on interviews with advocates, government officials and farmers involved 
in (criminal) cases on penal water rates, and the study of a number of these cases. The effort was 
a response to the severe water crisis in 1988-89 and 1989-90. It was intended to curb rice 
cultivation in the rabi season (see also chapter 9). 
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 I thank Mr. K. Pavan Kumar for the explanation of this procedure. 
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To conclude this discussion of the monitoring of localisation it can be stated that the legal 
and institutional mechanisms to control the cropping pattern, and thereby water distribution, 
are paralysed. This paralysis does not mean that localisation has fully lost its importance. Its 
efficacy as a water control mechanism is very limited, but it remains important for two 
reasons. 
The first reason follows from the discussion of the implementation of localisation. There 
it was shown that even if farmers do not keep to the localisation pattern, the exact way it was 
designed has implications for water distribution practices. 
The second reason is that localisation has created legal entitlements to water. Farmers with 
localised land who receive no water or less than they are entitled to, have a formal claim to 
receiving irrigation water. Formal water rights are a precondition for the pursuit of a more 
equitable distribution of water. The abolishment of localisation, which is sometimes 
proposed, could take away the entitlement to water of tailenders and make their predicament 
even worse, except when localisation would be replaced by a stronger system of water rights 
(see chapter 10 for more discussion of this issue). 51) 
3.3 THE PERSISTENCE OF AN UNREALISTIC MODEL 
Notwithstanding the wide gap between the theory and the practice of protective irrigation, 
and the full acknowledgement of this gap (see for example GOI/PC/PEO, 1965; CADA/TBP, 
1979; Interim Report, 1996), the model of protective irrigation has remained a central 
element of Karnataka's and India's irrigation policy (see section 3.1). The logic of this 
continued existence of the model of protective irrigation lies in the populism of post-
Independence Indian politics. 
To explain the meaning of populism in this context, I quote from Ramamurthy's work, 
on which I draw heavily in this section.52' 
Populism, in India, as elsewhere, usually refers to 'disingenuous slogan-mongering' by 
political parties to manipulate the electorate for votes. Gupta (1987:53), however, 
suggests that it is something more: 'a hegemonic discourse that interpellates members 
of dominated classes into the dominant class'. In other words, populism offers a vision, 
a policy logic, that neutralizes any potential antagonism between different classes in 
the same sector, or between different members of the dominant coalition. For example, 
in the recent past there have been various agitations for "farmer's rights", these have 
mainly represented the interests of rich peasants for subsidized electricity for irrigation 
pumpsets, higher agricultural support prices, and the like; demands that would lead to 
a larger surplus for them. Yet, the fight is presented as a fight between rural and urban 
areas and thus masks both class antagonisms within the agricultural sector and between 
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 The definition of the present 'right' is problematic because it is indirect. No water right as such 
has been defined, but permission to grow an irrigated crop has been granted. To my knowledge 
there have been no large-scale efforts of (tail end) farmers to claim supply of water as a legal right 
in court. The only reference to such an attempt I came across was in the history of water 
distribution of subdistributary D24/11 (see chapters 6 and 7 for other aspects of water distribution 
in this canal). 
5211 do not discuss the historical emergence of populist politics in independent India. For a summary 
discussion see Ramamurthy (1995:182-187), and for detailed political-economic debate see Frankel 
(1978), Gupta (1987), Rudolph and Rudolph (1987, 1988), Byres (1988, 1994), Toye (1988), 
Kohli (1988), Frankel and Rao (1989, 1990), and Vanaik (1990). 
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the rural rich and the other groups in the dominant coalition, industrialist and 
bureaucrats. (Ramamurthy, 1995:183) 
How populism provides a logic for the persistence of protective irrigation policy, can be 
clarified by looking at the role that State parliamentarians (Members of the Legislative 
Assemblies, MLAs for short) play for and in the constituencies from which they are elected. 
MLAs are not only active in their legislative function, but also, and perhaps more so, in 
the implementation of government policies and programmes in their constituencies. Their role 
can be understood as one of 'resource brokers'. Potter, describing how MLAs were 
perceived in the 1950s in Orissa, states that in the eyes of many people "a successful MLA 
is a 'fixer' (...), someone who can get a man a job, divert development monies into the 
constituency, help secure a contract, find a place in a school or a hospital" (Potter, 
1986:152). The logic of this behaviour lies in the need to secure votes, that is secure re-
election. Manor describes MLA activities to "channel goods and services" to slum dwellers 
in India's cities and "work hard as their advocates in dealings with state institutions" as 
informed by this consideration (Manor, 1993:143-144). Elsewhere Manor speaks of 'spoils 
distribution' politics and the 'game of patronage polities', in which "in exchange for electoral 
support [groups] gained access to resources" (Manor, 1989:337, 352, 348). Frankel 
characterises the phenomenon as "competitive populism, with its attendant corruption in the 
disbursement of social development funds" (Frankel and Rao, 1989:511).53) 
Because all MLAs have to secure resources for their constituencies there is a pressure to 
spread public resources thinly. In canal irrigation the translation of this pressure is the 
construction of vast technical systems that serve large areas.54' As Ramamurthy notes, "to 
get votes, one of the best things a politician can do is to get a government canal for his 
constituency." (Ramamurthy, 1995:184)55> Protective irrigation thus fits well into a populist 
discourse that professes "equal benefits for all". 
Paradoxically, the populist political configuration that sustains protective irrigation at the 
policy level also "effectively thwarts its implementation" (Ramamurthy, 1995:176). The role 
of rich peasants in (rural) constituencies explains this. 
Rich peasants are the main political support base for MLAs in most rural constituencies. 
Rich peasants act as 'resource brokers' in local situations themselves, and thereby wield 
considerable local political influence.56' Rich peasants with land in protective irrigation 
systems tend to appropriate more than their protective share of irrigation water. In fact this 
appropriation is part of the explanation of their richess (see later chapters for detailed 
discussion). They are unlikely to be opposed very strongly in this activity by the MLAs. The 
latter are likely to condone, in practice, the non-implementation of localisation and non-
531
 On MLAs, also see Chopra (1996) and Vijayatilakam (1998) 
541
 It is also one of the factors that explains the preference for starting new projects rather than 
finishing and maintaining older ones. 
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 The Hemavathy project in the Cauvery basin (South Karnataka) provides an example of the 
pressure that is usually exerted at the conception stage of irrigation systems to spread the 
commanded area over many taluks, districts and constituencies, while keeping available water 
constant. It was originally designed as an intensively irrigated rice scheme, but has been extended 
to become a genuine protectively designed system. After the completion of a system further 
extension may take place. In the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal we found a case where the length 
of a distributary canal was doubled as the implementation of an electoral promise. 
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 For more detailed discussion of the importance of rich peasants in local and State politics, see 
for example P.R. Brass (1980, 1990:particularly pp.305-310), Carter (1974), Kohli (1988), Mitra 
(1992) and Varshney (1993). 
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achievement of protective objectives, for the same reasons that they defend these principles 
at the policy level: the reproduction of their political support base, or more simply put, re-
election. 
The unequal distribution of irrigation water that results is usually represented in non-class, 
or more generally, non-social terms. It is commonly referred to in geographical terms as the 
difference between head-enders and tail-enders. Furthermore, the blame of this difference is 
put on the irrigation bureaucracy. The role of social differentiation as cause and consequence 
of unequal distribution of water is thus obscured, a common enemy is defined57', and the 
homogenisation of 'farmers' that is characteristic of the populist discourse, is not 
fundamentally challenged.58' 
3.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have given a description of protection and localisation as defining 
characteristics of South Indian canal irrigation. Protection in the most general sense refers 
to the ability of irrigation to protect crops against failure and people against famine in times 
of drought. In this oldest usage of the term no particular type of irrigation was implied. The 
term protective canal irrigation was coined in the 1870s in combination with the term 
productive canal irrigation. Protective canal irrigation systems were the systems that the 
colonial government expected to yield insufficient financial returns to be considered for 
construction but that were nevertheless built because they safeguarded crops against drought 
and people against famine, but also protected the colonial government against high famine 
relief costs and social unrest. 
Protective irrigation developed as the particular type of canal irrigation found in the 
drought-prone regions of the South Asian subcontinent. It has specific technical, 
organisational and socio-economic characteristics. Technically the systems have vast 
command areas, designed to spread water thinly over large numbers of farmers for 
supplementary irrigation of 'dry' subsistence foodgrains. The systems are supply-oriented 
with, in the South Indian reservoir-fed systems, continuous and constant canal flows. There 
is a minimum of regulation structures. Organisationally they have a low management 
intensity and a hierarchical command structure, which fits the supply-orientation of the 
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 In later chapters, particularly chapter 7, it will become clear that the role and room to manoeuvre 
of the irrigation bureaucracy in the implementation of localisation is strongly shaped by the same 
populist 'resource broking' configuration. With regard to the role of the state bureaucracy 
Ramamurthy argues that "protective irrigation diffuses the conflict between two sectors of the 
dominant coalition: the rural rich and state bureaucrats" (Ramamurthy, 1995:185). Against the 
growing power of the class of rich peasants "protective irrigation and localization vest control in 
the bureaucracy over a scarce resource" (/ib/V.:185). I do not think this is a fully correct 
representation. The control was vested in the irrigation bureaucracy before rich peasants organised 
strongly politically, and the bureaucracy's control has eroded since. The emergence of rich peasant 
political power is unlikely to have played a role in the choice of localisation as a rationing strategy. 
In my view protective irrigation and localisation provide a basis for conflicts between the state 
bureaucracy and rich peasants, rather than diffusing them, exactly because the resource is scarce. 
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 As a last contribution of populism to the problematic situation in large scale irrigation 
Ramamurthy notes that populism has helped "to produce under-priced water" (Ramamurthy, 
1995:185). The discussion of localisation monitoring and water rates in this chapter supports that 
analysis. See chapter 10 for more discussion on water pricing. 
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technical design. The main organisational problem that requires resolution is the need to 
ration water. Different rationing systems were conceived in different parts of India. 
Economically, protective canal irrigation systems aim to maximise crop production per unit 
water. The model implicit in the concept of protective irrigation originally was subsistence-
oriented family farming, by a relatively homogeneous peasant sector, exhibiting modest 
economic growth. After Independence more emphasis has been given to production and 
productivity increase in protective irrigation systems as well, but relatively extensive farming 
with a low degree of commoditisation and a substantial subsistence component, remains 
implicit in the model. However, in the existing economic conditions farmers generally aim 
to maximise production per unit of land instead of water. These conflicting perspectives 
create a basic contradiction in the implementation of protective policy objectives. 
Localisation is the institutional mechanism designed in South India to control water 
distribution, ration water and spread the benefits of irrigation. It is a form of agricultural 
land use planning prescribing which crops farmers can and cannot grow on their land. By 
mainly prescribing 'irrigated dry' crops, localisation, when adhered to, would spread water 
equitably over all land/farmers in the command area. Localisation was first implemented in 
the Tungabhadra valley shortly after Independence. However, instead of thinly spread water, 
unequal distribution can be observed in many South Indian protective irrigation systems. 
Head-enders appropriate excess quantities of water, depriving tail-enders. The government 
has not been able to turn localisation into an effective mode of water control. 
To explain the paradox of the persistence of the protective irrigation model at the policy 
level in the face of wide acknowledgement that irrigation practices on the ground are far 
from protective, the populist nature of Indian politics was called upon. The role of MLAs 
as resource brokers for their constituencies implies a policy logic of spreading resources, 
including irrigation canals, widely. This ideological representation of protective irrigation and 
localisation as in the interest of all farmers is populist because it is accompanied by a practice 
in which the rich peasants corner most of the benefits by appropriating more than their 
protective share of water. It are these same rich peasants who are the key political support 
base of the legislators. 
Protective irrigation and state governance 
This chapter has shown that protection and localisation were conceived as instruments for 
governance by an assumedly 'strong state' ruling an assumedly 'weak society'. The 'strong 
state/weak society' model was part of the imperial approach to irrigation as well as the 
technocratic model of planned development that was dominant in the first decades after 
Independence. But in both periods the model was a projection that did not match reality. In 
the colonial period as well as in the first period after Independence the state was less strong 
and society less weak than the model assumed. In situations where water was wanted rationed 
distribution was difficult to implement, and in situations where water was unwanted, it was 
difficult to enforce irrigation. The rise of rich peasants political influence from the 1970s, 
related with - among other things - the expansion of irrigation, further articulated the 
strength of 'society' in canal irrigation. At the same time the authority of the irrigation 
bureaucracy weakened through increased 'political interference', as Irrigation Department 
engineers generally put it. 
However, to characterise the situation in canal irrigation as a 'strong society/weak state' 
condition is also not correct. Neither the strong/weak opposition nor the state/society 
dichotomy effectively captures the relationship between state and farmers in canal irrigation. 
Society is differentiated along several lines, the state is a complex set of political, 
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administrative and enforcing institutions (Lipton, 1991:93), and the two interact in such a 
way that demarcation of state and society is not always easy, or even possible. 
The question that presents itself is how to interpret protective irrigation, both the policy 
and the practice, as an instance of state governance and state-farmers relations.59' It is 
difficult to give a straightforward answer to this question, because different meanings of 
protective irrigation exist, and are contested both within the state and between state and 
farmers. 
At the policy level protective irrigation is clearly the product of a concept of a 
'developmental state'. Protective irrigation posits a strong regulating role of state institutions 
in economic development, and its objectives are defined in terms of spreading resources for 
the overall benefit of society. 
The populist logic that sustains protective irrigation at the policy level signifies a different, 
political meaning. Protective irrigation policy (or ideology some would perhaps say) secures 
a degree of state legitimacy and helps to reproduce politicians' political support base. 
At the level of practice there is a crisis of governance, constituted by (i) the 'political 
interference' of members of the political state institutions in the day-to-day business of the 
administrative state institutions (and of the enforcing state institutions, as will be shown in 
chapter 7), (ii) rent seeking practices of politicians and officials, and (Hi) the social power 
of the rich peasants. One of the major consequences is unequal access to irrigation water for 
farmers, while the dominant populist discourse obscures a full understanding of this 
inequality. 
Notwithstanding these circumstances, protective irrigation and localisation are not dead 
letters, but do influence irrigation practice. Unequal distribution of irrigation water is a felt 
problem. It is articulated through the pressure that tail enders exert on system managers, but 
it is also part of the professional disposition of the Irrigation Department staff. The 
perception of many of them is that the systems are operated 'unscientifically' at present, and 
that tailenders unjustifiedly 'suffer' while others enrich themselves. They feel highly 
frustrated in the execution of their 'duty'.60' 
The same conclusion that Mooij draws for food policy can also be drawn for protective 
irrigation policy: the Indian state is characterised by normative pluralism (Mooij, 1996:243). 
The behaviour of politicians and state officials, that is state governance in practice, with 
regard to protective irrigation and localisation is both informed by official law and policy, 
and by unofficial rules of conduct in relation to rent-seeking, the relationships between state 
officials and politicians, and their interaction with (rich) peasants. 
It is not obvious how this empirical conclusion can be integrated into substantive theories 
of the Indian state and politics. These tend to favour one particular aspect of governance 
practices. Following Mooij's classification of schools of thought (Mooij; 1996:48-63), neo-
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 The strong/weak state/society formulations already were a reference to state theory, that is to 
Migdal's book on Strong societies and weak states (Migdal, 1988). For a critical review of this 
book see Jessop (1990). 
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 Chapters 7 to 9 provide evidence for this interpretation. Mooij, while discussing the role of state 
officials in another public distribution system, that of food, observes the following about the role 
of state officials in that process. "Many officials do feel some sort of commitment to the job they 
have to perform. Their first response to a question posed by a researcher about food policy is 
always in terms of the official objectives and procedures. This is not just an effort to misguide the 
researcher. It also shows their own perception of what the state is, does, should be or should do. 
They partly identify with these official objectives." (Mooij, 1996:242) In my experience the same 
holds true for canal irrigation officials. 
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classical political economists analyse the Indian state as a rent-seeking state (Bhagwati, 
1993), while others, mostly political scientists emphasise the erosion of the political system 
(Kothari, 1988; Manor, 1988). A third group sees state officials and politicians as a separate 
proprietary or political class (Bardhan, 1984a; Rudolph and Rudolph, 1987). Lastly, a fourth 
perspective has a more positive evaluation or view of development planning and the 
developmental state (Byres, 1994; Chakravarty, 1987; Dreze and Sen, 1995; Mundle, 1994). 
A theoretical synthesis is not available, and the debates have hardly been conducted with 
irrigation as part of the subject matter. Theoretical development is also hampered by the 
scarcity of detailed studies of actual governance practices, particularly in irrigation.61' This 
is therefore where my argument stops: with a call for more studies of governance practices. 
The policy and practice of protective irrigation with all its contradictions certainly provides 
an interesting case. 
To conclude this chapter I observe than one factor that makes the protective irrigation 
discourse more than populist rhetoric, and protection and localisation concepts with real 
effects at field level, has not yet been mentioned. This factor is that the concept has 
materialised in the earth, concrete and hydraulic characteristics of canal systems. The 
physical existence of canal infrastructure that allows thin spread of water makes it difficult 
to fully ignore the stated objectives of protective irrigation and localisation. This 
materialisation process is the focus of the next chapter. 
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 The major exception is Wade's work on the system of administrative and political corruption, 
an analysis which includes the irrigation bureaucracy (Wade, 1982a). Though focussing on rent-
seeking, he does not adopt the methodological individualism of neo-classical political economy, but 
analyses rent-seeking/corruption as an instititutionalised set of social relationships. Wade does not 
explicitly engage with state-theoretical debates. Ramamurthy's analysis referred to above confirms 
many of Wade's findings and tends to interpret these in the perspective of the state as a separate 
proprietary or political class. As indicated above, in my view that perspective on its own is unable 
to fully capture the nature of governance practices (for more discussion of the interpretations of 
these two authors see chapter 7). 
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Appendix 3.1: Rules for localisation (1956, Hyderabad State) 
PART l-C-Rules 
REVENUE DEPARTMENT 
NOTIFICATION 
NO.48/A2/350/55 Dated 6-9-1956 
In exercise of the powers conferred by section 67(l) and 3d) of the Hyderabad Irrigation Act, 
1357 Fasli, (24 of 1357F.) the Rajpramukh hereby makes the following rules:-
1. These rules may be called the "Rules Regulating cultivation under Irrigation Projects, 1 956", 
and shall come into force from the date of their publication in the Official Gazette (20-9-1956). 
2. "Localisation" means allocation of the lands proposed to be served by an irrigation project 
to different types of irrigation, viz., perennial, wet, garden and light. 
3. For the purpose of localisation work-
(i) "Revenue Officer" means any Officer appointed by the Board of Revenue. 
(ii) "Irrigation Officer" means any Officer appointed by Government as such. 
(Hi) "Agricultural Officer" meands any Officer appointed by the Government as such. 
4. In case, localisation work is to be done on an extensive scale, Government shall appoint one 
or more than one Officer for expediting such work. 
5. (a) Sufficiently before irrigation under a project is scheduled to commence. Government may 
constitute a Localisation party consisting of a Revenue Officer with an adequate field and clerical 
staff. 
5. (b) The benefits of irrigation under a project may be extended to as large an area as possible 
consistent with the economic utility of water and other local considerations. 
6. The Irrigation Officer shall inspect each village in the commanded ares, conduct contour 
surveys and take out levels on the basis of which he shall prepare a map for each village showing 
the area that can be easily served by the proposed irrigation system and pass it on to the 
Agricultural Officer. 
7. The Agricultural Officer shall go into the village and inspect every field in the commanded 
area of the project as shown in the map furnished by the Irrigation Officer, take soil samples, 
analyse them, technically, both in the field and in the laboratory, and then classify the soils in each 
village into different categories on the basis of their suitability for different types of irrigation. 
8. The Agricultural Officer shall examine carefully the following factors before allocating the 
soils in different types of irrigation:-
(i) Physico-analysis of the soil; 
(ii) Peculiarities of the lower strata of the soil; 
(Hi) Drainage capacity; 
(iv) Configuration of the ayacut; 
(v) Such other technical details which may be prescribed by the Director of Agriculture for soil 
classification work. 
9. The Agricultural Offiver shall, on the basis of the intensive survey and analytical work, mark 
on the map of each village the different soils available in the proposed ayacut give them different 
colours, viz., red, green, black, etc. He shall also indicate in the foot note of the map the crops 
suited for different soils and types of irrigation. 
10. After giving full details of the soils and crops, the Agricultural Officer shall send the map 
to the Revenue Officer. 
11. The Revnue Officer shall, with the aid of the map, inspect the village and then prepare a 
tentaive scheme for fixing the extent of irrigation and allocation of different crops in the village. 
12. In fixing the extent, he shall give due consideration to:-
(i) the allowance to be made for village sites, communal needs, grazing and pastures, etc; 
(ii) the lands unsuited for crop production be reasonably made over for other appropriate uses, 
like pasturage, irrigated forest, efc.; 
(Hi) the extent in respect of which there is likely to be steady demand for water in ordinary 
years; 
(iv) selection of only such land having good soil or soil capable of restoring its fertility quickly 
and at small cost; the governing condition being to obtain the optimum result for the 
expenditure on artificial supply; 
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M leaving of a dry belt of at least half a furlong around a village to avoid malaria; 
(vi) extension of the benefoit of assured water supply to as many villages as possible, 
consistent with economic utilisation of water; 
(vii) the economic condition of the people and their willingness to take to irrigation; 
(viii)tbe adequacy of the existing resources in the village in agricultural cattle, population, 
transport facilities, etc; 
lix) the prospect of developing the localised lands, within a reasonable time; 
M the nature and extent of land holdings, and the capacity of the land owners to develop their 
lands without much outside assistance. 
13. The lands to be allotted to different types of irrigation shall be in large compact blocks and 
as practicable there shall be a separate distributary for each type of irrigation. Irrigation of small 
patches shall be avoided and in the lands coming in the dry belt of the village, only heavy irrigation 
shall be prohibited. 
14. The Revenue Officer shall send the localisation scheme for each village together with the 
map to the Collector of the District or any other Officer as may be appointed by the Government 
in this behalf. 
15. The Collector shall arrane to give due publicity to the scheme in the village and on an 
appointed date, call a meeting of the villagers and ascertain their views and objections, if any. 
16. The Collector shall then, in consultation with the Revenue, Agricultural and Irrigation 
Officers, finalise the localisation scheme and affix one copy thereof in the village chavidi and the 
other copy to the Revenue Officer. 
17. After the sheme is thus finalised, the Revenue officer shall prepare an ayacut register 
showing:-
(a) name of village, taluk etc. 
lb) the survey number of the land; 
(c) the nature of the soil; 
(d) the name of the land owner and others interested; 
(e) the block in which the land is to be included; 
If) the crop or crops to be grown every year; 
(g) the crop rotation; 
Ih) the existing assessment; and 
(i) remarks 
18. The ayacut register shall be in triplicate one for the Tahsil Office, one for Division and the 
third to be retained in the Office of the District Collector. 
19. Immediately after the receipt of the ayacut Register the Tahsildar shall issue individual 
notices to the persons whose lands are included in the localisation scheme and direct them to 
prepare their lands for receiving water before the prescribed date. 
20. Supply of water for irrigation from a project shall be regulated, as determined in the 
localisation scheme. 
21 . It shall be incumbent on the land owners, whose lands have been proposed for irrigation, 
to take water for the crop and for the period as shown in the localisation scheme. 
22. When a land is included in a localisation scheme, it shall be compulsory for the land owner 
to pay the consolidated wet assessment of water rate for the land as may be determined by the 
Collector, irrespective of the fact whether he takes the canal water or not. 
23. Any person contravening or violating the provisions of these rules shall be punishable by the 
Collector with a fine not exceeding Rs.500. 
24. An appeal against the orders of the Collector shall lie with the Board of Revenue whose 
decision shall be final. 
25. Any fine imposed under the rules shall be recoverable as arrears of Land Revenue. 
MOHD. ABDULLA, 
Secretary. 
(Source; Government of Andhra Pradesh (1982) Report of the Commission for Irrigation Utilisation. 
Volume II. Hyderabad, pp. 128-130) 
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Appendix 3.2: Water rates in Karnataka State 
The table below gives the water rates and maintenance cess as levied in canal irrigation systems 
in Karnataka State from 1985, and the increases proposed in 1989. 
Table 3.2.1: Water rates and maintenance cess for canal irrigation in Karnataka 
Crop 
Rice 
Sugarcane 
Wheat 
Sorghum 
Groundnut and 
sunflower 
Tobacco 
Cotton 
Maize, rag/', millets. 
greengram, sweet 
potato, gingelly, onion, 
coriander, eucalyptus 
Pulses 
Manurial crops 
Garden crops 
Water rates from 
1985 
(Rs./acre) 
First crop 
Second crop 
35 
40 
150 
22 
20 
24 
24 
40 
20 
15 
8 
40 
Water rates as 
from 1.1.1989 
(Rs./acre) 
ordered 
100 
400 
60 
35 
60 
35 
60 
35 
35 
15 
60 
Maintenance 
cess 
(Rs./acre) 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
* 
4 
4 
4 
Source: Government Order No. PWD 89 NPF 86 (RID, dated 31.10.1988, 
Irrigation Department Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal 1990-91 and 1991-92 
and demand lists 
The rates levied in 1991-92 (when we did our research) were set in 1985. From 1989 the 
government of Karnataka ordered a substantial increase, which it started to levy from 1990. The 
background for this increase was the desire of the government to recover the operation and 
maintenance costs and stimulate irrigation development by giving it a sounder financial base. More 
specifically, the World Bank was insisting that the Karnataka government comply to an agreement 
made under one of the Convenants in relation to the bank's financial support of the Upper Krishna 
Project. This said that the government of Karnataka would undertake to collect full operation and 
maintenance costs. As soon as the government tried to levy the new rates, farmers from the 
Tungabhadra Left Bank area filed a writ petition at the Bangalore High Court, arguing that the 
increase was arbitrary. On 2.2.90 a stay order was issued by the Court, stopping the government 
from applying the new rates to the petitioners.62' As a result the Irrigation Department was using 
the old rates for drawing up the demand lists for water rates in 1991-92. 
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 These were Writ Petitions 2367/90 to 2375/90. I only checked for cases originating from the 
Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal and I did not try to find out whether other petitions than those 
mentioned were filed with the same objective. 
TUNGABHADRA LEFT BANK CANAL 
The social shaping of an irrigation system: 1859-1976 
In this chapter I introduce the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal, the protective irrigation system 
that is the focus of this book. The Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal has come into existence 
through a process of political negotiation, planning, design exercises, and data collection 
activities stretching over more than a century. A proposal for a large scale irrigation system 
in the Tungabhadra valley was first put forward by Sir Arthur Cotton" as early as 1859, but 
it was the Indian Irrigation Commission (1901-03) that put the Tungabhadra project firmly 
on the political agenda. In 1944 an agreement was reached over the division of the 
Tungabhadra river waters between Madras Presidency, the Nizam's Dominions2' and 
Mysore Princely State. Construction of the dam started in 1948, and utilisation of the canal 
system in 1953. The last distributary was operational in 1968. The final decision on the 
extent of the canal system was taken by the Krishna Water Disputes Tribunal in 1973 and 
1976. 
The theoretical question that this chapter investigates is whether and in what way the 
planning and design of the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal are examples of the social shaping 
of a technological system (MacKenzie and Wajcman, 1985; Hughes, 1987). This means (see 
chapter 2) that I try to determine to what extent the design characteristics of the system 
emerged in a process of negotiation among different actors, who brought with them their own 
interests, strategies and resources. 
The planning phase of the project clearly exhibits social shaping characteristics. The two 
main issues were: 
(i) the desirability and feasibility of a protective irrigation system in the Tungabhadra 
valley, and 
(ii) the division of the river waters among the riparian States. 
11
 Sir Arthur Cotton, Chief Engineer in Madras Presidency at the end of his career, is sometimes 
referred to as the 'irrigation wizard of the South' (Tungabhadra Board, 1959:1). He conceived, 
designed and executed the first large scale British irrigation works in South India in the deltas of 
the rivers Cauvery, Krishna and Godavari. The improvement and expansion of the existing systems 
in these deltas were extremely profitable to the colonial government in financial terms, and laid the 
foundation for South Indian large scale irrigation engineering. In addition Cotton is famous for his 
public advocacy of investment in irrigation as against that in railways, and his debate with Sir Proby 
Cautley on the design of the Ganges Canal. On Sir Arthur Cotton, see Hope (1900). 
21
 I will also refer to the Nizam's Dominions as Hyderabad, as is common practice. 
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It took a long time before the position of the Nizam's Dominions government that canals 
should be constructed on both banks of the river and their claim of a 50% share of available 
water, were accepted by the Madras Presidency government. The socio-historical context in 
which these issues were negotiated were (i) a lack of emphasis on protective irrigation in 
irrigation policy implementation, notwithstanding formal policy statements to the contrary 
(see chapter 3), and (ii) the unequal relation between Madras Presidency and the Nizam's 
Dominions, determined by the system of indirect rule of this Princely State called 
'paramountcy' (see Ray, 1988). An additional factor was the lack of experience with large 
scale irrigation construction, particularly in the Nizam's Dominions. 
The design phase of the left bank canal system is much less evidently an example of a 
social shaping process. Some design elements, like the total quantity of water available, the 
size of the command area and the part of it to be irrigated, the cropping (localisation) pattern 
and the duties to be adopted, and the length and alignment of the main canals, were part of 
the negotiations of the inter-State issues mentioned above. The claims of the negotiating 
parties were grounded and supported by concretising these design elements. Agreement on 
these design elements reached by the engineers needed political approval. 
Once a sufficient level of agreement on the sharing of the river water was reached in the 
1940s, the phase of detailed design of the irrigation system started. This process was fully 
controlled by the design engineers, and neither political actors nor the future users of the 
canal system seem to have played a significant role in it. From a users perspective it was a 
conventional top-down process that emphasised physical and cost of construction criteria in 
design choices, and which largely ignored the socio-economic context in which the design 
would have to function. This is particularly clear in distributary design. 
There is thus little process to be analysed in the design phase. The question that the social 
shaping perspective raises with regard to the design phase is under which (social) conditions 
designing takes place in a top-down, engineer-dominated fashion. 
The chapter is structured as follows. The first section (4.1) deals with the events that led 
up to the actual design and construction of the system. The reasons that nothing came of the 
system in the 19th century are discussed, as well as the long-drawn negotiations over the 
division of water in the 20th century. In the following section (4.2), the general features of 
the design of the Left Bank Canal are discussed: the total quantity of water available for the 
canal, the cropping pattern and duties, the alignment of the main canal, and the design 
process at distributary level. I conclude with some observations on the social shaping of the 
Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal and the social significance of its design characteristics (4.3). 
4.1 PLANNING 
The planning phase of the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal can be divided into two periods. 
The first runs from the formulation of the first plan for the Tungabhadra system in 1859, to 
the report of the Indian Irrigation Commission (1901-03). The second period starts where the 
first terminates, but has two end points: 1944, when the first agreement over the division of 
the Tungabhadra waters was reached, and 1976 when the final decision on this issue was 
taken by the Krishna Water Disputes Tribunal. 
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1859-1902: a plan remaining a plan 
The first description that I have been able to find of Sir Arthur Cotton's plan for a large 
scale irrigation system at the spot of the present Tungabhadra project dates from 1859. The 
Report of the Directors to the First Ordinary Meeting of the Madras Irrigation and Canal 
Company3' in October 1859, describes the project as follows. 
1. An Irrigating and Navigable Canal proceeding from the southern side of the 
Toombuddra [=Tungabhadra] River, and passing through the extensive and naturally 
fertile districts of Bellary, Kurnool, Cuddapah and Nellore, where it will join the East 
Coast Canal, and thus form a continuous water communication between the central 
Provinces, and Madras; taking its supply from the Rivers Toombuddra and Pennar, and 
other streams within its range, and also from large tanks or reservoirs in their 
neighbourhood and:-
2. A like canal leading off from the opposite [=left] bank of the Toombuddra at the 
same point as the first, passing through the Raichoor Doab, the southern portion of the 
country lying between the Kistnah [=Krishna] and Toombuddra Rivers. (MICC, 
1859:3) 
As this quotation suggests, the canal taking off from the right bank of the Tungabhadra 
river was part of Cotton's masterplan for canal construction in the Indian subcontinent (see 
item 1. in the quotation). The plan, conceived after the financial success of the irrigation 
system improvements and extensions in the deltas of the Province of Madras, focused as 
much on navigation as on the creation of irrigation potential. The canal on the right bank of 
the Tungabhadra was part of a design for connecting India's east and west, north and south, 
by means of waterways. The second objective of the right bank canal was to protect this tract 
from drought and famine. 
It is remarkable that in this first proposal for the Tungabhadra project a left bank canal 
through Raichur district is also included (see item 2. in the quotation above). From 1853 to 
1860, the period in which Cotton conceived his proposal, Raichur district came under direct 
British rule (see Ray, 1988:7-22 for this episode). The suggestion to construct a left bank 
canal seems to have gone unnoticed in the Nizam's Dominions, because it is only at the very 
end of the 19th century that irrigation construction is considered by the Nizam's government 
on the left bank, but on a much smaller scale (see below). In Cotton's proposal the objective 
of the canal on the left, Hyderabad bank must have been irrigation mainly, because a canal 
running parallel to both the Tungabhadra and Krishna rivers can hardly have been considered 
important in terms of navigation across India. Navigation for local transport may have been 
considered (see below). 
The execution of the plan came to lie with the Madras Irrigation and Canal Company 
(MICC). This company only managed to construct the Kurnool-Cuddapah Canal, and that 
barely.4' The construction of the canal was more expensive and technically more 
31
 The MICC was a shortlived effort at irrigation development by private enterprise. See chapter 3, 
section 3.1 and below. 
41
 Unfortunately I have not been able to trace the map that accompanied the 1859 MICC report. 
It is therefore uncertain whether a separate Kurnool-Cuddapah Canal and a canal running through 
Bellary were conceived from the beginning, or whether there initially was a plan for one canal only. 
Tungabhadra Board (1959:8) states that Cotton drew up a plan in 1860 for the Tungabhadra 
project including a storage reservoir, the Bellary canal, the Kurnool-Cuddapah canal, and works in 
Nellore district in the Pennar basin, to where the KC Canal would transport water from the 
Tungabhadra basin. No source is given for this information. Sandes (1935-11:25) dates the 
formulation of the first plan earlier in the 1850s, but gives no source. 
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complicated than anticipated, and the company ran aground financially in the mid-1860s 
(Atchi Reddy, 1990). 
However, there was considerable pressure from the Tungabhadra right bank area to build 
a canal. In July 1866 the Collector of Bellary district wrote to the Acting Secretary to the 
Board of Revenue "on the subject of the extreme importance of carrying out an irrigation 
project for the benefit of this District". He argued that such a canal would be a financially 
attractive proposition (Proceedings of the Madras Government, Public Works Department 
No.399, 20.8.1866). In a subsequent letter, the Collector further motivated his request by 
writing that 
[n]othing but irrigation can save this District from periodical famines; loss of valuable 
stock, dying for want of fodder, and distress which high prices entail on the great mass 
of the people. The agriculturalists are now bartering their gold ornaments, their capital 
made by cotton, for grain to exist upon; their cattle are dying in thousands for want 
of straw, which irrigation would furnish; grass has disappeared, {ibid.) 
The need for a protective irrigation system was thus strongly advocated by the administration 
of the concerned district. 
The Madras Presidency government was supportive of the plan, but the financial returns 
criterion (see chapter 3) was decisive. The Madras government stated that when the MICC 
would be unable to construct the system, the Presidency could consider to undertake the canal 
itself (Proceedings of the Madras Government, Public Works Department No.400, 
20.8.1866). This seems to have led to serious consideration of the construction of the canal. 
Thirumalai Iyengar (1945:5) refers to a government order from 1869 on a proposal for a 
canal through Bellary (G.O. No. 1756, dated 22.3.1869). The canal was found to be too 
expensive (yielding a return of 2.6% only), and it was decided not to execute it. A 
subsequent proposal (yielding 3.4%) was also unfavourably decided. 
Altogether it was considered that both (...) schemes for a canal from the Tungabhadra 
in the Bellary District were very unpromising whether cost, result of outlay, or 
probability of successful irrigation were considered. (Thirumalai Iyengar, 1945:5)5) 
Other considerations also complicated decision making on the project. There was the 
experience of 'unwanted water' gained in the Kurnool-Cuddapah Canal in the mean time (see 
chapter 3, section 3.2). The Famine Commission of 1878-80 reports that until the reasons 
for the failure of the K-C Canal are well understood, "the Government have excellent reasons 
for declining to undertake the Tungabhadra Canal" in the neighbouring district of Bellary 
(Famine Commission, 1880-11:161). 
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 It is unclear to which detail Cotton's plans and other early plans for the right and left bank canals 
were designed, but it is unlikely that they were designed in great detail. There was discussion on 
the extent and the type of irrigation and the cropping pattern to be adopted in the right bank canal 
in the years after the proposal was made. In the Proceedings of the Madras Government, Public 
Works Department No.398 (20.8.1866) it is stated that an area of 750,000 acres can be irrigated 
from the right bank canal running through Bellary district, which must - considering the extent -
have been for the irrigation of'irrigated dry' crops. In MICC (1867) a figure of 200,000 to 225,000 
acres is mentioned for the Bellary section of the right bank canal, and a duty of 100 acres/cusec 
(at main canal level) can be calculated from the data given. This suggests a mix of rice and 
'irrigated dry' crops. The Famine Commission of 1878-80 speaks of a canal irrigating 1 50,000 
acres for rice irrigation (Famine Commission, 1880-11:161; 1881:115). This acreage is also 
mentioned by Thirumalai Iyengar (1945:5), who also gives the discharge at the head of the main 
canal (2250 cusecs), implying a duty of 66.7 acres/cusec, which is a rice duty. I do not know 
which of these or other proposals were the basis for the calculations of financial returns. 
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With regard to the dam required for the system there were questions as well. In the years 
1863-1866 an investigation was done for the MICC on possible sites for reservoirs in the 
Tungabhadra valley.6' Suitable sites were difficult to find. Either the dams were too long 
(upto 4500 meters) and therefore very expensive, or the number of villages and value of 
property to be submerged by the reservoir was considered too large. The dams considered 
were earthen dams, with depths of water at the dam up to 100 feet (30 meters). The largest 
reservoir considered had a capacity of 92.3 TMCft. (Thousand Million Cubic feet), which 
is almost 70% of the capacity of the present reservoir. In the 1860s however, this size of 
reservoir was unprecedented in India. Experience with building large (masonry) dams was 
only gained - in India - at the end of the 19th century and in the first decades of the 20th 
century (Sandes, 1935:32; Kulkarni, 1990). Even if it had been decided to build the project, 
it is doubtful that it could have been constructed. 
Perhaps because of continued calls for the project from the district, the right bank canal 
did not fully disappear into political oblivion. In the separate Report of the Irrigation 
Committee of the Famine Commission of 1878-80, investigation of the possibilities for 
irrigation in Bellary district is recommended (Famine Commission, 1881:115). Thirumalai 
Iyengar mentions that the subject of canal construction was revived in 1885, 1889 and in 
1897-98, though without success. In 1899 the Madras government issued an order stating that 
"the subject must not be dropped and investigation must be resumed to find ways and means 
to utilise the large quantities of water going to waste" (G.O. No.2229, dated 8.3.1899; 
Thirumalai Iyengar, 1945:5). A substantive change at the policy level was needed to push 
the project forward. This came in 1902. 
1902-1944: negotiating the division of the Tungabhadra waters 
In the period from 1902 to 1944 the governments of Madras Presidency and the Nizam's 
Dominions had difficult negotiations about the proportional use of the available water in the 
Tungabhadra river. Because neither of the two parties could execute their plans without 
agreement of the other party, the final settlement was a 50% share of the waters for each 
government, despite the greater political clout of Madras Presidency. 
In 1902 the Madras Public Works Department (PWD) presented a proposal for a right 
bank Tungabhadra canal to the Indian Irrigation Commission (1901-03). The Commission 
attributed great importance to the project and requested further investigations directly after 
it had visited Madras (IIC, 1903-11:101). The proposal that the IIC recommended for 
investigation and construction in its final report is shown in map 4.1.7) 
It may be noted that the IIC proposal is for a canal on the right bank only. The possibility 
of new irrigation on the left bank, in Raichur district in the Nizam's Dominions, had taken 
concrete form only a few years earlier. Gopalan reports that in 1895 a Minister of the 
Nizam's Dominions government was on tour in Raichur District, and that the "wide spread 
and acute distress of the people" made him realise that the district should be protected by 
means of irrigation (Gopalan, 1934:2-3). A proposal was prepared, and sanctioned by the 
Nizam government, for rehabilitation of the Bennur irrigation system. This was one of the 
river diversion systems constructed during the Vijayanagar Empire, in the 13th to 16th 
6!
 The report of this survey can be found in Proceedings of the Madras Government, Public Works 
Department No.523, July 1866. 
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 In this plan the Bellary canal takes water into the Pennar basin as well, an idea that was dropped 
later and is not part of the present right bank design. 
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century.8' The Madras Government was of the opinion however, that this 10,000 acres 
project might affect their interests lower down the river, and that a decision could only be 
taken with the knowledge and consent of the Madras government. The project was stopped 
in 1898. This was the first occasion in the negotiations on the Tungabhadra project at which 
Madras showed its paramount power over the Nizam's Dominions. 
Perhaps because of this incident, the Indian Irrigation Commission (1901-03) wrote in its 
report that 
[t]he fact (...) must not be lost sight of that it will not be possible to carry out any 
large storage scheme on the Tungabhadra without occupying lands belonging either to 
His Highness the Nizam or His Highness the Maharaja of Mysore, or perhaps to both. 
We are hopeful that no serious difficulties may arise if they are allowed to participate, 
as far as may be practicable, in the benefits of any schemes that may be devised (.••)• 
(IIC, 1903-11:101) 
The hopes of the Irrigation Commission were in vain. In August 1905 a conference took 
place in Hyderabad between the Madras and the Hyderabad government on the compensation 
to be given by Madras for the submergence of territory in the Nizam's Dominions by the 
construction of a reservoir at Malapur, the present site. The Hyderabad government 
demanded a 50% share in the river waters. The Madras government submitted the plans and 
estimates that it had in the mean time prepared for the right bank project to the Government 
of India, with the suggestion that the Tungabhadra project should be deferred for 15-20 
years, as it was not a productive scheme. Preference was given to the more remunerative 
delta schemes (Gopalan, 1934:3-4)." 
This course of events shows two things. 
1) Madras Presidency was more powerful than the Nizam's Dominions, but not so powerful 
that the issue of submergence could be forced. Mutual consent was necessary. The 
Government of India also consistently took a position regarding this issue that aimed at 
not too unreasonable relations between the two States.10' 
2) Productive irrigation usually got preference over protective irrigation. Madras' interests 
in the Tungabhadra project were ambiguous. On the one hand it favoured water use in the 
Tungabhadra valley for protecting that area against drought and famine, on the other hand 
it had to guard the water supply to the downstream and very productive delta areas. 
The political deadlock over the shares of the different States in the Tungabhadra water 
would last till 1944. During this period Madras considered to change the site of the dam 24 
miles upstream to avoid submergence of Nizam territory, but this was found to be technically 
unpractical, as well as to cause similar problems with the Mysore and Bombay governments. 
The Madras goverment was under increasing pressure from the region to construct the canal. 
Gopalan mentions the "incessant agitation carried on by the educated ryots of Bellary" 
(Gopalan, 1934:57).'" Because of the political trump card held by Hyderabad - the need 
to give permission for submergence of part of its territory - and the increasing public 
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 For discussion of the irrigation canals constructed in this period, see Davison-Jenkins (1997). 
91
 Proposals for a dam plus a right bank canal were prepared in the reports of Mackenzie. For an 
account of the history of the right bank canal, see Thirumalai Iyengar (1945). 
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 One example of this is the position of the Government of India in the conflict around the Bennur 
project referred to above (see GONOH/PWD, 1937). 
1111 have found no references to public agitation or committees of investigation on the Raichur side. 
The feudal nature of the Nizam State may not have allowed such forms of political representation. 
Whether and in what way the local jagirdars (feudal landlords) and other influential people engaged 
in the discussions and decision making on the project is unknown to me. 
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pressure for a canal, the Madras government finally had to accept the principle of equal 
drawals from the dam on the left and the right side. At government level political agreement 
on this issue was reached in June 1944.12> 
The political impasse gave Hyderabad time to design a scheme that could make use of its 
claimed share of the water. After the Indian Irrigation Commission investigation and 
recommendations, the Bennur project was revived. But in 1915 it was finally dropped as it 
was much too small for utilising Hyderabad's claimed 50% share of the water. Investigations 
by the Hyderabad government showed that the Malapur site selected by Madras for the dam 
was indeed the best site, and that a left bank canal taking off from this reservoir should be 
contemplated to irrigate as much area in Raichur district as possible.13' In 1921 
investigations were started for this. In 1930 discussions between Madras and Hyderabad 
engineers were initiated on a joint project, and detailed investigations were done and plans 
drawn up (Gopalan, 1934:4, Appendix G). An extensive soil survey was undertaken in 
Raichur district, and the first project report on the Left Bank Canal was written (Mehta, 
1933; Gopalan, 1934).14) 
The June 1944 agreement of Madras and the Nizam's Dominions made start of 
construction of the dam and canal system possible. The agreement allowed partial utilisation 
of the river water for the Tungabhadra Project, to the extent of 65 TMCft. per year each. 
The States were free to design canals for larger amounts at their own risk, in anticipation of 
a final settlement that would allow greater use. On 28 February 1945 the Tungabhadra 
project was inaugurated and building work started. 
With the agreement for partial use of the Tungabhadra waters, the negotiations over the 
division of the river water were by no means over. The matter was considerably complicated 
by the reorganisation of the States after Independence. This meant that both the originally 
designed left bank and right bank canal systems were divided over new States, that is 
Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh.15' Conferences were held on the sharing of the water in the 
'
2I
 The sharing of the Tungabhadra waters also involved Mysore State (and to a very limited extent 
the Province of Bombay). Mysore claimed a share of the waters for the Bhadra project, upstream 
of the Tungabhadra project. An agreement on this was concluded between Madras and Mysore in 
July 1944. Supplemental agreements were made in December 1945 and April 1946 (the texts of 
all these agreements can be found in GOI/KWDT, 1973). 
131
 One of the complications of a dam at the Malapur site was that the reservoir submerged a 
considerable part of Salar Jung's jagir (a feudal estate). He was Dewan (prime minister) of the 
Nizam's Dominions in the 19th century. 
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 At the beginning of the century the Nizam State was hardly in a position to do such 
investigations and make such plans. A Public Works Department was established in Hyderabad in 
1868; a separate Irrigation Department in 1896 (Ramamurthy, 1995:190-191). The first batch of 
engineers graduated in Hyderabad (at the Osmania University Engineering College) in 1933 (1342 
Fasli) (The Osmania Engineering Graduates Association, 1948:11). Experience was gained with the 
first large project in the Dominions, the Nizamsagar dam and canal system, completed in 1931. 
These developments were part of the general 'modernisation drive' that was taking place in the 
Nizam's Dominions (Leonard, 1978). 
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 At Independence in 1947 the new Madras and Hyderabad States became the parties in the 
Tungabhadra project (after a failed attempt of the Nizam government to stay outside the Indian 
Union). In 1953 Andhra State was created, and the Kannada speaking taluks of Bellary district 
went to Mysore State. This located the right side of the head works in Mysore State, and a large 
part of the right bank canal system in Andhra State. The Tungabhadra Board was created to be the 
construction and managing agency for the right bank section of the dam and the part of the main 
(continued...) 
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Krishna basin, of which the Tungabhadra is part, in 1951 and 1960, but the matter was 
settled by the Krishna Water Disputes Tribunal in 1973 only (with the last details arranged 
in 1976).16) Positions and decisions taken in these negotiations affected the design of the 
Left Bank Canal, and the cropping pattern under it. How the final shape of the Left Bank 
Canal came into existence is discussed in the following section. 
4.2 DESIGN 
When the project slowly moved from the planning phase into the design phase, political 
actors gradually became less dominant and the control of the process shifted to the design 
engineers. The planning decisions regarding the Tungabhadra system were negotiated at the 
highest political level, with engineers in an advisory role. The negotiations on the design 
characteristics that affected the inter-State issues were directly between engineers from both 
States, but agreements that were reached needed political sanction. The detailed design of the 
canal systems was fully dominated by the design engineers. 
It was noted above that one of the factors that kept the Tungabhadra project on the policy 
agenda was the pressure exerted by local government and farmers, but these local actors 
seem to have played no role in the planning and design process. With regard to the design 
process I have found no references to local involvement in the overall design of the main 
system (the dam, the primary or main canal, and the rough design of the secondary or 
distributary canals). For the detailed design of distributaries and sub-distributaries during the 
construction phase there are some, but only some indications of local influence on design 
decisions.17' 
From the perspective of the users design thus was a top-down process. Furthermore, in 
their design choices engineers only considered physical and cost of construction criteria. 
They did not consider the socio-economic conditions within which the infrastructure would 
have to function. 
In this section I discuss debates and design choices regarding the following four design 
elements: the total quantity of water available, the cropping pattern and duties, the alignment 
of the left bank main canal, and distributary design. They provide the background for the 
15l(...continued) 
canal system relevant for distributing water between the two States (see Lakshminarayana, 1990 
on the Tungabhadra Board). In 1956 Hyderabad State and Andhra State were merged to form 
Andhra Pradesh. The larger part of Raichur district, except the eastern taluks of Alampur and 
Gadwal, went to Mysore State (later renamed Karnataka). As the original plan for the Left Bank 
Canal extended into these two taluks, there was a two-State situation on the left bank as well. 
'
6I
 The report of this Tribunal (GOI/KWDT, 1973, 1976a&b) contains a very detailed discussion of 
the conflicts over the Tungabhadra waters, and the appended volumes with the evidence contain 
reprints of most of the reports and of the important correspondence on the issue. This so called 
Bachawat Award (after the Tribunal's chairman) runs till 2000. Other sources are GOAP/PWD 
(1960), which was prepared for the 1960 conference on the Krishna waters, and the report of the 
Krishna-Godavari Commission (Krishna-Godavari Commission, n.d.). 
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 It is at the level of pipe outlet command areas that local influence is more noticeable, but here 
it is mainly social reshaping by users after the government had put the system in place. In this 
section I discuss the design of the system as originally constructed by the government between 
1948 and 1 968. The remodelling of the system that took place, particularly at the lower levels of 
the system is left to chapter 8. 
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analysis of water distribution practices in later chapters, and substantiate the evaluation of 
the design process as a top-down, design engineer dominated process.18' 
Total quantity of water available 
The first important physical variable for designing a canal is the amount of water available 
for irrigation over the year. This depends on the flow of the river and the storage capacity 
created. In a reservoir scheme like the Tungabhadra project, the daily, weekly or monthly 
flow in the irrigation canals is not directly dependent on the river flow (as it is in river 
diversion schemes). This is because of the buffer effect of a reservoir: it allows constant 
outflows with variable inflows. The discussion on availability of water was thus mostly on 
total availability for a year. 
River flows vary from year to year in relation to variation in the rainfall in the catchment 
area. Water availability is normally expressed in terms of 'dependable flow' or 'dependable 
supply'. If a canal is designed on the basis of 75% dependability for instance, this means that 
in three out of four years, the canal can take water as designed, and in one year there will 
be insufficient water available for full supply. Which figure should be chosen as dependable 
flow was intensely disputed by the engineers representing both sides. How much of this 
dependable flow would be available for irrigation of the Tungabhadra command area was 
another point of debate. For details I refer to Box 4.1. 
The agreement of June 1944 allowed both Madras and Hyderabad to utilise 65 TMCft. 
Both sides however designed their canals for higher use, as the agreement allowed them to 
do at their own risk. The 1947 project report for the Left Bank Canal is based on a total 
yearly utilisation of 92.3 TMCft. (including reservoir evaporation losses of 9 TMCft.) 
(GOI/KWDT, 1973-1:112). The division and available supply issue was further discussed 
after Independence in an inter-State conference in 1951 convened by the Planning 
Commission. This meeting led to a written agreement, ratified by the Bombay, Madras and 
Hyderabad governments. The agreement allowed Hyderabad to use an extra 35 TMCft. for 
the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal (ibid.:3S). However, Mysore refused to ratify the 
agreement, as it felt its interests were insufficiently accommodated. Though the other three 
States held the agreement to be valid for a long time, the Krishna Water Disputes Tribunal 
decided in 1973 that it was not valid (ibid.:28-43). The Tribunal in 1973 settled the amount 
of water available for the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal at 92 TMCft. (including reservoir 
evaporation losses) (ibid. :220). The further report of the Tribunal allowed Karnataka to use 
an additional 10 TMCft. from its total allowance in the Tungabhadra basin, making the total 
allowance for the Left Bank Canal 102 TMCft. (GOI/KWDT, 1976a: 162-170, 230).19> 
1811 do not discuss the design of the dam. There was extended debate on the dam profile, the mode 
of construction, including the type of mortar to be used for this masonry dam, the location of the 
spillway, and several other design elements. These discussions are an interesting episode in the 
history of dam building, but I will leave them aside here because the debates do not relate directly 
to water distribution within the Left Bank Canal system. The same is true for two other design 
features of the main canal than the alignment: its navigability between mile 24 and mile 100 
(though there was never any navigation on the canal) and the planning of intermediate reservoirs 
and drops for electric power generation (see GOKAR/ID, 1981 for details). 
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 The total allowance for the Tungabhadra right bank canals is also 102 TMCft, proportionally 
divided over the States of Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh. The total allowance to Karnataka for the 
Tungabhadra basin is 295 TMCft. plus iy*°/o of the difference between the use of Karnataka's 
projects drawing more than 3 TMCft. in the Krishna basin in 1968-69 and stipulated three year 
(continued...) 
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Box 4 .1 : Dependable flow in the Tungabhadra river 
A dependable flow figure had been decided in a conference in Bangalore by the Madras and 
Mysore governments in the early 1930s. Dependable flow at the dam site was determined 
by calculating the discharges at this point from discharges known at the Sunkesala weir of 
the KC Canal further downstream. The figures of river discharge for 32 years were taken 
(1900-1 to 1931-32). The dependable flow was taken as the flow in the 8th worst year, 
being 260 TMCft. (GOMAD/PWD, 1947:2) Dependability of the river flow was thus taken at 
75%. This figure sparked considerable debate in later years, as it did not include water use 
of existing irrigation, which, according to Hyderabad but not according to Madras, should be 
included in the figure to be shared on a 50/50 basis. Hyderabad thus termed it 'available 
supply'. The total dependable supply of the Tungabhadra basin had been calculated by 
Mackenzie in the first decade of the century to be approximately 350 TMCft (used and 
unused). The 75% dependable flow at the dam site (used and unused) agreed upon in the 
July 1944 Madras/Mysore agreement was 340 TMCft. That calculation was based on joint 
gauging of the river in the late 1930s and discussion on the interpretation of earlier discharge 
measurements. This is the quantity Hyderabad wanted shared among the Bombay, Mysore, 
Madras and Hyderabad States, with specific allotments to Mysore and Bombay, and a 50/50 
sharing between Madras and Hyderabad including existing irrigation and a contribution to the 
lower Krishna basin/project (see GOMAD/PWD, 1947 and GOMAD, 1954 for correspondence 
on the matter). The determination of the part of the dependable river flow to be used for 
irrigation is an iterative process in which the height of the dam (determining reservoir 
capacity), the regime of inflows into the reservoir, and the assumed cropping pattern 
(determining the release schedule for the canal) are the variables. An additional factor is 
reservation of water for use in upstream and downstream schemes. Gopalan uses a figure of 
204.01 TMCft available for irrigation in a bad year (with the reservoir level at 1630 feet 
above sea level) in the 1934 Left Bank Canal project report (Gopalan, 1934). How exactly he 
made this calculation is unclear. The Tungabhadra project in this manner would use 77% of 
the river flow in a bad year, and 51 % in an ordinary year. The bad year design left only 60 
TMCft. for other upstream and downstream claims on this water. Considering that Mysore 
claimed 84.6 TMCft. for its Bhadra project (Gopalan, 1934:8), the 1934 design was at the 
limit of possible water use. Gopalan designed the Left Bank Canal for 50% of the available 
flow (Gopalan, 1934:22, Appendix C, J). The Gopalan report was a maximum-possible claim 
of Hyderabad. However, in the second half of the 1 930s Hyderabad argued for a lower dam 
for some time, with the objective to reserve water for future downstream projects. This 
position was shortlived. 
This outline shows that the dependable flow at the Tungabhadra dam site and the part of 
it to be used in the Left Bank Canal were politically negotiated figures. Not only the final 
figures were debated, but also the methods for producing the relevant data for calculating 
them. Examples are the formula for translating rainfall into river discharge for a particular 
sub-catchment, and the discharge formulas for the weirs in the river (for some of these issues 
see GOI/KWDT, 1973-1). Because the formulas all contain locally specific empirical 
coefficients, and measurement data series long and accurate enough to check them thoroughly 
19l(.. .continued) 
periods later (1982-3 to 1984-5 for use between 1990-91 and 1997-98 for instance), with a 
maximum of 320 TMCft. (GOI/KWDT, 1976a:226-228) The complexity of such arrangements is 
indicative of the difficulties in reaching compromises on the sharing of river waters. 
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were not available, there was wide scope for debate and negotation. At different moments, 
different conclusions and compromises were reached.20' 
All States seem to have accepted the Tribunal's decisions. At the moment of the decision 
making, a large part of the Krishna waters was still not used for irrigation and hydro-electric 
power generation. Twenty-five years later the full-utilisation situation is in much closer sight. 
A new round of debate is due around 2000 A.D., when the Tribunal's Award will be 
reviewed. 
Cropping pattern and duties 
The second basic variable for the design of a canal system is the cropping pattern to be 
adopted in the command area. Together with the total quantity of water available, this 
determines the area that can be irrigated. The connecting variable is the duty assumed for 
each crop (acres to be irrigated with one cusec of discharge; for general discussion, see 
Jurriens, Mollinga and Wester, 1996). I first discuss the cropping patterns and then the duties 
that were adopted in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal. 
Cropping patterns 
The first cropping patterns for the Left Bank Canal were drawn up in the early 1930s during 
the execution of the soil survey of the possible command area and the preparation of the first 
project report. From the start the cropping pattern has been of a protective nature, with 
'irrigated dry' or light crops as the dominant category.21' Of the total of 690,000 acres 
proposed to be irrigated in the 1934 project report, 480,000 were reserved for 'irrigated dry' 
crops, which is almost 70%. Rice was included in the cropping pattern because it was felt 
that "a certain proportion of this crop is necessary to make the project financially a success" 
(Gopalan, 1934:59).22> 
Another typical feature of protective irrigation was also present in the first plans: only part 
of the command area of the canal would be irrigated. The irrigation intensity proposed in the 
1934 project report was 58.9%, varying from 68.0% in the head reach of the main canal to 
50.2% in the tail reach (ibid.:A2). Finally, there was hardly any double cropping (for 
additional details see ibid.:Appendix J). 
After the agreement of 1944 the cropping pattern was reconsidered several times (see table 
4.1). Characteristic for the (considered) changes in the localised cropping pattern after 1944 
is that it became more protective. The area with rice was reduced and that with 'irrigated 
dry' crops increased. The Hyderabad government sanctioned a cropping pattern in 1955 that 
201
 The dependable flow for the Krishna basin for example was set at 1716 TMCft. in the 1951 
agreement (GOI/KWDT, 1973-1:30). It was set at 2060 TMCft. by the Krishna Water Disputes 
Tribunal in 1973 (ibid.:73-81). An example with regard to duties is given below. 
2
" Mehta (1933) and Gopalan (1934) give the the different croppings patterns considered. The total 
planned irrigated area ranged from 466,550 to 645,000 acres, with different distribution of area 
over different crops in the various proposals. The ease with which one cropping pattern was 
replaced in the discussions by another shows the top-down nature of the design process. Nobody 
seems to have been worried about the question what the farmers who were supposed to grow 
these crops might think of the matter. 
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 The agricultural soil survey report for the Tungabhadra left bank command area had come to the 
conclusion that "the facts about the suitability of black-cotton soil for irrigation are over whelming" 
(Mehta, 1933:20). There were therefore considered to be no obstacles for the irrigation of either 
'wet' or 'irrigated dry' crops. 
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was more protective than the pattern included in the 1934 project report (see table 4.1).23) 
This sanctioned pattern has been the basis for actual localisation; the final result is visible 
in the most right-hand column of table 4.1. 
In 1976 the Technical Committee for the Re-examination of the Cropping Pattern proposed 
the most protective localisation pattern ever. This shows the force of the concept of 
protective irrigation at policy level, but it is also the last time that localisation is proposed 
as an instrument of state governance without fundamental questions attached. After this 
Committee's report no further changes were proposed in the localisation pattern. In the 1970s 
the discussion on localisation shifted from the issue of the best cropping pattern and how to 
convince farmers to take up irrigation, to the issues of the violation of the cropping cropping 
pattern, unauthorised irrigation and how to curb these (see chapter 3). In 1979 a report 
appeared with the telling title Report of the Tungabhadra Project ryots grievances committee 
(CADA/TBP, 1979). In the 1970s the realities of day-to-day irrigation management caught 
up with the technocratic dreams of the planners. 
Duties 
Underlying the calculations of the areas of different crops to be irrigated, once the total 
available water supply was agreed upon, were the duties accepted for the different crops.24) 
Gopalan gives an interesting look into the way duties were determined. During a conference 
of Hyderabad and Madras engineers, the duties proposed on Monday 6th February 1933 
were: rice 66.7, sugarcane 80 (8 months) and 60 (4 months), garden 120, kharifmd rabi 180 
(all in acres/cusec at distributary head). On Tuesday 7th February 1933, the following duties 
were considered to be more suitable: rice 60, sugarcane 75 (8 months) and 50 (4 months), 
garden 100, and kharif and rabi 150 (acres/cusec at distributary head) (Gopalan, 
1934: Appendix G). Because the change was made overnight it can be safely assumed that the 
basis of the change was not new experimental data on field irrigation conditions and canal 
losses. I must be concluded that duties were not a given, empirically determined, but a 
negotiable entity. This is hardly surprising considering the lack of experimental data on water 
use in field conditions at the time. The positive side to the adaptations was that they were 
made in the realistic direction. The - yet different - duties adopted in the Gopalan report are 
given in table 4.2. 
The changes in the (proposals for) duties to be adopted are more haphazard than those in 
the (proposed) cropping patterns (see table 4.2). The duties adopted in 1956 (by the Mysore 
government) are still in force. These differ from the duties proposed in the 1934 project 
report, but not in a systematic manner. Because Mysore State changed the duties, the peak 
discharge for the Tungabhadra Left Bank main canal increased. The main canal was 
redesigned for a discharge at the head of 4100 cusecs instead of 3200 cusecs. The work to 
bring the main canal to this capacity is still going on (also see chapter 9). 
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 The reasons given for this change were that (i) the protective capacity of the project was 
enlarged, Hi) it would conform to the local agricultural practices and the inclination of the farmers, 
(Hi) the development problems which usually arise in the wake of heavy ('wet') irrigation are 
proportionately reduced, and liv) in view of the poverty and low purchasing capacity of the people, 
the enlargement of the acreage under commercial and cash crops should prove a boon 
(GOAP/PWD, 1960:84; also quoted in Rao and Sundar, 1984:3). 
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 Duty figures incorporate expected water use (in)efficiencies by using different duties for the 
same crop at different levels of the canal system (main canal head, distributary head, field level). 
See table 4.2 below. 
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The Technical Committee of 1976 proposed systematically lower duties than in force, 
because it considered the latter unrealistically high. Many engineers have also expressed their 
opinion to me that they find the present duties unrealistically high. To my knowledge there 
has been done no extensive on-field research on actual crop water requirements and duties 
achieved in practice (for some actual water use data see Jurriens and Landstra, 1990). 
Table 4 .2 : Duties used and proposed for Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal (acres/cusec) 
Crop 
Rice 
Sugarcane 
Garden 
Cotton 
Khanf (light) 
Rabi (light) 
Project report 
la) 
Khanf 
Distributary 
Summer 
Distributary 
July-Dec 
Jan-Feb 
Mar-June 
Distributary 
1934 
62.5 
40 
100 
50 
75 
120 
Distributary 
Distributary 
160 
160 
Recommended in 
1945 |b) 
Kharif 
Distributary 
Summer 
Distributary 
Distributary 
Distributary 
Distributary 
Distributary 
Distributary 
66.6 
60 
62 
115 
180 
180 
180 
Adopted December 
1956 (cl 
Kharif 
Field 
Distributary 
Main Canal 
Summer 
Field 
Distributary 
Main Canal 
Field 
Distributary 
Main Canal 
Field 
Distributary 
Main Canal 
80 
65 
55 
55 
45 
40 
110 
90 
75 
150 
115 
100 
Field 
Distributary 
Main Canal 
Field 
Distributary 
Main Canal 
220 
175 
150 
175 
140 
120 
Technical Committee 
1973-1976 Id) 
Kharif 
Main Canal 
Main Canal 
Main Canal 
Main Canal 
Main Canal 
Main Canal 
38 
60 
90 
96 
135 
84 
Statement irrigation 
Department 1991 (ej 
Kharif 
Distributary 
Main Canal 
Distributary 
Main Canal 
Distributary 
Main Canal 
65 
55 
90 
75 
115 
100 
Distributary 
Main Canal 
Distributary 
Main Canal 
175 
150 
140 
120 
(a) Gopalan (1934:38-40) 
(b) Rao and Sundar (1984:3), probably taken from GOKAR/ID (1981:35) 
(c| GOKAR/ID (1981:35) referring to letter of Chief Engineer No.W/948/48/TS dated 22.12.1956; 
also in Rao and Sundar (1984:3) 
(d) GOKAR/PD (1976:Annexure VI) 
(e) Data from Chief Engineer's office, Munirabad (March 1991) 
The alignment of the main canal 
The alignment of the main canal is the third design element that was subject to debate. The 
main canal is a lined earthen canal, which for most of its length is a contour canal. The 
debated issue was its alignment. There were two main determinants for the alignment of the 
Left Bank Canal. 
1) The cost and facility of construction.25' 
251
 This was the main factor in the first 1 5 miles of the Left Bank Canal, where it goes through very 
rocky and hilly country. Many alternatives were considered there, mainly evaluated on the cost of 
their construction, and the possibility to use drops for electric power generation. The latter is a 
financial factor as well, because it raises the benefits derived from the project. 
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2) How much area was to be irrigated, and how that area was to be distributed over 
Raichur district.26' 
According to Kosnam four different alignments for the main canal were considered between 
1929 and 1949 (Kosnam, 1952-3:315-316) . 
The first alignment was made in 1929 by C.C. Dalai (see map 4.2). This is the alignment 
used in the 1934 project report. This alignment gives the largest extent of the Left Bank 
Canal that has been considered. It was the result of the Hyderabad's government instruction 
"to align the most economical canal to command and irrigate as large an area as possible in 
the Doab" (Gopalan, 1934:4). In this way Hyderabad could justify its claim of a 50% share 
in the Tungabhadra waters. Dalal's line consists of a main canal 13914 miles long upto 
Rampur, two miles west of Raichur town.27) The main canal bifurcates at this point into 
two branch canals, the North and South Gadwal branches, which rejoin after circling a group 
of rocky hills, to become the Alampur branch. This branch takes the water to the very east 
corner of the district, where the Tungabhadra and Krishna rivers join. The total length of the 
branches is 115Vi miles (Gopalan, 1934:13). 
The water for irrigation of this vast command was not all planned to come from the 
Tungabhadra reservoir. At Mile 110 the Right Bank Canal of the future Upper Krishna 
Project was planned to join the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal, and supply extra water for 
the tail end section of the command area. Therefore, only part of the commandable area 
beyond Mile 110 was attributed to the Tungabhadra Project, and the remainder to the Upper 
Krishna Project. The 1934 Tungabhadra Project encompassed the main canal upto Rampur 
plus the part of the North Gadwal branch upto the frontier of Gadwal taluk (26 miles) 
(Gopalan, 1934:17). 
The second alignment was surveyed by Khaja Azeemuddin in 1946 (Kosnam, 1952-3:316-
317). This alignment is located at a much lower level, commanding a smaller area between 
the main canal and the river, thus reducing the command area with 335,000 acres (see map 
4.2). This alignment was probably the result of the view that irrigation from the Tungabhadra 
reservoir should be limited in favour of projects downstream on the Krishna river (see 
above). It also concentrates more of the irrigation in the Gadwal and Alampur taluks, where 
the soils were considered to be excellently suited for rice cultivation.28' 
The third alignment was prepared by Jaffer Ali in 1947 and the fourth alignment was 
surveyed in 1949 (Kosnam, 1952-3:317-320). These were adaptations of the C.C. Dalai 
alignment. They reduced the length and the costs of that canal. These alignments were a 
return to a large command area for protective irrigation. In 1950 the proposal was made to 
construct the main canal upto Mile 127 and in addition, the South Gadwal branch upto Mile 
261
 One factor that normally affects the alignment of a main canal strongly is the bed level at the 
offtake point at the dam. This determines the area that the canal will be able to command. In the 
case of the Tungabhadra dam, there has been extended debate on the offtake levels of the 
different canals. This did however not affect the alignment of the left bank canal very much 
because in the first 20 miles of this canal there are drops exceeding the depth of the reservoir. The 
alignment for the major part of the 141 miles long canal is not affected by the offtake level at the 
dam. I therefore do not discuss the details of the debate on offtake levels. 
271
 Apart from the last 20 miles this canal is a contour canal, which implies that irrigation is only 
possible on its right side, towards the Tungabhadra river. The last section lying on the ridge, allows 
irrigation on both sides. 
281
 One engineer who worked in the design of the main canal in the 1950s suggested to me that 
Azeemuddin wanted to have more balancing reservoirs in the main canal, and therefore chose a 
lower alignment. I have been unable to find evidence for this statement. 
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14, and estimates were prepared for this. This variant of the Tungabhadra Project was 
sanctioned in 1951 by the Hyderabad government (see GOKAR/ID, 1981:166-186; 
GOAP/PWD, 1960). 
Discussion on the alignment of the main canal continued during the construction period. 
In 1956 Gadwal and Alampur taluks went to the new state of Andhra Pradesh. The Andhra 
Pradesh government argued that Mysore/Karnataka had an obligation to extend the Left Bank 
Canal into these taluks as this was part of the original project plan. The Krishna Water 
Disputes Tribunal finally rejected this in 1973, on the ground that Mysore/Karnataka was 
only held to construct the part of the canal that was sanctioned at the time of the 
reorganisation of the States (GOI/KWDT, 1973-1:58-60). 
The design of the last section of the main canal was reconsidered during construction. In 
1956, right after Raichur district came to Mysore State, there were different opinions on the 
length and alignment beyond Mile 103, where the contour canal reaches the ridge between 
the Tungabhadra and Krishna rivers. According to an engineer who worked on the design 
of the main canal in this period, there was fear that there wouldn't be sufficient water to 
supply a canal beyond Mile 127, and that it was better to wait and see. Others argued that 
postponement of the construction of the last section would risk that it would never be 
constructed, and that this might also endanger Mysore's claim to the water. For some time 
the Mysore government held the opinion that the canal should stop at Mile 127, and that in 
the ridge canal section between Mile 103 and 127 the Left Bank Canal should irrigate 50,000 
acres on its left side (GOMYS, 1957-58:74-75).29) There was however, also the view that 
water from the Tungabhadra basin should not be used to irrigate lands in the Krishna basin. 
Some therefore argued for a contour canal. This would avoid the problem of irrigating lands 
in the Krishna basin. But the contour canal was an 'unhappy' canal technically. It was finally 
decided to construct the canal as sanctioned, upto Mile 141, with the Mile 103-124 section 
as a ridge canal, and Mile 124-127 as a contour canal, irrigating land on its right side 
only.30> 
The alignment of the left bank main canal thus was subject to debate and negotiation, but 
the process and its meaning are difficult to reconstruct for want of detailed information. 
Distributary design 
On the design of the distributaries much less debate took place. These were only roughly 
designed in the planning phase. The main purpose was to estimate the approximate cost of 
their construction. Detailed design took place 'ongoing' in the construction phase.31' 
Distributaries run on the ridges, except when this involves heavy cutting. They branch out 
into subdistributaries, that run on ridges as well. 
Distributary design seems to have been fully done by the Irrigation Department with very 
little involvement, or even consultation of the local population. The clearest illustration of 
this I got from an engineer who had worked on the design of the Left Bank Canal 
291
 It may be assumed that there has been public discussion and public action on this issue, but I 
have not found any documentation on this. 
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 This is according to an engineer I interviewed who worked in the design of this section. Official 
documents mention a ridge canal from Mile 103-127. According to the same engineer Hyderabad 
State had already started the excavation of the lower contour canal in a few places by mechanised 
cutting. 
311
 This procedure explains why the distributaries are numbered to 106, but only 87 actually exist. 
Some were unnecessary or joined when designs were made. 
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distributaries. He informed me that the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal was the first canal 
system in India where aerial photographs were used to make the topographic maps. This 
according to him had the advantage that no or very few field visits were necessary, and that 
the design could be done fully at the drawing table. Distributary design thus was quite 
literally a top-down process. 
It is difficult to get a good impression of the design process of the distributary even as a 
technical exercise. The design (calculations and drawings) of each distributary were 
documented in a series of 'covers'. These are volumes on different elements of the design. 
Most of these documents are lost or untraceable in the Irrigation Department (sub)division 
offices where they should be kept. In Sirvar division office some engineers with a sense of 
history has searched for the covers still present, and restored to usable condition those they 
had found. They did not find many. For distributary 93, which I had selected for research, 
only one remained (on the design of the standing wave flume at the head of the 
distributary).32> Because it has been so poorly documented in the literature, I summarise and 
discuss part of the technical procedure in Appendix 4.1. The design procedure contains 
elements relevant for actually existing water distribution practices, to which I will return in 
later chapters. 
4.3 CONCLUSION: SOCIAL SHAPING AND DESIGN 
CHARACTERISTICS 
This chapter has given a descriptive account of the negotiated birth of the Tungabhadra Left 
Bank Canal. At the same time it has presented some of its major design features, focusing 
on those relevant for water distribution as it takes place presently. In this section I discuss 
whether and in what way the planning and design of the canal system as it is now found in 
Raichur district has been a process of social shaping. After that I summarise the technical 
design characteristics of the system that have particular relevance for water distribution 
practices. 
Social shaping 
The structuring influence of social factors on the technical features of the Tungabhadra 
system are particularly clear in the planning phase. The decision to build an irrigation system 
in the Tungabhadra valley, whether there should be a canal system on one side or on two 
sides of the river, and how much water was to be allocated to the canals were highly 
contentious political issues. The long-drawn negotiations on this are an interesting case for 
studying the relationships between Princely States and the regions directly governed by the 
British in colonial India, and between different States in independent India. In-depth analysis 
of the process of these political negotiations I have not undertaken. It is a research project 
by itself.33' 
3211 also tried to find the design covers for the other distributary selected for research, distributary 
24, which came under a different division office, but the covers were untraceable. 
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 For the period 1898-1950, there are over 900 pages printed correspondence between the 
governments of Madras and Hyderabad on the sharing of the waters of Tungabhadra river and the 
design of the dam (GOMAD/PWD, 1947; GOMAD, 1954; GONOH/PWD, 1935, 1936, 1937, 
1945). The Krishna Water Disputes Tribunal reports and appendices are a rich source as well 
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When the general parameters for the technical design had been agreed upon in the 1930s 
and 1940s, the specific technical design of the Left Bank Canal system seems to have 
undergone little social shaping. Some design choices like the overall cropping pattern, the 
duties and the main canal alignment were debated not only among engineers, but were also 
subject to decision-making at policy level because they affected the way in which claims on 
a a share of the river waters could be made. But the detailed design, which gave the system 
its concrete shape, seems to have been the exclusive domain of the design engineers. They 
used physical design criteria, and the economic factor of cost of construction to make their 
design choices. There are only a few isolated examples of (local) political and other social 
influence on main canal and distributary design and construction.34' 
This course of events could be interpreted as counter evidence for the central notion of 
the social shaping perspective that design and construction processes are social processes in 
which different stakeholders, with different interest, strategies and resources negotiate about 
the simultaneous creation of new technical and social orders. It could be read to confirm the 
very common view, at least among engineers, that politics and all things social are and 
should be reserved for the pre-design phase, and that designing does and should not involve 
political and other social choices once the terms of reference are clear, and should be left to 
technical experts alone. 
But a different interpretation, which makes use of the social shaping perspective, does not 
undermine it but perhaps even extends it, is possible also. This alternative interpretation 
argues that the absence of social shaping in the design and construction of the left bank canal 
system could occur under a specific set of social conditions only. There were two, mutually 
reinforcing, forces at work. 
The first factor that explains the absence of social shaping activities around main canal and 
distributary design is the mode of operation of the Irrigation Department. The period 
immediately after Independence was one of great belief in planned intervention and planned 
development (see chapter 3). It was also a period in which irrigation and other engineers 
were highly respected nation builders. The living example of this was irrigation engineer and 
statesman M.V. Visvesvaraya. He started his career as a district engineer in Bombay 
Presidency in the late 19th century, became Chief Engineer in Mysore State, Dewan (prime 
minister) of the same state, and from this went on to develop a concept of India as a planned 
economy (Visvesvaraya, 1934, 1951).35) The role of engineers in nation building was also 
33l(...continued) 
(GOI/KWDT, 1973). Material on some periods and episodes is less easily available. The relevant 
parts of Hyderabad/Andhra Pradesh State Archives for the period 1948-1956 when some important 
decisions were made and localisation saw the light of day, are unfortunately not (yet) accessible. 
The collection of additional information on the canal design and cropping pattern debates would 
require painstaking archival work in the records of the Madras and Hyderabad Public Works and 
Revenue Departments. 
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 Also see the example given in footnote 55 chapter 3 of the doubling of a distributary's length 
as a result of an electoral promise. 
351
 Visvesvaraya's main achievements as irrigation engineer were the design and introduction of the 
block system of water allocation and distribution in Bombay Presidency (see Bolding, Mollinga and 
van Straaten, 1995) and the design and construction of the Krishnarajasagar (KRS) irrigation project 
in Mysore State. He played a small role in the Tungabhadra project as the mediator of the conflict 
between Hyderabad and Madras engineers on the type of mortar to be used in dam construction 
(Visvesvaraya, 1951:99). On Visvesvaraya and planned development also see Vyasulu (1997). 
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strong immediately after Independence. Nehru's description of dams as the new temples of 
India has become famous (Varma and Saxena, 1989) and gives engineers the aura of 
priesthood. 
The second factor that explains absence of social shaping activities around main canal and 
distributaries design is the corollary of this social position and self-image of the irrigation 
engineer and the Irrigation Department. There was no developed system of representative 
politics or citizen participation in development planning. This was certainly true for the pre-
Independence period, but also for the first period after Independence when the Left Bank 
Canal was built. The common idea was that this elite of experts was going to explain to 
farmers how they should use the system constructed for them. Several joint officials-farmers 
committees were set up to help the smooth putting into operation of the Tungabhadra 
system.36> To question the design choices of the engineers would probably have been been 
considered heresy. The Irrigation Department till today has no institutional provisions for the 
involvement of (future) water users in design and construction of irrigation systems (also see 
chapter 8). 
The theoretical conclusion that can be drawn from this is that it is not sufficient to critique 
existing irrigation design practices by telling the engineers concerned that they may believe 
that they work within a planning cycle in which the technical design activity is isolated, and 
political decisions precede it, but that in reality their design activity is a social shaping 
process of interacting stakeholders. The problem37' with many irrigation design processes 
is that they actually are quite 'unconnected'. In some irrigation contexts it may be more to 
the point to analyse why and how other stakeholders than engineers are excluded from the 
design process, then to search for how these other stakeholders are engaged in the design 
process in formal and informal ways. 
Design characteristics relevant for water distribution practices 
To conclude this chapter I list the technical design characteristics of the Tungabhadra Left 
Bank Canal that have particular relevance for water distribution practices. 
The first socially significant design characteristic is the fully supply-oriented nature of the 
canal system. Once canal water has been released from the dam very little can be done to 
regulate its availability in time. There is no intermediate storage which could act as a buffer 
for lower-level releases of water.38' There are no possibilities for regulation in the main 
canal and distributaries other than the distributary and sub-distributary offtakes. This means 
that canal water level control, which can be important for reliable water supply, is very 
difficult.39' The supply-orientation and the size of the system also imply that adaptation to 
35l(...continued) 
Gopalan, the engineer who wrote the first project report for the Left Bank Canal, also published on 
the agricultural development of Hyderabad State (see Gopalan, 1948). 
361
 In the 1960s for example Distributary Irrigation Committees were established, in which the Block 
Development Officers played a role. The still existing committee at the system level is called the 
Irrigation Consultative Committee (ICC). It is now a platform for political negotiation (rather than 
consultation) on irrigation management by the technocratic elite (the engineers) and the political 
elite (the MLAs). Also see chapter 9. 
371
 The desirability to involve other stakeholders in the design process is discussed in chapter 8. 
381
 But for recent developments in this see chapter 9. 
391
 The 'regulators' that have been built in the Tungabhadra left bank main canal are not devices 
for water level control, but safety devices in case of canal breaches, to avoid that the full canal 
upstream of the breach empties itself through the breach. 
TUNGABHADRA LEFT BANK CANAL 85 
changing water demands, resulting from rainfall in the command area for example, is very 
slow. Changed releases take days to travel through the system, and it is difficult to regulate 
them in a location-specific manner. Such flexibility is not intended in the design of protective 
irrigation systems. Their design is geared to low intensity management of stable supplies to 
which farmers adapt. 
The second design characteristic relevant for water distribution practices is the 
predominance of 'irrigated dry' crops in the localised cropping pattern (and therefore high 
duties) and the low design irrigation intensity of 100%. The latter means that each piece of 
land is supposed to be irrigated for one season only, except for the limited part of the 
command area reserved for perennial and two-seasonal crops. These design characteristics 
imply that water is scarce by design. 
The third design characteristic, which is briefly discussed in the appendix to this chapter 
and treated in more detail in chapter 8, is the choice to install pipe outlets as the structures 
connecting the (sub)distributary canals and the outlet command areas. Regulation of the 
discharge through this structure is very difficult, particularly when water level control in the 
supply canal is impossible. More important perhaps even is the systematic over-dimensioning 
of pipe outlet structures in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal, which makes over-
appropriation of water technically very easy. 
These design characteristics constitute some of the conditions of possibility of the 
geography of social differentiation that is the subject of the next chapter. 
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Appendix 4 . 1 : Design procedure distributary canals Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal 
To write this appendix I used the most complete set of 'design covers' preserved by the Sirvar 
Division engineers, that of Distributary 85 (real number). They were able to recover 13 of the 
original 16 covers. The set of 'design covers' is the series of bound volumes that gives all 
information on the design characteristics of a distributary and their calculation. 
After determining the location of the distributary and subdistributaries, the capacity of the 
distributaries was designed from the tail up, on the basis of the localisation pattern in the pipe 
outlet command areas. On the basis of the localisation pattern a demand table for a pipe outlet 
command area was drawn up as in table 4.1.1. 
Table 4 . 1 . 1 : Pipe outlet demand table for distributary design (PO at chain 72 Right Side 
of Distributary 85) (duty in acres/cusec; Q = discharge in cusecs) 
May 
June 
July 
August 
September 
October 
November 
December 
January 
February 
March 
April 
Rice 
duty Q 
Kharif light 
102.65 
acres 
duty Q 
220 0.47 
220 0.47 
220 0.47 
220 0.47 
Rabi light 
49.73 acres 
duty Q 
175 0.28 
175 0.28 
175 0.28 
175 0.28 
175 0.28 
Cotton 
23.00 
acres 
duty Q 
175 0.13 
175 0.13 
175 0.13 
175 0.13 
175 0.13 
175 0.13 
Garden 
crops 
duty Q Total Q 
0.47 
0.47 
0.47 
0.60 
0.41 
0.41 
0.41 
0.41 
0.41 
To the peak discharge of 0.60 cusecs, 25% was added for 'fluctuation' (engineers in interviews 
talked about 'rush irrigation'). The more likely interpretation is however that this 25% is the 
difference between field level and distributary level duties, but this is not what is written in the 
document. If this would not be so, the distributaries would have been designed on the basis of field 
level duties. 
More confusing is a later, undated, correction of this calculation. The corrected calculation 
crosses out the demand table, takes the whole area localised together and calculates discharge on 
the basis of the rabi duty of 175, and adds 25%, giving 1.25 cusecs. For other pipe outlet 
commands where rice is grown, the discharge for rice is added to that of the 'irrigated dry' crops. 
The status and meaning of the correction cannot be derived from the document. With the corrected 
figures, the total distributary discharge would far exceed the design discharge as now found in 
Irrigation Department statements. Perhaps the correction is an anticipation of actual cultivation 
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practices, and the canal capacity needed to irrigate the thus cropped distributary command area 
simultaneously or in rotation. 
A further surprise is that that a standard pipe size is adopted for the pipe outlet structures that 
connect the distributaries with the local irrigation units (the pipe outlet command areas or tertiary 
units) The standard pipes have a 12 inches (1 foot) diameter with 11/ix1 Vi feet steel gates in front 
of them). At the same time different discharges are calculated for the different pipe outlet 
command areas. In some of the forms for calculation of the construction costs of the pipe outlet 
structures, the pipe size is pre-printed, which shows that there was indeed a standard procedure 
(as was also stated by several engineers interviewed on the matter). This standardisation 
undermines the idea of water distribution in accordance with the localisation pattern, unless 
regulation of discharge with the gate was envisaged. However, there is no indication that this was 
so, and indications to the contrary do exist (see chapter 8 for further discussion). A standard 12 
inch pipe implies general over-dimensioning of the pipe outlet structure orifices. 
The design of the distributaries remains somewhat of a mystery. The procedure for one 
distributary is insufficient ground for general conclusions. To find more evidence a lot of dust would 
have to be moved in the Irrigation Department offices. One can only hope that some of the original 
design material will be preserved. 
WATER, SPACE AND SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION 
Agrarian change in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal command area 
"I have seen agrarian capitalism in full swing", is what I wrote home after one of my first 
field visits to the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal command area. What I had observed and 
heard about was intensive and highly productive rice, sugarcane and cotton farming, more 
than one hundred ricemills, a sugarcane factory, one of the largest cotton markets in India, 
scores of tractors, gangs of migrant labourers, and satellite TV dishes on the roofs of farm 
houses. This picture of bustle and boom is obviously only part of the story of agrarian 
change following the introduction of canal irrigation in Raichur district. However, 
notwithstanding the problems and inequalities that are part of this pattern of agrarian 
development, one cannot but be impressed by the impact of irrigation on the economic 
dynamism of the region. 
In this chapter I discuss the process of agrarian change that occurred in the command area 
of the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal. The central theme is social differentiation in the context 
of a booming canal irrigation-based economy. 
The concept of social differentiation includes the following two meanings. The first 
meaning is that of categorisation or classification, the identification of types, of in this case 
farming households-enterprises. The second meaning is that of the process of the emergence 
and development of social difference, that is, of the categories or types identified. 
In the sense of categorisation, social differentiation in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal 
command area contains few surprises. The classification of farming households-enterprises 
in rich, middle, small and poor peasants that is common to the debate on agrarian change in 
India, fits the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal situation well. The specific features of the 
Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal case are the role of migrant farmers in the process of social 
differentiation and its spatial characteristics.1' Social differentiation took place on the grid 
11
 I do not take position in the debate between different schools of thought on agrarian change 
(such as articulated in the 'mode of production' debate and the debate on the green revolution for 
example; see Patnaik, 1990; Byres, 1981). That is, I don't use the research material to interpret 
the overall nature of the agrarian change process as a particular variety of agrarian capitalism, from 
the perspective of the agrarian question, or any other angle. There are several reasons for this. 
Firstly, the group of households-enterprises in the three selected pipe outlet command areas is not 
representative for the agrarian economy of the region (landless labourers and rainfed farmers are 
excluded for example, and the selection was on the basis of hydraulic units chosen with other 
objectives). Secondly, I focussed on the characteristics of the households-enterprises in the study 
(continued...) 
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of a canal system that was planted in a socio-agricultural landscape based on rainfed farming, 
and into which migrated large numbers of resourceful farmers to realise the potential benefits 
of irrigation. What has emerged in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal command area is a 
class-related spatial pattern of land distribution and access to water. Underlying the 
geography of social differentiation are the imperatives of location in water distribution, the 
settlement of migrant farmers in locations with favourable access to water, and mechanisms 
that allowed the concentration of the land of rich farmers, both migrants and locals, in head 
end reaches. I argue that the relation of location, space, access to water and socio-economic 
status are not just correlations, or the unintended outcome of the sum of all individuals' 
behaviour, but connections that are strategically pursued by farmers. The spatial relations 
constituted by the canal infrastructure need to be understood as a defining part of the agrarian 
structure, and their evolution a central element of the analysis of agrarian change in canal 
irrigated areas. 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 5.1 gives some of the quantitative 
dimensions of the economic boom that was induced by the introduction of canal irrigation 
in Raichur district. Intensification and commoditisation were the main features of the 
agricultural development process that occurred in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal 
command area. 
Section 5.2 discusses the pivotal role that migrant farmers played in this process. The 
settlers came from the agriculturally intensified and commoditised coastal areas of Andhra 
Pradesh. They brought the capital and the new agricultural practices that were the basis of 
the irrigation boom. The section describes why they migrated, why local farmers were 
willing to sell their land, and attempts to indicate the magnitude of the land transfers. 
In section 5.3 the main topic of the chapter is discussed: the spatial dimensions of social 
differentiation in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal command area. For this purpose a 
typology of farming households-enterprises is first developed. The characteristics of rich, 
middle, small and poor peasants are discussed. At the pipe outlet command area level a 
correlation is found between category of farming household-enterprise and location in the 
pipe outlet command area. At the distributary level the relation between settlement and the 
emergence of head-end and tail-end areas is investigated. It is shown that there is an overall 
correlation between geographical location, access to water and intensity of farming, but that 
there is also considerable diversity among distributaries. 
In section 5.4 I summarise the main points of the chapter. 
5.1 THE IRRIGATION BOOM IN FACTS AND FIGURES 
In the early 1950s less than 1% of the cultivated area in Raichur district was irrigated. In 
1991-92 this was 30%. The Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal made the largest contribution to 
1I(...continued) 
year, 1991-92. My data on their evolution is not complete. Given also the fact that there is no 
abundance of usable secondary socio-economic data on agrarian change in Raichur district, a 
sketch of the main features of the agrarian structure in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal command 
area is possible with the available data, but not a detailed evaluation of its historical evolution. My 
concern with regard to agrarian change was a different one: what are the features of the agrarian 
structure and the process of agrarian change that are specifically relevant for the analysis of water 
distribution practices? This is the question that I address in this chapter. 
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the irrigated area. It accounted for 77% of it, and the system thus irrigated 23% of the 
cultivated area in the district.2' 
The economic changes associated with this increase of irrigated area can be appreciated 
by looking at the differences between the rainfed farming system and the irrigated farming 
system. Kallur has documented this difference in his impact study of irrigation in Raichur 
district (Kallur, 1988). He selected 10 villages with irrigation (in the Tungabhadra Left Bank 
Canal command area) and 10 villages without irrigation, and in each village equal numbers 
of marginal, small, medium and large farmers (in total 240 households).3' 
The general conclusion that can be drawn from Kallur's study is that irrigated farming is 
more productive, more commoditised and more profitable than rainfed farming. Kallur found 
that all farmers used high-yielding or hybrid varieties for all crops under irrigated conditions. 
Under rainfed conditions mostly local varieties were used except for groundnut and sunflower 
{ibid.: 163-164).4) Kallur also found that irrigation lead to a shift in the cropping pattern to 
high input, high-output and high-value crops. Rice, sugarcane and hybrid cotton occupied 31, 
12.5 and 15.1 % of the irrigated cultivated area in Kallur's sample while the traditional food 
crops (sorghum and millet) occupied only 10.5%. In contrast, under rainfed conditions 
sorghum and millet occupied 58.1% of the cropped area. Similarly, 0.3% of pulses were 
grown under irrigated conditions, while these occupied 5.8% under rainfed conditions 
{ibid.: 131-137). Notwithstanding the relative decline of the area under food crops under 
irrigation with roughly 50%, more food is produced under irrigated conditions. This is 
because the yield of rice and irrigated sorghum is several times that of rainfed coarse 
grains.5' 
21
 Data on area irrigated can be derived from different sources. I used GOI/PC/PEO (1965), 
GOKAR/ID (1981), statistics available at the Principal Agricultural Officer's office in Raichur, and 
the GOKAR/DES/4/v?ua/Season and Crop Reports. There are many inconsistencies and unclarities 
in these data. Figures on crops grown and area irrigated given in this chapter should thus be treated 
with some care. For general discussion of the reliability of socio-economic statistics see Hill (1984). 
31
 Kallur collected the data for his impact study in 1982-83. He selected villages (and households) 
with irrigation in the 'heavy irrigation' zone of the command area (in Koppal, Gangavati, Sindhanur 
and Manvi taluks). By leaving out Deodurg and Raichur taluk and the less well provided parts of the 
other taluks he leaves out the parts of the command area where many farmers have less than 
optimal access to water. In other words, Kallur abstracts from the unequal distribution of water and 
focusses on the areas that do receive sufficient water for the cultivation of 'wet' crops (Kallur, 
1988:17-19). The comparison of extreme cases is useful for the purpose of illustration in this 
section, but does not give a representative view of irrigated agriculture in the command area. Other 
economic impact data on the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal can be found in Venkata Reddy (1979), 
Bisalaiah and Taylor (1973) and Meti (1972). The latter I have been unable to consult. For the right 
bank there are also several studies (Devarajulu Naidu, 1987; Sen and Das, 1986). To my 
knowledge no specifically executed 'bench-mark survey' exists of the agro-economic situation in 
the left bank command area just before the start of the project. Iyengar (1951) could be used as 
such. For the right bank there is such a study (GOAP, 1959). For farm economics data of 
householdsin distributary 36 of the Left Bank Canal, see Noij (1992). 
41
 It is not clear what Kallur exactly means by local varieties. Government support for the 
improvement of varieties used in rainfed agriculture started before Independence (GONOH/DOA, 
1944). There is also the - unknown - factor of selection by farmers themselves. The point is that 
under irrigated conditions varieties with a higher yield potential can be used. 
51
 For example, in the agricultural years 1979-80 to 1981-82 the average sorghum yield in Raichur 
district was 667 kg/ha (mostly rainfed cultivation), while that of rice (all irrigated) was 2444 kg/ha 
(GOKAR/DES, ASCR 1979-80 to 1981-82). The average yield of (irrigated hybrid) sorghum in the 
(continued...) 
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The importance of external inputs in the irrigated farming system and the high degree of 
commoditisation of irrigated farming can be seen in table 5.1. 
Table 5 . 1 : Commoditisation of irrigated farming compared to rainfed farming in 1982-83 , 
Raichur district 
Value of seed per acre 
Percentage seed purchased 
Fertiliser expenditure per acre 
Pesticides expenditure per acre 
Value human labour per acre 
Percentage labour hired 
Machinery expenditure per acre 
Transport costs per acre 
Percentage transport hired 
Total variable cost per acre 
Total variable and fixed costs 
Irrigated farming 
Rs.156 
90% 
Rs.643 
Rs.333 
Rs.180 
53% 
Rs.122 
Rs.188 
57% 
Rs.2003 
Rs.2983 
Rainfed farming 
Rs.47 
15% 
Rs.11 
Rs.O 
Rs.97 
26% 
Rs.O 
Rs.11 
1 % 
Rs.312 
Rs.490 
Source: Kallur (1988:179-187, 194) (for all crops and sample households) 
Among the external inputs used in irrigated farming chemical fertiliser is a very important 
one, covering almost one-third of the variable costs. The difference in fertiliser use between 
irrigated and rainfed farming can also be illustrated by means of taluk level fertiliser 
consumption data. The four taluks of Raichur district with very little irrigation (Devadurga, 
Lingsugur, Yelburga, Kusthagi) had an average use of 12.1 kg/ha in the 1980-81 to 1987-88 
period. The average use in the three main taluks of the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal 
(Gangavati, Sindhanur, Manvi) was 90.1 kg/ha in this period. In Gangavati taluk, which is 
the most intensively irrigated, it was 119.0 kg/ha (data from the Principal Agricultural 
Officer's office Raichur; Taluka Plan Statistics file). 
Under irrigation the use of some 'traditional' resources was also higher, despite their 
smaller proportional relevance. In rainfed farming the average use of farm yard manure was 
7.12 quintals per acre. In irrigated agriculture it was 10.46 quintals (Kallur, 1988:173). This 
is because irrigated agriculture can sustain more cattle through higher fodder production. The 
use of bullock power was higher in irrigated than in dryland farming for farmers with 
holdings smaller than 5 acres (8.2 versus 6.6 days/acre). For bigger farmers the reverse was 
the case (4.0 versus 7.0 days/acre) (ibid. All, 178). Larger farmers met the increased land 
preparation intensity under irrigation by using tractors. 
Irrigated farming was more labour intensive than rainfed farming, and relied more on 
hired labour. In irrigated farming total labour input per acre ranged between 78 mandays for 
marginal farmers and 47 mandays for large farmers. In rainfed farming these figures were 
50 and 37 mandays. The proportion of family labour in this was 63% to 35% for irrigated 
farming and 100% to 68% for rainfed farming. Rainfed farming is mainly based on family 
labour; irrigated farming has about 50% of hired labour (ibid.:\16). 
5I(... continued) 
summer seasons of 1980-81 and 1981-82 was 2418 kg/ha. The average yield in the kharif seasons 
(mostly rainfed sorghum) was 761 kg/ha (GOKAR/DES, ASCR 1980-81 and 1981-82). 
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Irrigated agriculture was also more profitable than rainfed farming. Kallur calculated the 
average income per acre for different crops and for different size classes of farms. He found 
that the income per acre per crop in irrigated farming was between 5 and 16 times as high 
as that in rainfed farming (calculated from ibid.:tab\e 7.4).6) As an indicator of the 
profitability of farming Kallur calculated the benefit/cost ratio (taking total costs). Table 5.2 
shows that irrigated farms are generally more profitable than rainfed farms. With all inputs 
priced most rainfed farms worked at a loss, while most irrigated farms worked at a profit. 
Table 5.2: Distribution of the benefit-cost ratio over total costs in irrigated and rainfed 
farming, Raichur district, 1982-83 
Size class of 
farms (acres) 
0-2.5 
2.6-5 
5-10 
10-
Rainfed farming 
Benefit-cost 
ratio = 0-1 
(% of farms) 
71.8 
72.7 
54.1 
50.3 
Benefit-cost 
ratio = 1-2 
(% of farms) 
23.1 
23.6 
27.9 
30.3 
Irrigated farming 
Benefit-cost 
ratio = 0-1 
(% of farms) 
7.7 
0.0 
3.5 
3.7 
Benefit-cost 
ratio = 1-2 
(% of farms) 
63.5 
81.4 
71.9 
66.6 
Source: Kallur (1988:218, 220) 
The Raichur district economy is often described as rice-based, but this image is not fully 
correct. The image of a rice-dominated economy is related to the strong growth of the rice 
sector in the district since the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal came into operation, and the 
economic and political power of rice growers, rice processors and rice traders. Since the 
early 1990s Raichur is the district of Karnataka's 19 districts with the largest percentage of 
its area cultivated with rice. The area planted with rice amounted to one-sixth of the State 
total (GOKAR/DES, 1995). By the end of 1989 there were 113 rice mills in Raichur district, 
while in the 1960s there were less than 20, and probably smaller ones.7> However, in 1981-
82 Raichur district contributed 25% to the State's cotton production and 15% to the State's 
oilseeds production, while the comparable figure for rice in that year was only 8%.8) It 
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 A major difference between rainfed farming and irrigated farming is that in irrigated farming 
double cropping is possible. Therefore the income per acre per crop in irrigated farming is not only 
higher, but the income gap for equally sized farms is further increased by the cultivation of two 
crops on the same land under irrigated conditions. 
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 Data from District Industries Centre, Raichur and the Mysore State Gazetteer 1970. 
81
 Rice production in Raichur district increased from 7416 tons in 1956-57 (0.7% of the State total) 
to 189439 tons in 1981-82 (8% of the State total). The cotton and oilseeds sectors exhibited 
substantial production growth in the same period that rice cultivation expanded, but their share in 
the total State production remained stable. Cotton production increased from 19,632 tons in 1956-
57 to 31,052 tons in 1981 -82 (24.4 and 25.4 % of the State total). Oilseeds production (excluding 
coconut) increased from 86,164 tons to 123,496 tons (13.1 and 14.8% of the state total). In the 
same period coarse grains production increased from 6.3 to 7.5% of the State production (119,961 
and 324,760 tons) and pulses form 4.6 to 7.9% of State production (5461 and 47,649 tons). 
1956-57 and 1981-82 were chosen as reference years because they were the earliest and the 
(continued...) 
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would therefore be more correct to say that Raichur district is an important producer of 
agricultural raw materials for the Karnataka economy.9' 
The material presented above suggests a positive picture of irrigation, but this is a partial 
picture. Irrigation is associated with productive and profitable high external input farming. 
This has been the basis of economic growth and the development of input, output and labour 
markets in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal region. However, a full economic analysis of 
the changes in the farming system and regional economy as a result of irrigation would also 
have to value the environmental costs of irrigation.10' Some environmental problems that 
threaten the sustainability of irrigated agriculture are the much quicker than expected siltation 
of the Tungabhadra reservoir and the extent of waterlogged and salinised/alkalinised soils. 
On both recent and reliable figures are lacking.11' Other environmental impacts on which 
data are not available are the effects of irrigation and high external input farming on soil 
fertility12', the occurrence of diseases like malaria13', the drinking water situation and the 
health impact of pesticide use.14' A sensible discussion of all these effects requires further 
research. 
5.2 SETTLEMENT 
The settlement of migrant farmers in the command area is an important feature of the process 
of agrarian change in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal. The investment capital and 
agricultural and entrepreneurial skills that this group brought with them were the basis of an 
expansive and intensive rice and sugarcane-based farming system that triggered the process 
8I(...continued) 
latest year for which I had an officially published set of data (GOKAR/DES, Annual Season and Crop 
Reports). 
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 Raichur district has a low level of industrialisation, with an emphasis on agro-processing. Of the 
(only) 20 large and medium industries in operation in 1989-90, 15 were directly related to 
agricultural production. The five exceptions were the Hutti Gold Mines, the Raichur Thermal Power 
Station, and three chemical industries. (Data from the District Statistical Office, Raichur). 
101
 It can also be noted that in terms of social development the situation in Raichur district as a 
whole is far from positive. Vyasulu and Vani (1997) calculated the Human Development Index for 
all districts in Karnataka (with 1981 Census data), in which literacy rate, infant mortality rate, life 
expectancy and income were included. They calculated the index in 12 different ways, and in 10 
of these Raichur district scored the lowest of all 19 districts. In the other two calculations it was 
the one but lowest district. 
111
 For some discussion of waterlogging and salinisation in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal, see 
Jurriens and Landstra (1990-1:20-22). See CADA (1997) for waterlogging and salinisation figures. 
121
 The NGO AME has found a worrying decline in soil fertility under intensive rice irrigation (see 
also footnote 19 in chapter 10). 
131
 Malaria was much discussed in the planning phase of the project, and the localisation rules 
specified that no irrigation should take place close to villages. The spacing rule is disregarded by 
the local population, for example in the construction of private lift irrigation schemes. 
141
 In both research locations a young male labourer died during our fieldwork period through over-
exposure to pesticides while spraying. Labourers hardly wear protective clothing while doing this 
work. On one hand the drinking water situation in the region has enormously improved through the 
construction of the canal system, but on the other hand there is acute shortage in canal closure 
periods and there are severe problems with the quality of canal water for drinking purposes (TIPP-II, 
1996). 
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of agricultural growth. I discuss the motivation for the settlers to migrate and the reasons of 
local farmers to sell land to them. I conclude with a brief sketch of the magnitude of land 
transfers. 
Reasons for migration 
The settler farmers in the Left Bank Canal mainly came from the coastal districts of Andhra 
Pradesh (see Anjaneya Swamy, 1988:65; Nagaraju, 1989:31 for district-wise information). 
This region witnessed expansion and intensification of irrigated agriculture since the mid-19th 
century, as a result of the enlargement and rehabilitation of canal irrigation, tenurial reforms 
in Madras Presidency and other factors (for historical accounts see Rao, 1985; 
Satyanarayana, 1990; Upadhya, 1988; Wallach, 1985). Intensive commercial rice cultivation 
was the dominant agricultural activity and the base of an expanding rural economy. 
The farmers who migrated were mostly small and medium sized farmers in their home 
areas. In Anjaneya Swamy's sample 80% of the Tungabhadra migrants held between 0 and 
5 acres (0-2 ha) (N=150). Only 3% held more than 10 acres (4 ha) (Anjaneya Swamy, 
1988:86, table 3.9).15) 
Most migrants were in their twenties and thirties. 37% of the migrants were between 20 
and 30 years of age at the time of migration and 43% between 30 and 40 (ibid.:82, table 
3.7). 71% of the farmers were members of joint households before migration, while 88% 
were independent households after migration (ibid.:&5). This fact plus the age of the migrants 
suggests that migration took place as a solution for the further division of holdings through 
division of property when a joint family was split. Many of the farmers in my own sample 
came to the Left Bank Canal as young families with no or few, young children. 
The pressure on land in coastal Andhra Pradesh was high. This resulted in low land 
availability for expansion of farms and in high land prices. Selling prices in coastal Andhra 
Pradesh and purchase prices in Raichur district are given in table 5.3. 
It follows from the table that for migrant farmers there was at least a factor 7-8, and often 
more than 10 difference between land purchase and land sale prices.16) Assuming that the 
cost of land preparation doubled the purchase price, migrant farmers could increase their 
landholding by a factor 3.5-4 at least, not counting other sources of money for investment 
than land sales.17) The combination of small holdings and a high land price difference was 
the major reason for farmers to migrate (Anjaneya Swamy, 1988:chapter 4; Nagaraju, 
1989:32, table 3.2). The push to migrate was further strengthened by 'no scope to enter non-
151
 In Nagaraju's sample (N = 41) the predominance of small farmers was even stronger. 80% held 
less than 3 acres (1.2 ha), and no farmer held more than 7 acres (2.8 ha). Nagaraju further notes 
that the landless migrants "were essentially labourers sponsored by the few rich farmer-migrants 
who wished to have some skilled labourers in wet cultivation" (Nagaraju, 1989:34-35). 
161
 Iyengar (1951:178) in a seven village survey conducted in 1950 found land prices for dry land 
in Raichur district ranging between Rs.197 and Rs.607 (average prices for highest and lowest 
grade). These are higher prices than Nagaraju found for later years. Nagaraju's prices may be on 
the low side when taken as representative for land sales in the command more generally. There 
may have been local differences, and the registered sale price may have been lower than the actual 
sale price to reduce administrative transaction costs. 
171
 Anjaneya Swamy (1988:117, table 4.6) found much smaller differences. He found that the 
factor between average land value in place of origin and the place of destination was 4, 1.4, 1.2 
and 0.95 in 1955, 1965, 1974 and 1984 respectively. My own data support the order of 
magnitude found by Nagaraju rather than Anjaneya Swamy's findings. 
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agricultural professions', which was mentioned by 54% of Nagaraju's respondents as the 
third most important factor for migration after small landholding and high land prices. 
Table 5.3: Land prices at which migrants sold and bought land in different years 
Period 
1955-60 
1960-65 
1965-70 
1970-
Price of land 
sold at place 
of origin 
(Rs./acre) (a) 
2500-7000 
7000-15000 
1 5000-25000 
Average prices, number of transactions 
and average acreage of land transactions 
in a head end distributary village lb) 
Price No. Total Average 
(Rs./acre) (acres) (acres) 
113 4 81 20 
203 7 119 17 
299 18 231 13 
375 16 196 12 
392 38 425 11 
609 26 293 11 
916 29 284 10 
1503 63 221 3.5 
7621 39 92 2.4 
10222 17 25 1.4 
27503 14 16 1.1 
Year 
1957-58 
1958-59 
1959-60 
1960-61 
1961-62 
1962-63 
1963-64 
1966-67 
1975-76 
1980-81 
1985-86 
Sources: (a) Nagaraju (1989:33, footnote 1). Prices as quoted by migrant farmers who were 
interviewed in the village survey. 
(b) Nagaraju (1989:47, table 4.1). Data from Sub-Registrar's Office of Land 
Transactions, Gangavati. Figures are rounded. 
It is not difficult to understand that these small and medium sized farmers with experience 
in irrigated farming decided to settle in new irrigation schemes to expand their holdings.18' 
More difficult to grasp is the easiness with which Andhra Pradesh migrant farmers were able 
to acquire vast areas of agricultural land in the head reaches of the Tungabhadra canal 
system. 
Reasons for land sales 
In informal discussions on land sales by the local population to migrant farmers, the 
phenomenon is often 'explained' by the ignorance, inexperience, laziness and lack of 
education of the local population. This representation of inferiority can be heard from local 
as well as migrant farmers, and is also not uncommon among government officials and, it 
must be said, academics. It does express the strength of the impact of settlement, but it is 
not an adequate account of the settlement/sales process. 
181
 The Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal was not the first irrigation system to which farmers of coastal 
Andhra Pradesh migrated (see Anjaneya Swamy, 1988). The Kamma caste group, who formed the 
majority of the migrants, further was a relatively well organised, well educated and economically 
and politically astute community (see Upadhya, 1988). 
WA TEH, SPA CE AND SOCIAL DIFFERENTIA TION 97 
The explanation of land sales by local farmers offered below consists of two elements. 
The first reason for land sales was the force of money in conditions of poverty. Many 
farmers found it difficult to ignore the purchasing power of the migrant farmers. The second 
reason for land sales was the strategy of particularly larger local farmers to sell part of their 
land to generate resources to invest in the development of the remaining land for irrigation. 
The force of money 
The financial solvency of the migrants that came to Raichur district in search for land was 
enormous compared to that of the local population. Nagaraju calculated that the migrants in 
his survey carried on average Rs.24,140 when they came to settle. 46% carried Rs.25,000 
or more, 12% more than Rs. 100,000 (Nagaraju, 1989:35). The migrants mostly came in the 
1950s and 1960s.19) The very different financial situation of the local population can be 
derived from Iyengar's detailed survey of the socio-economic conditions in Raichur district 
around 1950, a few years before the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal was opened for irrigation 
(Iyengar, 1951). Iyengar found that only 29% of the 1881 families he interviewed had 
savings, and that the average savings of these families amounted to Rs.299 (Iyengar, 
1951:450-451, table 185; figures for 1947-48). Because of these poverty conditions, it must 
have been very difficult for the smaller local farmers to resist the temptation to generate 
ready cash by the sale of land, particularly because the migrant farmers were willing to pay 
prices higher than current land prices. With the money these farmers could address 
immediate needs like paying off or relieving debts, and supporting household and other non-
agricultural expenditures. Larger farmers could sell the parts of their landholding that they 
considered of little value, and generate considerable amounts of money. This could be used 
for their immediate needs, or invested in agriculture (see below). 
How this temptation was transformed into actual sales is not very well known. It is not 
unlikely for example that land sales by indebted farmers were partly enforced by the local 
village elite moneylenders, but sufficient evidence for this conclusion is lacking. On the other 
hand small farmers may also have used land sales to clear debts and reduce the control of 
moneylenders on their livelihoods. What is clear from different sources (Nagaraju, 1989; 
Verhoeven, 1992; own field data) is that migrant farmers systematically gave loans to local 
farmers, big and small, in order to be able to acquire their land at some point in the future. 
The poor documentation of the land transfer process leaves space for the perpetuation of 
superficial explanations as referred to above.20' 
Investment capacity 
The very limited means of local farmers also implied that they had very little capacity to 
invest in the development of their land for irrigation. Investments to make land suitable for 
irrigation ran into several hundreds of Rupees per hectare, and a pair of oxen for ploughing 
191
 Nagaraju does not give a breakdown by year or period. 
201
 Some aspects of the process of land transfers were documented. For the right bank side of the 
Tungabhadra system the occurrence of land speculation before the canal system was opened, by 
local landlords as well as outsiders, is discussed in Sivaswamy (1947). Whether the same occurred 
on the Left Bank side is unknown to me. My interviews give evidence of some early settlers buying 
large tracts of land in order to resell to other, later migrants. 
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cost around Rs.2000 (Verhoeven 1992:73)21) in the early years of the Tungabhadra system. 
With the level of savings indicated above, the lack of investment capacity of local farmers 
can easily be fathomed.22' 
The problem was recognised at policy level, but not solved. Well into the 1960s the policy 
debate on the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal area focused on the slow rate of development 
of land for irrigation (see for example Anagol, 1969; GOMYS/DOA, 1968; Nair, 1961). 
Particularly land development for the irrigation of 'irrigated dry' crops ran behind schedule. 
The most important reason mentioned in documents from that period was the high cost to 
make land suitable for irrigation (levelling, construction of field bunds, 
adaptation/construction of field channels) combined with the lack of resources of local 
farmers to undertake these activities. Despite the recognition of the problem, institutional 
credit for land development was available to a very limited extent in the early phase of the 
Left Bank Canal project. To make things worse, the Census of India (1961b) notes that the 
problem with institutional credit was that it tended to benefit larger producers only. 
There also hardly was a local credit market in Raichur district for agricultural loans. 
Raichur district farmers were not used to take loans for agricultural purposes because rainfed 
agriculture was very capital extensive. In 1948 only 22% of farmers had debts, while, by 
comparison, this was around three-quarters of the farmers in Madras Presidency (in 1945). 
Of the loans of this 22% of farmers 95% had a different collateral than land. 52% of these 
loans were smaller than Rs.300, and none was bigger than Rs.1000. The loans were mainly 
used for household expenditures and marriages (Iyengar's data discussed in Verhoeven, 
1992:67-70).23) 
As a result, one of the few avenues open to generate investment resources was the sale 
of land. Particularly larger farmers used land sales to generate money for agricultural 
investments. This often was the purchase of cattle or oxen for ploughing because manure and 
draught power were a greater constraint in rainfed production than land availability. Farmers 
who had sufficient land, might sell part of it to gather enough money to develop the 
remainder of their land for irrigation and generate more income on a smaller holding (see 
above). A similar strategy followed by local farmers was to lease out part of their land to 
migrants for periods of 5-7 years for very low lease sums, but under the condition that the 
migrant farmer would bear the cost of land development, and return it to the owner fully 
leveled and bunded. In the Bhatta pipe outlet command area in distributary 93 this practice 
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 It seems to me that this figure of Rs.2000 is on the high side, but I have been unable to trace 
other sources with prices of draught animals in that period. There was great scarcity of draught 
animals in the early period of the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal, which may have driven up the 
prices. The scarcity negatively affected the pace of land development for irrigation. 
221
 An indirect indicator for the lack of investment capacity is the percentage of farmers who had 
a holding larger than what was considered a viable family holding in the land reform process in 
Hyderabad State in the early 1950s. The criterion for an 'economic' or 'family holding' was a net 
yearly income of Rs.800. A rainfed farm in the black cotton soil area of Raichur district would have 
to measure between 8.5 and 14.5 hectares to attain viability. Verhoeven calculated that 65% of 
the holdings in Raichur district were smaller than this and therefore were unlikely to be able to 
generate sufficient surplus to pay for the investments needed to start irrigated agriculture 
(Verhoeven, 1992:42, 60-61). 
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 However, the data on indebtedness are contradictory. The village census of Sirvar in Manvi taluk 
shows that 64% of the households were in debt, which an average debt per indebted household 
of Rs.482, mostly used for household expenditures and marriages (Census of India, 1961b:43). 
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was in use in 1991-92. Two local farmers had leased out their land to migrant farmers on 
these conditions. 
An indication of the magnitude of land transfers 
To my knowledge no statistics exist on the number of settler farmers who migrated into the 
Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal command area and the extent of their landholdings. Evidence 
on the importance of settler farmers in irrigation is thus necessarily impressionistic. 
For distributary 24 Nagaraju's study of land transfers in a middle-reach village can serve 
as an example (Nagaraju, 1989). In this village most land sales took place in the first 10 
years after the canal was opened for irrigation. After 20 years the land market had become 
rather quiet again (see table 5.3). In the period 1957-58 to 1966-67 the net accrual of land 
to migrants was around 1430 acres.24' The total area of the village was 4373 acres, 
including all cultivated and non-cultivated land (Census of India 1961a:280). This means that 
in a period of ten years approximately one-third of the village land was sold to settler 
farmers. 
Another indication of the magnitude of the transfers is offered by the situation in the 
subdistributary that was studied in distributary 24 in 1991-92. On the left side of this 
subdistributary not a single local farmer owned land in the upstream half. On the right side 
of the subdistributary the situation seemed to be similar, though my data is less extensive. 
Most local farmers were concentrated in the downstream four, out of a total of 18 pipe outlet 
command areas (plus the tail end watercourse) taking water from the subdistributary. 
Map 5 . 1 : Land development in Bhatta outlet, D93 
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 Based on figures given in Nagaraju (1989:48) assuming that 1964-65 and 1965-66 had the 
average accrual of 1963-64 and 1966-67. 
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In Bhatta outlet in distributary 93, 41 % of the 164 acres acres command area was owned 
by settler farmers in 1991-92, and another 4% leased by settler farmers from local 
farmers.25' This land was concentrated in the head reach of the outlet command area. This 
shift in landholding took place between 1978 and 1992, and was ongoing. On map 5.1 (see 
previous page) the dates of the leveling of particular plots are indicated as far as we could 
recover these.26' It can be seen that land development evolved from head to tail, starting 
with the activities of the settler farmers. Following the typical pattern, the migrant farmers 
settled along the distributary canal, acquired land in the head end of the outlet command 
area, and gradually moved downstream. Local farmers followed suit in developing their land 
for rice cultivation. 
This scattered and limited evidence suggests that in relatively short periods after the start 
of settlement substantive, and sometimes massive, redistribution of land took place from local 
to migrant farmers. 
5.3 THE GEOGRAPHY OF SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION 
The reader might perhaps expect, after the discussion above, that there is a systematic and 
regular pattern of migrant farmers with large landholdings occupying the geographical head 
ends (and using most water), and local farmers with small landholdings occupying the 
geographical tails (and having poor access to water). However, the geography of water 
distribution and social differentiation is more complex than this. In this section I argue that 
there is a general correlation of class, access to water and size and location of landholding. 
However I also argue that there is considerable diversity within this general pattern, which 
derives from different histories of settlement and irrigation development in different 
localities. 
Before I can make this analysis I present a typology of households-enterprises. This socio-
economic classification allows me to unpack the generalised notions of 'farmers' and 'water 
users' used so far. It also serves to transcend the dichotomous classification of migrant 
farmers versus local farmers, within which the former are the rich and successful farmers 
with large holdings, and the latter the poor ones with small holdings. I present a 
categorisation of rich, middle, small and poor peasant households-enterprises which allows 
a more refined analysis of the spatial pattern of water distribution in relation to the 
characteristics of the agrarian structure.27' 
After the presentation of the typology the discussion of the class-related distribution of 
land and access to water moves at two levels: the pipe outlet command area and the 
distributary level.28' At the level of the pipe outlet command area a strong correlation 
between location, access to water and socio-economic position is found. This is graphically 
presented by drawing the categories of households-enterprises on the outlet command area 
maps. I discuss how this correlation has emerged as a result of settlement and other land-
transfer mechanisms. 
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 See footnote 17 in chapter 6 on the size of this pipe outlet command area. 
261
 The year of leveling was mostly also the year of purchase. 
271
 For discussion of the possible role of caste, ethnicity and religion in social differentiation see 
footnote 46 in chapter 6, where the social relations of water distribution are discussed in detail. 
281
 A similar analysis is in principle possible at main canal level, but the number of distributaries that 
were studied is too small to allow firm statements (but see chapter 9 for some information). 
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At the distributary level I discuss the relation between settlement and head-tail divisions 
for distributaries 24, 93 and 97. The discussion shows the importance of looking at the way 
the head-tail pattern evolved over time, and identifies some other factors than proximity to 
the water source that influence the spatial pattern of water use. 
A typology of farming households-enterprises 
In this part of the section I present a typology of farming households-enterprises. It provides 
the basis for relating water distribution to social differentiation. 
The typology of farming households-enterprises presented below is based on the following 
data. For the 1991 kharif season we collected detailed information on the agricultural 
practices of the cultivators of the plots in the three selected pipe outlet command areas, as 
well as farm economics data. In a household survey of the same group at the end of the 
agricultural year we collected summary data on the second cropping season, rabi 1992, and 
on plots cultivated outside the selected pipe outlets, for both seasons. Through the household 
survey also general data on household composition, other economic activities, household 
assets and some other relevant items were collected. This data was complemented and partly 
checked with the daily observations and discussions registered in the research assistants' and 
my own field notes. 
The typology takes the household as the classification unit. Household is defined as a 
group that eats from the same pot. For the purpose of analysing water distribution practices 
Box 5.1: Households-enterprises as the unit of analysis 
The farming systems of irrigating farmers in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal can be 
described as 'male farming systems' (Safilios-Rothschild, 1988). Male farming systems are 
defined as those farming systems where male household heads/members dominate 
agricultural decision making. With very few exceptions the farming enterprises in my sample 
were controlled by the male heads of the households (or the family leader, an expression used 
in Wood, 1995; for further general discussion of male dominance in Indian farming 
households see Agarwal, 1994). Men controlled the use of the family land, the acquisition 
of inputs (and credit for that) and the marketing of the produce. They also managed the farm 
labour activities (though women, wives, daughters and daughters-in-law might perform most 
of this labour). The exceptions among a total of 82 farms were two cases of female 
controlled farms (one case where the husband had left/was sent packing, and one where the 
husband had recently died leaving his wife with young children), and one, maybe two cases 
of dual control (in one of these cases the wife took credit without the husband knowing 
where it came from). In all these cases there was the prospect of sons (or sons-in-law) taking 
over the management of the farm in due course. In what way farming decisions are 
negotiated within the household I do not know. Most households depended on agricultural 
cultivation and directly related activities alone. These directly related activities were mainly 
agricultural wage labour and the selling of milk produced by own cows and buffaloes. Both 
were to an important extent a female activity. The income gained from these activities was 
if not pooled at least spent for household purposes. Smits (1993) reports several cases where 
women had to give the income earned through wage labour to their husbands. In one case 
the husband even collected his wife's wages from the employer. When women kept their 
money income it was fully spent for household purposes. I therefore conclude that the 
households I studied are certainly not homogeneous units, but that they can be considered 
as single enterprises. 
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in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal it makes sense to regard farming households as single 
agricultural enterprises, even when internal divisions of labour and interests exist (see box 
5.1 on the previous page for discussion). 
The typology 
The main variable I used in the classification of the farming households-enterprises 
investigated is a qualitative version of Utsa Patnaik's labour exploitation ratio. This ratio is 
the balance between net labour hired in (labour hired in minus labour hired out) and family 
labour in self employment (Patnaik 1987:chapter 3).29> 
This led to the identification of the following four categories in the population of 80 
households-enterprises on which sufficient data was available. A short description of the 
different types of labour and employment relations that are involved is given in box 5.2. 
I: Households-enterprises who employ one or more permanent/bonded labourers for 
agricultural production, apart from large numbers of daily wage labourers. Family 
labour is not hired out. Field labour is not done by female family members. 
II: Households-enterprises who employ large numbers of daily wage labourers, but no 
permanent/bonded labourers. Family labour is not hired out. Field labour is hardly 
or not done by female family members. 
Ill: Households-enterprises whose main source of income is own agricultural production 
(mainly based on family labour, with some hiring in of wage labour), but who hire 
out family labour as wage labour for small to larger number of days. Female family 
members work on own fields as well as wage labourers. 
IV: Households-enterprises who derive their income mainly from hiring out family labour 
as wage labour. Cultivation of own land mainly by family labour with some wage 
labour hired in. Female family members work on own fields and as wage labourers. 
The labels commonly attached to these four categories in the (marxist) Indian debate on 
agrarian change are rich peasants, middle peasants, small peasants and poor peasants, a 
terminology that I will also employ (see Patnaik, 1987).30) 
The next step was to combine this classification based on labour characteristics30 with 
other characteristics of the household-enterprises. The classification correlated with the size 
of irrigated landholding, and there was also correlation of the classification with the terms 
on which credit was acquired. 
2911 disregarded the surplus appropriated through land leased out and loan interest (and the reverse) 
that is part of Patnaik's model, because these were minor factors in this case. 
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 The categories of landlords and landless labourers are not part of my typology. The first because 
they were not part of the sample, the second because without land a person cannnot be a water 
user (in this case). I personally find the labels 'poor peasants' and 'semi-proletarians' more fitting 
for the last two categories. More important than the labels however are the characteristics of each 
category. 
311
 Because of the partly quantitative and partly qualitative data on labour and employment, it is 
impossible to give a condensed presentation of the original data. 
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Box 5.2: Different types of agricultural labour and employment relations 
Agricultural labour working for daily wages 
* Hired individually (ploughing, tilling, pesticide spraying, fertiliser application, cleaning 
field channels) or in groups (harvesting, weeding). 
* When employer and labourers live in the same village or camp direct employment of 
groups; otherwise employment through meestris (females for female groups, males for 
mixed groups). Payment through meestri, who is group member. Meestri some extra 
payment at end of the season. 
* Sometimes semi-permanent arrangements with individuals and groups: 'first employment 
guarantee' arrangements against fixed or current rates, excluding the sugarcane harvesting 
period. 
* Common daily wage rates in 1991-92: Rs. 12 for males, Rs.10 for females. Some 
activities were paid better (for example Rs.20 for pesticide spraying). 
Group/gang labour on contract basis 
* For activities that need to be done quickly in times of peak labour demand, like rice 
harvesting and sugarcane cutting. 
* Local groups/gangs, but also seasonal migration from outside the command area. 
* Meestris act as group representatives, not as exploiting middle(wo)men. Work with the 
group and find new contracts. Get some extra payment. 
* Sometimes price arrangements linked to pre-season advances. 
Attached or bonded labourers 
* Old terminology of bonded labour is used {/iitada aalu), but (life)long attachment is rare. 
Better described as permanent labourers on 1-3 year contracts. Sambalada aalu (salaried 
worker) is also used. 
* Involves advance (loan) before contract starts. 
* All young men in the case of field labour. 
* In 1991-92 payment was Rs.3000-3500 per year, usually plus two bags of rice and a 
set of clothes, and sometimes meals at the farmer's house. 
* Unpopular employment relation that labourers preferably avoided. 
Wage labourers on a monthly wage 
* Small group of tractor drivers and their apprentices. 
* Monthly payment in 1991-92 Rs.400 per month (driver) and Rs.200 (apprentice), plus 
'tips' when tractor is hired by other farmers (Rs.5-10 per acre). 
Exchange labour 
* Involves exhange of labour days between two farmers (muuyiaalu). 
* Mainly found among small farmers relying heavily on family labour, and almost 
exclusively among local farmers. Not prominent in irrigated agriculture. 
* Only exchange of male labour was observed. 
Family labour 
* Found in all categories of the typology. A lot of pride and prestige is derived from 
building up a farm by own labour, particularly among settlers. Local elite also invests more 
family labour in agriculture than in the past. 
* Female participation is high in poor households, and absent in rich households. 
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The average irrigated landholding for the different categories is given in table 5.4. It can 
be seen that from poor to rich peasants the size of irrigated landholding increased.32' More 
details on landholding are given in appendix 5.1. 
Table 5.4: Landholding and origin of rich, middle, small and poor peasants in three outlet 
command areas in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal command area (kharif 1991) 
Number of migrant farmers 
Number of local farmers 
Total 
Average cultivated irrigated 
landholding (acres)" 
Average rainfed landholding 
(acres)"' 
Average total landholding 
(acres) 
Rich 
peasants 
20 
0 
20 
13.2 
0 
13.2 
Middle 
peasants 
13 
11 
24 
7.6 
1.1 
8.7 
Small 
peasants 
7 
18 
25 
3.4 
2.4 
5.6 
Poor 
peasants 
1 
10 
11 
2.2 
0.6 
2.8 
Total 
41 
39 
80 
a) All cultivated land was counted, both owned and leased; uncultivated and leased out land was 
not counted. 
b) All rainfed land was counted, cultivated or not. 
Table 5.5: Sources of credit for rich, middle, small and poor peasants in three pipe outlet 
command areas (1991-92) 
Source of credit 
No loans, moneylender himself 
Bank loans only 
Bank loans and input traders 
Input traders only 
Input traders and other farmers 
Other farmers only 
No credit, unable to get 
Unknown 
Total 
Rich 
peasants 
2 
4 
4 
3 
2 
0 
0 
5 
20 
Middle 
peasants 
0 
2 
6 
8 
3 
2 
1 
2 
24 
Small 
peasants 
0 
0 
5 
5 
3 
10 
0 
2 
25 
Poor 
peasants 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
5 
4 
0 
11 
The distribution of the types of credit over rich, middle, small and poor peasants is given 
in table 5.5. The terms of the credit become more unfavourable from top to bottom (for 
321
 Rich and middle peasants have very little rainfed land because they are mainly migrant farmers, 
who only invest in irrigated land. Small peasants are mainly local farmers and do own and cultivate 
rainfed land. Poor peasants generally didn't own rainfed land. In this category many farmers leased 
small pieces of irrigated land. 
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explanation, see appendix 5.1). The table shows that the terms of credit worsen from rich 
to poor peasants. This is visualised by highlighting for each category of farmers the two 
combined credit categories that contain the highest number of households-enterprises. 
However, the situation with regard to credit is rather specific per outlet command area. Table 
5.5 shows a general trend, but it doesn't fully convey the differentiated access to credit. 
Forms of credit and outlet-wise access of different categories of farming households-
enterprises to credit are described in detail in appendix 5.1. 
The cluster of the labour/employment characteristics, landholding and credit relations was 
used to make the final classification of individual households-enterprises into the four 
categories.33' Because the typology is based on the clustered occurrence of different types 
of relations, it can be considered as a relational typology (see Whatmore et al., 1987).34> 
Livelihood strategies 
The clustering of characteristics into four categories of farming households-enterprises is not 
just a statistical exercise. The four categories are associated with four different livelihood and 
accumulation strategies, which I will now describe. 
Rich peasants are the affluent farmers, who not only focus on expanding their agricultural 
operations (in canal and lift irrigation), but also undertake other activities. The main one of 
these is local input trading cum moneylending. Another one is hiring out their tractor when 
they own one. These farmers employ permanent labourers because they have large, intensive 
farms, but also to devote some of their time to their other business. Nevertheless, rich 
peasants farmers are still found in the field doing manual labour very frequently.35' These 
farmers invest strongly in the education of their children to start businesses or to take up 
employment outside direct agricultural production. Options open for these farmers and/or 
their children are to formally establish themselves as traders cum commission agents in a 
regional market centre (or become partners in such firms), or even start a ricemill. In my 
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 Five households-enterprises changed category when the landholding and credit characteristics 
were combined with the labour/employment characteristics. Three were shifted from the middle 
peasant category to the small peasant category, and one the other way. The fifth shift was from 
small peasant to poor peasant. This low number of changes shows the close fit of the labour, 
landholding and credit factors. The choice to take these three relationships as the basis of the 
typology is partly based on other research on agrarian change in India which shows that land, 
labour and credit are central differentiating factors, and partly on the analysis of the field data that 
was collected. There was also a close fit of the categorisation with possession of tractors, 
ownership of motorbikes and other assets, and quality of housing. Very few household-enterprises 
undertook productive economic activities other than agriculture (also see above). 
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 In the original design of this chapter a presentation of the farm economics data that we collected 
was also envisaged. However, its presentation takes a lot of space, and it is not essential for the 
argument of the chapter. Furthermore, as noted above, the sample of the households-enterprises 
in the three pipe outlet command areas is not representative for the situation in the command area. 
It can support a qualitative analysis of types and mechanisms, but does not provide basis for 
generalisation of quantitative findings. For those interested, quantitative data on the input intensity 
of irrigated farming, yields, the gross value of output (total and per acre), and the profitability of 
farming (total and per acre) for the four categories of households-enterprises are available from the 
author. 
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 Farms where farmers only supervise labour by others (part of Patnaik's definition of landlords) 
are very rare. Examples that I came across outside my sample were large landholders from the local 
elite, or business people and politicians who own land. These sometimes had appointed managers 
for their farms, or leased out land, but in other cases their sons undertook the farm work. 
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sample there were only very few examples of farmers setting up such official businesses. 
This had to do with the point of the demographic (and accumulation) cycle in which the most 
affluent farmers in my sample found themselves: recently married with young children. Some 
of them however were clearly on this trajectory. Farmers in this category are locally referred 
to as being 'economically and politically sound', or sowcars, which means rich and 
influential farmers who are also moneylenders. 
Middle peasants are farmers with a reasonably secure existence (though not necessarily 
at a high level of income). They make profits (in most years) that allow them to consider the 
expansion of their holdings by leasing or buying land. They focus on agricultural expansion 
and intensification. Activities outside agricultural production lie outside their ambit. Middle 
as well as rich peasants are employers of the members of the families of small and poor 
peasants households who go out for wage labour. 
Small peasant producers consider themselves and are considered primarily as farmers, but 
their position is a difficult one. At the next property division or through dowries for 
daughters their landholding may be fragmented or reduced. They hardly have the resources 
to solve this problem - by acquisition of land, investment in the education of their children, 
or setting up a small business - though this is sometimes attempted with great hardship. 
Because of their difficult socio-economic status, they run the risk to lose land when they have 
to take loans with local farmers. Family members also go out to be employed as wage 
labourers to earn additional income. Good agricultural results are crucial to this category, 
and failures may be disastrous. One of the few avenues for improvement in this category is 
the conversion of rainfed land held by the farmer into irrigated land by the installation of lift 
irrigation (by other, more wealthy farmers or the government). 
For poor peasant households the main concern is survival (maintaining minimal food 
entitlements for reproduction of the family). This category generally considers itself to belong 
to the labour class, and is often referred to by others as such. Own land cultivation gives a 
more secure basis to their existence than totally landless people. For this reason they actively 
try to hold on to, lease and sometimes buy small pieces of land. 
Water distribution and the typology of farming households-enterprises at pipe outlet 
command area level 
In this sub-section I discuss how at pipe outlet command area level the categorisation of 
farming households-enterprises is related with their location in the command area, and 
associated to that, their access to water and the crops grown. After the presentation of the 
situation in the three pipe outlet command areas studied, I summarise the mechanisms that 
explain the class-location correlation. 
In Kabbu outlet in distributary 24 the differentiation was that between rich peasants and 
middle peasants. The outlet as a whole had excellent access to water, which allowed close 
to 100 % rice and sugarcane cultivation. Three out of eleven cultivators were middle peasants; 
the rest were rich peasants. The three middle peasants had their land towards the tail end of 
the outlet (though not all the tail end land was cultivated by middle peasants) (see map 5.2). 
In Hatti outlet in distributary 24 all categories of farming households-enterprises were 
represented. This outlet is located on the same subdistributary as Kabbu outlet, but had a 
much more problematic overall access to water as a result of its tail end location. Map 5.3 
gives the spread of the four categories of farmers over the outlet. Also here a head-tail 
correlation existed, but it is less easily visible because of the layout of the outlet. The relative 
distances to the pipe outlet gate for rich, middle, small and poor peasants were 100, 109, 156 
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Map 5.2: Categories of farmers in Kabbu outlet, 
D24 
RP 
RP 
RP 
RP 
RP 
and 164. Rich and middle peasants 
were thus closer to the water source 
than small and poor peasants. 
Lastly, the spread of farmer 
categories in Bhatta outlet in 
distributary 93 is given in map 5.4. 
Here the pattern is also clear, 
particularly when the categories rich 
and middle peasants (mostly in the 
head end) and small and poor 
peasants (mostly in the tail end) are 
taken together, The correlation is 
remarkable considering the relatively 
short history of agricultural 
intensification in this outlet command 
area (1978-79 to 1991-92). 
From table 5.4 it could already be 
concluded that migrant farmers 
dominate the categories of rich and 
middle peasants, and local farmers the 
categories of small and poor peasants. 
Therefore, the head-tail pattern in 
terms of rich and middle versus small 
and poor peasants is also to a large 
extent a migrants-local farmers 
division. This suggests the great 
impact that migrant farmers have had 
on the agrarian structure, but the 
correlation is also the product of the 
choice of these three particular 
outlets, and of the focus on canal irrigation without including the lift irrigation associated 
with it. In general, the association between head end and migrants, and tail end and local 
farmers is not as strong as suggested by the situation in these three pipe outlet command 
areas. This is elaborated below when the relation between settlement and water distribution 
at the distributary level is discussed. 
More significant is the correlation of size of holding with location. The difference between 
the Kabbu and Hatti pipe outlet command areas in the subdistributary in distributary 24, 
illustrates this most clearly. In the head end Kabbu outlet command area the landholding of 
the 10 owner-cultivators ranged between 7 and 31 acres of irrigated land; the average was 
12.3 acres. In the tail end outlet in distributary 24 (Hatti outlet) there were three rich 
peasants with 24, 22 and 11 acres of irrigated land; the average was 19 acres.36> In Hatti 
outlet the 21 middle, small and poor peasants on which we had sufficient data owned between 
0.75 and 10 acres of irrigated land. Ten owned less than 4 acres; the average was 4.6 acres. 
B. JEL 
-SUBDISTRIBUTARY-
RP = rich peasant 
MP = middle peasant 
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 Their holdings in the tail were only part of their total holdings, which were mainly located in the 
head reach of the subdistributary. 
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parents. The objective may be to bring extra land into the family, or to keep land within 
the family as much as possible. The latter occurs when cousins marry. 
3) Larger farmers extend loans to smaller farmers to acquire land when these small farmers 
default on the loan. Larger farmers did - obviously - not explicitly state that this was the 
objective of the loans. However, we documented a number of cases where this had 
happened. The fact that in Bhatta outlet in distributary 93 some farmers extended loans 
to smaller head end farmers while being short of resources themselves further supports 
this analysis. 
The mechanisms discussed above are well known in the literature on agrarian change in 
India and as such unsurprising.41' What I find striking is how quickly these mechanisms 
have led to substantial shifts in the distribution of landholding, both in size and location. An 
interesting addition to the analysis presented would be the landholding history of a pipe outlet 
command area with no or few migrant farmers. This would give a better idea of the 
strategies of local farmers to capture the benefits of irrigation. 
Settlement and head-tail patterns at distributary level 
The extreme predominance of migrant farmers in the socio-economic structure and pattern 
of water distribution that was decribed above, is partly the result of the choice of outlet 
command areas. The role of migrant farmers in the places where they settled has been 
clarified by that description, but they didn't, and could not, settle everywhere where water 
was available. The discussion below on the spatial pattern of water distribution at distributary 
level, and its evolution over time, can put the role of migrant farmers in a better perspective. 
I discuss the relation between settlement of migrant farmers and the head-tail pattern in 
water distribution for distributaries 24, 93 and 97 (for the approximate location of these 
distributaries see map 1.1, chapter 1). 
Distributary 24 
The intensification of agriculture in distributary 24 started in the middle and tail end area of 
the canal (for a map, see figure 7.1). In the 1950s, the early years of the irrigation system, 
migrants made sure that the land they bought was localised for rice and sugarcane. They 
visited the Irrigation Department offices to study localisation maps and find out the survey 
numbers where rice and sugarcane could be grown. This meant that many of the early 
settlements, including those in distributary 24, were in tail end and middle reach areas, 
because that is where rice and sugarcane were localised (see chapter 3). 
A relocation of water use in the distributary took place because in the course of time rice 
and sugarcane cultivation expanded into the areas localised for light crops. This meant that 
water use in the upstream reaches of the distributary increased, and scarcity emerged in the 
tail end reach of the distributary. Upstream development started to affect tail end water 
supply in distributary 24 in the second half of the 1960s. Table 7.2 in chapter 7 shows that 
between 1966-67 and 1986-87 the total area irrigated in distributary 24 varied around a stable 
level. But a relocation of crops within the distributary command area did take place. In 1991-
92 rice cultivation had increased in the head reach compared to 1966-67 (see table 5.6).42) 
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 However, the discussion generally focuses on size of landholding rather than location. 
421
 Table 5.6 divides the distributary 24 command area in three parts, head, middle and tail, by 
clustering villages. This is because villages are the units in the collection of the cropping data. For 
(continued...) 
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When the rice cultivation under lift irrigation (from natural drains and the river) is subtracted 
from the total tail end rice cultivation, the shift is clear.43' 
Table 5.6: Rice cultivation in the head, middle and tail of distributary 24, 1966-67 and 
1991-92 
HEAD 
6 villages 
Localisation (acres): 
rice 232 
sugarcane 1877 
total 6483 
MIDDLE 
3 villages 
Localisation (acres): 
rice 556 
sugarcane 3723 
total 5765 
TAIL 
3 villages 
Localisation (acres): 
rice 1742 
sugarcane 1791 
total 5092 
Rice cultivation in 
1966-67 (acres and 
share of total) 
Kharif Rabi 
2819 
(39%) 
2995 
(41%) 
1441 
(20%) 
2683 
(44%) 
2300 
(37%) 
1178 
(19%) 
Rice cultivation in 1991-92 (acres and 
share of total! 
Kharif 
Lift irrigation 
included excluded 
6008 6008 
(48%) (52%) 
3752 3752 
(30%) (32%) 
2831 1831 
(22%) (16%) 
Rabi 
Lift irrigation 
included 
4844 
(59%) 
1311 
(16%) 
2051 
(25%) 
excluded 
4844 
(67%) 
1311 
(18%) 
1051 
(15%) 
Source: Demand lists distributary 24 (Irrigation Department) 
The figures in table 5.6 show that the emergence of private lift irrigation in the tail end 
of distributary 24 was a significant response to increasing water scarcity. It seems to have 
been a much more common approach than relocation of the full landholding to a more 
upstream part of the distributary.44' 47% of the pumpsets for lift irrigation in the two tail 
end villages in distributary 24 were owned by settler farmers. The capital required for these 
42l(... continued) 
the 1960s, 1966-67 was the only year for which village wise cropping data was available in the 
distributary 24 subdivision office. The village-wise clustering is crude as a head-tail division, and 
almost fully misses the shifts in the subdistributaries. 
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 My estimate of 950-1000 acres lift irrigation (all rice) in the distributary 24 tail end area is based 
on data for two of the three villages concerned. There is - thus - an underestimation of the total 
rice under lift irrigation in the tail end region. However, there is also some rice cultivation under lift 
irrigation in the middle and head reach. The kharif data for the two years can only be used for 
comparing the relative distribution within the distributary command. For comparison of the absolute 
areas cropped kharif data are less suitable because of the unknown factor of rainfall and its timing. 
The rabi figures can be used for both purposes because there is hardly any or no rainfall in this 
season. The table shows that in rabi 1991-92 the area cropped with rice in the tail and middle 
reach (excluding lift irrigation) was less than that cultivated in rabi 1966-67. 
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 The total investment for a 10 HP pumpset (which can irrigate tens of acres, depending on 
topography) roughly equalled the purchasing price for 2 acres of head reach land in 1991-92. 
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investments was generated in canal irrigation. However, another important group of pumpset 
owners were the village elite.45) For them lift irrigation has been an important instrument 
for the improvement of their economic status. They invested in pumpsets to supply their own 
lands, but to a large extent also to sell water to smaller, mainly village, farmers. This is an 
extremely profitable business. My calculations for one case suggest that the total investment 
can be earned back in two to three years. 
Despite the relocation of water to the head end reach of the distributary, the tail reach 
farmers of distributary 24 managed to consolidate their access to a share of the canal water, 
and a considerable area of rice (and sugarcane) is still cultivated in this part on canal water. 
The reason behind this is the political weight of middle and tail reach farmers, built up in 
the early period of the canal's operation. Details of this are discussed in chapter 7. Here it 
can be noted that the specific spatial history of settlement and agricultural intensification in 
this distributary has shaped the present geographical distribution of water use in the canal's 
command area. 
Distributary 93 
The first ten years after distributary 93 came into operation in 1968 the extent of irrigation 
was limited, even less than the localised area. Rice constituted a very small part of the crops 
grown. Farmers and officials reported in interviews that there was no scarcity of water in this 
period. 1978-79 is the year that settlement of migrant farmers started, and since then the 
irrigated area and rice cultivation have sharply increased (see table 5.7). 
The oldest and biggest migrant camp in distributary 93 was established by farmers who 
had settled in a neighbouring distributary in the 1960s. In that distributary they had chosen 
land localised for rice for initial settlement. In distributary 93 there is no rice localisation, 
but in 1978-79 this no longer deterred the settlers. Settlement in distributary 93 took place 
in the geographical middle reach (see figure 8.9, chapter 8). The sharp increase in rice 
cultivation in the middle reach caused acute scarcity of water in the tail end reach.46' 
The land in the geographical head of distributary 93 is mainly owned by a number of local 
landlords, reportedly owning hundreds of acres. In 1978-80 they were unwilling to sell, 
maybe because they were well aware of the potential value of their land. Around 1990 head 
reach local farmers started to develop their land for irrigation. In this distributary a shift of 
rice cultivation towards the geographical head may therefore be expected in the years to 
come, and water supply to the middle and tail reach will be negatively affected (for more 
discussion of this case, see chapter 8). 
Distributary 97 
Settlement in distributary 97 started in the late 1970s. All camps are located along roads 
and/or canals in the upper half of the distributary command. First the camps were built along 
subdistributaries and distributaries. In the 1980s farmers mainly settled along the distributary, 
closer to the water. 
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 50% of the pumpsets in the mentioned area was owned by local farmers (3% was unknown or 
mixed group ownership). Most of these pumpsets were owned by the village elite, but some were 
also obtained by Harijans (former untouchables) through government schemes. 
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 The village boundaries cross-cut the distributary 93 command in such a way that it is impossible 
to show this concentration in the middle reach on the basis of village-wise cropping data. 
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Table 5.7: Total area irrigated and rice cultivation in distributary 93 from 1976-77 to 
1991-92 
Year 
1976-77 
1977-78 
1978-79 
1979-80 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1980-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
Rice (acres)'' 
114 
160 
243 
423 
1168 
1401 
1750 
-
-
1793 
4124 
-
-
-
3540 
4525 
Total (acres)'' 
4117 
4424 
3386 
2493 
4178 
5363 
5558 
-
-
7236 
8347 
-
-
-
9858 
11782 
Rice (acres)b] 
_ 
-
-
562 
1503 
1621 
2121 
2549 
1771 
2812 
6530 
3505 
5267 
3468 
4435 
5123 
Total (acres)1" 
. 
-
-
3221 
4738 
5696 
6282 
5476 
6390 
9031 
12433 
9877 
9552 
8714 
10929 
12138 
a) Based on weekly standing crops file (Irrigation Department) 
b) Based on demand lists (Irrigation Department); there are many uncertainties, double counting 
problems and adding-up errors in these figures, particularly in 1985-86, 1986-87 and 1987-88 
In distributary 97 the largest local town also happens to be located in the head reach of 
the distributary (see map 5.5). This means that the head end area was no scarcely used 
'jungle' far away from the villages, as in distributary 24, but a core area of rainfed 
agriculture. There were therefore strong local landed interests in the head end of the 
Map 5.5: Villages and camps in the command area of distributary 97 
H = village 
T2r = camp 
IS = town 
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distributary. The strength of these local interests may partly explain the dispersed settlement 
pattern. The history of land acquisition that was reported to us is that rich settler farmers 
bought pieces of land from different large local landowners, after which the land was sold 
or leased to smaller migrant farmers, leading to small camps in different places. 
With the intensification of irrigated agriculture, also by the local population, the demand 
for water in the head reach of the distributary strongly increased. The start of the tail end, 
defined as the area that receives less than three irrigations per season, is steadily moving 
upstream. In 1992 this had reached the point that some of the most downstream camps started 
to experience serious water shortage. Many villages in the tail end of the distributary have 
been out of irrigation for many years (see chapter 8 for more detailed discussion of this 
distributary). 
Conclusion 
The descriptions of the spatial patterns of water use at distributary level, and their evolution 
over time, shows that the categories of 'head' and 'tail' need to be treated with some care. 
Location is important, but there is no simple correlation with intensity of water use. Neither 
can migrant farmers only be associated with the category of 'headenders' and local farmers 
only with that of 'tailenders', notwithstanding the pivotal role that migrant farmers played 
in the process of agrarian transformation. By implication, migrant farmers are not as 
predominant among rich and middle peasants as suggested in the discussion of the typology 
and the situation at the pipe outlet level above. And, local farmers are not as predominant 
among small and poor peasants as suggested there.47) The following two processes explain 
this. 
1. Migrant farmers have not always settled in the geographical head end (because of the 
localisation pattern) and have not been able to acquire all land in head end areas (because 
of unwillingness to sell by local farmers). The local farmers who had or could acquire the 
financial means, and had land in the right place also joined or are joining the process of 
agricultural intensification through irrigation. Also, what once were favourable locations 
sometimes became tail end reaches at a later stage, because ongoing land development for 
irrigation implied relocation of water use in the command area.4!i) 
2. In some tail reaches lift irrigation has strongly developed, both along the Tungabhadra 
river and along the nalas (natural drains) that separate the distributary command areas. 
This development is directly associated with canal irrigation. The water in the nalas to a 
large extent has its source, apart from rainfall, in the inefficiencies of canal irrigation. The 
financial investments in lift irrigation are to a large extent based on the earnings form 
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 However, the former is truer than the latter. Many settlers that do not manage to build up a 
successful farm remigrate to their home area, as mentioned above, or resettle in other, new 
irrigation systems when access to water deteriorates. This implies that migrants are likely to be 
poorly represented in the categories small and poor peasants. A much larger sample of farmers, and 
documentation of departures, would be required to test this hypothesis. 
481
 It may be true that in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal there is a gradual long term relocation 
of water use towards geographical head end areas. This can be observed in several distributaries 
and also seems to happen at main canal level. This statement is based on recent fieldwork, done 
by R. Doraiswamy and the author. However, the chapters on water distribution practices show that 
this is not a 'natural' and unavoidable process, but the outcome of struggles over water 
distribution, in which location is an important strategic factor. 
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canal irrigated agriculture (either the income from cultivation or the income from land 
sales).49' Local farmers seem to participate in this process on par with migrant farmers. 
5.4 CONCLUSION 
Canal irrigation induced a dynamic process of agricultural intensification and 
commoditisation. The farmers from the coastal areas of Andhra Pradesh who migrated to the 
Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal command area played a central role in this process. They 
brought the capital and the skills to establish a new farming system, based on intensive 
irrigation of rice, sugarcane and other cash crops. Because of the protective nature of the 
canal system's design, this intensification process resulted in unequal water distribution. This 
chapter has investigated the relationship between water distribution and social differentiation, 
and focused on the spatial dimensions of that relationship. 
At the start of canal irrigation the following observation in all likelihood also applied to 
the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal. 
"There is no obvious reason to suppose that all advantageous locations are 
systematically preempted by large landholders. Large fanners are found in all reaches 
of the canal network (...)" (Vaidyanathan, 1991:22-23)50) 
However, the distribution of landholding is not a given, static factor, but is influenced by the 
introduction and development of canal irrigation. There has been a redistribution of land in 
the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal, which tends towards concentration of larger holdings in 
head end reaches, and smaller holdings in tail end reaches. The most important process to 
cause this tendency were the land transfers associated with the settlement of migrant farmers. 
But, land transfer continued after the initial settlement, by purchase of land, by dowries and 
by strategic loan-giving. 
The picture of the relation between water distribution and social differentiation that results 
from this is more complex than a simple correlation of location with size of landholding, 
socio-economic status, region of origin, and access to water. At pipe outlet command area 
level a correlation could be observed between large holdings, rich and middle peasants, 
migrant farmers, and good access to water. At distributary level considerable diversity 
existed within an overall pattern of class-related access to land and water. Particularly the 
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 Also shopkeepers, input traders and other businessmen sometimes invest in lift irrigation. In the 
examples we came across this was often to sell water to farmers, and not for own cultivation. 
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 The truth of this statement depends on the level at which landholding is considered. At the level 
of the main canal and distributary it is certainly true. In all villages spread along these canals there 
will be larger and smaller landholders. At lower levels, within the boundaries of a village or 
subdistributary and outlet command area, the statement may not hold. Also under rainfed 
conditions there may be a spatial pattern in the distribution of landholdings. In one case we studied 
in the Malaprabha Right Bank Canal command area, the larger holdings of the richer farmers were 
close to the village, and those of the smaller, poorer farmers further away from it. Because the 
village was located on the bank of a nala, the holdings of the larger farmers were in the tail end 
when the canal was constructed, and those of small farmers in the head end. This locational 
pattern was one of the factors that led to effective water users organisation for water management 
(see van Ommen, 1997). In the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal area we have come across examples 
where small plots of both larger and smaller farmers were located close to the village, and the 
larger farmers also had big plots further away from the village which were more extensively used. 
It can be imagined that the combination of physical geography and social history has produced 
diverse patterns. 
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dichotomy of migrant versus local farmers breaks down at distributary level (and probably 
also would break down at outlet level when a larger number of outlet commands areas would 
be investigated). In distributary 24 migrant farmers had first settled in the middle and tail 
reaches and were confronted with upstream land development that relocated water use away 
from them. In distributary 93 head reach local farmers refused to sell land, and the migrants 
who settled in the middle reach will face pressure on water availability when these farmers 
start to develop their land for irrigation. In distributary 97 settlers had to share the head end 
location with local farmers from the town located in this part of the command area. 
In addition, the expansion of lift irrigation needs to be taken into consideration. Canal 
irrigation has provided both the water and the financial means to develop this type of 
irrigation along nalas and along the river. Both local and migrant farmers have invested in 
this, and for local elites it has been an important means to reproduce or strengthen their 
socio-economic status. 
A theoretical conclusion is that in the analysis of agrarian change in canal irrigated areas, 
the classification of agricultural producers can not only be based on socio-economic 
indicators like size of landholding, access to credit and labour/employment conditions. The 
relationships among these factors are not just correlations, or the unintended outcome of 
aggregate individual behaviours, but they are connections that are strategically pursued by 
the different producers.51' Spatial relations are a defining part of the agrarian structure. 
Typologies of agrarian producers and analyses of agrarian change in canal irrigation 
situations therefore need to incorporate the way the canal infrastructure shapes the physical 
and social landscape. 
The analysis above has a broad-brush character. How the different configurations of 
water, space and social differentiation are reproduced in day-to-day water distribution 
practices is still unclear. This is the subject of the four following chapters, which discuss 
water distribution practices at outlet, distributary and main canal level. 
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 In terms of critical realism, the factors are not externally but internally related (see Sayer, 1984). 
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Appendix 5 . 1 : Landholding and credit in Raichur district and the three selected pipe outlet 
command areas 
In this appendix more background information is given on landholding and credit relations in Raichur 
district and the three selected pipe outlet command area, as these emerged with the expansion of 
canal irrigated agriculture. 
Landholding 
Land distribution in Raichur district was skewed in the past and is skewed in the present. Table 
5.1.1 gives land distribution in the district in 1958 and 1977. 
Table 5.1.1: Land distribution in Raichur district in 1958 and 1977 
Size class 
0-15 acres 
1 5-30 acres 
> 30 acres 
1 9 5 8 
% of holdings 
66.8 
21.9 
11.3 
% of land 
30 
30 
40 
Size class 
0-12.5 acres 
12.5-25 acres 
> 25 acres 
1 9 7 7 
% of 
holdings 
69.8 
20.0 
10.2 
% of land 
33.0 
29.9 
37.1 
Source: Mysore Tenancy and Agricultural Land Laws Committee 11958) and Agricultural Census 
(1977) as reported in Census of India 11981) 
The table shows that both in 1958 and 1977 the two-thirds of the households with the smallest 
holdings owned about one-third of the land, and the 10-11 % of the households with the largest 
holdings owned 40% of the land. The structure of inequality did not change, but there was a 
downward shift in average landholding size. The average landholding in Raichur district in 1958 
was 15.5 acres. In 1977 it was 11.5 acres. In all likelihood this downward shift reflects increasing 
pressure on the land as a result of the growth of the farming population.521 This was partially the 
result of 'natural' population growth and partly the result of settlement by outsiders attracted to 
the irrigation. However, the conversion of rainfed land to irrigated land increased the productivity 
of the land. With a favourable water supply this more than compensated the reduced size of the 
holding (see the productivity differences discussed above). 
In my own non-random sample of farming households the distribution of landholding among the 
owner cultivators was a given in table 5.1.2. The table shows that the overall structure of unequal 
distribution is similar to the Raichur pattern discussed above. The average landholding is lower than 
in 1958 and 1977, but no meaning can be attached to this because of the unrepresentative 
sample. 
521
 As a result of land reform legislation, including land ceiling provisions, many farmers have 
distributed land titles over different family members. In the 'demand lists' for revenue and water 
fee collection that we studied in 1991-92, this spreading of landholding titles was clearly visible. 
To what extent this has affected past and present landholding statistics is difficult to ascertain. 
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Table 5.1.2: Land distribution among owner-cultivators in three pipe outlet commands" 
Size class 
0-5 acres 
5-10 acres 
10-15 acres 
> 15 acres 
Total 
% of holdings 
33 
33 
18 
16 
% of land 
10.1 
25.6 
22.1 
42.2 
Average area per 
holding (acres) 
2.8 
7.0 
11.2 
23.2 
9.0 
a) Landholding data of tenants and non-cultivating owners was not complete and therefore 
excluded. 
Credit 
Credit is the cornerstone of commercial irrigated agriculture in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal. 
92% of the cultivators in the two pipe outlet commands in distributary 24 took some form of credit 
to make their cultivation possible. In the outlet command area in distributary 93 the figure was 
probably as high, but for reasons discussed below this is not fully certain. Those who did not take 
credit were either too affluent to need it (because they were moneylenders as well for example), 
too poor to be able to get it, or tail enders practising extensive practically rainfed types of 
cultivation that require much less investment. 
Credit was used mainly for acquiring the external inputs for agricultural production. Similar to 
Kallur's findings nine years earlier, chemical fertilisers were the largest input cost, but seeds and 
pesticides are often also bought on credit. Credit is used for paying the labourers employed during 
the season as well. 
There were four sources of credit for agricultural production: banks, input traders and 
commission agents, local farmers, and specialised moneylenders. The cost of credit increased from 
the first to the fourth source.53' 
Banks 
The first source was a crop loan from a nationalised bank. Banks have a maximum loan per acre, 
which depended on the crop grown. For rice for example this was around Rs.1800 in 1991-92.541 
Bank loans were in principle the cheapest loans. Depending on the amount, the official interest rate 
varied between 12 and 15% per year.551 The loans were given in cash. A bank loan might carry 
other costs in addition to interest. Farmers systematically reported that to acquire a new bank loan 
(opening a new account) involved "spending at every table". The amounts quoted by farmers 
implied increases in the effective yearly interest rate of 5% or more. Regular customers, who 
renewed their loan seasonally did not seem to face this problem. 
531
 A fifth possible source are cooperative credit societies, but these were defunct. In the sugarcane 
area another source of credit existed in 1991-92. The sugarcane factory recommended farmers to 
the bank for crop loans, and supplied inputs like the planting material on credit. In one of the larger 
lift irrigation schemes the factory payed the electricity bills for the pumps. All these costs are 
charged to farmers through their bank account at the time the payment of sugarcane was made 
through these accounts. 
541
 The requirement was around Rs.4000 per acre. One way to get around this was to register loans 
as sugarcane loans, which had a higher maximum of Rs.4600. 
551
 Effectively the interest is higher because the loan was compounded every 6 months. Farmers 
consequently quote 18% (1.5 Rs. per 100Rs per month) as the bank interest rate. In the few 
account books I have seen the official rates were used. 
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Another cost was related to the requirement of giving the title deed documents of the land to 
the bank as collateral (for crop loans exceeding Rs. 10,000). Farmers holding ancestral property 
without sale deeds had to register their land at the revenue office, to get a document that they 
could deposit at the bank (an extract from the village land record was not accepted). This 
registration remained valid for 12 years, but was expensive (around 10% of the loan amount), and 
again required the payment of intermediaries. 
It is therefore not surprising that bank loans were hardly accessible to small farmers, but mainly 
to the assertive affluent ones. To illustrate this I quote from one of the interviews I had with bank 
employees in the command area. 
Loans for dry land, we usually discourage. Big farmers only come to this bank, 
dryland farmers don't come. 
With many small loans, there are so many accounts to handle, and we may also 
neglect the supervision. Lending is very easy to those who have 1) good lands and 
2) are relatively affluent. With landless, tailenders and dryland farmers it is difficult; 
there is a tendency to send them off with one word. 
The camp people know how to deal with us, they are worldly-wise. They know the 
bank's requirements and act according to our regulations. They know how to 
approach and convince us. Those who do not know how to talk to us, they don't 
get the loans. We put hurdles for those we don't want to finance, and we scale 
down our requirements for accepted parties. With such people the documentation 
we ask is minimal. 
Even the public sector banks cater to the higher class in practice. There is not a real 
sympathy for the lower class. Having to give 20% of the loans to the lower class, 
it's all eyewash. 
Input traders and commission agents 
The second source of credit were traders in agricultural inputs (fertilisers, pesticides and seeds). 
These traders were often also commission agents for agricultural produce, particularly rice and 
cotton. Farmers bought fertiliser and other inputs on credit in these shops on the condition that 
they would sell their produce through this shop. The interest rate was mostly 24% per year (2 Rs. 
per 100 Rs. per month), but we came across cases of 36% as well. 
There were other sources of profit in this arrangement than interest. Fertiliser on credit was 
Rs.5-10 per bag more expensive than fertiliser bought in cash.56' This amounted to a price 
increase of 254-6%. For pesticides and seeds such price increases also existed. Furthermore, the 
farmer was charged a commission of around Rs.2 per bag of rice (price per bag around Rs.200-300 
depending on variety and moment of sale) for the sale of his crop, and was also charged part of 
the weighing and handling charges (usually Rs.0.80 per bag). Legally these costs should be charged 
to the buyer of the produce. There might also be a difference between the price quoted to the 
farmer and the buyer of the produce. Finally, farmers were often not paid immediately, but had to 
wait several weeks. This was because the buyer also took some time to pay. When the farmer 
wanted to be paid immediately, as he legally should be, he was charged an extra month interest. 
Local farmers 
The third source of credit were rich peasants who acted as moneylenders and input dealers. Many 
of them were smaller, unregistered versions of the traders cum commission agents. The niche in 
the market for local moneylenders is the proximity to their clients. Transport time and cost for 
these clients are minimal compared to that with the traders cum commission agents located in local 
market centres. Another aspect of the relationship is the local knowledge on the creditworthiness 
of the clients. To get inputs on credit from a trader cum commission agent required a personal 
recommendation by a trusted person. Access to the local provider was more direct. 
When the local moneylenders cum input dealers were new in the market, they made their 
conditions somewhat more favourable than those of the official traders cum commission agents. 
561
 The price for a bag of urea was around Rs.1 57, for a bag of 'complex' (NPK fertiliser of different 
composition) between Rs.190 and Rs.240. 
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When established their conditions were very similar. However, I suspect that farmers had less 
control over the price they were paid for their produce in credit arrangements with local farmers. 
In chapter 6 I discuss the multiple dependencies of farmers on these local credit providers, which 
may reduce farmers' bargaining power with regard to conditions and prices. 
Specialised moneylenders 
The fourth source of credit were the specialised moneylenders, either local informal ones, or 
formally registered ones, or pawn shops. The first category seems to be the most important for 
agricultural loans. The providers were mostly the traditional village elite (see for example Census 
of India, 1961b). These loans were the most unfavourable, charging 3% interest per month or 
more.571 Many people in this category were also taking up trade in rice, and were merging with 
the third category. 
Credit sources in the three outlet command areas 
In the three outlet command areas investigated the distribution of credit sources was as given in 
table 5.1.3. 
Table 5 .1 .3: Sources of credit in three pipe outlet command areas, 1991-92 
Source of credit 
No loans, moneylender himself 
Bank loans only 
Bank loans and input traders 
Input traders only 
Input traders and other farmers 
Other farmers only 
No credit, unable to get 
Unknown 
Total 
Kabbu outlet, 
distributary 24 
No. and % of 
cultivators 
1 9% 
3 27%% 
2 18% 
4 36%% 
1 9% 
0 0% 
0 0% 
11 100% 
Hatti outlet, 
distributary 24 
No. and % of 
cultivators 
1 3 % % 
1 3 / 2 % 
11 4 0 % % 
5 1872% 
3 11 % 
4 1 5 % 
2 7 / 2 % 
27 9 9 % % 
Bhatta out let , 
distr ibutary 93 
No. and % of 
cultivators 
0 0% 
2 5% 
2 5% 
7 16/2% 
6 14%% 
13 3 1 % 
3 7% 
9 21 % 
42 100%% 
The correlation of credit source and category of farmer was outlet specific. In Kabbu outlet, the 
head end pipe outlet command in the subdistributary in distributary 24, the 11 cultivators 
predominantly used bank loans and took credit with input traders. Four farmers were affluent 
enough not to have to rely on the credit of input traders. These farmers were able to wholly or 
partly pay their inputs in cash, and sell their produce on favourable conditions (for example by 
storing rice till prices were higher than at harvest time). Of the four farmers who had taken credit 
with input traders only, three had taken a bank loan in recent years but not yet repaid, and one 
took a bank loan at the start of the 1992-93 season. Nine out of eleven cultivators (82%) can thus 
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 We were quoted rates upto 6%. This is high, but still an improvement on the loans in kind given 
by this group in the past. In the system called laagi a person who borrowed a bag of jowar 
(sorghum) had to repay 1.5 bags after 6 months. When not repaid this became the principal, for 
which another 50% was charged in the next half year. This were however not loans for productive 
purposes. I have no information on present local rates of interest for consumptive money loans. 
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be regarded as regular users of bank loans. Only one farmer depended (partially) on money 
borrowed from another farmer/local moneylender. This was the only tenant cultivator in the outlet. 
Hatti outlet, the tail end outlet in distributary 24, exhibited a greater spread over the different 
sources of credit. In this pipe outlet command a lower percentage of farmers were regular users 
of bank loans than in Kabbu outlet command: 44% against 82%.581 Eleven out of twelve farmers 
who had bank loans also took inputs on credit from input traders. In Hatti outlet nine farmers 
(33%%) had to take credit with other local farmers or were unable to get credit. In other words, 
they had to rely on unfavourable credit arrangements or no credit at all. The level of affluence was 
generally lower in this tail end command than in the head end Kabbu command area as a result of 
smaller holdings and a less reliable water supply. 
In Bhatta outlet in distributary 93, my information on sources of credit is incomplete. Nine 
farmers I have listed as 'unknown', all of whom were migrant rice farmers. They claimed to have 
bought their fertiliser and other inputs in cash. Because none of them sold his rice through the 
trader from which he purchased inputs, this claim is likely to be true. At the same time, it is highly 
unlikely that they had made these purchases from their own financial resources (considering size 
of holding and other factors). My guess is that all these farmers had taken either bank loans or, 
more likely, loans from other local farmers. 
Even without knowing the source of credit of 21 % of the cultivators, it is remarkable how many 
cultivators (partly) depended on local farmers for credit in Bhatta outlet: seventeen out of 42 
(401/2%). Fifteen of this group were local farmers. Most of them took loans with local gowdas (the 
village elite) who had been (money)lenders for a long time, and were now expanding their activities 
to include rice trading. Only one local farmer used bank loans, and seven took credit from input 
traders. In Bhatta outlet the history of intensive, credit-based irrigated farming was not longer than 
10-12 years. It may be hypothesised that this period had been too short for most local farmers to 
develop less personalised credit relations with less unfavourable conditions attached. In Hatti outlet, 
with a history of 30-35 years, this was much more the case. 
581
 There were no cases in Hatti outlet of cultivators without bank loans who did have such loans 
very recently. 
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The reproduction of unequal water distribution at pipe outlet level 
Preamble to chapters 6 to 9 
No visitor to the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal can fail to notice the skewed distribution of 
water in the command area. Luxuriously green patches are found close to scorched yellow 
areas, and both may be served by the same canal. The infamous head-tail differences occur 
at all levels of the system: outlet, distributary and main canal. In chapters 6 to 9 I discuss 
the water distribution practices at these different levels as examples of politically contested 
resource use. The objective is to understand the mechanisms through which the skewed 
pattern of distribution comes about from day to day, and year after year, and what different 
people have done and do to reproduce or change it. Chapter 6 discusses the pipe outlet level, 
chapters 7 and 8 the distributary level, and chapter 9 engages with the events at the level of 
the main canal. 
At each of these levels the interaction between water, people and technology takes a 
different form. The story begins at the outlet command area level, where farmers distribute 
water among themselves. The chapter shows that the nature of the agrarian relations in the 
command area, particularly credit and employment relations, structure unequal access to 
irrigation water. 
I then trace the water and follow its users upstream to see which diversions and 
encounters take place in the domain of the Irrigation Department between the outlet and the 
Tungabhadra reservoir. At distributary level the main theme is how the relationships between 
farmers and the irrigation bureaucracy, mediated by politicians, translate into rotation 
schedules (chapter 7) and adaptations to the outlet structures (chapter 8). These institutions 
and technologies are analysed as the expression of the balance of power between the actors 
concerned, and in their turn shape the interactions that take place. 
At the main canal level (chapter 9) the focus is on institutional transformation within the 
Irrigation Department. It is shown how, against all odds almost, management procedures for 
main canal operation that were introduced during a severe water crisis, made water supply 
at this level more stable and reliable. 
The practical relevance of this analysis is the following. That water is unequally 
distributed in protective large scale canal irrigation systems is not a new finding. However, 
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there are very few accounts of how this unequal distribution occurs on a day-to-day basis." 
This lack of documentation of actually existing water distribution is one factor that supports 
the perpetuation of a number of doubtful assumptions about irrigation water management that 
have dominated policy making in this field in the past decades. Three of these assumptions 
are (i) that farmers generally are uneducated wasteful users of water, (ii) that there is anarchy 
and chaos on the canals, and (Hi) that farmers are unorganised. 
This trifold picture has had unfortunate consequences for irrigation intervention. The 
image of uneducated wasteful farmers has supported a top-down, extension-driven mode of 
intervention in irrigation management, which I will describe as the 'policy as prescription' 
model in chapter 9.2) The anarchy and chaos characterisation creates an excuse for not 
looking at the existing situation in depth: where there is no order, it has to be imported from 
outside.3' The assumption of unorganised water users has created the illusion that Water 
Users Associations can be established on a tabula rasa.4) 
Together these assumptions have, for a long time, put the blame of the problems in large 
scale canal irrigation primarily on farmers. Recently however, rent-seeking analysis has 
brought the irrigation bureaucracy in the purview of wastefulness, chaos and anarchy and 
poor organisation as well (Repetto, 1986; Burns, 1993; Wade, 1982a). Such analyses 
underpin many of the policy initiatives for financial reform in the irrigation sector (see 
chapter 10 for detailed discussion). 
The elaborate discussion of water distribution practices in the following four chapters aims 
to put assumptions as outlined above in perspective by confronting them with canal-level, and 
office-level, realities. In this way realistic starting points for change in water distribution and 
management practices can be identified. I hope that detailed accounts such as the one 
presented in this book will help to prevent wishful thinking about changes in irrigation water 
management, and stimulate the design of irrigation interventions on the basis of locally-
specific knowledge of real irrigation situations. The threads of the policy-related argument 
will be drawn together in the concluding chapter 10. 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
For the purpose of analysing outlet level water distribution practices three outlet command 
areas were selected (see chapters 2 and 5). Two small ones were selected along a tail end 
subdistributary of distributary 24, a head end distributary. One outlet, which I called Kabbu 
outlet, was located in the geographical head end of this subdistributary. One outlet, which 
11
 Exceptions include Merrey (1983) for Pakistan, and Wade (1979, 1988a) and Ramamurthy 
(1995) on South India. Also see Brewer, Sakthivadivel and Raju (1997). Classics on the warabandi 
system in North India are Reidinger (1974) and Malhotra (1982) (also see Malhotra, Raheja and 
Seckler, 1984). Other contributions that discuss water distribution practices as understood in this 
book to a larger or smaller extent are Gorter (n.d.), IWRS (1982), Jairath (1985), Palanisami 
(1984), some of the papers in Pant (1984), Vander Velde (1980), and Venkata Reddy (1990). For 
discussion of water distribution practices in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal, also see 
Ramamurthy (1984) and Groenhuijzen and Noordman (1992). 
21
 The major example is the Command Area Development Programme. For critical evaluations of this 
programme see Wade (1982b), Bottrall (1985) and Sivamohan (1986). 
31
 For a 'law and order' approach to improve water distribution in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal, 
see for example CADA/TBP (1979). 
41
 Reference to such efforts is made in chapters 9 and 10. 
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I called Hatti outlet, was located in the tail end of the subdistributary. The third outlet 
selected was located in the geographical middle reach of a tail end distributary, distributary 
93. I called it Bhatta outlet. The approximate locations of the distributaries can be found on 
map 1.1. Figure 7.1 gives the location of the Kabbu and Hatti outlet command areas in 
distributary 24. Figure 8.9 gives the location of Bhatta outlet command area in distributary 
93.5) 
The hypothesis that informed the choice of outlets was that organisation for water 
distribution by water users was induced, if not explained, by the occurrence of water scarcity 
(Wade, 1988a; Uphoff, Wickramasinghe and Wijayaratna, 1990). Sites were selected which 
experienced, according to local farmers and Irrigation Department officials, a considerable 
degree of water scarcity, without being totally deprived. It was assumed that these would be 
the places 'where the action was' and therefore good sites for uncovering the mechanisms 
at work. 
I expected considerable conflict over water distribution at pipe outlet level.6) This 
expectation was strengthened by the observation of clearly unequal distribution of water at 
the beginning of the fieldwork in two of the three outlets, Hatti outlet in distributary 24 and 
Bhatta outlet in distributary 93. Surprisingly however, there was very little, if any, open 
conflict about the inequality in water distribution in these two outlets. The issue became even 
more puzzling when in Hatti outlet (distributary 24), which was an outlet experiencing 
serious water scarcity, we discovered the existence of a sophisticated set of rules for internal 
water distribution. It was equitable in principle and was employed in the field by the water 
users, but had unequal outcomes. 
The relations between water scarcity, the pattern of water distribution, and the rules and 
practices of distribution are explored below in two sections. In section 6.2 I discuss some of 
the general features of water distribution practices at outlet level. It will be shown that in all 
three outlet command areas farmers have made operational rules for water distribution. These 
rules are implemented, with varying degrees of strictness, in the water scarce periods of the 
agricultural year. The rules are resources which are called upon when needed. The two main 
characteristics of the operational rules for water distribution made by farmers are that they 
are based on the principles of zoning and sequencing, and on time/acre field irrigation. 
In section 6.3 I discuss the paradox described above: the existence of unequal distribution 
with equitable rules and no conflicts in the Hatti outlet in distributary 24. The analysis of this 
case links unequal water distribution to its structural conditions of possibility: the system of 
agrarian relations, particularly credit and employment. 
In section 6.4 I summarise the conclusions following from the analysis. 
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 The original plan was to select one outlet in the head end distributary and one in the tail end 
distributary. In the subdistributary selected in distributary 24, outlet command areas were small 
because of localisation for sugarcane, and two outlets were required to approximate the desired 
number of 40-50 cultivators. The selection of one outlet in the head and one in the tail created the 
opportunity to capture differences along the subdistributary as well (see chapters 7 and 8). 
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 This expectation was based on information collected before the actual fieldwork started, and 
consisted of interviews and discussions with researchers and other informants, the study of reports 
and other literature, and - a very useful source - newspaper reports on events related to water 
distribution in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal system. Particularly the latter source suggested 
persistent conflict on water distribution in the command area. This was partly due to the fact that 
my research was preceded by a few particularly eventful years (see chapter 9). 
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The title of this chapter is a tribute to the paper of Daniel and Alice Thorner 'The weak 
and the strong on the Sarda canal', written in 1957 (Thorner and Thorner, 1962). That paper 
discusses how people's position in the agrarian structure defines their access to canal water. 
Their paper is, to my knowledge, the first contribution to a political economy of canal 
irrigation in India. 
6.2 RULES AND RULE-MAKING AT OUTLET COMMAND AREA LEVEL 
In this section the various dimensions of rules and rule-making for water distribution at outlet 
command area level are discussed. I discuss how rules emerge in response to scarcity, which 
types of rules exist, how operational rules are made, what the main characteristics of the 
operational rules are, and how rules function as resources. 
Rules as a response to increasing water scarcity 
The Karnataka Irrigation Act, 1965 contains the provision that irrigation officers have powers 
"to inspect and regulate supply" at field channel level (Section 7). Neither before the Act 
came into force in 1965, nor after that, has the Irrigation Department made systematic use 
of the possibility to suggest or enforce distribution rules at outlet command area level in the 
Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal. The government constructed the field channels in the outlet 
commands7), but does not seem to have given systematic training or instructions on the 
organisation of water distribution (and of maintenance). 
In the beginning the organisation of water distribution must have been very easy, because 
hardly any was required. Only part of the command area was irrigated. Land development 
for irrigation progressed slowly, and water was abundant. When the Tungabhadra Left Bank 
Canal system gradually became operational between 1953 and 1968, farmers seem to have 
been left to their own devices as far as water distribution was concerned. Later, in the 1980s, 
there was a Command Area Development Authority programme for the introduction of the 
warabandi system of rotational water distribution. On paper water users associations were 
established in a limited number of outlet command areas as part of this effort, but they were 
never functional (see chapter 9 for more discussion on the role of the Command Area 
Development Authority and the effort to introduce warabandi). 
In all three outlet commands investigated the emergence of more or less detailed systems 
of rules for water distribution was a response to increasing water scarcity. When land 
development for irrigation advanced water started to become scarce. First scarcity was felt 
in certain phases of the cropping cycle, later more generally throughout the year. 
The subdistributary on which Kabbu and Hatti outlets are located started to experience 
scarcity in the course of the 1960s. Scarcity was caused by increasing land 
development,violation of the localised cropping pattern and unauthorised irrigation in the 
upstream parts of the distributary 24 command area. Within the subdistributary a similar 
process occurred. Water was increasingly appropriated by head end farmers. Hatti outlet, 
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 The Irrigation Department originally designed and constructed field channels along the ridges in 
the field, regardless of plot boundaries. These and other social factors were not taken into account 
in the design. The field channels have been extensively remodelled by farmers. As far as 
topography allows farmers have tended to realign them along plot boundaries, sometimes at the 
cost of considerable land leveling. In the purchase and sale of land plot boundaries have also been 
adjusted to the field channel system. 
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located in the tail end of the subdistributary, had to reduce the area cultivated with rice and 
sugarcane because of the decrease in water availability in the canal. Kabbu outlet is almost 
fully cultivated with rice till today, but securing sufficient water for this crop has become 
more difficult, particularly in the rabi season. (For more discussion of the spatial dimensions 
of the emergence of scarcity, see chapter 7.) 
Water scarcity in distributary 93 and Bhatta outlet is of much more recent date. In this 
distributary rice cultivation started on a serious scale around 1978-80, when the first migrant 
farmers settled in the command area of the distributary (see chapter 5). The steady increase 
in rice cultivation since then has made water scarce, particularly in the rabi season. Land 
development for rice cultivation is however still going on, also in the Bhatta outlet command 
area. Neither the spatial pattern of water distribution nor the rules for and practices of water 
distribution have crystalised and stabilised to the same degree as in distributary 24. In Bhatta 
outlet rules are gradually emerging while land development continues and scarcity increases. 
Types of rules 
Elinor Ostrom has made a useful trifold distinction of (nested) rules in common property 
resource management that can also be applied to irrigation. She distinguishes: 
1) operational rules; 
2) collective choice rules; 
3) constitutional rules (Ostrom, 1990:52) 
Operational rules are the rules that regulate the day-to-day decision-making on the use of the 
resource, in our case water distribution. Collective choice rules are the rules that govern the 
process of operational rules making. Collective choice rules regulate for example how 
operational rules can be adapted to changing circumstances like increasing water scarcity, by 
the community of water users or others having authority over system operation. 
Constitutional choice rules are the rules that determine who is eligible to take part in 
collective choice and operational rules making, and the rules for the design of the collective 
choice rules.8' 
At the outlet command area level farmers are basically autonomous in their rule making 
and implementation activities.9' The three types of rules take the following form at pipe 
outlet command area level. 
In protective irrigation systems the constitutional issue of the inclusion and exclusion of 
farmers in/from the community of water users has been resolved, in a spatial sense, in the 
design of the system through the localisation pattern. By fixing the location of the canals, and 
by earmarking the irrigable land under these canals, the group of farmers who have an 
entitlement to irrigation water has been defined. In the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal there 
is not much scope for inclusion of new land and farmers in the command area because of the 
full localisation of irrigable land. Exclusion does take place (see chapter 3). Farmers with 
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 Ostrom (1990:53) also lists the processes that belong to the different types of rules. To 
constitutional choice belong formulation, governance, adjudication and modification; to collective 
choice belong policy-making, management and adjudication; and to operational choice belong 
appropriation, provision, monitoring and enforcement. 
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 In this sense the outlet command area is comparable to the farmer managed irrigation systems 
discussed by Ostrom. However, outlet command area farmers depend on others for regulation of 
the supply to their outlet. That is a major difference with many farmer managed irrigation system, 
where farmers may also control the water source.The lack of control over water supply strongly 
affects rule making and implementation at outlet command area level, as will become clear. 
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land in places of the command area where irrigation water no longer reaches are de facto 
excluded from the community of water users. 
Farmers do have a possibility to partially redefine the division in sub-groups of the larger 
community of water users. In Hatti outlet there were boundary corrections of the command 
area, which implied the transfer of four small plots from a neighbouring pipe outlet command 
to the Hatti command. Outlet commands can also be sub-divided. When water became 
scarcer in Hatti outlet in the 1960s the outlet command area was adapted. A road divided the 
original outlet command area in two parts: the present 60 acres part on the downstream side 
of the road, and a 40 acres part on its downstream side (see figure 6.1). The 40 acre tail end 
portion lobbied for independent access to the subdistributary, and an extra pipe outlet 
structure was built downstream of that of Hatti outlet.10' Notwithstanding the occasional 
occurrence of such changes the group of water users in a particular pipe outlet command area 
can be considered as given. 
The localisation pattern not only defines farmers' formal entitlements to water in space, 
but also in time. Most farmers have an entitlement to receive irrigation water for one season 
per year (and mostly for 
'irrigated dry' crops). In one 
particular pipe outlet command 
area for example the formal 
community of users may 
therefore not be the same in 
the kharif season as in rabi 
season. Or, not the same land 
of the users will be officially 
irrigable. As discussed in 
chapter 3, the government is 
unable to enforce this system 
of rights. In practice all 
farmers with irrigable land feel 
they have a 'right' to irrigation 
water in both seasons and for 
the crops they prefer to grow. 
Whether this 'right' can be 
effectuated is not determined 
by the formal system of 
entitlements. The inclusion and 
exclusion of farmers in the 
irrigation system in space and 
in time is the outcome of the 
struggle over water distribution, and not the subject of constitutional rule making or 
implementation among farmers. 
Collective choice rules hardly exist in outlet command areas. There are very few 
formalised arrangements among water users for how to make operational rules and monitor 
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 The sluices under the road that connected the two parts in the past were still there. It was easy 
to imagine how cultivators on the upstream side of the road could deny water to the downstream 
side by obstruction of the pipes. 
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their implementation. The design of operational rules for water distribution has occurred and 
occurs in direct response to practical experience with the implementation of previously made 
arrangements and the need to solve new problems. Meetings of all water users in an outlet 
command area are sometimes conducted, but the design and adaptation process of operational 
rules has not been institutionalised. How they emerge is discussed below. 
The making of operational rules 
The history of the emergence of the water distribution rules in Hatti outlet in distributary 24 
can serve as an example of the process of rule-making at outlet command area level (see box 
6.1). In this case rules for rotational water distribution were designed in response to 
increasing water scarcity and difficulties that a large farmer encountered in the irrigation of 
his fields in the outlet command. Noticeable is the role of a local political leader in the rule-
making. 
Box 6.1: The emergence of operational rules in Hatti outlet 
The present system of rules for rotational water distribution in Hatti outlet exists since 1974-
75. It has been operational for more than 15 years, with some additions and refinements 
made in the course of time. All farmers in the outlet command area whom I asked about this 
agreed that the rules were introduced on the initiative of farmer B's father. Farmer B is one 
of the two big landholders in Hatti outlet command area. The accounts of how the rules 
emerged differ somewhat. Farmer B explained that the system was introduced by his father 
to avoid quarrels over water. He said that when there was insufficient water in the past 
"everyone quarrelled with everybody, and who was the fittest, the strongest survived, 
whoever is strong takes the water. Now they will blame God and keep quiet." The nature of 
the quarrels was the following according to the son. Farmer B's father had bought 17 acres 
of land in Hatti outlet command area by the end of the 1960s, which was a substantial part 
of the 60 acres large command area. The existing practice in the outlet command area was 
that everyone could irrigate according to need. When a farmer had finished the irrigation of 
his plots, the next person could start. This practice continued for several years after farmer 
B's father had bought the land. This lead to quarrels, presumably because water became 
scarcer through increase in upstream use, and through increase of intensive irrigation in the 
outlet command area itself. The 17 acres were not developed for intensive irrigation before, 
and were now prepared for rice and sugarcane cultivation. The problem for farmer B's father 
was that he did not live in or near the outlet command area, but in the camp at the head end 
of the subdistributary, 3 kilometers away. When he came to irrigate, he had to wait for 
someone to finish. When he came again another farmer had already taken the water, as 
farmer B's son explained. A small farmer put a reverse emphasis in the explanation of the 
emergence of distribution rules. He said that the small farmers came to ask farmer B's father 
constantly for water, but "you can't fight 10-15 farmers", and therefore farmer B's father 
didn't get enough water. Despite this difference in perception, both informants make the 
point that the rotation was in the big farmer's interest. According to farmer B his father 
forced the issue by once taking the water and keep it as long as he needed to irrigate all his 
plots. This took 1 5 days. Two meetings were held to come to a decision on the design of the 
rules for the rotation system. The first meeting was not successful. In the second meeting 
a third party, a political leader from the tail end camp who had no land in this outlet 
command, was present. Farmers explained the relevance of the political leader's presence by 
saying that in this way they "would be sure they would not be cheated". 
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To emphasise the importance of locally specific factors in rule making, the Hatti outlet 
can be contrasted to Kabbu outlet in the same distributary. In Kabbu outlet no rule making 
was possible in the period before 1984. At that moment a big and rich farmer sold his land 
to the father of the brothers now farming it (to finance the establishment of a rice mill). This 
big and rich farmer, who lived in a camp more upstream on the distributary and had his land 
spread along it, came and went as he pleased to irrigate his land in Kabbu outlet, or so the 
story goes. He had too much economic and political power for other farmers to be able to 
force him in the straightjacket of a rule system. Unlike in the Hatti outlet case local farmers 
seem to have been incapable, in the absence of accountability or dependency relationships, 
to negotiate more regulated water distribution.11' 
In Bhatta outlet in distributary 93 the rule making process could be directly observed 
because rules for water distribution were still in the making. The basic rule in water 
distribution in this outlet command area was that everyone could take water when he wanted 
it, on the basis of agreement of an order of irrigation with those who irrigated and desired 
to irrigate. The principle was that who first asked the present irrigator, would be next in 
sequence. This typically is a rule that occurs in a situation without water scarcity. 
With an increasing percentage of Bhatta outlet command area under rice cultivation, water 
became scarce during a period of a few weeks in kharif 1991, notwithstanding that this rainy 
season was one with abundant rainfall. Day-to-day agreements became difficult, and a 
rotation system was implemented.12' Some farmers claimed that the rotation had been in 
existence for the past 5 years, others mentioned a shorter period. 
All farmers we discussed the matter with agreed on the existence of the following two 
rules in the rotation. The first one was the division of day and night irrigation (changing at 
6 a.m. and 6 p.m.). The wet crop, that is rice, was to be irrigated during the night; the light 
crops, that is all other crops, were to be irrigated during the day. The second rule was that 
during the night irrigation would take place on a time per acre basis. The basic rule was one 
hour per acre. For part of the week this was changed to 1.5 hours per acre, namely when 
the pipe outlet gate was opened less than usual as part of the rotation schedule in the 
distributary. During daytime irrigation turns were to be decided on the basis of mutual 
agreement. Discussions with farmers regarding the order of irrigation in the hour-based, 
night part of the rotation did not yield clear results. Some farmers claimed that it existed in 
some of the field channels, but others contradicted this.13> Rice cultivation is likely to 
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 As an aside it can be noted that these two contrasting examples somewhat qualify the often 
cited condition for successful rule making and implementation that it is enhanced by the 
homogeneity of the group of water users. The two cases suggest that the quality of the socio-
political relationships within the group can make a big difference for the behaviour of the socio-
economically dominant members of the group. 
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 Farmers reported that this took place after joint decision making of all farmers during a meeting 
at a central point in the command area. In reality however this meeting is more likely to have been 
a meeting of a limited number of leading farmers. We failed to observe a large meeting at the 
indicated meeting place on the day that it had supposedly taken place. One can understand the 
importance of claiming that all farmers were part to the decision. How the communication took 
place to other farmers we have not been able to find out exactly. In the Bhatta outlet case there 
was great secrecy about the organisation of cultivators and their representatives, for reasons 
discussed in chapter 7. 
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 We were unable to do field observations at night. One reason for this was the illegal extra water 
drawals at night (see below) at which the farmers wanted no witnesses. We were unable to 
reconstruct the order of irrigation the morning after the night before. 
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increase after 1991-92; already in kharif 1992 new land development (leveling) for rice 
irrigation was observed during a short field visit. This will necessitate adaptation of the 
day/night system, because it will become impossible to irrigate all rice land during the night. 
In none of the three outlet commands was there an institutionalised procedure for the 
formulation and adaptation of operational rules. The pattern that can be discerned in their 
fabrication, apart from their emergence in response to scarcity, is that 'the important farmers' 
in the outlet command area play a central role in the process. To this point I will return 
below. 
Main elements of operational rules in outlet command areas 
The two characteristics that could be found in all rule systems we documented or heard 
about14) were 1) systematic rotation of turns over users by sequencing and zoning, and 2) 
time/area-based irrigation. 
In all three outlet commands agreements existed on the sequence of irrigation. In Bhatta 
outlet in distributary 93 this was, as already mentioned, a rotation in which the 'irrigated dry' 
crops part of the outlet command (mainly the tail end part) irrigated during the day, and the 
wet crops (rice) part (mainly the head end) during the night, and perhaps some sequencing 
during the night irrigation. Hatti outlet in distributary 24 had a very detailed rotation system 
that is discussed in section 6.3. Here, I discuss Kabbu outlet in distributary 24 as an 
example. 
The 11 cultivators of Kabbu outlet in distributary 24 together cultivated 70 acres. The 
outlet was divided in two sections. The first section consisted of 5 cultivators, who cultivated 
39 acres. These cultivators were a father, his three sons, and the father of one of his sons' 
wife. This group of 5 cultivators had an irrigation turn of 26 hours, three times a week on 
Friday, Sunday and Tuesday.15' The turn started at 6 in the morning on these days and 
lasted till 8 o'clock the next morning. On Saturday, Monday and Wednesday the second 
group of cultivators, 6 in number who cultivated 31 acres, had their turn of 22 hours.16> 
The irrigation thus alternated between the two sections during the week. The rationale of 
spreading the three days for one section over the week, rather than keeping them as a block, 
was that the discharge in the subdistributary varied systematically during the week (see 
chapter 7). The alternation was meant to spread water equally over the two sections. 
The Kabbu outlet had another common characteristic of rotation or sequence rules: the 
order of irrigation was systematically varied to compensate for different availability of water 
during the week and for the inconvenience of irrigation at night. The first section internally 
compensated for the later start on Friday of irrigation, the day after the weekly canal closure. 
The gangman normally opened the subdistributary canal only around 9.00 a.m. on that day. 
This group also alternated night irrigation. These family members had a very flexible system 
of irrigation. Four of the five lived on the canal bank in their plots. The brothers regularly 
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 Apart from the three outlet command areas investigated and discussed in detail, we collected 
less elaborate information on many other outlet commands. 
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 The rationale of weekly rotation for internal distribution in outlet commands lies in the existence, 
in many secondary canals, of rotation at subdistributary and distributary basis also on a weekly 
basis, and the resulting weekly fluctuation of discharge at a particular point in the canal. 
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 The relative turns would be 26.7 and 21.3 hours when calculated proportionally to landholding. 
I do not know how the rounded figures of 22 and 26 hours were decided. Thursday is the 
subdistributary canal closure day. This closure is part of the rotation system at distributary level 
(see chapter 7). 
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took care of each other's irrigation. However, alternation of night irrigation and other 
flexibilities do not depend on kinship relations (see the discussion of Hatti outlet in section 
6.3). 
In all outlet commands investigated the irrigation time for an individual plot was based 
on the size of that plot. The most common rule found was an irrigation time of one hour per 
acre, but variations exist. The most complex time/acre based rotation schedule we found in 
another tail end subdistributary of distributary 24. It was devised by farmers themselves in 
response to a severe water crisis in the late 1980s, after which they effectively took over the 
management of the canal from the Irrigation Department. The details of the example can be 
found in Box 6.2. 
Box 6.2: Time/acre irrigation in a tail end subdistributary in distributary 24 
This relatively short subdistributary had six pipe outlet command areas that received, in turn, 
all water flowing into the subdistributary. On Friday the subdistributary was closed as part 
of the distributary rotation. On the first Saturday of the season the most upstream pipe outlet 
command started with irrigation, and in that week the six pipe outlet command areas received 
water going from the upstream side to the downstream side. The next week irrigation went 
from the downstream side to the upstream side. In the next sequence the second pipe outlet 
command started on Saturday, in the next the third, etcetera. In this way the differences in 
supply from the distributary during the week were evened out. 
Farmers had decided how many acres could normally be irrigated on the different days of 
the week: 25 acres on Saturday, 40 acres on Sunday, 60 on Monday, 80 on Tuesday and 
Wednesday and 90-100 on Thursday. For each day the irrigation time per acre was calculated 
by the division of 24 hours or 1440 minutes by the number of acres. On Saturday for 
example the irrigation time was 58 minutes per acre, In the first sequence for example, only 
part of the first pipe outlet command could be irrigated. On Sunday another part of the first 
PO was irrigated at a rate of 36 minutes per acre, and on Monday the remainder of the first 
pipe outlet command area and most of the second outlet command at a rate of 24 minutes 
per acre, and so forth. Earlier, explained the farmers, they irrigated all six pipe outlet 
command areas simultaneously, and they could irrigate a little bit everywhere, and no water 
reached the tail. But "if water is concentrated in one place it can irrigate some land". 
Rules as resources 
An important aspect of the rules made for water distribution at outlet command level is that 
they function as resources in the social interaction regarding water distribution. This means 
two things. Firstly it means that the rules are not operational the full agricultural season or 
year, but are mobilised when needed. Existing rules are mobilised in periods when the 
demand for water is high. Secondly it means that when the rules are in operation, they not 
only function to determine the sequence and duration of irrigation, but also form the basis 
on which divergence from and violations of the rules are negotiated. 
Because rotation rules were applied only in short periods in the three outlets studied in 
1991-92, the evidence that could be collected on the second meaning is limited. Moreover, 
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most of it is included in the discussion of Hatti outlet in section 6.3.l7) I therefore limit 
myself to the discussion of the first meaning, by giving examples from the three outlet 
command areas in turn. 
Kabbu outlet 
In Kabbu outlet in distributary 24 we did 68 observations of which plots were irrigated at a 
particular moment, spread over the two seasons, all during daytime. Of these 51 (or 75%) 
were according to the rotation over the two sections (the expected figure in case of random 
irrigation is 50%). This shows that the rotation was not always followed. We could identify 
periods in the year that farmers reported that there was 'no rotation', and indeed irrigation 
practice fitted the rule badly. This was the case for example in December and January. The 
demand for water was relatively low in this period because temperatures were low, the first 
crop harvested, and the second crop in the nursery phase and early crop stages. Rotation was 
implemented strictly, though not without exceptions, in March when the demand for water 
was much higher: temperatures were higher and the rice crop was in full growth.18' 
Hatti outlet 
In Hatti outlet in distributary 24 there was no scarcity in the first month of the agricultural 
year 1991-92, because of sufficient rain. 'Irrigated dry' crops had been sown on rainfall 
before the canal water reached the pipe outlet on 21 June. However, towards the end of July, 
water scarcity came to be felt. The reason was increased water use in the outlet command 
area itself as well as upstream. The coincidence of full growth of light crops and rice was 
a period of scarcity. 
The first rotation period started on 28 July, and came to an end with rain starting on 20 
September, which lasted for several days. On 28 or 29 September the rotation was re-
introduced for a period of two weeks. Mid-October the harvest period started, demand for 
water went down, and rotation was no longer required. After this there were several months 
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 In general adherence to the rules in the periods that rotation was implemented was rather strict 
in the outlet command areas in distributary 24. The less than 100% adherence to the alternation 
between the two sections in Kabbu outlet even in more water scarce/high demand periods that is 
mentioned below, should be interpreted as flexible use of the rules rather than violation. In Hatti 
outlet the alternation of the two 30 acres zones was kept to very strictly, but within the zones 
there was more flexibility in the application of the rules (see section 6.3). In distributary 93, where 
rotation rules were much less 'consolidated', the situation was different. How rule violation made 
the rotation break down in Bhatta outlet is reported below. In the small sized (60-70 acres) outlet 
command areas in distributary 24 interference of other farmers (within as well as outside rotation 
periods) in the turn of the irrigating farmer was very rare. Such interference was quickly noticed. 
In Bhatta outlet in distributary 93, which measured approximately 164 acres, there was more 
interference. For tailenders it was necessary to guard the field channels within the outlet during 
irrigation. (164 acres was the area actually cultivated in 1991-92, determined on the basis of 
information from farmers and own measurement. The survey number listed in the Irrigation 
Department records for Bhatta outlet command area together were 220 acres. There was no good 
outlet command area map that could be used to check and explain the difference.) 
1BI
 In the kharif season it never came to a period of strict implementation of the rotation because 
of sufficient canal water supply and frequent rainfall. The rules were sometimes used in this period 
by farmers to claim that they could irrigate on a particular day ("today your section irrigates, 
therefore our section can irrigate tomorrow"). This didn't cause problems because there was 
sufficient water. Our observations were not frequent and detailed enough to allow more detailed 
analysis of this phenomenon. 
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without the rotation in operation because the demand for water remained relatively low. 
From October to January there was harvesting of rice and 'irrigated dry' crops, followed by 
the planting of new crops. Because less rice was planted in the rabi season than in kharif, 
demand for water was reduced. Also, December-February was the harvest period for 
sugarcane, a water demanding crop. Lastly, temperatures went down in the course of 
November, and only rose again substantially in the month of February. As a result of the 
latter, there was almost an introduction of the rotation system early February, but from that 
moment part of the cotton crop and the other 'irrigated dry' crops came to an end, which 
reduced the irrigated area in the outlet command area. In this whole period it was possible 
to distribute water on the basis of mutual agreement. 
It was only in the second half of March that the reduced area started to feel serious 
scarcity. In this period there were days in the week that no water at all reached the pipe 
outlet through the subdistributary because of high upstream use (peak season for the second 
rice crop, sugarcane re-started, hot season started). From 22 March rotation was started. This 
period terminated on 18 April. In Hatti outlet the use of the rules for rotational water 
distribution was thus also restricted to the most water scarce periods of the year. 
Bhatta outlet 
In Bhatta outlet the rotation was implemented for one two-week period only during the 1991-
92 agricultural year. Reasons for this were the not too unfavourable water supply situation 
of the outlet command area in general, and concerted efforts by farmers to increase supply 
in response to scarcity. 
Canal water arrived in distributary 93 in the second half of July. It rained a lot in that 
month. There was no water scarcity well into August. On 24 August we had the first 
observation of the irrigation of a non-rice crop in Bhatta outlet.19' The 'irrigated dry' crops 
needed water after it had not rained for some weeks. In the same week the Irrigation 
Department introduced rotation in the distributary, which implied the closure of the Bhatta 
pipe outlet for 2lA days per week. 
The scarcity thus created led farmers in Bhatta outlet command area to introduce rotation. 
On 29 August it was decided that all farmers would get 1 hour per acre for the irrigation of 
their plots. However, the rule was not actually introduced. First farmers tried to get the 
supply improved. On 30 August farmers forced the gangman to open the pipe outlet gate 
more than normal (this was at the end of the first closure period of 2lh days).20' On 31 
August a group of 20-30 farmers went to the local Irrigation Department office, and 
mobilised the Mandal Pradhan who lived in the tail end village to join them, which he 
did.21> After having waited for several hours farmers spoke to the Executive Engineer, but 
he did not make any promises. The representation remained without effect. 
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 From 31 July we systematically observed which plots were irrigated during the daytime. 
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 In actual fact the pipe outlet gate was not fully closed during these 2Vi days. The 'almost 
closure' situation did allow some irrigation to continue in the outlet command. 
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 The Mandal Pradhan is the chairman of the Mandal Panchayat, the elected body in between the 
village and taluk (sub-district) level, created under the decentralisation policy implemented in 
Karnataka during the 1980s. This Mandal Pradhan was the biggest landowner of the tail end 
village, an important local moneylender and employer, effectively the village head, and, depending 
on the person, feared, admired and detested. His family's, very big, house was symbolically located 
at the highest point of the village. 
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On 6 September, at the end of the second almost closure period of the pipe outlet gate, 
it was decided to introduce the day/night system, with time-wise irrigation during the night. 
Up to 14 September there was no irrigation of rice plots during the day. The agreement 
turned out to be very fragile. On 14 September a cultivator known for his selfish behaviour 
broke the rule and started irrigating his rice plots out of turn, to which other farmers respond 
by doing the same. The system immediately collapsed. The situation did not develop into a 
crisis because from 15 September there was intermittent rain till early October. 
After the two weeks in August/September, the rotation system in Bhatta outlet was not 
reintroduced during the rest of the agricultural year. The reason for this was the following. 
After the day of the unsuccessful representation to the Irrigation Department the strategy to 
increase supply to the pipe outlet command area was changed. From then on the pipe outlet 
gate was systematically raised by farmers during the night by means of duplicate keys.22' 
Even after the implementation of rotation had stopped, rice continued to be irrigated 
predominantly at night. One reason to irrigate rice at night rather than 'irrigated dry' crops, 
is that it is more difficult, and more dangerous because of snakes, to irrigate fields with 
'irrigated dry' crops in darkness, particularly the unleveled ones. Another reason is that 
under the cover of darkness the supply into the pipe outlet command area can be easily 
increased, to make the irrigation of the rice plots a lot quicker. 
In contrast to the situation in distributary 24, scarcity was less a given factor for Bhatta 
outlet farmers. There was very feable control of outlet gates by the Irrigation Department at 
night in this distributary. This meant that Bhatta outlet farmers could easily appropriate 
additional water to the detriment of outlet command areas located downstream. They could 
thus avoid scarcity and rotation did not need to be implemented again. 
Conclusion 
The three examples support the statement that rules are mobilised when required. In addition 
it can be observed that there is some regularity and predictability in the occurrence of 
scarcity /high demand periods, in which rules are likely to be mobilised. Two of such periods 
are (i) the period when rice and 'irrigated dry' crops simultaneously have high demands for 
water in knarif3\ and (ii) the period that starts late February/early March and lasts till the 
canal closure in April or May, when the second rice crop requires a lot of water because of 
very high temperatures. This shows how the rhythms of the crop cycles and the weather 
structure social interaction on the canals. 
It can also be observed that water scarcity at outlet command area level is not 
straightforwardly determined by given crop/weather interactions and given water use 
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 Farmers initially were hesitant to raise the pipe outlet gate. Even later in the year farmers 
sometimes asked the gangman to do it, rather than do it themselves. There was great secrecy 
around this practice. Only months after it had started, and after repeated observation of adjusted 
gate settings early-morming, farmers confirmed the existence of the practice. We were never told 
who exactly had duplicate keys, though it was confirmed by a number of farmers that they existed. 
The strategy to raise gates themselves was a change from the bribing strategy to get gates raised 
by the Irrigation Department personnel that was used in earlier years (see chapter 7 for more 
discussion of the events in preceding years). 
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 This overlap period is also visible in the table in Annex 4.1 (distributary design). There was thus 
some awareness of this phenomenon in the design phase. However, in the design crop water 
requirements are supposed to be stable for the full growing period of the crop, which in reality is 
not the case. The peak demand in the overlap period is likely to be higher than the design table 
suggests. 
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practices by farmers in other locations. Both can be influenced to some extent. The first by 
adapting crop choice to anticipated scarcity, as will be discussed in detail for Hatti outlet 
below; the second by active farmer intervention in distributary level water distribution. 
Bhatta outlet provides an example of the latter. The issue is discussed in greater detail in 
chapter 7. 
6.3 THE REPRODUCTION OF UNEQUAL WATER DISTRIBUTION 
Introduction 
With regard to (inequality in water distribution at pipe outlet command area level 
qualitatively different situations can occur. This section focuses on the reproduction of 
unequal water distribution in Hatti outlet, but it should be kept in mind that other situations 
can also occur. In this introduction I briefly discuss the Kabbu outlet and Bhatta outlet cases 
as examples of other possible situations, after which I turn to the Hatti outlet case. 
In Kabbu outlet in distributary 24 no unequal distribution could be observed. In kharif 
1991 the outlet command was almost fully cultivated with rice. There was one farmer (out 
of a total of 11) who cultivated cotton, and one farmer who cultivated part of his plot with 
sugarcane. In rabi 1992 three farmers cultivated part of their plot with groundnut, and the 
sugarcane cultivation was continued. The rest was rice.24) All the non-rice crops were 
concentrated in the upstream half of the outlet command area; the downstream half was too 
wet for other crops than rice. The tail end problem in this outlet consisted of some 
waterlogging and salinity in the lowest plots along the natural drain. However, no systematic 
differences were found in this outlet command in rice yields and varieties going from head 
to tail.25) 
At first sight, the 1991-92 cropping pattern of Bhatta outlet in distributary 93 suggests 
highly unequal distribution of water from head to tail. In kharif 1991 the dominant crop in 
the upstream half of the outlet command area was rice (see map 6.1). Cotton was found on 
some of the higher spots, some of which are difficult to irrigate because of their elevated 
level. In the downstream half rice was found in the lower wet spots and where drainage 
water could be re-used. The dominant 'irrigated dry' crop in that part was sunflower, with 
a very limited number of plots with jowar (sorghum). In rabi 1992 there was extensive rice 
cultivation as well, but it was more concentrated in the upper half of the outlet command 
than in kharif 1991. 
This cropping pattern suggests that in Bhatta outlet it is not easy to get water to the tail 
end for (lucrative) rice cultivation. However, some care is necessary with regard to this 
conclusion. It was already noted in chapter 5 that land development (leveling) was still 
ongoing in this outlet command (see map 5.1 in section 5.2). For this outlet, the water in the 
distributary seems not to have been used up in 1991-92. In kharif 1992 rice cultivation had 
expanded further down into the outlet command area, partly because of the development of 
new land for rice cultivation, and partly because some head end farmers leased in land lower 
down in the outlet command area. It seems very likely that when water will become scarce 
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 We observed the cropping pattern in kharif 1992 as well. Then rice cultivation was almost 
100%. The only non-rice cultivation was the sugarcane. 
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 One leased out tail end plot along the drain had significantly lower yields in both seasons. This 
was probably due more to management problems (labour, nursery preparation) than to water 
availability or waterlogging and salinity problems. 
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Map 6.1: Cropping pattern kharif 1991 in Bhatta outlet D93 
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in the future a head-tail pattern will occur similar to the one found now, but the 1991-92 
cropping pattern can not straightforwardly be interpreted as a case of unequal water 
distribution. The primary inequality seems to lie in the capacity to develop land for 
irrigation.26' 
The only outlet command that I studied which had a 'genuine' head-tail pattern of unequal 
water distribution was Hatti outlet in distributary 24. 'Genuine' means that in this outlet 
command area all land was suitable for rice cultivation (because leveled) and all farmers 
would have liked to grow it. The paradoxical situation in this outlet command was that a 
clearly unequal pattern of water distribution co-existed with an equitable set of rules for that 
distribution, which was known and acknowledged by all cultivators of the outlet command 
area, and which was actively used. However, this seemingly contradictory situation caused 
no conflicts among the cultivators. It is the purpose of this section to explain this paradox. 
Unequal water distribution in Hatti outlet 
All plots in Hatti outlet were leveled and suitable for rice cultivation. According to the 
farmers in the outlet, the command was fully cultivated with rice and sugarcane in the past. 
In 1991-92 however 'irrigated dry' crops were dominant. There even was extensification of 
land use in the outlet command area by the planting of tree crops. 5'/2 acres (out of a total 
of 60 acres) were planted with eucalyptus, and 3 acres with coconut. The latter was low 
yielding. Rice cultivation in kharif 1991 was concentrated in the head end, as well as 
sugarcane farming (see map 6.2). The small amount of rice cultivation in the tail end of the 
outlet command was based on re-use of drainage water (from an adjacent outlet command 
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 The use of the cropping pattern as an indicator for unequal water distribution is possible because 
of the general desire to grow rice, a water demanding crop. The Bhatta example shows that the 
indicator only 'works' when all land in an outlet command area is suitable for rice cultivation (also 
see chapter 5). 
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Map 6.2: Cropping pattern in kharif 1991 in Hatti outlet, 
D24 
area and from the drain). The 
dominant 'irrigated dry' crop 
was cotton. There was very 
little cultivation of coarse 
grains. In rabi 1992 one plot 
in the head end, the one 
nearest to the pipe outlet 
structure, was cultivated with 
rice on canal water, and one 
plot in the tail end was 
cultivated with rice on re-use 
water. Sugarcane cultivation 
was continued in the head end 
of the outlet command area. 
Some land was left 
uncultivated in this season, and 
the remaining part was planted 
with 'irrigated dry' crops.27' 
This pattern of water 
intensive crops in the head end 
part of the outlet command, 
and 'irrigated dry' crops in the 
rest can be interpreted as unequal distribution. All farmers in the command area would have 
cultivated rice or sugarcane if they could, and the outlet command area was suitable for 
it.28> 
The structure of landholding was very unequal in this outlet command. There were two 
big farmers, farmer A and B, both settlers. They owned 24 and 22 acres, all of which was 
irrigated land. Of that 2 and 14 acres were located in Hatti outlet. The other cultivators were 
mostly small landholders, owning between 0.75 and 10 acres of irrigated land. Most fell in 
the 2-4 acres category (for more details, see chapter 5). 
The land of the two big farmers was located in the head end of the outlet command area 
(see map 6.2). Half of the Eucalyptus land and all the coconut land was owned by farmer 
B. Here we see another paradoxical element: the big farmers appropriated the larger share 
of the water that reached the outlet command area. This is visible in their cultivation of rice 
and sugarcane. However, one of them had also extensified his land use by planting 
eucalyptus and coconut trees. 
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Water distribution rules in Hatti outlet 
It was already mentioned above that Hatti outlet had an elaborate system of rules for water 
distribution. Its characteristics were as follows. 
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 In kharif 1992, a year that started with serious water problems and night guarding in the first 
week of the season, cotton was even more dominant. 
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 Apart from farmers' expression of this preference, I could observe an outlet command almost 
fully covered with rice and sugarcane during a short field visit in 1996. Additional water had been 
brought to the outlet command by means of lift irrigation, and farmers had switched to rice and 
sugarcane as much as possible. 
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Map 6.3: Sections for rotation in Hatti outlet, D24 
The outlet command is divided into two parts, each of 30 acres.29' These two parts 
receive irrigation water on alternate days. Each part thus receives water for 3 days per week. 
One day per week the subdistributary canal is closed as part of the rotation at distributary 
level (see chapter 7). Which part starts on the day after the canal closure, changes every 
week. In this way the variation of water availability over the week is compensated. Both 
parts have further internal differentiation (see map 6.3).30) 
The first part, which is 
referred to as 'Farmer B part' 
is divided into a segment of 
20 acres and one of 10 acres. 
The 20 acres segment has 17 
(14+3) acres of Farmer B 
and his brother, and 3 acres 
that are the plots on the left 
side of the approach canal 
from the outlet structure to 
the main area of the outlet 
command. The 20 (14+3+3) 
acres section receives 2 days 
of water, the 10 acres section 
one day. It is also agreed that 
the 1 day for the 10 acres 
section should not always be 
the same day of the 
week.31' The 10 acres 
section is again divided into 
two 5 acres subsections, 
which each receive 12 hours 
of water. Here, and in all other instances, the turns change at sunrise and sunset (6 o'clock 
is the official agreement). The 24 hours turn changes at sunset. 
OUTLET STRUCTURE - SUBDISTRIBUTARY 
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 The rounded figure of 60 acres total command area was used by farmers themselves in their 
explanation of the rules. The command was actually slightly smaller. According to the localisation 
pattern, the survey numbers under this outlet command area measure 57.1 acres. When I added 
up the data furnished by individual farmers (in the datasheet on agronomic practices, the household 
survey, and informal talks), I arrived at exactly the same number. There is a good fit with the areas 
calculated on the basis of the surveying-by-pacing that I did to prepare a map of the outlet. 
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 It is remarkable that the 4 main segments of 20, 10, 1 5 and 1 5 acres discussed below closely 
correspond with the 4 survey numbers that make up the pipe outlet command. In the past a single 
survey number belonged to a single landholder. In the course of time the survey number became 
subdivided by inheritance and sale. In two of the 4 survey numbers this history is still very clear 
in the pattern of landholding. The third was sold by the single owner to a single farmer, farmer B's 
father. In the fourth the previous social connections could not be easily traced. Field channels also 
run - when topography allows - along the boundaries of the survey numbers. Spatial units have 
kept their social significance, even when their inhabitants have changed. 
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 When farmer B explained the rotation system to us he said he had 'to give' one day of water 
to the farmers in the 10 acres section. This is a significant way of phrasing it. It expresses both 
his dominant role in the pipe outlet command, as well as his high water demand/use (see below). 
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settler farmer.35) He planted 2 acres of rice, while water was very scarce at the start of the 
season. Smaller farmers upstream of him in the same segment who had cultivated rice in 
kharif 1991 did not do so in kharif 1992. 
The example suggests that location is not the only factor, and that another part of the 
answer is that the economically and socially powerful farmers get most of the water. It seems 
to be the case that 'the weak' anticipate that they would lose a battle over water with 'the 
strong'. Such a battle would have to take place when more farmers would decide to grow 
rice. The combined explanation would therefore be that power and/or location give a farmer 
water.36> There is high empirical correlation between this statement and the pattern of 
distribution, but it begs another question: how are 'location' and 'power' set to work, 
through which process do they translate in more or less water and wet or 'irrigated dry' 
crops? 
Location 
For 'location' the explanation is straightforward. Being where the water comes first, or 
where the water has to pass to reach others, gives a strategic advantage for irrigation. 
Possibilities for upstream interference by others are less, and detection of interference with 
the supply of water to downstream plots will take time, and requires an effort of the 
downstream farmer to be corrected.37' The upstream-downstream location of plots along a 
canal creates as it were a natural queue. In addition, upstream water users will experience 
smaller water losses through canal seepage and other (non-intentional) leaks than downstream 
water users. 
Because of the small size of the Hatti outlet command, the heavy clay soil, and the 
relatively favourable water supply, the canal losses factor seems to have been of minor 
importance in the kharif (rainy) season.38' In the rabi season the problem was more serious 
because the field channels dried out more when not used, developed cracks and sometimes 
took a long time to fill. This problem was increased by the characteristic of the rotation 
system that the water can be in one part of the outlet command on one day, in another the 
next day, and yet another on the third day. There is very little sequential irrigation of plots 
along a field channel. Sequencing would reduce canal water losses. 
The upstream location of farmer A and B undoubtedly made their position stronger. Also 
the fact that the head reach lands were adjacent to the settlers camp helped in this respect. 
Farmer A could literally see his lands from his veranda. Such monitoring ability makes 
interference by others very unlikely. 
However, I believe the major part of the explanation lies in the economic and political 
power of the two big head-end farmers. Historically power preceded location. The first step 
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 He was, for example, the central person in a joint lift irrigation system in the tail end of the 
subdistributary. He was also a farmer with some religious status. He went on an important 
pilgrimage during 1991-92, and he was able to invite the local MLA (Member of the Legislative 
Assembly) to a religious ceremony in his house, though the MLA did not show up. He had attended 
the marriage of this farmer, who wasn't an MLA at that point in time. He was also a farmer always 
on the look out and actively pursuing the purchase of new and high quality seeds. 
361
 Location alone can be sufficient, as evidenced by the cultivation of rice by some small farmers 
in the head end of the pipe outlet. 
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 The interefernce argument does not strongly apply to Hatti outlet, but it does apply to Bhatta 
outlet (see above). 
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 This conclusion, as well as the following remark on the rabi season, are based on field 
observations and discussion with farmers, not on discharge measurements. 
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in the creation of the upstream-downstream social order was the purchasing power of 
particularly settler farmers to buy land in head end locations (see chapter 5). The basic 
question therefore is how socio-economic power is set to work in the choice of crops. I have 
found no evidence in Hatti outlet that the big farmers A and B directly prescribed to other 
farmers which crops (not) to grow. The process is a more subtle and indirect one. 
Power: economic 
Small tail end farmers were convinced that they would not be able to get sufficient water 
when they would grow a more water consuming crop. This belief was also based on practical 
experience. One small farmer with a plot in the tail as well as in the middle part of the outlet 
command reported that he had suffered a great financial loss when he had grown rice in the 
middle reach plot in the previous year, but was unable to get sufficient water.39' The choice 
of less water consuming crops is based on the anticipation, informed by farmers' own 
experience or that of others, that they would run a great financial risk when they would grow 
more water consuming crops, because they would be unable to get sufficient water to get a 
good yield. 
The social relationships that constituted this inability were: 1) socio-economic relations 
of dependency, particularly credit relations and employment relations, and 2) political 
relations that regulated the representation of the farmers in the outlet command at higher 
levels of the system. 
The two big farmers in Hatti outlet supplied several agricultural inputs to other farmers 
on credit. Fertiliser was the major one, but one of the two large farmers also sold pesticides 
and cotton seeds on credit, and hired out his tractor, also on credit. The other big farmer, 
apart from supplying inputs on credit himself, served as a gatekeeper for credit from one of 
the fertiliser traders in the local commercial centre. He could recommend small farmers to 
the trader, who would then give them inputs on credit. For small farmers these informal, and 
illegal, credit relations were crucial, because they had no access to formal, bank credit (see 
chapter 5). The informality and illegality meant that these were local and personalised 
arrangements.40' At least 6 out of the 20 small farmers in Hatti outlet had such relations 
with farmer A or B in 1991-92.41' 
Farmer A and B, like all good businessmen, gave substantial credit only to those they 
considered creditworthy. Only farmers who are able to get reasonable yields would be 
creditworthy. The plots of the six farmers they gave credit to were located in the head and 
middle reach of the outlet command area. Two of them were able to grow rice (on part of 
their land). 'Supporting' this group in the outlet command created the situation that tail end 
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 How the denial of water to this farmer took place we could not reconstruct. In 1991-92 there 
was no such case to observe. How the rich peasants/head end farmers show their muscle when 
denying water to others, I therefore do not know. 
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 The credit arrangements need not be only verbal agreements. One of the farmers in Kabbu outlet 
who was also a moneylender showed us the printed letters of credit of the different farmers that 
he had borrowed money to. The forms were filled in and signed except for the amount of the loan. 
This gave the moneylender the opportunity to fill in the amount he liked in case of non-repayment. 
Whether this system was also used in Hatti outlet I do not know. 
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 The real number may have been higher. Informal, and formally illegal, credit relations are not 
easy to document, because farmers are reluctant to talk about the (personal) details of their credit 
situation. Furthermore, the count concerns relations with regard to agricultural production in one 
year only. Some farmers took credit with farmer A or B in earlier years, but not in 1991-92. 
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farmers who would want to claim more water would not only have to fight farmer A and B, 
but also their business clients.42' 
In addition to credit, farmer A and B were also the employers of a number of farmers in 
Hatti outlet. For example, farmer B's tractor driver was the brother of one of the tail end 
farmers, and he employed one of the small head end farmers almost on a permanent basis 
to look after the irrigation of his 14 acres, including guarding activities on the 
subdistributary.43' More important in quantitative terms was that farmer A and B also 
regularly employed the wives and daughters of the male farmers that cultivated land in Hatti 
outlet. I am unable to quantify the importance of farmer A and B as employers for other 
farmers and their family members in Hatti outlet, but that such employment took place on 
a regular basis can be concluded on the basis of my field data.44' 
Power: political 
Farmer A and B were the representatives of the outlet command at higher levels of the 
system in the activities needed to secure the water supply to the outlet command. These 
activities are discussed in detail in chapter 7. Here it suffices to mention that farmer A was 
the treasurer of the organisation of five tail end outlet commands that jointly lobby for 
sufficient supply to the tail end of the subdistributary. Farmer A and B together with other 
local leaders regularly travelled to the Irrigation Department office to bring problems to the 
attention of the irrigation officers. Small farmers thus depended for their water supply quite 
directly on the big farmers, because the supply of the whole outlet command depended on 
the latter's performance as lobbyists. 
A next logical question could be: when these two big farmers had so much economic and 
political leverage over others, why did they bother to participate in the design and 
implementation of the rotation system, and why did farmer B go as far as to extensify his 
land use by planting eucaluptus and coconut trees? A full answer to this question cannot be 
given in this chapter, because it requires discussion of processes at higher levels of the 
system, particularly the distributary level (chapter 7). Here it can be stated in general that 
the relations of economic and representational dependence are not fully one-sided. The 
'strong' also depend on the 'weak' farmers in both an economic and a political sense. 
Business requires clients, and leadership requires followers. 
The local, and formally illegal, agricultural input business of the farmer-traders requires 
local clients. Because of the illegality the main mechanism available to the farmer-traders to 
secure repayment of loans is the social control within the local community.45' Social control 
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 Another factor, related to farmer A and B capacity to give credit, that is invest, is that in 1991 -
92 farmer A and B were discussing the possibility to invest in a pumpset to be installed on the river 
bank that could bring additional water to the outlet command. Investment in a pumpset lies far 
beyond the possibilities of almost all other farmers in the outlet. In 1996 I could observe that the 
lift irrigation had been installed. 
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 This gave this small farmer the advantage that sometimes water from farmer B's turn could be 
diverted to his own plot. 
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 Employment relations were not the primary focus of the research, and I therefore devoted a 
limited amount of time to it. Furthermore, such research 'following the workers' instead of the 
water, would have had to be village (and camp) based instead of outlet based. Another 
complication was that farmer A and B had most of their cultivated land outside Hatti outlet. 
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 The risk involved when such relations are absent was suggested by the relations of rich peasants 
with groups of migrant labourers for example. We collected several examples of these labourers 
(continued...) 
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requires a respected position in the local community. Rich peasants act as as opinion leaders, 
as members of (elected) councils, and as mediators of local disputes for example. To 
reproduce their roles as leaders in their communities they need to accumulate social capital 
by showing responsible/useful behaviour vis a vis the people who support them, including 
their fellow water users. The adherence to the rotation schedule by farmer A and B in times 
of real scarcity, and their leading role in implementing it, can be interpreted in this way. 
When they would only think of their own interests, and would not want to accept yield 
reduction of their sugarcane by sharing in water scarcity, or decrease their demand on water 
by extensifying land use, their social reputation and political leadership would be negatively 
affected. 
A paradox resolved 
The argument I have developed above is that the characteristics of the agrarian structure 
(particularly informal credit arrangements and employment relations) and that of the 
organisation of political representation and leadership, constitute the structural conditions for 
the inability of small farmers in unfavourable locations to claim an equal share of the canal 
water. They are unable to substantially reduce the excessive appropriation of water by the 
local elite, the rich peasants, who often have land in favourable locations. Those who are 
'weak' avoid conflicts over water distribution by the cultivation of less water consuming 
crops. Water distribution is not a practice in which the deprived choose to confront the 
privileged.46' 
From the perspective of rule making and implementation, the Hatti outlet case shows that 
making equitable, that is location and status neutral, rules for the supply of water to plots 
within an outlet command area, and implementation of these rules in water scarce periods, 
may not be sufficient to achieve equity in distribution. The problem may lie in the way 
demand for water is constituted. By the choice of different crops with different water 
requirements inequity is accepted before distribution and rule implementation even start. 
45l(...continued) 
running away with the advances given to them by their employers before the season (the advances 
were given to bargain lower rates). There is very little the employer can do about this. 
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 Another factor that may be important in the dependency relation between rich and middle 
peasants on one hand, and small and poor peasants on the other, is the caste and community 
factor. In the different research locations there seemed to be a strong correlation between 
economic position and caste position. The outlet command areas studied however, happened to 
be relatively homogeneous in caste composition (distributary 24), or did not show a caste related 
pattern in access to water (distributary 93). Furthermore, the position of the migrant farmers, who 
do not fit into the local social hierarchies in a straightforward manner, complicates the analysis of 
such correlations. My finding is that caste (or ethnicity or religion) does not have to be introduced 
as a separate factor to get a satisfactory analysis of the pattern of water distribution. In the 
discussions with farmers on water distribution reference to economic and political power was 
always very explicit, but very few references were made to caste. Also the description of the 
migrant farmers by local farmers was mostly in terms of their farming and entrepreneurial skills and 
wealth (economics) and their capacity to deal with the bureaucracy and other actors (politics). 
Nevertheless, I feel I cannot make strong statements about the role of caste (or ethnicity or 
religion) in the organisation, or lack of it, of tailenders versus head enders. Given the correlation 
between caste/Community and economic and political power, the caste/community factor may 
come to the fore when conflicts arise, and it is likely that the caste/community idiom is one of the 
resources used by the powerful in such conflicts. However, more explicit and open conflict than 
occurred in Hatti outlet in 1991-92 would be necessary to uncover this. 
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The system of localisation is a set of rules that intended to create an equitable demand for 
water. But, as we have seen, it is ineffective. Local rule making has not replaced localisation 
with a set of equitable demand-side rules, even when it has sometimes produced and 
implemented equitable supply-side rules for water distribution. 
6.4 CONCLUSION 
The main substantive conclusions of this chapter are the following. 
In all three pipe outlet command areas that were studied sets of rules existed for internal 
distribution of water in the outlet. The detail and sophistication of these rules differed for the 
three cases. The evidence presented has suggested that more detailed rules are formulated in 
the face of water scarcity. All rules were the product of local rule making by water users 
themselves, without involvement of the Irrigation Department or other government agencies. 
In all three cases the rule sets functioned as resources, mobilised when necessary.47' 
Necessity occured when water became so scarce that conflicts arose over its distribution that 
could not be handled by mutual agreements of those who wanted to irrigate. These periods 
were related to the interaction of changing crop water requirements of different crops in their 
growth cycle, and the cropping pattern and planting dates, together with the pattern of 
rainfall and canal supply. 
Water distribution rules organised water distribution in space and time by means of three 
principles. 
1) Zoning of the outlet command for the systematic rotation of irrigation turns over 
different parts of the outlet command area. 
2) A regular sequence in the irrigation of plots within zones. 
3) Irrigation of individual plots on a time/acre basis. 
The first principle, zoning, had been introduced in all cases we collected information on. 
Zoning was no simple expression of geographical convenience, though this factor was 
certainly important in the design of the zoning pattern. It also expressed social 
considerations. The distribution of the two big farmers in Hatti outlet in distributary 24 over 
the two main zones was no coincidence. One of the zones in Kabbu outlet was a family 
affair. And the crop-based zoning in Bhatta outlet in distributary 93 had to do with the 
practice of raising the pipe outlet gate at night. 
The second and third principle, plot-sequencing and time-wise irrigation, were not always 
found. Their introduction seems to depend on the degree of water scarcity and the specific 
history and circumstances of an outlet command area. Sequencing may involve arrangements 
for alternating day and night irrigation, and arrangements for spreading the distributional 
effects of the variation of canal supply. 
Time-wise irrigation expresses the link of water rights to land rights. Equity among users in 
access to irrigation water is defined on a per acre basis. At present, the congruence of the 
471
 One methodological consequence of this is that it is very important when observations of water 
distribution are made. Visitors that spend only a few hours or days in the outlet have a fair chance 
to come outside the rotation periods, and may think they observe 'unorganised' irrigation. 
Furthermore, it is our experience that it is not always easy to get good information on existing rules 
outside the rotation periods. Short term visitors may therefore easily conclude that the rules are 
unclear or contradictory. 
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entitlements to the two resources, land and water, is considered as normal and self-evident 
by almost everyone.48' 
Water distribution practices sometimes diverged from water distribution rules. These 
divergencies should not be understood simply as 'inconsistent behaviour' or 'non-adherence'. 
Many differences between theory and practice were exceptions to the rule that had been 
negotiated on the basis of the existence of the rules. Rules were not only a resource for 
determining a distribution pattern in times of scarcity, but also for the negotiation of 
adaptations to the schedule. 
The Hatti outlet case illustrated that the outcome of rule implementation may contradict 
its normative basis: inequality vs. equality. The actual implementation of equitable 
distribution rules may be part of the occurrence of a pattern of unequal water distribution, 
when the demand for water by the different farmers is structurally differentiated. 
The latter point leads to the major theoretical conclusion of this chapter. Though there is 
no water market as such, there is a situation with regard to water use that resembles an 
'interlocked transactions' or 'interlinked markets' condition. It could perhaps more 
appropriately be called an 'interlocked access' or 'interlinked entitlements' to resources 
situation.49' For poor and small peasants access to irrigation water depends on, is 
interlinked with, access to other resources, notably credit for agricultural inputs, employment 
and access to political representation. Rich peasants are the nodal points in these networks. 
481
 The history of the introduction of the irrigation time/acre principle in the Tungabhadra Left Bank 
Canal is unclear. The migrant farmers from Andhra Pradesh certainly brought it with them as part 
of their irrigation experience. However, it may not have a single origin, but simply may have been 
a 'logical' rule in the given conditions. It leaves untouched, and confirms, the distribution of 
landholding, which is the basic variable in the social differentiation of farmers (see chapter 5). A 
degree of inequity is implicit in the time/acre-wise irrigation because it does not compensate for 
differences in soil quality, and for transmission losses and travel time. 
491
 For the concept of interlocked markets/transactions, see for example Bharadwaj (1974, 1985), 
Crow and Murshid (1994) and Sarap (1991). 
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Forms of organisation in distributary water management 
Distributary water management is perhaps the clearest illustration of the basic premiss of this 
book that water distribution is a political process of resource negotiation. In the Tungabhadra 
Left Bank Canal the distributary level is the main meeting ground for farmers, government 
officials and other actors involved in water distribution. This applies in the literal sense that 
these actors meet and interact on subdistributary and distributary canals on a daily basis. It 
also applies in the sense that many of the meetings and confrontations that are situated in 
other locales (like the Irrigation Department offices, the house of the local member of 
parliament or the site of a road block) have to do with water management at distributary 
level. This zone 'above the outlet' (Chambers, 1988) is a veritable arena, staging a spectacle 
of water distribution practices, both day and night and throughout the agricultural year. 
To analyse the patterns in this eventful drama I use the term 'forms of organisation'. It 
refers to all institutionalised forms of human behaviour that are part of water distribution. 
The leading questions for my analysis of forms of organisation are: how do the different 
actors involved in distributary water management respond to water scarcity? What are their 
strategies, how do they interact, and which institutions emerge as a result?. A lot of attention 
is given to the strategic manoeuvring of different actors concerning water distribution, and 
I will emphasise the diversity and dynamic nature of distributary level institutions. At the 
same time I analyse how these forms of organisation are part of the larger structure of 
society. This embeddedness explains the stability in outcome of the day-to-day struggle over 
water. Notwithstanding the diversity of and change in strategies, practices and institutions, 
the distribution of water over space and time is relatively stable, evolves slowly, and is 
difficult to redirect by planned intervention. The room for manoeuvre at the distributary 
interface is heavily constricted. 
In the introduction (section 7.1) I elaborate the questions addressed in the chapter. The 
following three sections discuss the main institutional responses to the emergence of scarcity 
and contested distribution. These are rotation at distributary and subdistributary level (section 
7.2 and 7.3) and the role of politicians in distributary water management (section 7.4)." In 
section 7.5 I draw a number of conclusions. 
11
 Because of the diversity of forms of organisation the discussion has to be limited to the main 
elements. I do not discuss forms of organisation in the lift irrigation schemes in the command, and 
give only limited attention to the styles of management of the canal-level officials of the Irrigation 
Department. I also do not discuss all activities of farmers 'above the outlet' in detail. 
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7.1 INTRODUCTION 
Formally speaking there should be no need to ask the question which forms of organisation 
occur in distributary water management. The formal arena for rule making regarding water 
distribution in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal is the Karnataka State parliament. Through 
the Karnataka Irrigation Act (1965) and several other laws and regulations the Karnataka 
government has vested the authority for the management of the canal irrigation systems in 
the Irrigation Department.2* The Irrigation Department regularly releases ordinances, 
schedules, and other forms of operational rules regarding water distribution at the main canal 
and distributary levels. This allocation of authority and definition of rules fully determines 
how the main canal and the distributaries should be managed. There are no institutionalised 
platforms for joint rule-making, implementation and monitoring by farmers/water users and 
the Irrigation Department.3' 
In practice the Irrigation Department is incapable of exerting its legally defined dominance 
and does not succeed in distributing water according to the localisation pattern (see previous 
chapters). Users are able to treat irrigation water in the distributary canal network as a 
common pool resource. The basic feature of common pool resources that "exclusion is 
difficult, and yield is subtractable" is badly felt (see Orstom and Gardner, 1993:93).4) For 
the government management it is difficult to prevent (over)extraction of water from a system 
like the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal with open earthen canals spread over 240.000 
hectares. It simply provides too many opportunities for water users to interfere with main 
system management. 
The operational rules that actually govern water distribution at distributary level are not 
designed in formal arenas governed by constitutional and collective choice rules. They are 
crafted in the confrontation of government officials who try to implement localisation, head 
enders who guard their privileged access, and tailenders who attempt to relieve the scarcity 
they experience. Existing rules and other institutions are the emergent properties of these 
interactions. 
The analysis of this emergence below is a critical engagement with the work of Robert 
Wade and Priti Ramamurthy. They have done detailed work on actually existing forms of 
organisation in three canal irrigation systems very close to the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal 
(Wade, 1975, 1979, 1980a&b, 1982a&b, 1988a&b, 1990; Ramamurthy, 1988, 1989, 1995). 
The focus of their analysis is the forms of organisation found among water users, the nature 
of the irrigation bureaucracy, and the type of linkage that exists between the two. The focus 
21
 For discussion of the effort to make the Command Area Development Authority the paramount 
institution, see chapter 9. 
31
 In the Tungabhadra system there is a formal platform for discussion at system level in the form 
of the Irrigation Consultative Committee (ICC), but its role should be understood differently (see 
chapter 9). 
41
 The use of irrigation water for crop production implies its consumption. The water disappears 
from the system through evapotranspiration, percolation, seepage and drainage. The yield of the 
resource is thus subtractable. However, part of the canal water is re-used within the system after 
it has percolated and seeped into the groundwater aquifer and the natural drain. Lift irrigation and 
diversion by means of pick-up weirs and canals from natural drains is widespread in the 
Tungabhadra system. This water is partly used within the localised command, partly it extends 
irrigation beyond this. 
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of my analysis in this and the following two chapters is the same, but some of the main 
findings on these issues are different than Wade's and Ramamurthy's. 
The nature of the relationship between the farmers/water users and the Irrigation 
Department officials in main system management that the two authors present is captured in 
the following quotation. 
The central point is that farmers' uncertainty about water supply induces patterns of 
'hoarding' behaviour, which in turn induces a sense of frustration, alienation, and low 
morale among the irrigation staff, culminating in the 'syndrome of anarchy', a set of 
mutually reinforcing negative expectations on both sides of the farmer-irrigation staff 
relationship. (Wade, 1990:189)5) 
The situation is one of opposition and confrontation. The main mechanism that connects the 
two parties is that of bribe payments by farmers to officials in order to secure water supply 
(or, from the opposite perspective, the extortion of illegal payments from farmers by 
officials). Those farmers who have access to political networks can use the lobby of MLAs 
(Members of the Legislative Assembly) and other politicians to reduce the volume of bribe 
payments and exert more continuous pressure on the Irrigation Department. 
In these practices the existence of village-based 'common interest corporations' of farmers 
is very important. These undertake activities to secure and/or increase water supply to the 
outlets concerned, and organise the internal distribution of water, which involves the 
appointment of common irrigators. These organisations of water users emerge in response 
to certain degree of water scarcity and risk in irrigated agriculture.6' 
In the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal we have come across very few examples of 'common 
interest corporations', and none with a degree of organisation comparable to that described 
by Wade and Ramamurthy. The ones I did find were not village-based, but based on 
hydraulic units. I have found only one example of the appointment of common irrigators, and 
that for a few years only (see the discussion of distributary 93 in chapter 8). Incidental as 
well as routinised bribing is part of Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal water distribution, but it 
is not the main element of the farmers/officials relationship. Consequently, the political lobby 
through MLAs is not explicitly aimed at the reduction of bribe payments, but is mainly, as 
is also discussed by Wade and Ramamurthy, a proxy for an accountability relationship 
between farmers/water users and the Irrigation Department. 
The theoretical structure of Wade's and Ramamurthy's analysis is as follows. The 
officials' behaviour on the canals stands in the service of the overall rent-seeking activities 
of the state. Rent-seeking at the local (canal) level feeds that at higher levels, and this 
'system of administrative and political corruption' characterises the nature of the Indian state 
in general (see Wade's seminal paper on this; Wade, 1982a). Because the system also 
reproduces social differentiation in the farmers' communities, the economically and politically 
powerful members of the farming community seem to be happy, or see no other option, than 
to participate in the system (see Ramamurthy, 1995). There is only the occasional heroic 
irrigation engineer that tries to distribute water along different principles (Wade, 1980). 
Nothing seems to emerge from the daily struggle over water other than the reproduction of 
51
 As Wade points out, 'syndrome of anarchy' is originally Hart's term (see Hart, 1978). 
61
 The most stylised form of this ecological explanation of the occurrence of forms of collective 
action by water users can be found in Uphoff, Wickramasinghe and Wijayaratna (1990). Wade 
argues that in the cases he studied variations in risk and scarcity sufficiently explained the 
occurrence of the 'common interest corporations', but that for understanding the institutional form 
of these organisations, many other factors are relevant (Wade, 1988a:214). 
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this externally grounded schema of relations. It seems to be a stable configuration without 
history and evolution. 
In the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal the distributary level interface of water users and the 
Irrigation Department is not the barren battlefield that Wade and Ramamurthy sketch. 
Though a battlefield no doubt, the day-to-day interaction has generated other institutional 
forms for mediating the distribution of scarcity than the management-by-bribe-and-political-
lobby approach. In this chapter I show that the interaction of water users and Irrigation 
Department staff has resulted in the emergence of Irrigation Department managed but jointly 
controlled rotation schedules at distributary and subdistributary level. The rotation schedules 
and the way they are implemented can be interpreted as the institutionalisation of the balance 
of power between head end and tail end farmers, as well as that between water users and the 
Irrigation Department. The political lobbying activities of farmers should not only be seen 
as the pursuit of particular economic interests by political means, but as a set of structured 
practices they are also an important factor in the consolidation and reproduction of the 
rotation schedules. 
In the following three sections I present the evidence that supports these statements. In the 
concluding section I return to the main argument. 
7.2 ROTATION AT DISTRIBUTARY LEVEL 
For the Irrigation Department as well as the water users, the emergence of water scarcity in 
the distributary and subdistributaries created the need for managing the system rather than 
operating it.7) Farmers started to intervene in main system management on a large scale. 
Chambers classified farmers activities above the outlet in the following categories: fact-
finding, local negotiation, lobbying, appropriating, guarding, operating, and construction, 
capture and maintenance (Chambers, 1988). Farmers in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal 
undertook all of them.8' The Irrigation Department was confronted with damage to the 
canals and structures, with farmers who interfered with the tasks of the canal personnel, tail 
end farmers who complained that they did not get their due share of the water, and head end 
farmers who pressed the Irrigation Department to condone their over-appropriation. In many 
distributaries in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal there seems to have been a similar 
institutional response to these problems: the establishment of rotational systems of water 
distribution at the level of the distributary, and sometimes at subdistributary level.9' 
Rotation can accomplish several things. First, it can increase the efficiency of irrigation 
by concentrating the flow of water. This reduces canal seepage losses, and it can make field 
irrigation more efficient because a plot can be irrigated quicker (also see box 6.2). When 
introduced in a situation of continuous flow as in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal, rotation 
can spread water over a larger area, not only by efficiency gains in the canals, but also by 
71
 The factors that explain the emergence of scarcity were discussed in chapters 5 and 6. 
81
 In addition to fact finding, I also came across the phenomenon of person-finding. It happens that 
Irrigation Department officials make themselves scarce when they expect problems, like being 
locked up in their house by a group of farmers. Farmers may then sometimes sent out patrols to 
nearby towns and hotels to locate the concerned officer and force him to respond to the 
representation by the farmers. 
91
 A quick search in Irrigation Department files yielded written statements of rotation schedules for 
twenty mostly larger distributaries. 
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the reduction of the total volume of water supplied to the areas already irrigated. Lastly, 
rotation can make irrigation supply more predictable and reliable. 
This section contains detailed description of rotation schedules at the distributary level. We 
studied three distributaries, numbers 24, 93 and 97.10) Of the three distributaries, 
distributary 24 has the oldest and most elaborate rotation schedule. It is the main example 
in this section. The recent implementation of the rotation schedule in distributary 93 provides 
some insight in the process of the introduction of rotational water distribution. Distributary 
97 is one of the few larger distributaries where there is no distributary rotation in operation. 
Of the three distributaries it has the lowest actual water availability per unit area. This 
combined with the location of settlers and a town in the head reach of the command area (see 
chapter 5) seems to have prevented the introduction of a rotation schedule. 
The detail of the description in sections 7.2 and 7.3 illustrates the multitude and 
complexity of the factors that explain the emergence or non-emergence of particular forms 
of organisation in distributary management. The readers who prefer not to submerge 
themselves into these case stories are refered to the concluding paragraphs of each section, 
where the main findings are summarised. 
Rotation in distributary 24 
For distributary 24 the introduction of a distributary rotation system can be dated in the 
second half of the 1960s.11' The oldest Irrigation Department document that I found in 
which it is described is from 1969 or 1970.12) This document describes a rotation system 
which involves the closure of one or more subdistributaries plus pipe outlets directly taking 
water from the distributary, every day of the week. The rotation starts on Sunday at the head 
of the distributary, and ends with the tail end subdistributaries on Saturday (for the layout 
and rotation details see figure 7.1). More than twenty years later this rotation system is still 
in use. 
The effect of the distributary rotation system is that there is some supply to tail end 
subdistributaries and outlets during a few days per week. In figure 7.2 the mid-day daily 
water levels in the rabi season are given for different points along the canal. The 
measurement points are indicated in figure 7.1. It can be observed that the discharge into the 
distributary is relatively stable, but that the rotation system creates increasing variation going 
downstream. At the start of the third, tail end section of the distributary the ratio between 
the maximum and minimum water depth in the canal is 1.5/1. At the tail end outlet it is 5-
101
 In distributary 24 three months field work was done in the rabi season by Kees van Straaten 
(van Straaten, 1992). In distributary 97 three months fieldwork was done by Alex Bolding (Bolding, 
1992) in the same period. In distributary 97 no investigation of water distribution was done at the 
outlet command area level, and therefore this distributary was not discussed in chapter 6. 
111
 This follows from references to it in the files of the Distributary Irrigation Committee from that 
period. 
121
 One retired engineer told me that the introduction of this rotation schedule was preceded by a 
lot of discussion with the water users in the distributary. At one point the Irrigation Department 
proposed to introduce self-management of the distributary by a Distributary Committee, with the 
supply of a fixed discharge at the distributary head by the Irrigation Department. The Irrigation 
Department had also prepared a schedule for how this supply might be distributed. According to 
the engineer, the farmers accepted this proposal when it was discussed with them in a field 
meeting, but later rejected it. The engineer explained the rejection by stating that the Irrigation 
Department proposal was equivalent to giving a hungry man a piece of bread and asking him to 
share it with others. 
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Figure 7.1 : Rotation schedule in distributary 24 
CLOSURES: 
Sunday: 
Monday: 
Tuesday: 
Wednesday: 
Thursday: 
Friday: 
Saturday: 
Subdistributary D24/2 
DPOs 
Subdistributaries D24/3, 
D24/4, D24/5 and D24/6 
DPOs 
Subdistributary D24/7 
DPOs 
Subdistributary D24/8 
DPOs 
Subdistributary D24/9 
and D24/10 
DPOs 
Subdistributary D24/11 
Subdistributary D24/12 
DPOs = Direct Pipe Outlets (outlets 
that take water directly from the 
distributary canal) 
Source: File Division office 1992 
In the rotation schedule published 
around 1970 subdistributaries D24/11 
and D24/12 were closed on Friday and 
the tailend pipe outlets on Saturday. 
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10/0, that is infinite, because the supply regularly dries up completely.13' 
There is considerable regularity in the variation of water levels during the week. At the 
start of the third section of the distributary (D24/III) the water level is low on Wednesday 
to Saturday, when the closures in the rotation schedule are downstream of this point. From 
Sunday to Tuesday when the rotation-closures are upstream, the water levels are higher. At 
the tail end the water level is zero or very low on Friday and Saturday, the days that D24/11 
and D24/12 should be closed and all upstream subdistributaries are open. When one or more 
131
 The variation in discharges is even more pronounced because Q (discharge) relates to water 
depth3'2 (approximately). 
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of the upstream subdistributaries are closed, water does reach the tail end. Wednesday and 
Thursday, when the subdistributries immediately upstream of D24/11 and D24/12 are closed, 
are the best days, though the pattern is irregular. 
The variations in the water level at the head of D24/9 also show a regular pattern. The 
days after the weekly closure on Thursday, the inflows are low. The closures in the rotation 
schedule are downstream of the D24/9 offtake on Friday and Saturday. When the rotation 
restarts on Sunday at the head of distributary 24 the discharge into D24/9 starts to build up. 
The closer the closure is to D24/9, the higher the discharge into D24/9. Monday, Tuesday 
and Wednesday are the 'good days'. These days are crucial for irrigation in the tail end 
outlets of D24/9.I4) 
The distributary 24 rotation system is not a rigorously implemented schema, but a resource 
called upon when necessary. During the season, the strictness of its implementation depended 
on the acuteness of water distribution problems. During relatively calm periods, the Irrigation 
Department allowed a degree of tampering with outlet gates by farmers, at night (by the 
absence of night patrols) but also during the day. The Irrigation Department staff regularly 
violated the official schedule itself to solve local problems in distribution, like increased 
demand for transplanting and ploughing, or requests for a last irrigation before the canal 
closed. Because of variation in the local conditions, the schedule may be used more in one 
season than another. Over the years, the rotation system was reintroduced many times. In 
times of water crises the schedule is formally declared, by notifications, to be in operation 
(again), and efforts are made to implement it more rigorously than in the period before the 
notification. 
The rotation system in use in distributary 24 can also be interpreted as the maximum that 
headenders will allow to accommodate tailenders. This follows from the failure to introduce 
more rigorous schedules. In the second half of the 1980s several efforts were made by the 
Irrigation Department to implement a rotation schedule that would push more water to the 
141
 Subdistributary D24/9, like the distributary 24 tail end outlet, benefits mostly from closure 
closely upstream, and less of closures further upstream, because extra discharge in the main 
distributary as an effect of the closure of subdistributary and pipe outlet gates, is consumed close 
to the point where it is generated. This is because the downstream gate settings are not adjusted 
downwards in order to spread the extra discharge over the full canal length proportionally. The 
pipes of pipe outlets and subdistributary offtakes are put on bed level, and therefore do not behave 
proportionally: the percentage increase in discharge through the pipe is more than the percentage 
increase in the canal. It would also be very difficult to implement such a practice of fine tuning of 
gate settings. Water levels can substantially vary within a single day, and pipe outlets are non-
modular structures, which also makes them sensitive to changing water levels in the outlet canal 
(see chapter 8). However, a 'rough tuning' response to varying water levels does exist. For 
example, normally the D24/9 offtake gate is raised 11 or 12 inches. On Friday and Saturday, the 
days with low supply in the distributary at the D24/9 offtake point, the gangman puts the gates 
of the D24/9 offtake at 9 inches opening. This reduces supply into D24/9 and increases supply to 
the area downstream of it. On the other hand, in the peak demand period at the end of the season, 
late March and early April, the gangman, under farmers pressure, raised the gate to 13 inches, even 
14 inches on one day, and skipped the Thursday closure on 9 April. 'Rough tuning' is thus not a 
strictly implemented rule. (For those who study figure 7.2 closely, the absence of Thursday closure 
of subdistributary D24/9 at the end of April and in May is caused by abundant supply: the rice 
harvest had started.) 
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tail by closing subdistributaries for two days per week instead of one.'5> In March 1989, 
at the height of a water crisis (see chapter 9), the Irrigation Department ordered a rotation 
in distributary 24 that divised the distributary in two parts, each receiving water half of the 
week. The Irrigation Department also tried to implement this in the following 1989-90 
irrigation year. In July 1989 the Mandal Pradhanl6) wrote a letter to the Assistant 
Executive Engineer in charge of distributary 24 saying that "if the POs are closed as 
specified in the notification, it is going to create a lot of problems to the farmers. Because 
of this reason, it is better to follow the old system of closing POs (...) rather than this new 
system. We request you to consider this matter." This consideration did not take long. Ten 
days later the Assiatant Executive Engineer wrote to his superior, the Executive Engineer, 
that "if we follow the [new] rotation system farmers will be getting water once in 8 to 10 
days, as such ayacut farmers are opposing it. (...) it is not possible to introduce the new 
rotation system, instead of it the old rotation system will be followed". After these failed 
efforts to implement rotation with longer closure periods, a new Section Officer came and 
adopted a different strategy (see section 7.4, example 3).17) 
Rotation in distributary 93 
In distributary 93 rotation at distributary level was first introduced in the early years of the 
canal when demand for irrigation water was so low that it was decided to supply the outlets 
along the main distributary for one week and along the subdistributaries the other week (see 
figure 8.9 for a map). When migrant farmers settled in the canal command, from 1978-79, 
this was one of the first things they tried to change. They represented to the Irrigation 
Department without success, and consequently mobilised support from a local MLA. At a 
cost of 8000 Rupees a ceremony was organised to which important officials from the 
Revenue, Agricultural and Irrigation Departments, functionaries from the banking sector, and 
village leaders from ten surrounding villages, were invited. The local MLA laid the 
foundation stone for the main camp on the distributary. During the ceremony the water 
facilities for this new camp were discussed, as well as the number of pipe outlets, both of 
which the settlers wanted improved. After 1981, the founders of the camp reported, water 
supply was continuous. One of them observed that "money is the only thing that matters to 
get the work 18) 
'
5I
 I found references to proposed changes in the distributary 24 rotation system starting from 
kharif 1985. In August 1985 the Irrigation Department ordered the introduction of rotation in 
subdistributaries in the third section of distributary 24. In January 1986 a system was notified in 
which each subdistributary is closed two days per week. This was repeated in August 1987 and 
in late 1988 and early 1989. It seems unlikely that implementation was very successful. Farmers 
made no reference to it in their accounts of changes in water distribution in distributary 24. 
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 The Mandal Pradhan is the chairman of the Mandal Panchayat, which is the elected body one 
level below the District Council [Zilla Parishad). The Mandal Panchayat covers a number of villages. 
These bodies were introduced under the 'Karnataka Zilla Parishads, Taluk Panchayat Samithis, 
Mandal Panchayats and Nyaya Panchayats Act 1983' in an effort to decentralise decision making 
on (rural) development. 
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 There is a difference between notifications issued by the Irrigation Department that try to resolve 
real crises in the field, and notifications that are issued because 'higher authorities' have given 
orders to do so. In December 1989 another notification was issued for the 50/50 rotation after 
pressure from the Command Area Development Authority, which seems to have had no impact at 
all. 
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 The MLA later became a cabinet minister, and was instrumental in the sanction of the 
construction of roads and electricity lines to the main camp on distributary 93. 
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Box 7.1: Water distribution and legal action in distributary 93 
Just outside the main camp on distributary 93 there was a large pipe outlet of which farmers 
constantly raised the gate to take extra water. As nothing had helped to reduce this, the 
Section Officer decided on a different strategy: to bring the offenders to court and get them 
convicted. Knowing how difficult court cases could be won by the Irrigation Department, he 
made certain arrangements. One necessity was to catch the gate-raisers red-handed, and a 
second to have independent witnesses. Through the gangman he got word that farmers were 
preparing to demolish the gate. On that particular night, he went to the camp close by, 
socialised with farmers, and let himself be given food and drink, to avoid suspicion and 
mislead the offenders. He had earlier asked some farmers from a tail end village to go into 
hiding not far from the concerned outlet. Some time after dark, farmers came to raise the 
gate and 'remodel' the outlet. When the Section Officer heard noises indicating that this 
business was going on, he went to the spot and the witnesses came forward. The Section 
Officer could now book the case. However, went he went to the local Sub-Inspector of 
Police, this person refused to register the case. After the incident on the canal, some farmers 
from the camp had immediately gone to the Sub-Inspector and convinced him, by means I can 
only guess at, not to accept the case. The Section Officer responded by addressing his 
Executive Engineer and through him the Superintending Engineer. The Superintending 
Engineer supported his departmental staff and went to talk with the Police Inspector, who 
consequently instructed his subordinate to register the case after all. This all happened within 
24 hours, because the law prescibes that cases have to be be registered within this period. 
After 2-3 years the offenders were convicted, and had to pay a Rs.200 penalty. 
The increasing gap between supply and demand led to the introduction of a new rotation 
system in distributary 93 during the 1980s. When exactly this happened is not fully certain. 
The Section Officer in charge of distributary 93 in 1989-90 stated that he newly introduced 
rotation in that year. In order to be able to introduce a rotation schedule the management 
routines that had emerged since rice cultivation had started to expand, had to be undermined. 
The middle reach rice farmers of distributary 93 had maintained their generous water 
supply throughout the 1980s by 'maintaining' the canal officials. There was a systematic 
practice of collecting money on a per acre basis for this purpose. A 'management committee' 
of trusted farmers was formed to organise this.19) The newly appointed Section Officer for 
distributary 93 tried to enforce a more equitable water distribution pattern. He designed a 
rotation system, supervised his field staff closely, was on the canal a lot, and confronted 
farmers who interfered. He also mobilised the law, legal procedures and the police, to 
enforce water distribution. An example of one such a confrontation is given in Box 7.1. The 
example illustrates the perseverance and clever manoeuvring of this officer, the difficulty but 
possibility to change existing distribution patterns, and also it is a lesson in how to construct 
a winnable court case.20' 
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 This is one of the two examples of organised bribe payments that I could identify in the areas 
studied. The other was situated in subdistributary D24/10 and involved the collection of money in 
emergency situations only. It had also been superseded by other management routines (see section 
7.3). 
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 The case described is based on interviews with the concerned Section Officer, and the 
documents of the court case. I could not verify all details by interviews with farmers. 
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The Section Officer through these actions and his refusal to take bribes (he threatened to 
pursue those who offered them) was able to establish a rotation schedule in the 
distributary.21' In this rotation the distributary was divided in two parts which received 
water for 3 days each. The border was located just upstream of the main camp on 
distributary 93 in the middle of the rice cultivation area.22) The seventh day, Sunday, the 
canal was closed. Whether it was fully implemented as planned I do not know, but heroic 
stories are told by tail end as well as head end farmers on the efforts of this officer to 
implement the system. "He was not afraid of anyone" is what was said with admiration. The 
system must have had some effect because tailenders tried to prevent his transfer, but without 
success.23' 
In August 1991 a different rotation system was notified. In this rotation there were three 
sections instead of the earlier two. The first section stretched from the main canal till 
approximately the start of the middle reach rice area, the second section from this point till 
the end of this rice area, and the third section included the remainder of the canal (see figure 
8.9 for a map). The rotation consisted of closure of the first section from Sunday evening 
to Wednesday morning (2V4 days), and the second section from Wednesday morning to 
Friday evening (2'/2 days). From Friday evening to Saturday evening there was no closure. 
The major advantage for the middle reach rice farmers of this rotation as compared to the 
earlier one was that on all days of the week (except of course the day that de distributary as 
a whole was closed) water was passing in the distributary canal past the middle reach outlets. 
This created the possibility to draw water at any time required, while in the earlier system 
part of the distributary canal in the middle reach was dry for half of the week. The change 
to the new three-section rotation can thus be interpreted as a concession to the middle reach 
rice farmers. 
The implementation of this rotation schedule during 1991-92 was not very strict. This was 
partly due to the timely rainfall at the start of the year, and partly because the Section Officer 
of distributary 93 took very little interest in water management. As a result field staff got 
little support in implementing the rotation. Figure 7.3 shows that in the rabi season in 1991-
92 the intake of Bhatta outlet command area, which is located in the second section, was 
never closed fully in the Wednesday to Friday rotation period (also see chapter 6). The same 
was true for other pipe outlet commands in the second section, and also the pipe outlet 
commands in the first section during their rotational closure. The gate opening was reduced 
to one or two inches on the 'closure' days, but the gates were never fully shut. 
There was a day and night rhythm as well. The gate readings given in figure 7.3 are from 
12 p.m.. We also took a reading early morning before the gangman arrived. On most days 
in February and March, the peak period, we found the gate opened 6 or 7 inches in the 
morning. The gangman then came and reduced it to 4 inches, at which level it was kept 
during the day. When we drove along the canal around 6 p.m., after the gangman had 
returned home, we frequently observed farmers sitting on outlets to manipulate gates. 
2,1
 It is noticeable that the middle reach farmers were unable to prevent this despite their political 
connections. One possible explanation is that after roughly 10 years they were not yet sufficiently 
embedded in local politics, and that their distributary was relatively small and not a central area in 
a constituency (see also section 7.4). 
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 I leave aside the details of the rotation schedule in the subdistributaries. 
231
 It seems that this officer's ability as a trouble shooter was also noted by his superiors and he 
was posted in comparable problematic situations in other distributaries in the years after his 
transfer from distributary 93. 
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Also visible in figure 7.3 is that the 
water level in the distributary at Bhatta 
outlet was generally higher in the three 
days before the canal closure than the 
three days after it. This means that the 
partial closure of the outlets in the second 
section raised the water level and 
increased the supply to the third, tail end 
section. When tailenders talked about the 
rotation they said that they could get 
water during three days a week. These 
were the days of the second section's 
partial closure. The Irrigation Department 
concentrated the little bit of night 
guarding that it did in the rabi 1992 
season to enforce the rotation more 
strictly, also in these three days. 
That the rotation was not very strictly 
implemented is also shown by the actions 
that a large farmer from a tail end village 
found necessary to undertake to get water 
to his lands. When this large farmer 
wanted to irrigate his lands he employed 
6 labourers to guard the canal and he 
himself guarded the distributary gate at 
the main canal. These interventions were 
prepared with representations to the 
Irrigation Department. Reportedly, the 
labourers sometimes carried axes while 
guarding the canal. 
Main findings 
The main findings of this section are the 
following. 
1) Water scarcity induces the 
emergence of rotation schedules. They 
are used in many distributaries in the 
Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal, from head 
to tail. However, very low water 
availability combined with other factors 
may make them unfeasible. 
2) Rotation schedules are the 
outcome of local negotiation between 
different groups of farmers and the 
Irrigation Department. It seems to be the 
Irrigation Department that usually 
articulates the exact time schedule; the 
feasibility of this shows in its use. The 
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introduction of rotation and its reproduction over time is not easily achieved. It requires 
repeated and concerted action from farmers as well as Irrigation Department staff, and may 
involve the mobilisation of political influence and the law. Its monitoring involves guarding 
activities of both the Irrigation Department and farmers. The rotation schedules are thus 
jointly controlled. 
3) Rotation does not accomplish equality in water distribution but does push some water 
to the tail end areas. Rotation schedules can be interpreted as the expression of the power 
balance between head enders and tail enders. 
4) Rotation creates a regular variation of water availability, that is, it increases the 
reliability of supply. 
5) The management style of the Irrigation Department officer responsible for distributary 
management is an important variable in the implementation of rotation schedules. 
6) Rotation schedules are an institutional resource that is drawn upon when needed. 
7.3 SUBDISTRIBUTARY ROTATION 
In this section I discuss subdistributary rotation in distributary 24. This distributary has in 
total eleven subdistributaries that provide an interestingly diverse pattern of forms of 
organisation (see figure 7.1 for the layout of the distributary system).24> 
In distributary 24 the subdistributary rotations are partially formalised and implemented 
by the Irrigation Department, and partly they are farmer controlled. Also, rotation is not 
practised in all subdistributary canals. The reasons for these and other differences are 
explored below.25' 
Farmer controlled rotation: D24/10, D24/11 and D24/12 
The most complex subdistributary rotation schedule, combined with rotation within the outlet 
command area, was found in D24/11. The details of this were already given in chapter 6, 
box 6.2. 
In a neighbouring subdistributary, D24/12, with six pipe outlets like D24/11, farmers had 
not been able to come to an agreement on rotational water distribution. The farmers of the 
two head end pipe outlet command areas had refused to participate in a rotation system 
proposed by the tail end farmers. Because of the location of the head end pipe outlet 
structures, literally on the doorstep of people's houses in the middle of a camp, the tailenders 
could do very little about this refusal.26' 
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 The two subdistributaries in distributary 93 do not add to this analysis. Distributary 97 has no 
rotation at all, as explained above. 
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 The descriptions given below are based on interviews with farmers, and not on direct 
observation of rotation practices. Only in subdistributary D24/9 systematic observation was done. 
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 The D24/12 tailenders stated that since 1985 they operated their own rotation. The rotation 
concerned 4 outlet command areas, located in pairs (one outlet on each side of the canal). The two 
pairs were alternately closed for 24 hours. These outlets no longer had gates. Water was led 
around the structure rather than through it because the pipe could not take the full subdistributary 
supply. Gangmen were not active on this canal in 1991-92 and the Saturday closure of this most 
downstream subdistributary was not effectuated. Within the pipe outlets distribution was done on 
a one hour per acre basis in the tail end four outlets, and one hour and three quarters per acre in 
the upper two. Farmers in the upstream outlets claimed that this time-based rotation in the outlets 
had been in operation for more than 10 years. 
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The major difference between D24/11 and D24/12 is the settlement pattern. In D24/11 
farmers now living in a camp in the head end of the subdistributary originally settled in the 
tail, and moved when water became scarcer. Many farmers have their land spread along the 
distributary. The settlers who lived in the head end of D24/12 have always lived there and 
have their land concentrated in the head end of the subdistributary. The four tail end outlets 
were mainly cultivated by farmers from a tail end village.27' 
Another factor that may explain the difference between D24/11 and D24/12 is the greater 
length and higher design duty of D24/12 (see table 7.1), and its location further downstream 
along the distributary. D24/12 farmers also claim that the sill level in their subdistributary 
offtake was too high, but the Irrigation Department denied this. 
Table 7 . 1 : Characteristics of D24 subdistributaries 
Subdistributary 
number"' 
24/2 
24/3 
24/4 
24/5 
24/6 
24/7 
24/8 
24/9 
24/10 
24/11 
24/12 
Length 
(meters) 
7656 
915 
1007 
2654 
3721 
4270 
2898 
3965 
2989 
1525 
2244 
Design discharge 
(cusecs) 
30.36 
4.84 
6.90 
12.70 
8.59 
25.67 
14.64 
20.46 
4.16 
6.44 
9.38 
Localised 
area (acres) 
3547 
189 
914 
535 
969 
2012 
1506 
1285 
996 
424 
758 
117 
39 
89 
42 
112 
78 
103 
63 
240 
66 
81 
Overall duty 
(acres/cusec) 
(high) 
(very low) 
(medium) 
(very low) 
(high) 
(medium) 
(medium) 
(low) 
(very high) 
(low) 
(medium) 
a) Subdistributary 24/1 does not exist 
Sources: data mainly some from the Section Officer's notebook, assuming that these are the 
figures actually worked with). Lengths of canals were checked with command area maps. 
Localisation and design discharges were checked with the localisation boards on the canals, and 
with the 1969-70 rotation schedule. There were inconsistencies. 
D24/10 also had a beheaded form of rotational water distribution, but with a different 
history. Before 1985 the whole distributary was involved in rotation. All pipe outlet pipes 
were 9 inches in diameter. Downstream farmers often came to block the upstream pipes with 
stones. The stones were put inside the pipes and were difficult to remove. The head end 
farmers represented to the Irrigation Department, which decided to decrease the pipe 
diameters of the upper 4 pipe outlets to 6 inches and leave the downstream 4 pipe outlets at 
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 In both the D24/11 and D24/12 cases the head end pipe outlets are cultivated by both settler 
and local farmers. There is no simple local/settler division in access to water. However the 
settlement pattern does influence the possibilities for the implementation of rotational distribution 
in the subdistributary. 
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9 inches.28' From that moment the four upstream pipe outlets were out of the rotation. 
Since then rotation is practised in the downstream half only. Every pipe outlet there receives 
water on two consecutive days, one pipe outlet at a time. This means that three out of four 
pipe outlets receive water every week and that the days on which a particular pipe outlet 
receives water rotate in a cycle of 4 weeks. In at least one of the pipe outlets irrigation is 
organised on a one hour per acre basis. There is no longer a gangman active on the canal. 
He would hardly have any possibility to regulate gates also. Of the four pipe outlets in the 
upper half two had their gates removed. The lower four pipe outlets were completely 
demolished. The design duty found for this subdistributary (see table 7.1) is extremely high, 
and make the water distribution problem technically understandable. The reasons for this high 
duty are unknown. 
Other management routines than rotation: D24/8 and D24/9 
In subdistributaries D24/8 and D24/9 there is no rotation over pipe outlets. Rotation 
schedules for these two subdistributaries are appended to the 1969-70 document that specified 
the distributary 24 rotation system, but were, according to farmers, never implemented. In 
the second half of the 1980s several efforts were made by the Irrigation Department to 
introduce rotation in these subdistributaries, but without success. 
Two main factors explain the absence of rotation, a technical and a socio-political one. 
The technical factor is that the two subdistributaries have been designed for almost 100% rice 
and sugarcane localisation in the case of D24/9, and roughly 50% in the case of D24/8. The 
tail end of the D24/8 command in 1991-92 was irrigated by a lift irrigation scheme, which 
relieved scarcity conditions. This implies that the subdistributary canals can carry sufficient 
water for irrigation of rice and sugarcane in most of their commands. 
The socio-political factor is that these two subdistributaries are part of the original core 
area of settlement. The political weight that farmers from these subdistributaries carry was 
considerable, because of their numbers, and through the economic power and social and 
political networks built over the years.29' 
The political weight of the water users ensured that water kept reaching these 
subdistributaries; the design characteristics made sure that it can flow through the canal. 
The management routine that did exist in D24/9 was the following.30' In the 
subdistributary Irrigation Department gangmen are active and the outlet structures were in 
a reasonable state. For each outlet the gangman had set a 'normal' gate opening, which was 
acceptable to headenders and brought some water to the tail. The gate opening was expressed 
in threads, counted on the rod along which the gate is lowered and raised. The threads visible 
when the gate is fully closed were painted white. The gate opening could quickly be 
determined by counting the unpainted threads that were visible. The number of threads that 
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 In 1985 there was a pipe outlet remodelling programme in many subdistributaries. 
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 The data on which this statement is based is quite diverse. It includes interviews on the history 
of settlement and water distribution with different actors, information on the commission agents 
and rice traders community, information on political networks, and accounts of interactions 
between these farmers, the Irrigation Department and the local MLA. One example of the latter is 
discussed below in example 3 in section 7.4. It were the leading farmers from subdistributary 
D24/9 whom the Section Officer chose to mobilise when he needed support to solve a problem 
with head end farmers. 
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 My interview data suggest that it was the same in subdistributary D24/8. 
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is 'normal' for a particular outlet was not a calculated number, but based on experience.3" 
The routine consisted of the gangman's judgement of the water level in the canal and his 
decision whether he would put the gate at normal level, or squeeze the supply into the outlet 
a bit. He never raised the gate above its normal position on his own initiative. In this way 
the gangman tried to maintain a stable, though unequal, distribution of water in the 
subdistributary. 
This routine worked during the day, but every morning when the gangman came on duty 
he had to correct a number of gates back to their normal position. Farmers changed the gate 
openings during the night after the gangman went off duty.32) The canal was the farmers' 
domain at night. Then farmers who needed to irrigate traveled up and down the canal to 
check the upstream gates, or to obstruct them to increase the supply to their own fields. This 
guarding and manipulation work was done by the farmer-irrigator himself, a family member, 
or in case of some rich peasants, by a labourer. Upstream farmers sometimes guarded their 
outlets by sleeping on it, or by employing people to do so. Most of the manipulation and 
guarding activities took place between sunset and midnight.33' 
The guarding and manipulation activity was mostly a matter of individual farmers or very 
small groups, who in water stress periods might act jointly in larger numbers. However, a 
more organised form was put into operation in times of high water stress. The five tail end 
outlets of subdistributary D24/9 since many years had an association that undertook activities 
to safeguard the water supply. One of these activities was the employment of night guards 
in difficult periods, to check upstream gates and eventually obstruct them. The money for 
the wages of these employees was collected on a per acre basis from the water users. A few 
years before we did our fieldwork the Irrigation Department had started to pay for these tail 
end night guards. In subdistributary D24/9 the Section Officer handed the money to the 
chairman of the five outlets committee, who employed and payed the workers.34' For the 
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 For outlets on the main distributary of D24 calculations had been made by the Section Officer 
to determine the gate opening needed for the design discharge. These calculations bear little 
relation to the real situation because the head between main distributary and field channel was 
standardly assumed to be one foot, which is an arbitrary value. The meaning of these pseudo-
calculations was more their strategic value in negotiations with water users on discharge into the 
outlet. The Section Officer could, and did, argue that a particular opening was what farmers in an 
outlet were allowed to get, scientifically derived from the localisation pattern, which has legal 
force. Farmers were unable to check the calculations. 
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 Farmers manipulated gates by means of copied keys. Some gates were in a state that lifting 
could be done by hand. There was gate manipulation during the day as well, but much less so than 
during the night. During daytime a person is quite exposed and the adjustment of other people's 
gates a risky matter. During the day farmers generally asked the gangman to raise the gate if they 
needed more water. Sometimes the gangman obliged and sometimes he didn't, depending on the 
situation on the canal and his relation with the concerned farmer. Gangmen sometimes received 
small payments for changes made in the gate settings. However, gangmen generally found it 
difficult to refuse requests of influential farmers even without payment. The social status of 
gangmen was low. Often they had worked as agricultural labourers before. Gangmen who had 
worked on the canal for a long time had sometimes developed good arguing skills to use against 
requests for favours. 
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 An amusing example of this at distributary level is that middle reach farmers in distributary 24 
made sure that their gates weren't blocked just after midnight. This was the time when tailenders 
returned home from the cinema, on the way blocking a few gates. 
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 The five-outlets-committee had office bearers and held regular meetings where the accounts 
were checked and activities were planned. This is the only example of such a stable and well 
(continued...) 
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Irrigation Department it was attractive to work through intermediaries because it was easier 
than direct employment. The latter created selection and control problems. For the local 
leader it was interesting because it created new patron-client relationships. To be an 
intermediary is a form of social capital accumulation. The Irrigation Department-paid night 
guards were not allowed to adjust gates, but had to report interference to the gangman when 
he came on duty in the morning. The turnover of management responsibilities to water users 
was thus partial. 
Irrigation Department managed rotation: D24/2, D24/6 and D24/7 
In three other subdistributaries with (part of) their command area in the core area of 
settlement and agricultural intensification, D24/2, D24/6 and D24/7, internal rotation systems 
implemented by Irrigation Department gangmen were in operation. There were a number of 
differences between these three subdistributaries and other subdistributaries. 
Subdistributaries D24/2 and D24/6 were not designed for 100% sugarcane and rice, but 
the localised area includes a substantial part of light crops.3i) The discharge capacity per 
unit area of command is thus relatively small (or the duty high) compared to D24/8 and 
D24/9.36) D24/7 has a bifurcation point in the head end, and in fact consists of two canals. 
This complicated water control. D24/2 and D24/7 are long canals with vested interests in the 
tail and middle reaches. That is where the original land development and settlement took 
place, and these powerful farmers have a strong interest in distributary rotation. 
The reason that the Irrigation Department plays a role in this rotation, in contrast to 
D24/10, D24/11 and D24/12, may be hypothesised to lie in two factors. First, the water 
supply into D24/2, D24/6 and D24/7 apart from being relatively higher is also much stabler 
than that into D24/10 and particularly D24/11 and D24/12. This was due to the more 
upstream location of D24/4, D24/6 and D24/7. Secondly, the length of the subdistributaries 
increased the number of water users and the number of villages and camps they came from. 
This may make farmer controlled rotation more difficult to establish. 
These factors together make the existence of subdistributary rotation managed by the 
Irrigation Department more likely in these three subdistributaries than in the others37', 
because there is bothe the need and the possibility for (from the farmers' perspective) 
external management. 
"'(...continued) 
structured form of tail end organisation that I have heard about in the distributary 24 command 
area. There might be more however, because they are easily overlooked. Farmers do not quickly 
reveal their existence to outsiders, possibly because of the occasional bribing that their activities 
involve. The Irrigation Department officers seemed only to know (about) the leaders of the 
organisation. 
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 D24/7 was designed for almost 100% sugarcane. This may still give capacity problems when 
a lot of rice is cultivated, and canal maintenance is poor. Unlike D24/8 it had no large lift irrigation 
scheme in the tail end. 
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 D24/6 passes along a piece of unlocalised command, and therefore prospects for unauthorised 
irrigation are good. There is thus more demand (and a higher duty) than table 7.1 suggests. It 
should be noted that discharge capacity is a relevant factor only when the subdistributary is in a 
position where it can potentially draw full design discharge. This is not the case for D24/11 and 
D24/12. 
371
 This prudent formulation is deliberate because a fully convincing explanation would require more 
information, to be gathered through intensive fieldwork. Straightforward correlations do not exist. 
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No rotation and no Irrigation Department presence: D24/3, D24/4 and D24/5 
Subdistributaries D24/3, D24/4 and D24/5 had no internal rotation systems in 1991-92, and 
no or very low Irrigation Department management presence along the subdistributary. 
Subdistributary D24/4 is in principle a similar case to D24/6 (it also has great possibilities 
for unauthorised irrigation). However, this was a subdistributary with severe water supply 
problems. The explanation for this may be the difficult location of the subdistributary outlet 
in a curve in the canal, and with a drop structure downstream of it that was regularly 
demolished by downstream farmers. Therefore supply into the canal was low, leading to 
severe internal distribution problems. Irrigation Department staff was chased away when it 
tried to enter into this subdistributary (see example No.3 in section 7.4). 
Subdistributaries D24/3 and D24/5 provide yet another situation. These two canals have 
exceptionally low design duties, that do not correspond with the localised cropping pattern. 
The absence of water distribution problems (and organised rotation) is therefore not 
surprising.38' In the 1969-70 rotation document lower design discharges are found than at 
present in the Section Officer's notebook. Influential settler farmers cultivated land in these 
subdistributaries, which are located very closely to a camp (D24/5 takes off in the camp). 
I can only assume that this influence got translated into a low design duty to legitimise higher 
releases into these subdistributaries. 
Main findings 
At first sight, the clustered presentation of the different management situations in the 
different subdistributaries perhaps suggests that there is a straightforward relationship 
between location on the distributary and management practices in the subdistributary. Except 
for subdistributary D24/2 the discussion moves from the tail end to the head end. The 
locational factor is certainly of importance, but on closer look it becomes clear that there are 
a large number of factors that influence and explain the existing forms of organisation. 
The material presented above suggests that the following factors are important for the 
explanation of the nature of the water distribution routines at subdistributary level. 
- The settlement pattern. 
- The design capacity of the canal/overall duty for the command area. 
- The social power of farmers to bring water to the subdistributary. 
- The degree of water scarcity. 
- The opportunities for expansion of irrigation outside the localised area. 
- The length of the canal as it influences the number of farmers and villages/camps. 
- The hydraulic conditions at the subdistributary offtake. 
- The bifurcation pattern of the subdistributary. 
- The stability of water supply into the subdistributary. 
The discussion of these factors above has shown that they are not independent but 
interrelated, that not all factors are relevant in all cases, and that a factor may have a 
different meaning in different situations. 
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 Gangmen were not active on these two canals, and pipe outlets were demolished. However, the 
latter should in this case not be interpreted as a sign of water scarcity, but exactly the opposite. 
There was so little water scarcity that the structures themselves were not important. 
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7.4 LEGISLATORS IN DISTRIBUTARY WATER MANAGEMENT 
The main actors in the responses to water scarcity described above are farmers and Irrigation 
Department officials. A third actor is important: the politicians. All elected members of 
governmental bodies come under this heading. For water distribution in the Tungabhadra Left 
Bank Canal the MLA, the Member of the Legislative Assembly, the State parliament, is of 
particular importance. 
Constituencies, commands and resource broking 
India has a constituency based parliamentary system. Each member of parliament thus has 
a clearly defined base area. Some of these are part of irrigation systems, covering head end 
areas, tail end areas, or parts of both. For the purpose of this analysis the basic point about 
Indian MLAs is that they are resource brokers (see chapter 3 for discussion and explanation). 
Irrigation water is a resource provided by the state with development objectives, but it is 
not a development programme in the same way as for example a government housing 
scheme. Its benefits cannot be handed out at special occasions where the good deeds and 
ideas of the MLA and his/her political party can be commemorated, like for example can be 
done at the public distribution of sites for houses to former untouchables. The distribution 
of irrigation water is a continuous and spatially dispersed activity, for which a functional 
organisation, the Irrigation Department, bears day-to-day responsibility. MLAs can - thus -
influence water distribution only by influencing the behaviour of Irrigation Department 
officials. 
The mechanism that enables an MLA to do this, is his/her influence on the transfer of 
government officials. Chief Ministers and Ministers 'delegate' their legal decision making 
power with regard to transfers of members of the government administration to MLAs in 
exchange for support of these MLAs of the Cabinet in the Assembly (de Zwart, 1992). Wade 
summarises the importance of transfer determination by MLAs by stating that "[t]ransfer is 
the politician's basic weapon of control over the bureaucracy, and thus the lever of surplus 
extraction from the clients of the bureaucracy" (Wade, 1982a:319). De Zwart adds to this 
monetary objective the argument that frequent transfers are a method for politicians to avoid 
competition in 'resource broking' by government officials, who are also (potential) 
'gatekeepers' for state resources (de Zwart, 1992:5-6). There is difference of opinion on the 
degree to which political determination of transfers is systemic and institutionalised, and 
involves monetary transactions, but there seems very little doubt that it exists in most places 
at least in some degree.39' 
From the perspective of the farmer/water user, influencing water supply through the MLA 
or another politician is a deviation. A shorter institutional route is to exert pressure on the 
Irrigation Department directly. This is indeed very commonly done, and different methods 
are used for it, as indicated above. These methods come into existence because there are 
virtually no formal accountability mechanisms between water users and Irrigation Department 
391
 Wade (1985) may be read to suggest that political determination is ubiquitous and highly 
institutionalised. De Zwart (1992) has found, studying several departments in Gujarat, that routine 
transfers are very common, and political determination and the attendant system of payments for 
posts only found in part of the cases. De Zwart further shows that the possibilities for government 
servants to resist 'arbitrary' transfers are very limited. One of the few avenues open to them is 
legal action. As the objectives of transfer policy are very vaguely described, it is very difficult to 
win such cases, even when one can afford the costs of litigation. 
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managers. The irrigation bureaucracy is designed on a 'management by prescription' model 
(see also chapter 9). The absence of such accountability mechanisms makes the exertion of 
direct pressure a cumbersome affair. One reason for this is that it has to be repeated 
continuously. Farmers therefore regularly resort to an indirect method to influence Irrigation 
Department behaviour: lobby their MLA to secure water supply. Farmers explained to me 
that this method gave a bigger chance of longer lasting success, and was cheaper.40' There 
is an accountability feed back loop in political lobby in which the initiative lies on the 
farmers' side: the threat not to re-elect the MLA. 
I do not claim that this set of relationships exists in all parts of all irrigation systems, or 
even in all distributaries in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal. Its occurrence depends on a 
number of factors.41' Firstly, as already indicated, irrigation water should be an important 
resource in the MLA's constituency. Many voters in the constituency must depend on canal 
irrigated agriculture. In the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal rice and sugarcane farming, 
trading and processing were the backbone of the local economy in distributary 24. In 
distributaries 93 and 97 a much smaller part of the command area is irrigated, and with less 
remunerative crops. In those cases a politician's vote base may not be primarily related to 
irrigation. 
Secondly, a lot depends on the geographical intersection of constituencies and command 
areas of canals. In the case of distributary 24, the downstream/tail end half was part of one 
constituency, and the upstream/head end half of another. This created a situation in which 
the downstream/tail end MLA had a relatively clear interest to defend, even when there were 
inequalities in distribution within the command area in his constituency. Distributary 93 was 
literally on the margin of a constituency, had a relatively small area of rice cultivation and 
therefore fewer (influential) people. According to farmers MLAs showed their faces only at 
election time. 
A third factor is the political history of the constituency cum command. In distributary 24 
some villages had very good connections with the MLA, others much less so. This had to 
do with their relative economic and electoral 'weight', and changes in that over time, but also 
with the availability of strong local leaders and other contingent factors. The type of political 
networks through which political support and influence can be mobilised are very important, 
and these are locally specific.42' 
In summary, the Indian administrative system provides few possibilities for water users 
to hold Irrigation Department canal officials directly accountable for the performance of their 
duties towards them. Under certain conditions farmers can use the avenue of political lobby 
as one of the few ways to institutionalise such an accountability relationship. Farmers can 
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 This confirms Wade's analysis (Wade, 1980a:366). One farmer leader from the tail end of 
distributary 24 told us that paying bribes was something that their fathers did, but they had 
different methods. 
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 The basic condition that the resource should be scarce is fulfilled by design. Also see Wade 
(1980a:370-371) on the conditions under which politicians may involve themselves in water 
distribution. 
421
 One of the weaknesses of our research is that we have not documented the details of the social 
and political networks of the MLAs and the parties they belong to. Boss' work on the right bank 
suggests that different political configurations may also exist, for example with a prominent role 
of leaders of the Karnataka State Farmers Movement (KRRS) rather than MLAs (Boss, 1998). He 
also makes reference to the importance in canal management of the political agents of the different 
political leaders. More research on these local socio-political networks and practices would be of 
strategic importance for any intervention programme. 
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exchange their electoral support for the MLA's influence on Irrigation Department officials. 
In this relation the possibility to default lies on the farmers' side. The exertion of this 
influence allows the MLA to reproduce his/her base for re-election. (S)he can exert influence 
on the bureaucracy through the transfer system. Irrigation Department canal managers have 
very few resources to act as equal partners in this triangle, though they are not as helpless, 
and as innocent, as they often portray themselves to be. 
Three examples 
Three examples of interactions that occurred on distributary 24 are given to show the role 
an MLA can play in water management. The three examples are ordered in a sequence of 
increasing complexity of the interaction. 
Example No. 1 
One good morning my assistant and I were driving up the distributary to do some shopping in the 
local market, when we passed a pipe outlet where there was a lot of commotion. Some gangmen 
and a large group of farmers were fiercely arguing. We stopped and we heard that the farmers had 
refused to allow the Irrigation Department gangman on duty to close the gate of the pipe outlet. 
As it was Wednesday, this pipe outlet had to be closed, Wednesday being the one-day-a-week 
closure day for this pipe outlet in the distributary rotation system. Furthermore, the farmers had 
raised the sill level of the canal drop immediately downstream of the pipe outlet to increase the 
discharge through the pipe. They claimed the sill of the drop was damaged and at too low a level. 
One of the gangmen had already phoned the Section Officer and told him to come immediately, as 
there was a crisis situation. This was exactly what had been the farmers' intention. They had 
already prepared a place to sit in the shade of a tree, and had instructed the local tea-shop owner 
to brew K-tea, that is extra good quality tea. When the Section Officer came he was, after some 
initial discussion, seated under the tree, and given tea. A written petition, prepared and signed by 
all farmers the previous evening was presented to him. The farmers' problem was that insufficient 
water was flowing into the pipe outlet. They argued that the pipe level of the pipe outlet was too 
high relative to the bed level of the canal. The Section Officer argued back that they were 
cultivating rice instead of the authorised sugarcane, and that they therefore were in perpetual need 
of more water. After a long discussion the Section Officer agreed to leave the pipe outlet gate open 
this Wednesday under the condition that they would remove the stones in the drop. He told the 
farmers to bring the petition to his office the following day. He guessed that farmers would be 
satisfied with one extra day of water, and would not actually come to his office the next day. He 
was right. 
0 = Irrigation Department Officials 1 = pressure and request 
P = Politician 2 = water 
F = Farmers 
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That the Section Officer came to the field so quickly is unusual. Usually farmers have to travel to 
the Division office first and present their case there. In this case however it was different. Most 
of the land in this pipe outlet was owned by a former well known MLA and MP (member of 
parliament at national level), who had leased out part of his land to a number of smaller farmers. 
The manager of the rest of his land was the person who spoke on behalf of the farmers in the 
discussion with the Section Officer. As one gangman said: "the Section Officer should take care 
with this pipe outlet". The role of the politician in this case was one in the background, but still 
clearly felt. The interaction is summarised in the figure on the previous page. 
Example No. 2 
The second example is the standard type of interaction that took place. In one of the tail end 
subdistributaries the usual pattern of water supply was that three days in a week there would be 
'good water' and three days 'poor water', while the subdistributary was closed one day per week 
as part of the distributary rotation system. In the course of the dry rabi season the water levels on 
the good days, Monday to Wednesday, were going down. Farmers of five pipe outlets at the tail 
end of the subdistributary organised a tail end association many years back. The leaders of this 
association went to the Irrigation Department office to talk to the Section Officer. Also small 
amounts were paid to the gangmen of the subdistributary, for which money had been collected on 
a per acre basis. Several visits were made to the Division office, but the situation did not improve. 
The farmers decided to go to their MLA and one good morning a tractor full of farmers, plus the 
leaders on motorbikes, travelled to the MLA's house in the local town, where they explained their 
case. They also took the opportunity to complain about the irregularity of the bus service to the 
village. The MLA settled this on the spot by summoning the depot manager of the bus corporation 
to his verandah, and instructing him to be more punctual. As the Irrigation Department office was 
some distance away from the town, the MLA could not summon the concerned Irrigation 
Department officials, and the farmers requested for a field inspection. A few days later the MLA 
plus Irrigation Department officials appeared on the canal to inspect the site. The Executive 
Engineer, head of the Division, had also come. A long discussion of the three parties followed and 
finally the MLA instructed the officials to release the water as per schedule. The Executive Engineer 
was courageous enough to protest. He said: "but Sir, how can I release water to tail enders when 
at the same time you send me slips with instructions to release water to head enders?" To this the 
MLA replied: "only work according to the approved schedule, ignore the slips, even if they come 
from me." For some time the water situation improved. To summarise: 
0 = Irrigation Department Officials 
P = Politician 
F = Farmers 
1 = request and pressure (fails) 
2 = complaint 
3 = instruction 
4 = water 
Example No. 3 
One of the head end subdistributaries, D24/4, was designed for the irrigation of light crops. 
However, a lot of rice was grown in the head end of this subdistributary, and a considerable tail 
end problem therefore existed in the subdistributary. Furthermore, the gate of the subdistributary 
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was situated in a bend of the canal in a very unfavourable position. The drop downstream of the 
gate had been destroyed by farmers from lower reaches, which further reduced the discharge into 
the subdistributary offtake. One good night the tail end farmers of this head end subdistributary 
destroyed the subdistributary gate. As a result a lot more water entered the subdistributary. The 
Irrigation Department booked a case against the farmers for damaging government property, but 
the police took no action. The Irrigation Department tried to close the gate partially to reduce the 
flow, but farmers guarding the gate chased the officials away by throwing stones. The canal road 
was located on the other side of the canal than the subdistributary offtake, which was therefore 
difficult to reach for Irrigation Department officials. The Section Officer realised he would not be 
able to do something to change the situation on his own, and thought of another plan. He decided 
to approach the leaders of the distributary tail end farmers, who were suffering because of the 
lower supplies, and to ask them to go to the MLA to complain about lack of water, and ask the 
MLA to put pressure on the head end farmers. "When the Irrigation Department calls a meeting 
farmers won't listen, but when the MLA calls it, it is different", is how he explained his strategy. 
The tail end farmers went to the MLA to complain about the water shortage, and explained the 
cause of it. The MLA realised the seriousness of the situation, also after having collected additional 
information from the Section Officer. The MLA took immediate action. A number of people were 
arrested by the police and put behind bars. The MLA left to the State capital on other business for 
two days. The families of the arrested people got very nervous, and on the return of the MLA 
prayed him to release their kin. The MLA consequently organised a meeting in the village. The 
village was actually just outside his constituency, but he commanded some respect there. Apart 
from MLA he was also the owner of a ricemill and a fertiliser shop. The farmers of this village took 
fertiliser on credit and also borrowed money from his fertiliser shop. In the meeting the MLA 
promised to release the people from the police cells, if the village promised to allow the Irrigation 
Department to repair the gate and reduce the inflow into the subdistributary. The villagers accepted 
this. The MLA then instructed the Irrigation Department officials to do the work and release water 
to the tail end subdistributaries. To summarise: 
0 = Irrigation Department Officials 
P = Politician 
FHEAD = Head End Farmers D24 
FTAI, = Tail End Farmers D24 
1 = ID official tries to reduce discharge (fails) 
2 = ID official goes to distributary tailenders 
3 = complaint and request of tailenders D24 
4 = pressure 
5 = instruction 
6 = water 
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Conclusion: a triangle of accommodation 
Which interpretation of the role of MLAs in water distribution do these three examples 
suggest? 
The examples show the large power of the MLA in his constituency. Rather than its 
representative he seems to be its ruler. Administrative officers are at his call and at his 
command. The verandah of his house is the locale where the grievances of the general public 
are listened to. The MLA actively engages in the day-to-day problems of administration and 
resource distribution, including water distribution in the canal in his constituency. The third 
example suggests the close relationship between his politico-administrative and his economic 
power. In that case the MLA used his economic power directly as a resource in his operation 
as a politician. 
It is in the nature of the job of MLA however to have to please as many voters as 
possible. Because of this the MLA may be caught in contradictions. The example of the slips 
that he issued for water releases, illustrates this. But he can get away with the the Kafka-
esque answer "ignore the slips even if they come from me". As a gangman later observed 
privately, "he never said he would stop writing slips". 
Irrigation Department officials speak of politicians often as being terrible nuisances coming 
from a different sphere, making 'scientific water management' impossible. In practice their 
relationship may be more complex. The Section Officer in example No.3 had good relations 
with the MLA, built up over a period of 10 years, working in this region in different 
capacities.43' He used this relation to his advantage in his water management work. He had 
to be very careful with this. In the department he risked to be accused by others, particularly 
superior officers, of partiality. He had to be very careful with his relationship with the MLA 
because he played the game of resource broking himself, and might be seen by the MLA as 
a competitor.44' 
In a more general sense the three examples, and particularly the third, show the more 
systematic role that an MLA can, under particular circumstances, play in the mediation of 
different interests within the command area of a distributary. The fact that an elected 
politician's vote bank necessarily consists of different groups with different interests means 
that he cannot simply defend a particular interest, but that the contradictions refered to above 
are systemic. MLAs can react differently to this situation. They can evade and avoid the 
problems in water distribution, and concentrate on less controversial things. However, when 
irrigation is important in a constituency this attitude is not likely to be feasible. The MLA 
in distributary 24 in 1991-92 seems to have done more than the least risky option, which is 
to only control conflicts that threaten to escalate. In implicit or explicit collusion with the 
Section Officer of the distributary an effort was made to improve water management in that 
canal.45' 
It should be noted that the margins for improvement are limited. As another MLA in the 
Tungabhadra command area said to us in an interview "no politician who thinks of his career 
can ignore the interest of rice farmers." Also in distributary 24 no fundamental relocation 
431
 He was a native from the adjacent district and therefore wanted to stay posted in this region. 
His relative 'localness' may have helped him in building networks and judging situations. 
441
 This confirms Wade's observation that party factionalism has not penetrated the bureaucracy 
in a substantial degree (see Wade, 1980a: 372). 
451
 I do not know whether the cooperation of the MLA and the Section Officer was a joint strategy. 
I suspect it was mostly implicit, regarding the risks involved, and looking at the course of events 
in example No.3. 
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of water took place; unequal water distribution kept on being reproduced. However, the 
margin that seems to have been used is the efficiency gains that are possible by means of 
better organised management. 
The Section Officer was first appointed for the third, tail end section, but he also took 
over the second, middle reach section of distributary 24 when the Section Officer of this 
section was transfered. The central element of this officer's approach was to consequently 
enforce rotation, but to be accommodating to farmers who really wanted extra water at 
particular moments. To cut down water use in the middle reach and increase supply to the 
tail reach he reduced the discharge into subdistributaries and pipe outlets on the main 
distributary. But, he let some farmers take extra water for a limited period when this could 
not be avoided, and squeeze the supply at places where he knew water was not short at the 
same moment. In this way he avoided escalation of conflicts.46' 
This style of management required detailed knowledge of the situation along the canal. 
The Section Officer introduced a monitoring system alongside the routine two-hourly 
registration of water levels during the day by the gauge reader. The gauge book kept by the 
gauge reader came to the Subdivision Irrigation Department compound only rarely, because 
the gauge reader lived in a village 15 km away from this compound. Instead, the Section 
Officer arranged that he received slips of paper with the water levels at different points along 
the distributary written on them, early every morning. These were brought to him by the 
night patrol crew. He had also appointed a special person to collect and bring him this data 
during the day. He could therefore signal problems immediately, without having to be on the 
canal continuously. 
Another institutional change he effected was the transfer of gangmen in the middle reach 
that were responsible for subdistributary gate settings. He replaced them by young gangmen 
with insecure jobs, who were - therefore - prepared to take risks in confronting farmers 
wanting to raise the gates. The transfers also upset existing patterns of bribe payments of 
farmers to gangmen. 
It is difficult to be sure about the practical effects of the Section Officer's management 
style. A comparison of the distributary cropping pattern figures of the period before his 
tenure (pre-1989) and the period of his tenure up to the end of our fieldwork in 1991-92, 
shows that in the period that this Section Officer was active on the canal the total area 
irrigated and the area cultivated with rice and sugarcane increased substantially (see table 
7.2). When I wrote the first draft of this chapter I concluded that the Section Officer's style 
of management had probably increased the efficiency of water use considerably.47' It was 
unlikely that the discharge into the distributary had been increased; maximisation of 
withdrawals had been the practice for a long time.48' 
However, at the finalisation of the chapter this interpretation was put into serious doubt. 
Cropping pattern data up to and including 1996-97 had become available to me. After the 
Section Officer's transfer in 1993, the area cultivated with rice and the total area irrigated 
continued to increase (see table 7.2). 
461
 Once during the 1991-92 season this strategy encountered the limits of available water, and he 
decided to raise the gate of the distributary at the main canal to let extra water into the 
distributary. 
47!
 Even at this stage the conclusion was a prudent one. Favourable rains also helped, certainly in 
1991-92, as well as a large lift irrigation system that came into operation. 
481
 For the unreliability of distributary discharge figures, see chapter 9. 
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Table 7.2: Cropping pattern in distributary 24 from 1966-67 to 1996-97 
Year 
1966-67 
1967-68 
1968-69 
1969-70 
1970-71 
1971-72 
1972-73 
1973-74 
1974-75 
1975-76 
1976-77 
1977-78 
1978-79 
1979-80 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1980-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
Rice (acres) 
13416 
Not available 
16152 
16791 
16751 
13400 
9743 
10791 
10454 
13308 
15055 
Not available 
10492 
11985 
12902 
13005 
11872 
15240 
16687 
12116 
16415 
Not available 
18308 
15864 
20508 
21985 
25806 
28011 
29652 
30991 
34897 
Sugarcane 
(acres) 
478 
969 
1142 
602 
581 
988 
1451 
2464 
2315 
2948 
2444 
2392 
3164 
3427 
2767 
1810 
1387 
551 
732 
2978 
1321 
1722 
3511 
1488 
2352 
1455 
1832 
976 
Rice and 
sugarcane 
(acres) 
13894 
17121 
17933 
17353 
13981 
10731 
11242 
12918 
15623 
18003 
12936 
14377 
16066 
16432 
14639 
17050 
18074 
12667 
17147 
21286 
17185 
22230 
25496 
27294 
30363 
31107 
32823 
35871 
Total 
irrigated 
(acres) 
18053 
22845 
22148 
23766 
20192 
19202 
21413 
23042 
21241 
25824 
20376 
19862 
19044 
19516 
18192 
21068 
23117 
22514 
23369 
28595 
28515 
28998 
31317 
34327 
34362 
36388 
36871 
39785 
Rice and 
sugarcane as a 
% of total 
77 
75 
81 
73 
69 
56 
53 
56 
74 
70 
63 
72 
84 
84 
80 
81 
78 
56 
73 
74 
60 
77 
81 
80 
88 
85 
89 
90 
Source: Demand lists for distributary 24 (Irrigation Department) 
Furthermore, a similar increase in rice and total area that started around 1988-89, after 
a long more or less stable period, could also be observed in the cropping pattern data of 
other distributaries, and at the level of the Left Bank Canal as a whole.4" At the same time 
the total drawals from the Tungabhadra reservoir remained constant or reduced (see table 
9.2). 
I do not have an explanation for this extraordinary phenomenon. It may have been caused 
by a system-wide increase in the efficiency of water use, but I have no other indications that 
this has occurred. Perhaps more likely is the explanation that the increases in figures reflect 
an improvement of the registration of actual crops cultivated (a reduction of underreported 
491
 This can be concluded from data collected by R. Doraiswamy in 1997, which is not reproduced 
here. 
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rice for example). Whatever may be the background, it prevents a firm conclusion on the 
effects of the change in management style in distributary 24 in the early 1990s. 
The evidence for the positive effects of the Section Officer's managerial efforts is 
therefore only qualitative in nature. Farmers, in 1991-92, were of the opinion that due to the 
new approach to water management the situation on the distributary had greatly improved. 
According to farmers there was less need for guarding at distributary level and less 
violence50>, bribing practices had disappeared as far as water distribution was concerned, 
there was less need to make representations to the Irrigation Department office51', and the 
irrigated area had increased. We ourselves observed that in the 1992 rabi season the daytime 
water levels in the third section of the distributary canal were maintained during the night. 
When the Section Officer came up for transfer, farmers lobbied for the continuation of his 
tenure, and this was supported by the MLA.52) 
What I conclude from this case study is that politics and the involvement of politicians is 
not something that is necessarily detrimental to the quality of water distribution, and should 
be seen as undesirable interference. This is the common position of Irrigation Department 
staff, and Wade's and Ramamurthy's work may also be read in this way. This case shows 
that, even under extremely difficult circumstances like that in the Tungabhadra Left Bank 
Canal, political configurations may be possible which exhibit constructive features. A 
management style based on strategic (political) manoeuvring may be more effective than 
prescriptive and administrative styles. The triangle of leading farmers, politicians and 
government officials is a true 'triangle of accommodation' (Migdal, 1988), in which neither 
of the three parties fully has the upper hand, and which therefore leaves room to manoeuvre. 
7.5 CONCLUSION 
All four chapters on water distribution are designed to illustrate the book's two central 
theoretical premisses: 1) that water control can be usefully analysed as the political 
contestation of resource use, and 2) that water control is multi-dimensional. The second 
premiss will only be fully clear for the distributary level at the end of chapter 8. The first 
premiss requires, I hope, no further argument after the description and analysis of the events 
above. 
In this concluding section I limit myself to the more specific conclusions that can be drawn 
from the chapter. In section 7.1 I mentioned that the argument of this chapter was a critical 
engagement with Wade's and Ramamurthy's work. I structure the concluding section 
accordingly. 
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 Stories of extreme conflict include examples in which farmers put a circle of straw around 
Irrigation Department jeeps, with officers in them, and threatened to put the straw on fire, or 
farmers who threatened to drink a bottle of pesticides when water supply into their canal was 
reduced. Also organised raids to the head end of the distributary by Irrigation Department jeeps 
together with groups of tail end farmers in tractors were part of water distribution practice. 
511
 A farmer in the one before last pipe outlet on the distributary canal told us that trips to the 
Irrigation Department office had not taken place since the officer was appointed. Water was 
coming he said. 
521
 In order not to make too much of a hero of this Section Officer, the following information is 
interesting. We were told that several years later while he worked in a different area, he seems to 
have overplayed his hand and was suspended on a corruption case (in relation to construction and 
maintenance funds). 
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Scarcity 
Wade and others have convincingly argued that water scarcity is a major inducing factor in 
the emergence of collective action of water users in water distribution. This chapter supports 
that conclusion, and generalises it to forms of organisation in water distribution, of which 
Wade's 'common interest corporations' are one example. However, the chapter has also 
raised a number of questions regarding Wade's conceptualisation of scarcity. 
I have argued that scarcity is a historically, spatially, socially, and we could add here, 
technologically, constructed phenomenon. The forms of organisation that occur in response 
to scarcity in their turn influence its characteristics. Scarcity is thus both cause and 
consequence of organisation, and not a (fully) independent explanatory variable. 
Wade's operationalisation of the degree of scarcity is a very straightforward one: relative 
location on the canal. The discussion above shows that in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal 
this operationalisation is not very workable. For example, when the subdistributaries along 
distributary 24 would be taken as the parallel of Wade's villages along the canal, it is clear 
that location is not related to the forms of organisation in these subdistributaries in an 
immediately transparent way. A second factor that influences scarcity is the design capacity 
of the subdistributary in relation to its command area (the overall duty). But even these two 
factors together do not give a straightforward empirical regularity in the forms of 
organisation. Scarcity means different things in different subdistributaries, and the design of 
a single indicator for it would in my view be both impossible and undesirable. Only when 
we understand the different dimensions of scarcity we may understand, for a particular 
locality, which forms of organisation scarcity has induced. Put differently: in contrast to what 
Wade argues, also the occurrence of particular forms of organisation requires a multi-factor 
explanation, and not only their form. 
Villages 
The organisation of water distribution in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal is canal-based, 
not village-based. This is evident for the rotation schedules, but it also applies to the 
examples of water users organisations that were found. 
In the systems studied by Wade and Ramamurthy each village is supplied by one or more 
separate water courses. In the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal distributaries, subdistributaries 
and outlets cross-cut village boundaries in an arbitrary manner.53' The differently designed 
systems are located in different States, but why this has resulted in these design differences 
is unclear (also see chapter 4). 
Furthermore, the creation of the canal system has changed the social landscape radically 
in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal. Camps were built by settlers along the canals and 
roads. Camps are located in the territory of villages, and in that sense are part of them, but 
are in important respects independent social entities.54' Often camps belong to several 
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 In the case of outlets this is less so, because these are small units and have a fair chance of fully 
falling within the territory of one village. Furthermore, the physical boundaries of outlets, 
particularly natural drains are sometimes also the village boundaries. But D24/9 is a case where the 
subdistributary was constructed parallel to a village boundary at 160 meter distance. It roughly cut 
the outlets in half, which implied that all pipe outlet command areas on one side of the canal had 
farmers from two villages. 
541
 These differences are clear even to the casual visitor: houses, the language, food and clothing 
are all different. There is virtually no inter-marriage between the settlers and the original inhabitants 
of the area. 
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villages because the ridges on which the canals and the camps are located, are frequently 
village boundaries. The main camp on distributary 93 lies in the territory of five different 
villages. The largest camp on distributary 24 has acquired village status itself and has been 
allocated territory that first belonged to surrounding villages. In both distributary 24 and 
distributary 93 some villagers had changed, or were contemplating to change, their place of 
residence from the village to a place along the canal close to their irrigated fields. The advent 
of irrigation has caused considerable fluidity in the definition of 'the village' as a social and 
territorial unit. In such a situation it is perhaps not surprising that the canal (section) is the 
unit of organisation rather than the settlement unit (village or camp).55> 
The farmers/Irrigation Department interface 
My main argument with Wade and Ramamurthy however is the picture they sketch of the 
relationship between irrigators and the Irrigation Department in main system management. 
The discussion of the rotation schedules at distributary and subdistributary level has served 
to illustrate that in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal locally negotiated and jointly controlled 
forms of organisation have emerged which seem to have created more predictable, and 
perhaps more efficient patterns of water distribution than in the systems studied by Wade and 
Ramamurthy. In the systems they studied the relation of Irrigation Department staff and 
water users is one of constant confrontation, with bribes and political pressure as the main 
intermediaries. In the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal a lot of the turmoil on the canals and 
in the offices is related to the implementation of a set of rules on rotational distribution that 
is considered legitimate by (large parts) of all parties concerned. 
This also implies that the role of politicians in water distribution should be slightly 
differently evaluated. In Wade's and Ramamurthy's work the evaluation of the role of MLAs 
is largely negative. It is part of the 'syndrome of anarchy' on the canals. Although it is 
evident that the access to political influence is highly skewed and is a means by which local 
elites reproduce their dominance in Migdal's 'triangle of accommodation', I still have a more 
positive interpretation of politicians' enrolment in water distribution. Through the mechanism 
of political lobby rich peasants56' create an accountability relationship between the Irrigation 
Department and themselves, a relation that is otherwise absent. This I suggest is one of the 
stabilising factors for forms of organisation like rotation schedules that have a potential to 
distribute water more efficiently, and in principle also more equitably. 
The evaluation of the role of politicians in water distribution just presented points to a 
larger issue. When it is acknowledged that water distribution is an inherently political 
process, and that the distribution of scarcity requires political mediation, the question arises 
how this political mediation can and should be organised. This involves addressing questions 
like: who has access to the political process, and on which terms, how are different interests 
balanced, and which institutions and negotiation procedures are required for this? It leads to 
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 The situation is, of course, complex. In some cases canals or outlets are mainly or only occupied 
by either villagers or settlers. But, even in such a situation it would not be fully correct to suggest 
that the village or camp is the unit of organisation. At the same time, social relations in villages and 
in camps do play a role in water distribution. 
561
 When I discuss the role of 'farmers' and 'water users' at distributary level in this chapter, these 
are the rich peasants (see chapter 5 and 6) from different localities who compete for water. They 
do this for their own benefit, but also on behalf of, and by mobilising the support of, the farmers 
in their locality. 
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a position which says that the basic issue in changing existing water distribution patterns and 
practices is that of democracy (for further discussion see chapter 10). 
8 
POINTS OF CONTACT 
Outlets as the contested linkage of water users and the state1' 
[TJhere is probably no single item in the design of an irrigation system which has a 
greater effect on the distribution of water than the type and design of an outlet. (...) 
[T]he outlet is the point of contact between the Canal Administration and the 
cultivators. It is here that the cultivators receive their supply of water, and any 
alteration in the size or type of an outlet, even if it does not affect its discharge, is at 
once a cause for suspicion and consequently a source of misunderstanding between the 
public and the Administration. There have been cases of prolonged controversies 
between the Administration and the cultivators when the remodelling of outlets was 
taken up individually or collectively over a long reach of a channel. At times, 
considerable capital is made out of these controversies by interested political parties, 
with considerable loss both to the cultivator and the public revenues. (Mahbub and 
Gulhati, 1951:4) 
This chapter begins with a tribute to a very special book. To my knowledge Mahbub and 
Gulhati's volume is the only book that not only lists India's (once) existing irrigation outlet 
structures, but also discusses their history. In irrigation textbooks this 'mundane artefact' 
(Latour, 1992) normally gets scarce treatment relative to the importance Mahbub and Gulhati 
- in my view rightly - attribute to it. The main focus in the textbooks are the more 
spectacular works like dams, aqueducts and major canals. The book, written by two senior 
irrigation engineers, is also special in that it does not take a patronising attitude towards the 
'uneducated farmer', who so often figures in accounts of irrigation management. Instead, the 
authors in the Preface express the hope that farmers may use their book to verify whether 
they receive their due share of irrigation supply. 
In the preceding chapter on water distribution at distributary level, the technical irrigation 
infrastructure did play a role, but was not discussed in detail. It was shown that the 
distributary canals, and particularly the division and regulation structures on them, are an 
important site of social interaction for water distribution. It was also made clear that the 
design and construction characteristics of these devices give rise to particular forms of social 
activity, and that the structures are materially transformed in the process. This chapter 
11
 Sections 8.2 and 8.3 were published in an earlier version written with Alex Bolding (Mollinga and 
Bolding, 1996; also see Bolding, 1992). Kees van Straaten contributed to section 8.1 (see van 
Straaten, 1992 and Bolding, Mollinga, and van Straaten, 1995). 
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further explores the technical dimension of water distribution. It focuses on the outlet 
structure. 
Outlet structures, or outlets, are the technical devices through which water is released 
from the distributary canal system into the field channels of the outlet command areas. They 
are the material connection of the farmers' domain of water management in the outlet 
command area, and the - contested - Irrigation Department's domain of main system 
management. Farmers try to secure and increase water supply through the outlets by means 
of activities 'above the outlet' (Chambers, 1988), and/or by physically remodelling the outlet 
structure itself. This chapter discusses the technical diversity that exists among outlet 
structures as a result of these adaptations by farmers and the Irrigation Department engineers' 
responses to them. 
Design and construction characteristics of outlets are interpreted in this chapter as the 
outcome of a negotiation process between different categories of water users and government 
engineers, and as an expression of the balance of forces among these groups. The technical 
characteristics of the outlets are the product of evolving water distribution practices, and at 
the same time structure, that is, constrain and enable, these practices. The analysis illustrates 
the importance of the space and time coordinates of social interaction to understand its 
causes, characteristics and effects. It adds to this the relevance of the way human behaviour 
is materialised in artefacts. In terms of water control the chapter investigates the manner in 
which different actors try to give material shape to the control mechanisms that they try to 
establish. 
The theme of the chapter is treated in two ways. In the first part of the chapter the history 
of outlet structures in Indian canal irrigation development is sketched in two sections. In 
section 8.1 three responses to the emergence of control problems in water distribution in the 
19th century are outlined: water distribution through the invisible hand of the market, by 
rotational water distribution, and by legal-administrative prescription of cropping patterns 
(localisation). The outlet technology that belongs to each of these three responses is 
discussed. In section 8.2 the reasons for the continued use of pipe outlets in South India's 
protective irrigation systems are investigated. 
The second part of the chapter focuses on pipe outlets in the Tungabhadra Left Bank 
Canal, again in two sections. In section 8.3 two examples are given of the spatial distribution 
of different types of pipe outlet structures, along subdistributary D24/9 and distributary 93. 
It is shown that the technical characteristics of the pipe outlets vary systematically with 
different water management situations in different parts of the command area of these canals. 
In section 8.4 the subject is the process of the adaptation of pipe outlet design and 
construction. This adaptation is a response to changes in water availability, and to the -
related - evolution of the patterns of interaction between water users and government 
officials. The example discussed is distributary 97, a tail end distributary. 
In the concluding section 8.5 the relation between design, construction and water control 
is recapitulated, and some conclusions are drawn on the relation between the state, farmers 
and technological change. 
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8.1 OUTLETS IN INDIAN IRRIGATION HISTORY 
From construction to (lack of) control 
From the beginning the British faced control problems of various kinds in the canal irrigation 
systems that they started to construct in the 19th century. One of these problems was the 
control of water distribution.2' With the act of the construction of a canal came the issue of 
the allocation and distribution of the newly available water. In the beginning of canal 
irrigation development, the engineers concentrated their efforts on the head works at the point 
of diversion of water from the river, and on the main canal. "The construction, operation, 
and management of the actual water distribution system was, by default, placed in the hands 
of the irrigating community." (Stone, 1984:196) This concentration of effort had to do with 
the lack of skills, experience and resources of the engineers3', but also with the principle 
of British colonial rule to interfere as little as possible with processes at the local level. 
Initially, cultivators were allowed to make cuts in the banks of the canals to bring water 
to their fields. This had the disadvantage of a very limited spread of irrigation water. 
Irrigation was concentrated close to the main canal, and waterlogging problems started to 
occur. To spread the use of irrigation water, and consequently increase revenues and 
protection against famine, the network of canals was gradually expanded by the addition of 
branches, distributaries, subdistributaries, minors and watercourses to the system. Also, the 
system to let out water from the canals was changed. The maintenance-prone cuts were 
replaced by earthenware pipes (called colabas in North India). These were the first pipe 
outlets. In the second half of the 19th century the pipe outlet was the outlet structure used 
all over India (for an example, see figure 8.1).4) 
The introduction of pipes contributed to the improvement of the maintenance of canals, 
but they were hardly a device to control water distribution in a quantitative sense. 
Hydraulically, the pipe outlet is a non-modular structure. This means that discharge depends 
on both the upstream and downstream canal water level.5' The discharge also depends on 
the diameter of the pipe, but this is not related to (non-)modularity. This makes the pipe 
outlet highly unsuitable as a regulation or rationing device. In North India canal water levels 
fluctuated considerably. The canals diverted water directly from rivers with discharges that 
21
 Other problems were the control of waterlogging, salinity and the malaria effects of canal 
irrigation (for discussion see Whitcombe, 1972, 1983; Stone, 1984:134-157). 
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 Technically the construction of the canals initially was very much a trial and error process. The 
British did not have a lot of experience to build on, as the scale of the irrigation systems that were 
contemplated was unsurpassed. Engineers were sent on study tours to Southern Europe by the 
East India Company and the Government of India to document experience with irrigation in Italy, 
France and Spain (Baird Smith, 1852; Scott Moncrieff, 1868). But the technologies and procedures 
employed there were not directly transferable to the Indian context. To what extent the British 
learnt from existing Indian irrigation technology is not clear. 
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 All design drawings of North Indian pipe outlet structures that I have seen show gated structures. 
The gates in figure 8.1 are of the open/close type, and do not allow regulation of the discharge into 
the pipe. Buckley (1905) also contains a drawing of pipe outlets in Bengal which do have movable 
gates and can be fixed at different levels/pipe openings. 
51
 For explanation of the differences between modular, semi-modular and non-modular structures 
see for example Mahbub and Gulhati (1951), and -in summary- below. The condition of non-
modularity of pipe outlet structures applies under conditions of submergence, which is common in 
Indian systems. What in practice also occurs is a situation in between full submergence and free 
flow, which is hydraulically even more complicated. For discussion see Hoogeveen (1991) and 
Bolding (1992:100-105). 
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Figure 8 .1: Pipe outlets for village channels in the United Provinces 
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Source: Buckley (1905:296) 
vary with changes in snowmelt and rainfall. Furthermore, there were no cross regulators in 
the canals to stabilise water levels with varying discharges. It is therefore difficult to 
determine the driving head of a pipe outlet, because it changes frequently. Also pipe outlets 
require individual calibration, and because the discharge coefficient in the discharge formula 
of pipe outlets6' varies with different water levels and heads, calibration is very complicated 
indeed. These hydraulic characteristics were poorly understood in the 19th century. The 
relation between pipe diameter, canal water levels, discharge and irrigable area were based 
on practical experience, rather than insight in the physical processes involved. Improvements 
could be made in site selection when contour maps of the command area started to be made 
61
 The discharge formula is Q = Cd.A.(2gH)\ with Q is discharge, Cd is the discharge coefficient, 
A the cross section of the pipe, and H the driving head (difference between upstream and 
downstream water level). 
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in the 1890s (Mahbub and Gulhati, 1951:24), but the distribution and rationing of water by 
means of pipe outlets remained a very approximate affair.7) 
There were three different responses to the limitations of the technical control of water 
distribution by means of pipe outlets.8' The first was the effort to employ the market 
mechanism for the efficient distribution of water. This required devices for volumetric water 
supply in order to be able to introduce volumetric pricing of irrigation water. Efforts to 
develop modular outlets for this purpose were undertaken. The second response was to 
introduce rotational systems of water distribution with proportional distribution of surpluses 
and shortages occurring during the season, over all water users. This required a semi-
modular outlet structure. The third response was legal-administrative control of water 
distribution by prescription of cropping patterns as in localisation (see chapter 3). For each 
of the three responses I discuss the outlet technology associated with it.9) 
Response 1: The invisible hand 
In line with the economic theory and ideology in vogue, the British in the 19th century first 
tried to use the price mechanism for better distribution of irrigation water. With prices 
regulating water distribution, the invisible hand of the market would do the work, and no 
direct government intervention at the local/field level would be required. In an initial 
application of this principle in North India, the British sold the colabas to local people at 
prices set to recover the cost of construction of the distribution network. They hoped 'local 
enterprise' would do the rest of the work of spreading the water economically. What 
happened instead was the creation of durable property rights to the water supply, which was 
put to speculative use by the locally powerful who had bought the colabas. These owners 
extracted sometimes exorbitant rents from cultivators who depended on the water that came 
through the colaba (Stone, 1984:196-199). 
Another experiment to employ the price mechanism for water distribution took place also 
in North India, in the 1850s. Some engineers believed that economy of water use could only 
be effected through charging by volume. In 1855 an experiment was done with an adapted 
version of the Modulo Magistrate, investigated by Baird Smith on a study tour to Italy for 
the East India Company (Baird Smith, 1852:26-57; see figure 8.2). The device was supposed 
to be able to give constant discharge with varying water levels in the parent canal.10) In 
71
 The technical trajectory of the North Indian colaba pipe outlet in the 19th century was from the 
loose earthenware pipe to the earthenware pipe with head and toe walls, to the rectangular 
wooden and masonry barrel, to the steel or cast iron pipe (Mahbub and Gulhati, 1951:49). The 
hydraulic principle of the outlet structure did not change with these adaptations. 
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 The identification of three responses is no claim to comprehensiveness. This chapter, together 
with Bolding, Mollinga and van Straaten (1995), is to my knowledge the first attempt to write a 
sociotechnical history of outlet structures in Indian canal irrigation. It is an element of a research 
project that focuses primarily on contemporary canal irrigation, and therefore the historical analysis 
has limitations. The East Indian situation (Orissa, Bengal) for example is not considered at all, and 
closer study of the responses and areas discussed here would undoubtedly uncover larger diversity. 
The discussion does serve the purpose of situating the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal case. 
91
 The story of changes in the modalities of water control starts in the 1850s, but the first few 
decades of the 20th century were the period in which most change took place. By the 1940s the 
regional differentiation of the subcontinent in terms of types of outlets used and institutional 
arrangements for distribution seems to have consolidated. No major changes have taken place since 
then. 
101
 For other designs contemplated in this period see Mahbub and Gulhati (1951 xhapter 10). 
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Indian practice it turned out to be ineffective. The structure silted up, and cultivators were 
suspicious of the machine and interfered with it. And, but this was not specific to India, the 
discharge was not constant with varying water levels (Stone, 1984:180-181; see figure 8.2). 
With delivery by volume impossible, charging by volume also became unattainable. 
Figure 8.2: The Modulo Magistrale of Milan 
Flan. Fig. 1. 
Longitudinal Section. Fig. 2. 
lOFeet 
The distributary canal is on the left side. EF is the gate orifice through which the water 
enters, GH the one through which it leaves the structure. IK is a shutter which can be raised 
and lowered to adjust the flow. DLMH is a closed chamber "the under surface of which is at 
precisely the same height as the water ought to have over the outlet GH" (p.50). The 
objective was to keep the water level in the chamber constant to assure, so it was assumed, 
a constant discharge through GH (GH had standard dimensions to allow measurement). The 
spout NO, which had a small downward slope, led the water to the watercourse. The 
quotation suggests that the influence of water levels and pressure on discharge were not fully 
understood. On the other hand, the water level/pressure in the chamber could be measured 
through an open groove in the masonry LD, and the gate IK was to be adjusted to keep this 
constant. The original Italian sources would have to be consulted to decide whether the 
hydraulic confusion was only Baird Smith's. 
Source: Baird Smith (1852:48-49) 
Stone describes a subsequent experiment of sale of water by contract between the mid-
1860s and 1874 (Stone, 1984:181-182). This involved 3 year leases for fixed, but not 
volumetrically quantified, water delivery through existing pipe outlets. The cost of the lease 
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was based on the earlier revenue assessment of the irrigated area under the outlets (with some 
discount). The system stimulated expansion of irrigation under the outlets and economy of 
water use, because farmers were free to use the water they leased as they saw fit. The lease 
system failed through problems among the cultivators to proportionally share the costs and 
benefits of the leases. More than an effort to establish a water market, this experiment was 
a way to spread the use of irrigation water and reduce the management tasks of the 
government. 
The two experiments described just now, volumetric and contractual delivery, were 
combined in a new effort several decades later. The introduction of the 'block system' of 
water distribution in the Nira Left Bank Canal and other irrigation systems in Bombay 
Presidency in the first decades of the 20th century was the most comprehensive attempt to 
employ the market mechanism for water distribution in large canal systems. This system was 
to include volumetric water delivery and volumetric pricing (see Bolding, Mollinga and van 
Straaten, 1995). The system involved contractual water supply to groups of farmers with 
lands in contiguous blocks, and required a modular outlet to fix and measure the water 
supply. The discharge of modular outlets is independent of both the upstream and 
downstream water levels, and discharge is therefore fixed and total water use easily 
measured. By this time the hydraulic aspects of modularity were better understood than in 
the 1850s, and a number of technically modular outlet structures were designed (see figures 
8.3 and 8.4). 
However, the modules could not be transformed into working artefacts in the field, as they 
did not fulfil the design criteria that they should be cheap, and, more importantly, tamper-
proof.10 Tamper-proofness was necessary to counter the appropriation of irrigation water 
by entrepreneurial sugarcane farmers, who desired to intensify this cultivation far beyond 
what was allowed in the contractual arrangements of the block system. When the intensive 
cultivation of sugarcane turned out to be very profitable to the government in terms of 
revenue collection, the Bombay Presidency government became a supporter of the sugarcane 
interests, and abandoned the protective objectives that were part of the block system.12' The 
efforts to introduce modular outlets, notably Gibb's module, were also abandoned, and pipe 
outlets are used in the system till today. 
A major institutional stumbling block at the policy level for the employment of the price 
mechanism for water allocation was the fact that water fees were part of the land revenue 
(the land revenue varied for 'wet' and 'dry' land and for different crops). The separation of 
charges for irrigation water from land revenue proper, and variation of the irrigation charges 
in relation to changes in water scarcity, are both necessary to create a situation in which 
prices may affect distribution and to introduce a competitive element. This conflicted with 
some of the main characteristics of imperial revenue policy. The politics of imperial 
administration implied that there was downward pressure on land revenue rates as a result 
of considerations of social stability, increase of cash crop production and other reasons. For 
poor cultivators, owners and tenants, increased rates would cause serious problems. 
Uniformity of rates (for example across irrigation systems) was also considered to be 
politically desirable. (For detailed discussion of these issues, see Stone, 1984:159-179.) 
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 See Pinch and Bijker (1984) for discussion of this issue of the 'stabilisation' of new artefacts in 
social and technical networks. 
121
 The block system was a departure from the original objective of irrigation of 'irrigated dry' crops 
only, but still contained a protective element (see chapter 3, section 3 .1 , and Attwood, 1987, 
1993; Bolding, Mollinga and van Straaten, 1995). 
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Figure 8.3: Visvesvaraya's self-acting module 
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This rather complex apparatus consists of a chamber which communicates with the 
distributary (and consequently has the same water level), a barrel which floats on the water 
in the chamber, and a hose which connects the barrel with the watercourse. From the 
distributary, the water flows into the chamber, through the valves of the floating barrel into 
the barrel, and through the hose into the watercourse. Because the barrel is floating and 
follows the fluctuations of the water level in the chamber, the working head of the water 
flowing into the barrel remains the same. Consequently the discharge will remain constant. 
The discharge can be altered by changing the weight of the barrel (changing the working 
head) or by opening or closing the valves (changing the area of flow). 
Source: The Irrigation Conference, Simla, 1904 (1905) 
There were thus a number of reasons why economic control of water distribution through 
the invisible hand of the market failed in 19th and early 20th century India. Distribution 
through the economic mechanism of the market is an idea that has recently attracted new 
attention and support, as will be discussed in chapter 10. But in the 19th and early 20th 
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Figure 8.4: Gibb's module 
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This module has the shape of a snail's shell. The water enters through the bell-mouth 
entrance, moves upward into the curved rising pipe, makes a full turn under a series of 
baffles, and flows into the watercourse through an expanding spout. The result is a constant 
discharge within a limited range of fluctuating water levels in the distributary. The baffles 
restrict the area of flow in the snail's shell structure; a rise in water level would result in 
rotating movements of the water in front of each baffle. This would mean increasing loss of 
energy and thus loss of head, which helps to keep the discharge constant. 
Source: Inglis and Joglekar (1940) 
century irrigation water was "of necessity allocated through a combination of technical and 
institutional mechanisms" (Stone, 1984:195). These mechanisms I will now discuss. 
Response 2: proportional and rotational water distribution 
From the second half of the 19th century the Indian government tried to increase its control 
over water distribution through combined technical and managerial means. The government 
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took on the responsibility to construct the technical infrastructure at ever lower levels of the 
system, and brought the canals closer and closer to the farmers' fields.13' The government 
also claimed the ownership of this infrastructure.14' The increasing prominence of the 
objective to spread irrigation water for protection against drought and famine (see chapter 
3), reinforced the interventionist character of government involvement in irrigation water 
distribution. North India (including present Pakistan) experienced important institutional and 
technical changes in irrigation water distribution in canal irrigation in the early decades of 
the 20th century. Institutionally the development and consolidation of the so called warabandi 
proportional and rotational system of water distribution was the key change.15' It involved 
and became possible by the invention and widespread introduction of a semi-modular outlet 
structure. 
The problems experienced in the technical control of water distribution by means of pipe 
outlets, and the advance of hydraulic science, in the first decades of the 20th century led to 
an intense search for new types of outlets that allowed greater control. The outlet that closed 
the debate on water distribution in North India and ended the quest for new designs was 
Crump's design of a semi-modular outlet (Crump, 1922) (see figure 8.5). This device, 
installed at the head of the outlet command area, discharges quantities of water into the outlet 
command area in a fixed proportion to the discharge in the distributary canal. Because of the 
standing wave, the outlet structure's discharge is independent of the water level in the 
downstream watercourse. When the sizes of the semi-modules are designed to fit the irrigable 
area behind them, a system of fixed proportional distribution is created. This outlet, and 
adapted versions of it, are the dominant type of outlet in the canal systems of North India and 
Pakistan till today. 
In the new system experience-based 'tattling' [turn-taking] was replaced by the 'scientific' 
system of proportional and rotational water distribution that we now know as warabandi. The 
introduction of the semi-module allowed a more precise form of water distribution, in which 
distribution could reliably be based on time-shares, as the proportion of outlet discharge to 
distributary discharge was stable.16' Mahbub and Gulhati compare the old and the new 
system as follows. 
The tatiling of outlets on distributaries or among channels on a distributary systems 
continued as normal irrigation practice until about 1930, when, with the installation of 
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 This development was completed after Indian Independence, when the government took on the 
responsibility to construct the field channels in the outlet command areas at government cost. 
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 In North India definitively through the 1873 Irrigation Canal and Drainage Act. In Madras 
Presidency the operation of the 'regulation sluice' that leaves water out of the canal to one or more 
villages, became the official responsibility of the government also in 1873 (Famine Commission, 
1881-V:112). 
'
5I
 See chapter 3 for references that give descriptions of the warabandi system. Its historical origins 
as a rotation system are not fully clear. It is probably a development of the 'tatiling' system of turn 
talcing in use in the 19th century (which used pipe outlets). On 'tatiling' see Buckley (1905:282-
285). 
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 The success of the warabandi system, and the semi-module outlet structure that belongs to it, 
has been much acclaimed. The image of success has been particularly advanced in the context of 
debates on the introduction of warabandi in South Indian canal systems (see chapter 9). The fact 
of the matter is that there are very few reports on the actual working of the warabandi system, at 
present or in the past, on the basis of which success or anything else can be argued. For discussion 
of warabandi in Pakistan, see Merrey (1983), Merrey and Wolf (1986), Beeker (1993), van Halsema 
and Wester (1994), and Bandaragoda (1998). For India, see for example VanderVelde (1980), 
Malhotra, Raheja and Seckler (1984) and Jacobs et al. (1997). 
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Figure 8.5: Crump's semi-module 
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The throat plus the sill cause a standing wave, which eliminates the influence of the 
downstream water level on the discharge. To regulate the discharge only the water level in 
the distributary requires control. In later designs a gate or roof block is put in the throat, to 
make the structure adjustable. It then becomes an orifice semi module or adjustable 
proportional module. 
Source: Mahbub and Gulhati (1951:69) 
semi-modular outlets and the installation of flumes and control points in distributaries, 
it was gradually found possible to give regular supplies to all outlets on a running 
channel. The tattling of channels is now [in the 1940s] resorted to, not on account of 
any defects in the design of outlets, but during winter when the water supply available 
in the rivers is not enough to feed all the distributaries on a canal. The unit of 
distribution is now a distributary and all outlets and minors of a distributary are always 
running full supply when full supply is let into the distributary. The tattling of outlets 
on any channel is regarded as a sign of inefficient working of a system and is looked 
upon with disfavour. (Mahbub and Gulhati, 1951:28) 
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Response 3: localisation 
The third response to lack of control over water distribution was the policy of localisation, 
as implemented in the protective irrigation systems of interior South India. This legal-
administrative instrument of land use planning and the way it is meant to structure water use 
was discussed in chapter 3. Here I focus on the outlet technology that belongs to it. 
Localisation leaves perhaps the largest scope of the three responses for choosing the 
appropriate outlet technology. Semi-modules would however be most logical in a situation 
like the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal. The system has continuous flow without cross 
regulators, and a fixed area entitled to receive irrigation water, with fixed crops. Semi-
modular outlets could both accommodate the situation of constant water levels in the main 
system when a constant discharge is released from the reservoir, and the situation that the 
discharge varies over the season with changing demand. In the latter case the proportional 
distribution of the variable discharge over the command area would remain the same. The 
choice for pipe outlet structures, with their problematic regulation characteristics, that has 
been made in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal is therefore at first sight, and with the 
benefit of hindsight, not a technically and managerially logical one. In the next section I 
investigate the background of this choice for pipe outlets. 
8.2 THE CONTINUED USE OF PIPE OUTLETS IN SOUTH INDIA 
In South India, no development towards semi-modules or modular outlets has taken place, 
despite the fact that the protective irrigation systems constructed in interior South India are 
similar to the Northern ones in their objective to spread water thinly. In this section I first 
explore the reasons for lack of outlet innovation in South India generally, and after that 
discuss the developments in the Nizam's Dominions and Hyderabad State. 
Pipe outlets in South India 
A major difference between South Indian and North Indian protective irrigation systems is 
that for a long time there was no great demand for water in the systems in the Deccan. 
Farmers took a 'lukewarm' attitude to irrigation in these dry tracts because of productivity, 
market and soil conditions (Famine Commission, 1881-V:120; for discussion of these and 
related points see chapter 4). In addition, the protective systems of interior South India were 
not colonisation schemes, unlike many of the systems in the North. In the new Northern 
systems farmers were selected who were thought to be interested in and capable to start 
irrigated agriculture. The South Indian systems were constructed in settled areas with social 
relations characterised by a poor, differentiated and indebted peasantry that lacked the means 
to invest in irrigation even if they wanted to (Attwood, 1987; chapter 5).17) 
171
 Just like the 'capitalist farmers' that were selected by the British as the leading group of settlers 
for the canal colonies in newly constructed irrigation schemes in North India were important for the 
rapid development of irrigated agriculture in the new schemes (Jairath, 1984), so were the 
Shaswad Mali farmers who migrated into the Nira Left Bank Canal in Maharashtra, as described in 
Attwood's case study, important for the development of an expansive sugarcane sector. The role 
of the migrants from Andhra Pradesh in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal has been discussed in 
chapter 5. What these groups had in common was that they brought with them capital to invest 
in irrigated agriculture, experience with commercial irrigated farming, and no 'feudal' ties that 
locked them into marginal production and productivity. 
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As a result, the water management problem in the protective systems of the South for a 
long time was much more to induce farmers to use the water, than to ration it (see chapters 
3 and 4). The actual situation in the systems created little inducement to increase technical 
control at the outlet level.18) 
Figure 8.6: 6 inch pipe outlet as used in Madras Presidency 
F . 5 . L . = Full Supply Level 
G.L. = Ground Level 
Source: Ellis (1931:304) 
Technical control at outlet level was also not part of the dominant engineering tradition 
in the South, which was based on rice irrigation in the delta regions (see chapter 3). In the 
few pages devoted to outlets in the classic textbook of South Indian irrigation engineering, 
Ellis' irrigation manual, the pipe outlet is the most important structure discussed (see figure 
8.6).19) Figure 8.6 shows that the pipe outlets in the deltas were ungated. This implies that 
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 The effort to increase technical and other forms of control in the Nira Left Bank Canal referred 
to above was also an effort to increase the use of irrigation water in this system, which was one 
of the protective systems with low utilisation rates, rather than to spread and ration it. 
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 In the 1931 edition of Ellis' manual attention is paid to the North Indian Kennedy gauge outlet, 
and in the 1950 edition one paragraph is devoted to the North Indian adjustable proportional 
module, a development of the Crump semi-module (Ellis, 1931:307-308; 1950:323-324). The 
disadvantages of pipe outlets are also discussed, but the Kennedy gauge outlet is considered 
unsuitable for the South Indian continuous flow conditions, as discharge does not vary 
proportionally with changing water levels (it is too close to modularity). With regard to the 
adjustable proportional module no remarks on suitability are made, though it solves the problem of 
proportionality. 
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no regular opening and closure was envisaged, or possible, as would for example be required 
in the 'tattling' as practised in the North. 
In delta irrigation the reasons not to be interested in the increase of control capacity at 
outlet level were the lack of water scarcity, and the lack of government involvement in local 
water management. The first reason is illustrated by the following quotation. 
[T]he irrigation [in the Godavari and Krishna Canals] is in the monsoon, and hitherto 
there has been abundance of water for the irrigable area. The ryot may wish to flood 
his rice-field a foot deep, and the irrigation officer may know that six inches is enough 
and dole it out accordingly. But, generally speaking, when the outlet has been granted 
to supply water to a certain area, the water flows uninterruptedly throughout the 
season, and, if one ryot gets twice as much as another, both get enough and they are 
tolerably contented. Distribution like this is rough indeed compared to that on a North 
Indian canal, where a two-inch flooding may save the crop, and an inch and a half may 
lose it, and where the ryot has only a chance of water at all three or four days in the 
fortnight. The Madras Canal Engineer then needs to bestow little attention on water 
duty. Nor does he care much if the distributary channel is untidy and wasteful of 
water. There is plenty more to draw from. (Scott Moncrieff, 1879:135) 
With abundance of water, pipe outlets were the cheapest and easiest to construct type of 
outlet. In the very flat delta areas pipe outlets had the advantage that they could work with 
a very low driving head. Demand for water and scarcity did increase in the deltas in the 
course of time, but the perceived scarcity still occured in a context of very intensive cropping 
patterns with a high percentage of rice cultivation. This is an altogether different situation 
than the dry tracts of North India and of interior South India, where scarcity and rationing 
were design principles. This situation can be guaged through another quotation of Scott-
Moncrieff. 
In a dry season in Northern India, the canal officer is mobbed by thirsty ryots 
imploring him to supply water. He spends his days, sometimes even his nights, in 
patrolling his distributaries and seeing that the volume at his command is being fairly 
dealt out. He gets daily reports (at times twice or thrice a day) of the depth of water 
at points three or four miles apart down his channels. He is always on the watch lest 
the flow of the water be checked by silt deposit, weeds, tufts of grass, or rubbish, and 
it is his pride to have clean orderly channels. Nor does his care end with the outlet 
from the distributary bank; but as he rides through the village lands he keeps an eye 
on the field channels and advises how they should be laid out as to secure that as little 
water as possible should be lost in them. A glance at any Revenue Report of Irrigation 
in the North-Western Provinces or Punjab will show how much prominence is given 
to 'high water duty', that is, to the area irrigable from a given unit of discharge. The 
Engineer is held responsible for the water in his canal as he is for the money in his 
cash-box, and every year a more rigorous account is required of it. (Scott Moncrieff 
(1879), published in Famine Commission (1881V: 135-137)) 
Lack of government involvement in local water management, the second reason for limited 
interest in the increase of technical control at outlet level, derived from the existence of 
strong traditions of self-management in the Southern systems. Many of the 'government 
works' were expanded and/or improved indigenous systems (see Famine Commission, 1881-
V for historical examples, and Sengupta, 1991 for contemporary ones), in which farmers 
seem not to have welcomed government intervention at the lower system levels. At the 
beginning of the twentieth century Buckley noted that it was difficult to convince Madras rice 
farmers of the usefulness of field channels (Buckley, 1905:295). The construction of village 
and field channels would have enabled stronger government involvement in local water 
management, through the introduction of rotational water distribution for example. The 
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existing field-to-field irrigation method was fully farmer controlled. South Indian irrigation 
engineers may thus have had relatively little exposure to outlet level water distribution 
problems. 
It must be assumed that the South Indian engineers continued to use the pipe outlet 
structure as current in the delta regions when they undertook to construct new large scale 
protective systems in the upper parts of the rivers in the 20th century for two reasons: 
1) there was no immediate pressure to reconsider this design choice, because the systems 
they knew from close by either had abundant supplies or suffered from lack of 
demand for irrigation water; 
2) the possibly problematic nature of water distribution at local level was not recognised or 
appreciated because there was little experience with local water management.20' 
Pipe outlets in the Nizam's Dominions and Hyderabad State 
As noted in chapter 4, the construction of larger irrigation systems in the Nizam Dominions, 
where the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal was conceived, started in the first half of the 20th 
century. The first large scale system, constructed between 1924 and 1932, was the Nizam 
Sagar project, which would eventually irrigate 110.000 acres (Anjaneya Swamy, 1988:48-52; 
HYDBUL 111/9:707-710). It was originally planned to irrigate 275.000 acres, but the 
government seems to have had little control over the system's actual use by farmers. The 
project has effectively become a rice and sugarcane scheme. The outlets that were used in 
the Nizamsagar system were 6 inch pipes (HYDBUL 111/9:707). It can be assumed that these 
were direct copies of the pipe outlets used in Madras Presidency. 
The reference to Madras is explicit in the later Dindi project (Azeemuddin, 1944, 1947). 
The Dindi project however had explicit protective objectives. "[T]he system of irrigation 
proposed is based on the underlying principle of giving the maximum benefit to the largest 
numbers of cultivators." (Azeemuddin, 1947:38) All 'paying crops' had to be excluded. 
"Even rice for which this tract of Telingana is eminently suited had to be curtailed to the 
minimum possible extent in order that more rabi and kharif crops may be protected." 
(Azeemuddin, 1944:96) The protective nature of the system showed in the limitation of rice 
cultivation to 7000 acres of a total of 39,000 acres, which is 18%. The rest were 'irrigated 
dry' and garden crops (Azeemuddin, 1947:38). 
Khaja Azeemuddin, the engineer who oversaw the design and construction of the Dindi 
project in the early 1940s21' employed Ellis' manual for his calculations of available water 
supply and other things. He also designed a new type of pipe outlet (see figure 8.7), which, 
he notes, gave very satisfactory results in trials at an experimental station (Azeemuddin, 
1947:41). 
Azeemuddin's design of this pipe outlet was based on several considerations. He stated 
that "[i]n a canal system usually [that is, in Madras Presidency, PM] very few, if any, 
regulators are provided at the mouth of field channels." The reason for this was the "heavy 
burden on the channel estimate" if they were provided. However, "[t]he cultivators naturally 
waste a good deal of water and there is always quarrel between the cultivators under the 
same distributary." And as "water is very precious in these parts (...) every effort has to be 
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 Engineers themselves, with hindsight, usually also explain the use of pipe outlets in the 
protective systems to be the result of an extreme 'rice bias' in the training of the South Indian 
irrigation engineer. 
2,1
 He also played an important role in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal design some years later 
(see chapter 4). 
194 ON THE WATERFRONT 
Figure 8.7: Field channel sluice for Dindi project 
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Source: Azeemuddin (1947) 
made to control the wastage of water by the ryots." (Azeemuddin, 1947:41) Azeemuddin thus 
designed a cheap and gated outlet for the protective Dindi system, that cost only 10-12% of 
the 'ordinary design', and which had locking arrangements.22' 
The objective of protection also became definitive for the next large scheme, the 
Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal (see chapter 4). Gated pipe outlets were introduced in this 
project from the start.23) The fact that the pipe outlets were equipped with gates may be 
interpreted as an indication of the existence of some awareness of the need to regulate the 
supply. I have not found any documentation on the type of regulation envisaged, and oral 
explanations in interviews mostly emphasised the open/close function of gates rather than 
their capacity to regulate water flows in quantitative or qualitative ways (also see discussion 
in the next section). It seems that the concept of water control by means of pipe outlets was 
thought through very little in the design stage. This is illustrated by the following remark in 
the project report for the right bank canal. After the statement that pipe outlets will be used 
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 It is not known to me whether and on what scale the pipe outlet as designed by Azeemuddin 
has been actually introduced in the Dindi project. 
231
 This information comes from interviews with engineers who worked in the construction of the 
canal. The 1934 project report of the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal (Gopalan, 1934) makes no 
mention of the type of outlet structure to be used. The same is true for the project report 
published, most probably in 1954, by the government of Hyderabad State (GOHYD/PWD, n.d.). For 
the right bank canals of the Tungabhadra system, pipe outlets were also envisaged (Thirumalai 
Iyengar, 1945:para.34). 
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it is observed that "supply will be delivered strictly on an acreage basis" (Thirumalai 
Iyengar, 1945:para.34). Seemingly, no contradiction between the use of pipe outlets and 
strict acreage-wise supply was felt to exist. 
A second design feature of the pipe outlet structures is even more puzzling. The pipes of 
the Left Bank Canal outlets were systematically overdimensioned in the first phase of the 
project. A standard pipe diameter of 1 foot was used, despite elaborate calculations of the 
design discharge for the outlet command areas (see Appendix 4.1). A 1 foot diameter pipe 
can discharge 2 to 4 times the design discharge of an average outlet, and thus makes over-
appropriation technically very easy.24' The Tungabhadra case thus supports the general 
conclusion drawn in the previous section that the engineers did not realise what the 
complexities of water distribution might be.25) 
When these complexities presented themselves (see chapter 7) engineers did start to make 
adaptations to the standard pipe outlet design. Pipe diameters were reduced in many places 
to 9 inches or, less often, 6 inches (for more discussion see the next two sections).26' 
However, to my knowledge it was never considered to use any other type of outlet than a 
pipe outlet in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal (and other protective systems in 
Karnataka).27' 
It is not the case that knowledge on other outlets is or was not available within the 
Mysore/Karnataka engineering community. For example, a note of the Mysore Engineering 
Research Station contains a detailed description of different types of outlets used in India 
(MERS, 1966). Experiments were also done with some of these structures.28' 
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 See Bolding (1992:100-105) for an example. With all pipes installed at the bed level of the 
(sub)distributary canals, distribution along a canal automatically became unequal because of the 
reduction of water depth that normally occurs in the downstream direction. The reduction in water 
depth is not proportional to the reduction in discharge because the canal cross section is also 
adapted, but still there normally is a reduction. This gives higher discharges through upstream 
outlets when gate openings are the same. This can only be avoided by the closure of upstream 
gates for longer periods than downstream ones, or by the adaptation of the gate openings to the 
water depth. The complexity of this calibration has been mentioned in section 8.1. As noted above 
I have found no evidence that these complications were considered in the design phase. 
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 In the forms used in distributary and outlet design in distributary 85 (see Appendix 4.1) the 1 
foot pipe diameter for the pipes in the pipe outlet structures was preprinted. This shows that the 
1 foot diameter design element was a standardised feature of the structures. When directly asked 
about the reasons for the standard 1 foot diameter design of the pipes, some retired engineers 
whom I interviewed stated that it was feared that smaller-size pipes might get easily blocked, 
particularly in black cotton soil. This could easily have been tested in the first distributies put in 
operation, but this seems not to have been done. It is therefore not a very satisfactory explanation. 
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 With a 9 inch diameter pipe the pipe outlet structure is often still over-dimensioned; a 6 inch 
diameter pipe comes close to what is usually required. Because the engineers assume an arbitrary 
working head of 1 foot in the calculations, for which there is no empirical basis, and because outlet 
command area size is not always adapted to the stated standard design discharge of 1 cusec (see 
chapter 6), it is difficult to make exact statements about the over-dimensioning of pipe outlet 
structures on the basis of pipe outlet diameters alone. 
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 What was also not considered was the possibility to install (smaller) pipes at one-third design 
depth below the full supply level, to get proportional division of water (Mahbub and Gulhati, 
1951:155; also Pradhan, 1996:69, 131 for discussion in the Nepalese context). 
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 An earlier example is the Silver Jubilee Souvenir Volume published by the Mysore Engineers 
Association in 1932, which contains pictures of a '90° ' V Notch with baffles, with hook gauge', 
a '0,3 cusec Gibb module, with baffle vanes in view to consume the extra head' and a 'unit for 
experiments on notches and the standing wave flume' (Mysore Engineers Association, 1932). 
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What needs to be explained is why the experience of many problems with the pipe outlets 
in actual water distribution (see chapter 7) has not resulted in a reconsideration of the type 
of outlet to be used, or at least a debate on the pros and cons of pipe outlets, among 
engineers. I will not try to provide this explanation at this point, but leave it to the 
concluding section of this chapter. In the following two sections I take the continued use of 
the pipe outlet structure in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal as given, and discuss what 
happened to the standard design when it started to be used. 
8.3 THE SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF PIPE OUTLETS 
ALONG TWO CANALS 
A close look at actually existing pipe outlet structures in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal 
shows that there is considerable diversity in the precise characteristics of individual devices. 
As has been shown in the previous chapter, farmers generally do not sit and wait to see how 
much water the Irrigation Department will supply to them, and when it prefers to do so. 
Farmers actively intervene in main system management, formally the domain of the 
government, to secure sufficient water supply to their fields. 'Remodelling' of the physical 
characteristics of the pipe outlet structure is part of this intervention. 
There are at least two ways in which farmers can manipulate the pipe outlet structure in 
order to increase the discharge into the outlet command area. One is to increase the driving 
head. This can be achieved by a raised upstream water level (through obstructions in the 
canal like stones or bathing buffaloes) or by a lowered downstream water level (through a 
dug out field channel bed level for example). Another strategy is to increase the pipe's cross 
section, by convincing the Irrigation Department to install a larger pipe, by damage to the 
pipe that creates favourable leakages, or by installing an extra, illegal, pipe. 
The general response of the Irrigation Department to these interventions of the farmers 
has been to use the gate of the pipe outlet to regulate the water flow. The gate was made 
more finely adjustable, and a lock was put on it. In this way, the Irrigation Department has 
tried to control the flow through the outlets and to fulfil at least part of its responsibility to 
distribute water equitably among all farmers. The effort to regulate flows by gate settings 
stimulated farmers to seek new strategies to increase supply. These include convincing 
Irrigation Department officials to raise the gates, and manipulation of gates by farmers 
themselves (see chapter 7 for detailed discussion). 
We have found that the type of modifications made to the pipe outlet structures depend 
on the scarcity of water and the modes of interaction (and their development over time) of 
the groups of people involved. Hence, the characteristics of outlet structures will differ from 
place to place in the system. In this section I give two examples of the spatial distribution 
of pipe outlets along canals in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal, and suggest the significance 
of this spatial distribution for understanding the daily reproduction of the pattern of unequal 
water distribution. 
First example: from head to tail in a subdistributary 
The first example is sub-distributary D24/9. Distributary 24 is located in the head end of the 
Tungabhadra system, and was constructed in the early stages of the project, more than 35 
years ago in 1991-92. In subdistributary D24/9 a clear head-tail pattern had evolved in this 
period (see chapter 7). The cropping pattern along this almost 3 km long subdistributary in 
1991-92 showed 100% rice cultivation in two seasons in the head end outlet command areas, 
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and less than 10% rice cultivation in one season in one of the tail end outlet command areas 
This change was also visible in the pipe outlet structures. The subdistributary can be divided 
into four sections. In each of the sections a different type of pipe outlet was found, related 
to a different water management situation. 
Photo 1: Thread-gate mechanism found on the canal side (held by research assistant 
ft. Doraiswamy) 
In 35 years of water distribution the outlets of the subdistributary had undergone several 
changes as a result of increasing water scarcity. At the very beginning, when as yet there was 
no water scarcity, pipes of standard size (1 foot diameter) were installed in the outlets of this 
sub-distributary, with 'pen-gates'. These gates could be fixed at different levels by inserting 
a wooden or iron 'pen', or rather pin, through the holes made at regular intervals in the 
handle of the shutter. This gate type is now distant history, and most farmers only knew the 
thread-gates that are presently used (see photo 1). In the thread-gate the gate handle is a long 
bolt, and a hexagonal nut has to be turned with a special key to raise or lower it. The 
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mechanism also has a spring lock, to prevent that the nut is turned. For this an additional key 
is needed. 
The thread-gates were introduced when water distribution problems started to occur 
because of increased water scarcity. The gates began to be used as regulation and control 
devices to limit discharges into the outlets. But thread-gates could also be manipulated by 
farmers, either by damaging them or by means of copied keys. In the 1980s another change 
took place. The Irrigation Department adjusted (in effect, reduced) the standard size pipes 
to diameters supposedly calculated on the basis of the command areas of the outlets.2" 
Photo 2: The bunker type outlet 
The design of the outlet structures along the subdistributary was standardised in the 1980s 
in the sense that they, in principle, all possessed thread-gates and had recalculated pipe 
diameters. But the details of the shape of the outlet structures varied from head to tail. 
In the first, head end section of the sub-distributary the problem was excess withdrawal 
of water for the cultivation of two crops of rice per year. In an effort to control damage to 
the gate/outlet structure and prevent manipulation, the Irrigation Department had constructed 
what can best be called 'bunkers' at the first six outlets (1, 2 and 3 1/s + r/s, see figure 8.8). 
These were heavy, rectangular concrete blocks of about 0.80 x 1.60 m, with the gate 
mechanism in the middle of the concrete block, hidden and protected in the structure (see 
photo 2). The gate itself was concealed, and could not easily be reached by hand, hammer 
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 I write 'supposedly' because of the arbitrary assumptions made about the driving head (see 
above), which implies that actually existing hydraulic conditions were not considered. In many 
cases the pipe was not reduced to a size that no longer required reduction of the discharge by 
partial closure of the gate. 
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or crowbar. The lock mechanism was - necessarily - visible and could be reached on the 
outside top. It remained the Achilles heel of the structure. However, because it was less easy 
to inflict physical damage on this structure than on other types, it was mostly manipulated 
by means of copied keys. The relation between the farmers and the Irrigation Department 
operators was one of negotiation of the number of threads that the gate was opened. 
Figure 8.8: Pipe outlets along a subdistributary canal 
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The second, middle section of the sub-distributary consisted of eight outlet structures of 
a different construction (4 ,5 ,6 and 7 l/s + r/s). These were built of stone blocks from local 
granite and mortar, the materials originally used in all structures. The gates were visible and 
accessible (photo 3). The structures were smaller than the 'bunkers' in the first canal section. 
Many of the middle section outlets had been slightly damaged to increase the discharge 
through the pipe. A common type of damage was a hole in the structure in such a way that 
when the water depth exceeded the top of the gate, water could also enter the pipe over the 
gate. Apart from manipulation of the gates themselves, the farmers in this section of the 
canal tried to raise water levels in the subdistributary by the creation of canal obstructions 
with stones, wood, mud and straw. This was possible in this canal section because water 
levels were lower than in the first section. There the canal was still so deep and wide that 
obstruction was difficult. 
In the third section of the sub-distributary the situation was different again. Here, water 
was really scarce. Actual water depths were well below design water depths. Outlet 8 l/s was 
a structure of the stones and visible gate type, but the gate was no longer there. When this 
pipe was scheduled to be changed from a 1 foot diameter pipe to a smaller pipe, the farmers 
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irrigated through pump-lift irrigation from the river, and waste water diverted from a natural 
drain. Farmers had solved the scarcity problem by tapping other water sources. 
Second example: migrant entrepreneurs in a tail end distributary 
Between 1978 and 1990 the rice area in distributary 93 increased from several tens of 
hectares to 1500 ha. The demand for water in the distributary increased enormously. There 
is now considerable conflict over water distribution because of increased scarcity (see chapter 
7). 
As in the previous example, the pipe outlet structures were originally built of granite and 
mortar, and furnished with pen-gates.31) The pen-gates have been replaced with thread-
gates, but can still be found in the area, even when they are used only as a post to tether 
buffaloes. The problem of increased water scarcity led to the destruction of most pipe outlet 
structures: gates were removed, and half or more of the stonework was demolished in some 
cases (see photos 4 and 5). The response of the Irrigation Department had been to start the 
construction of more solid, concrete structures in the place of the stone-and-mortar ones.32) 
The spread of these new structures in 1991-2 illustrates the water management problems in 
this distributary (see figure 8.9). 
Photo 4: Half demolished stone-and-mortar pipe outlet with gate frame still visible 
The migrant farmers, who were mainly responsible for the increase in rice cultivation, had 
settled on the banks of the canal, in or near the fields they cultivated, in the middle reach of 
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 Also in this distributary the pipes of the pipe outlet structures were over-dimensioned. 
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 These were of the visible gate type. The bunker type had not been introduced in 1991-92. 
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the canal. Figure 8.9 shows that the Irrigation Department started its work of pipe outlet 
reconstruction in the area close to the migrant camps in the middle reach. The other sections 
of the canal, closer to the original villages, received their water through the original stone-
and-mortar structures. In the head end there was no great need for water control, because 
water use was low (see chapter 5, section 5.4 and chapter 7, section 7.2). In the tail end 
section of the distributary the problem was not the condition of the pipe outlet structures, but 
the arrival of water, as in the first example. 
Photo 5: Demolished stone-and mortar pipe outlet with raised gate mechanism 
Both the sub-distributary and the distributary case exemplify the significance of the 
material characteristics of pipe outlet structures for the social dynamics of water distribution. 
If nothing else, these structures are signposts of complex social processes. The two cases 
show that the shape of the structures is itself the subject of negotiation and change. This point 
is elaborated in the following section, where the process of negotiation and renegotiation the 
shape of pipe outlets is the focus. 
8.4 THE SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION OF PIPE OUTLETS IN A TAIL END 
DISTRIBUTARY 
The example to illustrate the process of pipe outlet adaptation over time, is a story about a 
distributary at the tail end of the main canal, distributary 97. Also in this canal, water has 
become scarce over the years and this growing scarcity has led to fierce interaction on the 
canals and elsewhere. The confrontation of the Irrigation Department officials and farmers 
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Figure 8.9: The geographical spread of pipe outlet structures in distributary 93 
main . / ' 
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of command 
EE3 = distributary offtake 
over water distribution also triggered a process of pipe outlet structure redesign. This process 
went through several phases, in which different types of pipe outlet structures emerged. 
Phase 1: the 1960s and 1970s 
The construction of the 16 km long distributary was completed in 1964. Initially, local 
cultivators were somewhat reluctant to develop their land and to start practising irrigated 
agriculture. As a result there was ample water at the time. In view of the abundance of the 
supply compared to demand, the distributary was extended in 1969 to a total length of 31 
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km.33) Approximately 100 pipe outlets now tap water from the distributary and its sub-
distributaries. 
With the immigration of settler farmers, demand for irrigation water rose gradually, as 
they cultivated rice and developed (leveled and bunded) large pieces of land. In the 1970s 
patches of land must have been developed all along the canal. In the tail end village of the 
canal, near Km 30-31, groundnuts were grown under irrigation on the fertile red soils that 
are found there. In the head reaches of the distributary and subdistributaries, settlers grew 
rice. 
The type of pipe outlet found in this period was one with a pen-gate without a padlock. 
On the subdistributaries the steel gates of the pipe outlet structures were cast in a vertical 
round pipe, as such pipes were readily available during the construction of the canal system. 
The pipe outlets on the distributary itself were of a more fortified type, with the pen-gate cast 
in a U-shaped concrete block (see photos 6 and 7). 
Photo 6: The vertical pipe type outlet 
Also in this distributary the pipe diameters were systematically designed larger than 
required.34' The management of the pipe outlets by the Irrigation Department was of low 
intensity. One gangman, the Irrigation Department employee responsible for gate operation, 
oversaw the operation of three to four pipe outlets. It was considered unneccessary to have 
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 This extension was an electoral promise of a local parliamentary candidate. 
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 In this distributary 1 foot diameter pipes were not the maximum, but 1.5 foot diameter pipes 
were also found. This has to do with very large-sized pipe outlet command areas. The over-
dimensioning situation still applies (see Bolding, 1992). 
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gauge readers to monitor water levels in the canal. This type of outlet and low surveillance 
intensity allowed farmers to appropriate water easily for water-intensive cropping patterns. 
Photo 7: Outlet with a concrete U-shaped block, with pen-gate or thread-gate 
Phase 2: the 1980s to 1987 
In this phase the status quo between the cultivators and the Irrigation Department changed 
and gradually an unmaintainable situation emerged. More and more land was developed, and 
the cropping pattern shifted towards 'wet' crops. The Irrigation Department started to face 
a water distribution problem, because the water supply remained the same, or even decreased 
due to growing demand in the upstream distributaries. Average daily supply in the rabi 
season (December-March) fell over the years, with 1986 as the year with lowest supply. 
A new type of pipe outlet was introduced in the subdistributaries to replace the damaged 
'vertical pipe with pen-gate' type of outlet. The vertical pipe was replaced by a more robust 
rectangular block built of granite stones. More gangmen were deployed - one for every two 
to three outlets - but the outlets were still easily manipulated. The tail end of the distributary 
started to fall dry. At first the water still reached Km 31, but later it only got as far as Km 
28 and Km 25.35) 
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 The cut-off point used was when water reached the area less than three times per season. Three 
irrigations are required for the cultivation of crops like irrigated sunflower. 
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In the second half of the 1980s the tail enders organized themselves into a 'body'.36' 
This organisation of over 350 water users organised actions against the Irrigation Department 
in order to increase the water supply to the tail end reaches. From 1984 to 1987 this 
organisation was responsible for many violent actions, the operation of pipe outlets and the 
intake of the distributary from the main canal, strikes at the offices of the Irrigation 
Department and physical threats to Irrigation Department officials to obtain more water. The 
authority of the Irrigation Department crumbled and its power proved to be weak. Police 
cases were booked against 'the body' but were suspended, thanks to the intervention of local 
members of parliament (MLAs) and other politicians who backed the cultivators. The 
Revenue department, which collects the penalties imposed by the Irrigation Department to 
correct farmer behaviour, also proved susceptible to political influence. Practically speaking, 
pipe outlet management was controlled by competing groups of cultivators. 
The end of this period was marked by the dissolution of 'the body' in 1987. There were 
several reasons for this break-up. As explained by the original treasurer, there was no longer 
unity among the farmers. Initially, when one member did not receive sufficient water a 
delegation of members would go to the Irrigation Department office, or forcibly raise the 
gates out of solidarity with that one member. This feeling of solidarity disappeared and 
people became focused on their own water situation. Why bother about others some 
kilometres downstream? It seems likely that water scarcity became so acute that collective 
organisation was no longer feasible (see Wade, 1988a). Another reason is that one Irrigation 
Department officer who worked on this canal succeeded to mobilise sufficient political 
support to get 'the body' convicted for illegal activities at the district court.37> 
Phase 3:1987-1989 
In this period the Irrigation Department tried to regain control over water distribution and 
concentrated on the control of the operation of the pipe outlets. It designed and constructed 
a new pipe outlet: the fortified thread-gate. This is the same type of structure as the fortified 
pen-gate, but with the pen-gate replaced by a thread-gate. The shutter can be moved up and 
down by turning a hexagonal nut with a special key. This turning mechanism was sometimes 
covered with a small iron box that could be locked with a padlock. The Irrigation Department 
thus tried to make it impossible for the farmers to manipulate the gate. The thread-gates were 
installed along the main distributary and along the subdistributary where most members of 
the collapsed 'body' had their land. 
With the same determination to retake charge of the water distribution, the Irrigation 
Department fortified the offtakes of the sub-distributaries. The number of staff on the canal 
was increased. Whereas there had previously been one Assistant Engineer/Section Officer 
for the whole canal, the distributary was divided into four sections, each with an Assistant 
Engineer/Section Officer. More gangmen were recruited, night control by means of patrolling 
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 The organization never had an official name or legal status. It was formed spontaneously during 
one of the many strikes (bandhs) of tail enders at a point halfway along the distributary. A 
president, secretary and treasurer were appointed, and every member had to pay Rs.10 per acre 
as contribution. Besides actions upstream of their pipe outlets to improve water supply to the tail, 
'the body' also organised water rotation within pipe outlet commands. Two paid labourers 
functioned as common irrigators to operate the water turn for each member. 
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 After this conviction, the officer was demoted to supervise a subdistributary, whereas previously 
he had been responsible for a whole section of the distributary. Apparently, this action against 'the 
body' had triggered other political forces who organised his demotion. 
POINTS OF CONTACT 207 
trucks was introduced, and paid labourers were recruited from among the tail end farmers, 
to guard pipe outlets during the night. 
This offensive met with strong resistance, which was enhanced by the fact that 1988-89 
and 1989-90 were crisis years for the tail end section of the main canal generally. During 
rabi 1989 farmers for the first time did not merely damage pipe outlets, but actually 
destroyed them. The fortified thread-gate is not easy to manipulate, therefore the farmers 
removed the gates and sometimes chipped away the concrete casing. In other cases farmers 
copied the keys of the gangmen and operated the pipe outlets themselves. The gangmen, 
night labourers and night patrols of the Irrigation Department were bribed, outnumbered or 
beaten up by cultivators. In the absence of political and juridical support the Irrigation 
Department was unable to impose the planned control. The tail end of the distributary moved 
further upstream. 
In the tail end the fortified thread-gates were damaged much less frequently (see table 
8.1). It makes no sense to manipulate the pipe outlet if there is no water. To go upstream and 
close all head end pipe outlets was an impossible and dangerous task for tail enders. With 
occasional strikes and the organisation of functions for politicians the tail enders were able 
to effect short periods of water supply, but these did not bring them long term victories. For 
most tail enders this was the signal to concentrate on other strategies to get water. 
Groundwater wells were dug in the red soils near the river. Lift irrigation with the help of 
motor pumps seemed to be the only solution for the tail enders. 
Table 8 . 1 : Frequency of damaged pipe outlets on the main distributary, and relative 
distance from distributary intake in distributary 93 
Rank number 
(from head to tail) 
1-15 
16-30 
31-46 
Number 
damaged 
15 
12 
6 
Percentage 
damaged 
100 
80 
37.5 
Phase 4: Rabi 1990 to Rabi 1992 
The Irrigation Department had overestimated its power but developments at the level of the 
main canal provided some relief. The water crisis of 1988-90 in the tail end section of the 
main canal led to changes in the management of the main system. These changes increased 
supply to the tail end section of the main canal. Also, a system of rotation over distributaries 
was introduced, which increased the efficiency of water use (see chapter 9). As a result, the 
average discharge into the distributary in the dry and hot rabi season increased and in 1992 
was almost twice that in 1986. However, settlement and development of land for irrigation 
continued, and concentration of irrigation in the head region of the distributary intensified. 
By 1992 the tail end started at Km 21. 
Faced with damaged pipe outlets that could only be operated on an on/off basis, the 
Irrigation Department devised another management approach. On each su-distributary and 
on the distributary, the head reaches were to be irrigated during the day time. At night every 
upstream pipe outlet was closed and guarded by two labourers recruited from tail end 
villages. A truck and jeep performed night controls to check that all upstream pipe outlets 
were closed in order to push water to the tail at night. The Irrigation Department 
concentrated its efforts on the pipe outlets that took water directly from the distributary, and 
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on the sub-distributary offtakes. The remaining outlets in the subdistributaries were left to 
their users for operation. 
This approach suffered from the same problems of bribes and intimidation as the earlier 
ones. In practice the management was mostly ad hoc. When large groups of discontented 
farmers came to the office, extra controls were installed and the engineers tried to show their 
commitment. When Irrigation Department officials were outnumbered by farmers at night 
at a particular point, they shut their eyes and turned their backs. When MLAs requested them 
to supply water to a particular group of farmers, they tried to do so for some time. Gangmen 
were bribed on a large scale or forced under physical threat to open gates and keep such 
things secret from checking officials. During night controls the Irrigation Department jeep 
first drove a 'warning' round before the situation was actually checked. This was done to 
give the sleeping labourers who guarded the outlets time to wake up and close the pipe outlet 
before the arrival of the checking officials. After the check the gates were re-opened. The 
actions of the Irrigation Department became almost symbolic. 
The description of these four phases shows that the pipe outlets and their technical 
characteristics are both an instrument in the struggle between Irrigation Department officials 
and farmers over water distribution, as well as an outcome of that interaction. The designs 
of the pipe outlets have been modified in response to the balance of forces between officials 
and farmers. The example also shows that using the word 'struggle' is no exaggeration in the 
context of water distribution. 
Photo 8: The ungated outlet 
The latest strategy of the Irrigation Department seems to be avoidance of conflicts with 
cultivators. The overall goal of pipe outlet operation is shifting from the implementation of 
POINTS OF CONTACT 209 
a reasonably equitable water distribution pattern to the execution of a safe water distribution 
policy, with an eye to equitable water distribution when equity can be achieved without risks. 
A new type of pipe outlet was designed that reflected the situation and the new strategy of 
the Irrigation Department: the ungated pipe outlet. 
The ungated pipe outlet is an open pipe fixed in a head wall of granite stones. This pipe 
outlet does not have a gate, as this is considered as a waste of goverment money because the 
farmers will destroy it (see photo 8). The rationing/control aspect was realised in a different 
way. The offtake field channel was lined and constructed at a high level in order to lower 
the driving head of the outlet. In this way the Irrigation Department hoped to confront the 
farmers with a fait accompli. The only way to manipulate, besides rigorous destruction of 
the whole structure, is to construct checks in the distributary or subdistributary, to raise the 
water level. At the time the field work was done for this chapter, two ungated pipe outlets 
had been constructed. In 1992 the engineers were also considering the reintroduction of the 
pen-gate (without padlock). This allows farmers to manipulate the outlets without infliction 
of damage. 
8.5 CONCLUSION: DESIGN, CONSTRUCTION AND WATER CONTROL 
In this concluding section I first present a brief summary and some interpretation of the 
detailed and complex material discussed above. I then move on to draw some more general 
conclusions on the relation between technological change and state-farmers relations in Indian 
canal irrigation as exemplified by this case study. 
An interpretative summary 
Almost from day one the - then British colonial - government was faced with a problem of 
water control when it undertook to construct large scale irrigation systems in different parts 
of India. The control of water distribution was a particularly pertinent problem in areas with 
strong water scarcity. Given the objectives of colonial rule, the government designed the 
irrigation systems in dry areas to spread water thinly over large numbers of villages and 
farmers. It thus created the problem that the government canal managers needed to ration 
irrigation water. After failed efforts to organise water distribution through the invisible hand 
of the market with the aid of modular outlets, the government resorted to proportional and 
rotational water distribution with semi-modules in North India iyvarabandi) and to 
prescription of cropping patterns (localisation) and the use of pipe outlets in interior South 
India. This shows that in different times and places different forms of water control evolved 
as a response to the problems encountered on the canals. 
In each of the three responses discussed there is a close link between the institutional and 
the technical dimension of water control. In the 'invisible hand' mode of water distribution, 
modular outlets that allow stable volumetric delivery are required. Though technically 
feasible modular outlets were designed in India, volumetric delivery and pricing was never 
successfully introduced. This had to do with 1) opposition of farmers, and 2) the nature of 
the land revenue system. The effort failed through institutional factors. 
In a rotational mode of water distribution that seeks to distribute water proportionally to 
land holding, and with fluctuating water levels in the rivers and canals, semi-modules are the 
appropriate structure. They distribute surpluses and shortages equitably. Semi-modules also 
reduce the management tasks of the government, as they are 'automatic'. Proportionality is 
only achieved however, when there are institutions within the government bureaucracy that 
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guarantee the execution of rotation schedules over distributaries that maintain water levels 
close to full supply conditions, and institutions at outlet command area level that achieve 
equitable distribution in the outlet command area. 
In the protective irrigation systems of interior South India, where localisation defines the 
mode of land use planning and water distribution, semi-modules would also have been a 
logical choice. The reasons for the adoption of pipe outlets are related to low demand for 
water in existing 'irrigated dry' systems in this region, no scarcity of water in the 'wet' 
systems, and perhaps the strong tradition of local management in 'wet' irrigation, which 
implied limited government exposure to field and outlet level water distribution practices. 
There were no incentives for engineers to abandon the use of pipe outlets. It is however 
surprising that the use of pipe outlets continued even when water distribution problems 
proliferated through increased demand, and consequently scarcity. The Tungabhadra Left 
Bank Canal may be seen as a case where the objective of a wide spread of irrigation water 
was not achieved through both institutional and technical factors. 
A close look at the design and construction of pipe outlet structures in the Tungabhadra 
Left Bank Canal revealed further linkages between the technical and the institutional 
dimensions of water control. Technological trajectories not only exist at the level of large 
regions of a subcontinent, but also at the level of single systems and single canals. 
What I find striking - because it came unexpected - is the variation in the details of pipe 
outlet design and construction in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal. This variation is easily 
overlooked, and has been overlooked so far, by outside observers. Almost all the variation 
has to do with the contestation of water control by government managers and farmers. 
The two main variables in the design and construction of the pipe outlets are: 
1) the presence and type of the gate (including locking arrangements), and 
2) the sturdiness of the structure in which the gate and pipe are fixed. 
There are pipe outlets without gates, with pen-gates and with thread-gates. The precision with 
which discharge through the pipe can be regulated increases in this order. There are gates 
without locks, with padlocks and with spring-locks, the latter with or without a protection-
box around it. These signify different relations between government managers and water 
users. No locks either means abundance of water and no relation between government and 
water users, or such dominance of water users that the government no longer tries to regulate 
flow through locking the gates. The successful use of padlocks assumes strong control of the 
government management, as they do not allow adjustment without destruction of the lock. 
They seem to have been used only in a transition phase from the original unlocked pen-gates 
to spring-locked thread-gates. The spring-locks require two keys for manipulation (and three 
in case a box is added), but these two keys can easily be copied locally. They therefore allow 
manipulation without damage, though farmers sometimes damage the structures to facilitate 
manipulation. The spring-lock is thus a suitable device in control-through-bargaining 
situations between government managers and water users. It allows day-to-day adjustment 
of gate settings in response to changes in demand. The design also allows a division of 
management responsibilities between day and night, between government officials and 
farmers respectively, without damage to the structure, while the possibility of regulation is 
maintained. 
The second variable, sturdiness of the structure in which the gate is embedded, exhibits 
a variation of at least 4 types. Gate structures fixed in vertical pipes as found in distributary 
97 is the first. Together with the second, stone-and-mortar-with-visible-gate type, it dates 
from the early stages of the canals, when sturdiness was not a question. When demand, 
scarcity and the manipulation of structures by farmers increased more solid structures were 
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tried. The major change was to shift from stone-and-mortar to concrete, but leave the 
structure unchanged, that is the gate visible. This third type is now widely used. An 
additional change was to locate the gate in the middle of a concrete structure, to make it less 
accessible. This fourth 'bunker' type was found in subdistributary D24/9. These 
developments are an answer to a problem with which the 19th century engineers also tried 
to deal: how to make a structure tamper-proof? 
The variation, and its geographical spread, are the product of the history of water 
distribution practices in the particular canals where we find them, and from the balance of 
forces between government managers and farmers, and the forms of organisation and routines 
that have resulted from that. The resources of the different actors engaged in this social 
interaction may depend on external and contingent factors like the political party in power, 
non-water related factors that determine access to Irrigation Department offices and to other 
parts of the administration (like the Revenue Department and the legal system), and the social 
relations of the water users in the command area. The outcomes of interaction also depend, 
as this chapter and the previous illustrate, on the personal ambitions and capacities of the 
actors involved. Irrigation Department engineers can be 'smart' managers or not, committed 
or not, good technicians or not, and not in every distributary a 'body' of water users is 
formed. 
What kind of generalisations are possible on the basis of these empirical findings? Many 
of the factors mentioned above are interdependent in complex ways, and depend on other, 
contingent external factors. I therefore think there is not much scope for an effort to develop 
a general theory of factors that shape the technical features of pipe outlets. There is no fixed 
pattern of evolution of these technical forms. The emergence in 1992 of the ungated outlet 
in distributary 97 illustrates this. Regular spatial patterns do emerge, as shown in the 
examples of spatial distribution in sub-distributary D24/9 and distributary 93, but the type 
of regularity differs from canal to canal. Each of these regular patterns can be understood 
by the identification of factors relevant to that particular case, and the way they articulate. 
However, some tentative generalisation is possible at a different level. The case study can 
also be read as an example of the relation between technological change and state-farmers 
relations. More than firm statements the case allows a number of questions to be raised on 
this larger theme, which can be considered as an agenda for further research. 
The state, farmers and technological change 
I start with the observation that local level engineers (mostly Assistant Engineers overseeing 
(part of) a distributary canal) are quite innovative in their adaptation of the design of pipe 
outlets to changing conditions. At the same time however there is no sign of similar 
innovativeness with regard to the type of outlet structure. The use of pipe outlets is 
unquestioned. The problems in water management have not generated an internal debate in 
the engineering community on this particular design element, which, as this chapter has 
shown, is the crucial, and highly problematic, point of contact between farmers and the 
government management. How can this be explained? 
A first point is that irrigation engineers seem to be more interested in invention than 
adaptation. Their professional interest is aroused much more by the invention and deployment 
of new technologies than by making work and adaptation of existing technologies to changes 
in circumstances. 
Historically this is clear from the intensity of Indian irrigation engineering debate and 
experimentation in the early decades of the 20th century. The hydraulic and engineering 
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disciplines were undergoing strong development in that period, and many inventions were 
made. For outlet structures the starting point of this period lies around 1900. At a conference 
in Simla in 1904 several proposals for new devices were discussed (The Irrigation 
Conference Simla 1904, 1905; also see Kennedy, 1906).38> After this systematic 
experimentation took place in field research stations and laboratories. This resulted in a series 
of technical papers (see for example Crump, 1922; Inglis, 1928a&b; Inglis and Joglekar, 
1940). Crump's semi-module and Gibb's module reached a stage of development in the 1920s 
and 1930s that allowed use in real irrigation situations. As noted above, the semi-modular 
outlet became the dominant artefact in North India. The debate and experimentation came 
to a closure in the 1930s and 1940s, after which only smaller adaptations took place that did 
not change the hydraulic principles of the devices (see for example Bharadwaj, 1949). 
Then followed a period in which the design standards for the existing outlet structures 
became standard designs. For any canal structure (outlet, drop, flume) that needs to be 
constructed, a standard form and procedure is available. These were used in the design of 
the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal, as well as, at present, with any repair work. They can 
also be found in the irrigation engineering textbooks. Design and construction of canal level 
artefacts have been highly routinised.39) 
What does arouse the professional interest of irrigation engineers is the 'high tech' frontier 
of irrigation engineering. Examples of this are modern sprinkler and drip irrigation 
technologies, and different kinds of modelling that involve the use of computers. In general, 
the large and more spectacular civil works like dams are found more appealing than the 
mundane artefacts at the canal level. This predilection is also evident in the strong interest 
to receive training at prestigious technical irrigation faculties, particularly in the United 
States.40' 
Another illustration of the same point is the research focus of the Karnataka Engineering 
Research Station. When I visited the hydraulics department of this institution in 1996 I was 
informed that their research focused on the design of spillways for dams. Between the 1930s 
and 1960s there was attention for outlet structures and measuring devices, as evident from 
the publications quoted in section 8.2, but in the 1990s this was no longer there. As in other 
places of the world, outlet structures and measuring devices have become known structures, 
available, on the shelf as it were, when required (see Bos, 1978). 
What has not developed is a recognised professional interest in the day-to-day business of 
making designed artefacts work in practice, and the technological innovation associated with 
this. The adaptive work of local level engineers described in this chapter is not documented 
and detailed and prolonged field work was required to be able to recognise it. The engineers 
themselves hardly saw their work from the perspective described in this chapter. They 
usually described it as choices forced on them by the difficult circumstances of water 
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 For other design elements important developments also took place in this period. For a technical 
discussion of dam/weir and canal design in North India see Brown (1983/84). 
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 I suspect that in the training of irrigation engineers students are mainly taught to master these 
design routines, and that little emphasis is given to the choice between different designs. I have 
not investigated training curricula in detail, so this is a tentative observation. 
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 As noted above, British engineers were sent to Spain, Italy and France in the 19th century to 
collect ideas for new technologies. Around the turn of the century American and Australian 
engineers visited India (Wilson, 1903; Deakin, 1893). The newly independent Indian government 
sent some its engineers to the United States (and Italy and Yugoslavia) for the same purpose (Sain, 
1957). 
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management, and initially were often hesitant to discuss it because they had diverged from 
the standard designs. 
It can be noted in this respect that Indian irrigation engineers have virtually no formal 
training in the agricultural and institutional dimensions of irrigation management (see 
Chambers, 1988). In addition it is important to note that the designs of outlets and other 
lower level structures are mostly made by lower level and therefore often junior irrigation 
engineers. Their designs need the approval of higher level officers. The hierarchical structure 
of authority of the Irrigation Department does not create an incentive for innovativeness; it 
does create a strong bias to keep to standard designs. To propose something else than a pipe 
outlet would spark a lot of debate, and would put an individual engineer on the spot. Also, 
the introduction of a new type of outlet requires at least a distributary level approach. In 
most cases this exceeds the domain of the field level engineer. The response of local 
engineers seems to have been to take the institutional constraints as given and try to work 
within the margins that canal-level implementation allows. The degree of innovativeness that 
has been discussed in this chapter is therefore perhaps quite remarkable.41' 
The second point I want to raise concerns the interaction of irrigation engineers and 
farmers with regard to design and construction. The pipe outlets case study at first glance 
seems to be a classical example of the social (re)construction of a technical artefact. Different 
actors, notably farmers and Irrigation Department staff negotiate and renegotiate the technical 
characteristics of the device. However, farmers and irrigation staff hardly meet each other 
in this process of remodelling, and hardly ever directly discuss the desirable features of the 
structures. Farmers inflict damage on/remodel the outlet structures during the night or at 
other moments that no Irrigation Department staff is present. The staff registers the 
damage/remodelling and decides whether it should be repaired, and when, with or without 
changes in the design characteristics. After this is done a new round starts. Sometimes 
farmers make direct requests to the Irrigation Department to change outlets, for example 
when they think the pipe is installed below bed level, but these occasions are relatively rare. 
There are very few encounters at this interface (Long, 1989). 
What this means is that there is no formal or informal platform for the negotiation of 
technological innovations. Possibilities for a meaningful discussion between farmers and 
irrigation staff and among different groups of farmers, are more or less ruled out because 
of the lack of such a platform. Mahbub and Gulhati's hope that farmers would use the 
knowledge contained in their book to check whether the government managers provide 
sufficient water to their outlets therefore must remain an idle hope. Particularly those who 
do not get their share of the water have few possibilities to make their voice heard in such 
a way that it makes a difference, because there is no structured participation of water users 
in the technical decision-making of the Irrigation Department. 
To explain the absence of institutions for participation in design activities reference can 
be made to some of the same issues that were discussed above: the routinisation of irrigation 
design, the scope of the training of engineers, and the hierarchical organisation of the 
Irrigation Department, where accountability relations are upwards to superiors rather than 
411
 The design and estimate of a new pipe outlet structure or one that needs to be repaired has to 
be sent upwards in the Irrigation Department hierarchy for approval. But the design and estimate 
do not specify the exact type of gate to be used nor the mode of construction and construction 
material. The generality of the design and estimate create a space for adaptation to local 
conditions. Decisions on the precise construction characteristics can thus be made by Section 
Officers (see Bolding, 1992:100-105). 
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downwards to water users (also see chapter 7). In addition there is, on the farmers' side, the 
diversity of interests between headenders and tailenders, or more generally the problem of 
social differentiation. The same mechanisms that help to reproduce unequal water distribution 
at the outlet and distributary levels (see chapters 6 and 7) are likely to hamper the 
introduction of more democratic forms of technological change. 
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Institutional transformation in main canal management 
This chapter discusses changes in the organisation of water distribution in the Tungabhadra 
Left Bank main canal between 1980 and 1992. I describe two attempts to change main canal 
water distribution routines. Firstly I look at an attempt generated at the policy level to change 
main canal water distribution through and by the Command Area Development Authority 
(CADA) (section 9.2). Secondly, and more elaborately, I discuss how the day-to-day and 
year-to-year happenings in the command area induced institutional change in main canal 
management during a severe water crisis (section 9.3). This is preceded by a description of 
the inequality of water distribution at main canal level (section 9.1). 
In the concluding section 9.4 I first discuss the relevance of the water control framework 
for the analysis of main canal management. I briefly summarise how water distribution at 
main canal level is politically contested, and how the technical, organisational and socio-
economic/political dimensions of water control are related at this level. After that I discuss 
at greater length a number of specific conclusions that can be drawn from the main canal 
case study. The overall theme is what the case can teach us about irrigation policy for 
management reform. I argue for the adoption of a 'policy as process' perspective instead of 
the current 'policy as prescription' model. The former implies locally-specific policies, with 
more participatory policy formulation and more adaptive policy implementation. 
Finally, the chapter as a whole has two more general, and more mundane, objectives. 
Firstly it means to be a contribution to the very limited set of analyses of main canal 
distribution practices in South Asian irrigation. Detailed studies of irrigation water 
distribution practices at the level of the main canal are even rarer than those at distributary 
and outlet level. As a result we know much better what is not happening in main canal 
management - management as planned - than what is happening. 
Secondly, the chapter tries to sketch a more refined picture of the workings of the 
Irrigation Department than the popular images of rent-seeking and anarchy on the canals tend 
to suggest (also see chapter 7). It identifies a more complex set of difficulties in the 
realisation of more equitable water distribution than these common pejorative qualifications 
of main canal management allow. The chapter sketches some of the contours and limitations 
of the knowledgeability and capability of the Irrigation Department staff as central actors in 
main canal management. 
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9.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this introductory section I give the background information for the main story of the 
chapter. It includes a description of unequal water distribution at main canal level, the 
emergence of water scarcity and a distribution problem around 1980, and the importance of 
the opening and closure dates of the canal. 
Unequal distribution at main canal level 
In 1991-92 water distribution in the Tungabhadra Left Bank main canal was unequal, though 
how unequal is a matter of perspective. The main canal is divided into four Canal Divisions 
for its management (see figure 3.1 in chapter 3). Table 9.1 gives the water use in each of 
these Divisions, going from head to tail. I have taken a two-week period in February/March 
1992 for the calculation of the average discharges at the dam site and the borders of the 
Divisions. In this part of the agricultural year water stress is not extreme, but because it is 
in the rabi season, all water will certainly be used (in contrast to a period like November or 
December for example), and there was no rain (as was the case in the kharif season). 
Table 9.1 shows a head-tail pattern in the distribution of water along the main canal. 
Somewhat surprisingly perhaps, actual distribution is not extremely skewed when compared 
with the planned distribution as per the localised cropping pattern. The Irrigation Department 
manages to keep the water distribution reasonably close to the pattern as planned through 
localisation.1' 
But this is not how farmers look at the matter. For farmers localisation has become an 
irrelevant factor in their crop choice (see chapters 3, 6 and 7). Farmers throughout the 
command desire to practise intensive irrigation. If we consider the spread of the water over 
the four Divisions in relation to the irrigable command area in these Divisions, a much 
higher degree of inequality emerges. The water use per acre of command area is 2.2 times 
in the head end Division than in the tail end Division. It is this perception of inequality that 
underlies the water users' attitude toards the Irrigation Department's main canal management. 
The emergence of scarcity and a distribution problem 
The pattern of unequal, head-tail water distribution in the main canal was not always a 
problem. In the initial decades of the Left Bank Canal's existence there was surplus water 
at the level of the system as a whole. Table 9.2 shows the total water drawals from the 
reservoir for Left Bank Canal irrigation. It can be deduced from the table that in the 1960s 
the main canal did not have to run at full capacity. Till the mid-1970s 'bonus crops' were 
11
 The relatively higher water use in the second Division as compared to the First Division in 
proportion to the localisation pattern has to do with the much larger area localised for rice and 
sugarcane in the First Division (40998 versus 5861 acres). Several aspects of inequality are not 
visible in this table. In an overall analysis allowance would have to be made for the fact that part 
of the supply to the tail end comes in periods when it is not needed. This happens when the release 
at the dam site is insufficiently reduced in comparison to lowering demand (at harvest time for 
example). Another factor that accentuates the head-tail pattern is that the supply to the tail end 
covers a shorter period of the year. The tail end has to wait longer before the water arrives when 
the canal is opened or the discharge increased, and the water supply shrinks and stops earlier when 
the canal is closed or discharge reduced (the latter because upstream users try to draw the 
maximum when closure nears). This can easily make a difference of two weeks of water supply 
per year. The last exacerbating factor is that the supply to the tail end division is more variable than 
that to the upstream divisions. 
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Table 9 . 1 : Water use in the four Canal Divisions of the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal 
between 18.2.92 and 2.3 .92 
First Canal 
Division (head 
end) 
Second Canal 
Division 
Third Canal 
Division 
Fourth Canal 
Division (tail 
end) 
Water use in a Division 
(average discharge 
'consumed') (in 
cusecs) (a) 
986 
1140 
939 
456 
Actual water use as a 
proportion of planned 
water use according to 
the localisation pattern 
104% 
115% 
9 1 % 
80% 
Actual water use in 
proportion to the size 
of the Division's 
command area (b) 
141% 
103% 
92% 
64% 
a) This is the difference between average discharge in the main canal at the head and at the tail 
of the Division; average release at the dam site was 3541 cusecs. Based on gauge register and 
gauge table Irrigation Department. 
b) The total localised area was taken as the command area. For Division one to four these are 
119246, 188688, 173861 and 120903 acres respectively 
allowed in the summer season. A last indication of the existence of a surplus situation in the 
early phases of the canal's existence, is that in discussions on the length of the summer canal 
closure period during the 1970s, it was considered whether this should be 20 days or a month 
(GOKAR/PD, 1976; CADA/TBP, 1979). These periods look extremely short in the present 
circumstances.2' 
21
 This does not mean there were no management problems in the main canal. The major main canal 
management problem in this period was the occurrence of breaches (see GOKAR, n.d.) These 
breaches could cause serious water shortages for particular areas, depending on at which point in 
the canal they occurred, how long they took to repair, and what moment in the season it was. The 
breaches were a serious risk factor in irrigated agriculture, that caused insecurity of the water 
supply. In the 1970s the breach problem started to be remedied. The problem was identified to lie 
in the faulty construction of the main canal, particularly the unsatisfactory way in which the 
consolidation of the canal banks had been done. To remedy the problem, a programme of 'outer' 
and 'inner strengthening works' was designed, which is still in progress. Breaches are by no means 
fully a thing of the past, but reportedly the situation has improved. However, the Irrigation 
Department is also commonly accused by farmers of letting breaches occur and enlarge themselves 
by not promptly stopping water supply, in order to attract repair and maintenance funds. I am 
unable to judge the truth of this accusation. Breaches have distributional effects, but are not 
caused by distributional factors. Therefore, the implications of breaches are left aside. 
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Table 9.2: Total water drawals by the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal, 1961 -62 to 1991-92 
Year 
1961-62 
1962-63 
1963-64 
1964-65 
1965-66 
1966-67 
1967-68 
1968-69 
1969-70 
1970-71 
1971-72 
1972-73 
1973-74 
1974-75 
1975-76 
1976-77 
1977-78 
1978-79 
Total drawal fin TMCft) 
(a) (b) (c) 
38.809 
41.839 
56.683 
61.688 
67.655 
70.828 71.59 
63.193 62.66 
77.443 
74.250 
75.380 
75.380 
63.020 
67.83 
67.67 
73.38 
85.79 
(d) 
67 
78 
75 
85 
88 
(e) 
76.438 
87.463 
82.028 
94.932 
74.548 
85.885 
85.927 
Year 
1979-80 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
Total drawal (in TMCft) 
(c) (d) 
85 
89 
77 
80 
81 
82.298 
64.740 
(e) 
88.868 
88.086 
80.21 
80.938 
80.828 
76.209 
74.855 
83.604 
65.046 
69.74 
73.958 
75.857 
77.278 
70.924 
80.431 
73.322 
70.516 
TMcft. = Thousand Million cubic feet 
a) GOI/KWDT/MYDK-15 (1970) 
b) GOKAR/PD (1976:116) 
c) Gauge registers Irrigation Department, data collected in 1991-92 
d) Jurriens and Landstra (1990:table 13) 
e) Gauge registers Irrigation Department, data collected in 1997 
The present problem of insufficient supply to the tail end divisions with maximum main 
canal release, has emerged around 1980 and has intensified since then. Table 9.2 shows that 
for a long time the Left Bank Canal's total yearly drawals from the reservoir increased.3' 
This increase seems to have taken care of the increase in demand for water that was caused 
by ongoing land development for irrigation in the command area and the intensification of 
irrigation. In the course of the 1970s total drawals started to exceed 80 TMCft. and from 
then the increase stopped. In fact, there seems to be a decrease after 1980-81. The limit that 
was reached was the maximum discharge capacity of the main canal.4' In addition, the level 
of use that was reached in the Left Bank Canal and, presumably, in other canals that draw 
water from the Tungabhadra reservoir, led to the exhaustion of the reservoir earlier in the 
31
 Data from different sources and collected at different times from the same source are given in 
table 9.2 to indicate the reliability of the total drawals figures. 
41
 A factor that complicates the interpretation of the total drawals figures is that the discharge 
capacity of (parts of) the main canal increased during the 1980s through the outer and inner 
strengthening works programme. The main canal is still unable to carry its design discharge of 
4100 cusecs. The maximum drawal from the reservoir is about 3500 cusecs. It can be noted that 
the Left Bank Canal has never drawn its full share as allocated in the Krishna Water Disputes 
Tribunal's Award (see chapter 4). 
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year than before. This necessitated earlier canal closures, which automatically led to lower 
total drawals.5' 
I conclude from these figures and data collected through interviews that from 
approximately 1980 water distribution in the main canal has been a zero-sum game. The 
phenomenon of the relocation of water use to upstream reaches that was described in chapters 
5 and 7 for the distributary level, also started to occur at main canal level from this year.6* 
Canal opening and closure 
Before I enter into a discussion of the attempts to change main canal management once 
it had become an issue, it is useful to explain in some detail the relevance of the opening and 
closure dates of the canal. The opening and closure of the canal refers to the following three 
elements. 
1) The opening date at the beginning of the agricultural year (somewhere around June). 
2) The closure date at the end of the year (in the period March-May).7) 
3) The question of a closure period, and its length, halfway during the agricultural year 
(in November-December). 
The agronomic importance of an early opening date of the canal (at the start of the 
agricultural year) is that in this way (supplementary) irrigation is possible in the optimal 
sowing period of the rainfed/irrigated dry crops. It also allows early sowing and 
transplantation of rice. Late sowing leads to yield reduction. A further advantage of an early 
start of irrigation is that a second irrigated crop does not extend into the hot summer season 
that starts from March, but that irrigation can be stopped in February. This reduces the total 
yearly water requirement and, by implication, would allow spread of the available water over 
a larger area. 
51
 Whether the siltation of the reservoir has been a factor of significance in this process is difficult 
to judge. That it will become so at some point in the future is certain. 
611 consider 1980 to be a reasonably accurate, though necessarily approximate date because it was 
independently mentioned by different actors (farmers, officials, journalists) in different parts of the 
command area as the year when problems started. For example, farmers in the last distributary, 
distributary 106 (real number) reported that since 1980 their distributary has gone out of irrigation. 
It is very difficult, and very labour-intensive, to quantify the process described above more 
precisely. First, the required data on discharges, cropping patterns, irrigation efficiencies and other 
relevant factors are not all very reliable or simply do not exist. Furthermore, the figure of total 
drawals per year black-boxes a complex pattern of variation of demand and supply over time and 
space. There are 87 distributaries, each with a different history of the development of water use, 
which have affected main canal water management in different ways. And there are yearly 
variations in the quantity and timing of rainfall in the canal command area and in the catchment 
area of the reservoir. Also, variations in the cropping pattern occur caused by non-water factors 
like crop prices and pests. Demand for water increased, but not along a smooth curve, and the 
supply of water that was possible (and its timing) varied from year to year. There is thus not one 
single year in which demand and supply met. We are documenting the relocation process in greater 
detail at both distributary and main canal levels in subsequent research. 
71
 Actually, there is not one single closure date for the full main canal. The sugarcane growers in 
the first reach of the main canal upto Mile 36 are entitled to receive water into the month of May. 
This section of the canal is closed only in May. The discussion below refers to the closure date of 
the part of the main canal downstream from Mile 36. The struggle over the water release period 
for the sugarcane growers is in itself an interesting episode in the political contestation of main 
canal management, which involves a lot of legal action, but I leave it aside here. 
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The closure date at the end of the season is important for the irrigation of a second crop. 
As discussed in chapter 4 the original design of the scheme did not envisage any double 
cropping, that is two consecutive crops on the same piece of land. Irrigation was primarily 
meant to support the rainfed cropping calender, with cultivation of kharif and rabi crops on 
different plots. A release period of 8 months is sufficient for this cropping pattern.8' 
However, for farmers who had invested in the development of their lands and took the 
opportunity to cultivate two irrigated crops on their new plots, an opening period of the canal 
of 8 months is insufficient for full maturation of the rice crop." 
It is around the second rice crop that a lot of the struggle regarding the closure date 
revolves. The quicker depletion of the reservoir during the year, caused by the expansion and 
intensification of irrigation, started to affect the second (rice) crop. It pushed back the closure 
date to a moment earlier in the year. The full depletion of the reservoir in the rabi season 
under pressure of rice farmers also affects the start of the irrigation season in the following 
year. As a result there is no carry-over storage at the end of the agricultural year. Carry-over 
storage can be used for a timely start of irrigation in case the monsoon rains in the catchment 
(and inflows into the reservoir) start late. In the present situation the start of the irrigation 
fully depends on the timing of the monsoon rains in the catchment. 
The closure period halfway the agricultural year has to do with the second rice crop as 
well. One of the main aims of a closure in November-December is to curb rice cultivation 
in the second season. Closure makes it impossible to raise rice nurseries, when it is well 
timed and sufficiently long.10' Another aspect of mid-year closure is that it saves water in 
a period with low demand for water because temperatures are low and many crops have been 
harvested. 
After having presented this background information I can now proceed to discuss the first 
attempt to change the pattern of unequal distribution at main canal level. This involves the 
introduction of a new actor in water distribution. Apart from farmers, Irrigation Department 
staff and politicians, the Command Area Development Authority plays a role. 
9.2 CADA AND WARABANDI: A NEW PLAYER AND A NEW GAME 
This section describes the fate of the efforts to change the organisation of water distribution 
in canal irrigation systems through the establishment of Command Area Development 
Authorities. I focus on the events in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal command area, but 
situate the account in the overall Command Area Development effort. The story conveys how 
a policy conceived at the Central Government level was translated and transformed during 
its long journey to implementation at the system and canal level. 
81
 This 8 months release period has been introduced in later projects in Karnataka like the 
Malaprabha and Upper Krishna Project. 
91
 Particularly in case farmers choose to cultivate long duration rice varieties like Sona Masuri, 
instead of shorter duration varieties like IR-64 or Emergency. 
101
 Farmers can get around this by ponding water in rice plots before the canal closes, by storage 
of water in farm ponds, or by starting nurseries along the natural drains or the river by means of 
lift irrigation. 
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The establishment of CADAs 
In 1973 the Central Government issued instructions to the States to establish Command Area 
Development Authorities for its irrigation schemes (see GOI/MOI/CAD and water 
management division, 1984 for the orders with regard to Command Area Development). The 
establishment of Command Area Development Authorities in India was the result of the 
recommendations of the Irrigation Commission and the National Commission on Agriculture 
(GOI/MOIP, 1972, GOI/National Commission on Agriculture, 1973).ll) These commissions 
had noted and investigated - among other things - the underutilisation of large scale irrigation 
systems. Better management to remedy underutilisation was, and is, considered as a major 
contribution to the resolution of the food crisis and an important contribution to agricultural 
growth in general (GOI/PC, 1992).12> Command Area Development Authorities were 
presented as the suitable institution to undertake such remedial action (see Box 9.1 for the 
establishment of CADAs in Karnataka). 
Command Area Development Authorities were intended to be interdisciplinary institutions 
that integrated and had authority over the line departments that worked in the irrigation 
system concerned. 
The Command Area Development Authority would be responsible for water utilisation 
and integrated area development in the irrigation command, including modernisation 
of the distribution system, the provision of drainage and the maintenance and operation 
of both the distribution and drainage systems. (D.O. No.F.ll-9/73-CAD, dated 1st 
September 1973, from Secretary, Union Ministry of Agriculture to State Chief 
Secretaries, on Setting up of CAD Authorities-Objectives, Jurisdiction, Constitution 
and Powers etc., in: GOI/MOI/CAD and Water Management Division, 1984:20) 
This was a vast mandate, which included main canal management. The institutional status 
and position of Command Area Development Authorities differs somewhat from State to 
State, but nowhere did they get the position as envisaged in this quotation. In practice the 
Command Area Development programme focused on the physical activities of field channel 
construction, 'on farm development' and the introduction of rotational water distribution 
below the outlet (see for example Hart, 1978; Pant and Verma, 1983; Wade, 1982b). 
I highlight two important, and related, reasons for this development. The first is the way 
the problem of underutilisation that the CADAs were supposed to solve was defined. The 
second is the active resistance to the establishment of a coordination authority by particularly 
the Irrigation Department, which stood to lose control over its full domain. 
In the first identification of the underutilisation and management problem, policy makers 
located the cause of this problem at the farm and outlet level: farmers did not construct field 
channels and field drains, they did not level their lands, and if they did they tended to waste 
water. 
As is well known it is the management of water in the commands of major and minor 
projects which offers the greatest scope for improved production. These commands 
represent about 50% of our total irrigation potential and suffer from a number of 
111
 The Command Area Development (CAD) programme of which the establishment of CADAs was 
an element, was strongly supported by organisations like the World Bank and USAID. The 
programme was funded by the Central Government. 
121
 The (under)utilisation rate of irrigation systems is usually expressed as the ratio between the 
total area irrigated in a system and the total area made suitable for irrigation by the Irrigation 
Department. However, it can also be expressed as the ratio of actual water use and projected 
water use, for example. For a technical discussion of the concept of (under)utilisation, see Mitra 
(1986). 
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Box 9.1 CADAs in Karnataka 
Karnataka's response to the Command Area Development Authority initiative was slow. It 
took till 1980 before the Karnataka Command Areas Development Act (Act No.6 of 1980) 
was accepted, which arranged the legal framework for Command Area Development 
Authorities. In the mid 1970s, following the Central Government instructions, CADAs were 
established, but it seems only in the form of CADA Boards, without an executive institution 
attached to it. Such a Board also existed for the Tungabhadra project. The command area 
development work was carried out through the line departments, as it had been before. The 
Karnataka Command Area Development Authorities were 'revitalised' in 1979-80 (CADA/TBP, 
1986:15) within the legal framework of the new Karnataka Command Area Development Act. 
The Tungabhadra CADA was constituted as a statutory body on 11 December 1979. For the 
Tungabhadra Project a CADA-like setup was in place already before the Command Area 
Development programme started. In the 1950s and 1960s the developmental activities in the 
Tungabhadra command area were coordinated by the Divisional Commissioner of Gulbarga 
Division, of which Raichur District was part, who was the ex-officio Administrator of the 
Tungabhadra Project. A Deputy Administrator (who was Additional Deputy Commissioner 
under the Revenue Department) was based in Munirabad, the dam site. There was also the 
Tungabhadra Advisory Board (TAB) with 8 non-official members, and a Project Working Group 
of which all the departmental heads were members (GOMYS, 1957-58; GOI/PC/PEO, 1965). 
The Administrator and Deputy Administrator were both IAS (Indian Administrative Service) 
officers, that is, high level government officials. There was thus a clear effort to come to an 
overall development process in the command area of the Tungabhadra project from an early 
date. The new CADA structure combined the authority of the earlier Administrator with the 
tasks of the Project Working Group. The present ICC (Irrigation Consultative Committee) is 
a very similar body to the TAB. Also in terms of practical work, there was not much new: in 
the 1950s the Hyderabad Government already decided to construct field channels and not 
to leave this to farmers. What was new was the effort to create an institution that had far 
reaching authority over the technical departments that worked in the command area, and the 
location of the coordination authority outside the Revenue Department. Some people have 
told me that the organisation of the Tungabhadra project served as the model for the 
Command Area Development policy. I have been unable to verify this statement. 
deficiencies, the most important of which are the lack of adequate delivery systems 
which should reach upto the farmers' fields, the lack of proper land-shaping and 
levelling of fields, the absence of drainage, where necessary, as well as such other 
factors as the proper timing of water supplies and the avoidance of wastage through 
seepage, etc. The lack of infrastructural support in such matters as extension, 
demonstrations adequate communications, marketing facilities, scientific crop planning 
and the supply of inputs, such as, credit, fertilisers, pesticides, machinery, seeds etc. 
are also important matters. The shortage of power, and recently of diesel in the case 
of areas commanded by minor irrigation also needs to be looked into urgently.(D.O. 
No.F.ll-9/73-CAD, dated 19th May 1973, from Union Minister of Agriculture to 
Chief Ministers of States, on Command Area Development-Concepts and Organisation 
Pattern, in: GOI/MOI/CAD and Water Management Division, 1984:1-2) 
A similar relegation of water management problems to the outlet level command area level 
occurred when in 1980 a policy was adopted to introduce the much acclaimed North Indian 
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warabandi system of water distribution in all Indian canal irrigation system.13' The features 
of warabandi as a system of rotational (weekly) water distribution at distributary and outlet 
level, with water allocation to plots on a time/acre basis were explained in chapters 3 and 
8. In an important policy workshop organised by the Administrative Staff College of India 
(ASCI), in Hyderabad in April 1980, the following definition of warabandi was agreed upon 
for the purposes of the Command Area Development policy. 
Several viewpoints on Warabandi were discussed, taking into account the different 
systems existing in the country, such as Osrabandi, Shejpali and the Phad systems. 
Finally, a common view emerged as reflected in the following definition: 
"Warabandi is a system of equitable water distribution by turns according to pre-
determined schedule specifying the day, time and duration of supply to each irrigator 
in proportion to land holdings in the outlet command." (Singh, 1981:46) 
A similar perception existed at the Tungabhadra project level. When the Chief Engineer 
Tungabhadra Project was invited in 1980 by the CAD A Administrator14' to comment on the 
implementability of warabandi in the project, he described warabandi as follows in his reply. 
Here it is to be pointed out that [the] Command Area Development Authority is in 
charge of water management below the outlet and since [the] warabandi system 
essentially deals with distribution of water under each outiet, the work of implementing 
warabandi system on an experimental basis in the beginning and later extending it to 
the entire [command area] will have to be responsibility of Command Area 
Development Authorities. 
Neither in the workshop definition, nor in the Chief Engineer's description is there any 
reference to the main system management element of warabandi (proportional distribution 
over outlets by maintaining full supply levels in distributary canals by systematic on/off 
rotation of these canals). The definitions only refer to water distribution over farmers within 
the outlet command. On its journey from North to South India and in the step from policy 
to practice, some elements of the warabandi model disappeared. 
It is not the case that views that emphasised the importance of main system management 
were not voiced. In the same workshop referred to above it was noted that on the basis of 
experiments with the introduction of warabandi undertaken in the 1970s, 
it was soon realised that the main canal system must behave in a disciplined manner 
discharging sufficient quantity of water at the required supply level. Undependability 
of canal supplies made Warabandi a meaningless exercise. (Singh, 1981:1)15) 
Within the borders of Karnataka there was documented experience with rotation at 
distributary level, particularly in Bhadra Project, Tunga anicut and Malaprabha Project. The 
Chief Engineer Tungabhadra Project chose to disregard this experience, though it was part 
of the available documentation. The introduction of warabandi fully focused on the outlet 
level. It involved the design of rotation schedules for these outlets and, later, the 
establishment of outlet-level Water Users Associations. 
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 It was the Fifth Conference of State Irrigation Ministers, held in Bangalore in December 1980, 
which decided that warabandi should be introduced in all major systems in India. The first 
experiments in Karnataka with the warabandi system took place in the Hemavathy and Harangi 
commands in 1981-82 (Govindaiah, 1989). 
141
 The Administrator is the head of the executive part of the CADA. There is also a CADA Board 
which governs the CADA. It is headed by a Chairman. The chairmanship is a political appointment. 
It is often held by former MPs or MLAs or other politically active persons. 
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 Also see Wade and Chambers (1980) for an elaborate discussion of main system management 
as the gap in irrigation intervention. 
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The absence of a main system component in the CADA water management programmes 
can be explained by the second reason mentioned above: the resistance of trie Irrigation 
Department to the creation of a coordinating institution. This can be well illustrated with the 
Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal case. 
CADA and warabandi in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal 
The warabandi concept arrived in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal in 1979-80. In 1979 
warabandi received its first mention and advocacy in the report of the Tungabhadra Ryots 
Grievances Committee, chaired by the executive head of the CADA, the Administrator 
(CADA/TBP, 1979). In March 1980 the CADA Administrator sent a report on a 1970s 
warabandi experiment in another Indian State to the Irrigation Department's Superintending 
Engineers, Executive Engineers and Assistant Executive Engineers. It was accompanied by 
the question what the Irrigation Department's opinion was on the implementability of 
warabandi in the Tungabhadra project, and what was already happening in this regard. Also, 
the recommendations of the Hyderabad workshop of April 1980 were distributed and the 
Chief Engineer Tungabhadra Project was asked to send his comments to the Secretary to 
Government (Irrigation).16' 
The Chief Engineer quoted above had already located both the area and responsibility for 
implementing warabandi outside the Irrigation Department's domain. He continued to explain 
his position more explicitly as follows.17' 
The suggestion of the workshop that wing of Irrigation Department concerning 
operation and maintenance should be brought under Command Area Development 
Authority, cannot be accepted. Command Area Development Authority is responsible, 
for management below the outlet point with the coordination of other departments. 
Since it is a statutory body, Command Area Development Authority should have its 
own staff or get it from concerned departments on deputation. The centrfal] works of 
maintenance of main canal and distributaries including the outlet structures and 
supplying correct discharge at the outlet point should be with the Irrigation Department 
and the Irrigation Department should not be made subordinate to the Command Area 
Development Authority. Here it is to be stated that a separate Engineering wing has 
already been provided under CADA and hence no further action is necessary to 
transfer any section of the Irrigation Department under CADA. 
But the political push to implement the new warabandi policy was strong. In January 1981 
the Central Government issued a notice following a meeting of irrigation ministers the month 
before, to implement warabandi on a pilot scale in at least two distributaries in each scheme. 
The Irrigation Department was forced to engage in its implementation. 
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 This instruction to report to the Secretary to Government (Irrigation) exemplifies the relationship 
between the Chief Engineer and the CADA Administrator. The CADA Administrator is higher in rank 
than the Chief Engineer, but in many cases the Chief Engineer does not accept that authority. The 
CADA Administrator has to get support from the politico-administrative boss of the Chief Engineer, 
that is the Secretary to Government (Irrigation). Another issue here is that CADA Administrators 
initially were IAS (Indian Administrative Service) officers, while the Irrigation Department argued 
that they should be engineers. There is also ongoing discussion whether the Secretaries to 
Government in the Irrigation Department should come from the engineering cadre or be IAS 
officers. One element of the difficult relationship between the Irrigation Department and the CADAs 
is the more general animosity between 'technocrats' and 'bureaucrats' (see for example Deccan 
Herald, 7.11.88 and The Hindu, 14.1.90). 
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 See letter No. CE/TBP/PLN/Warabandi/TA7/80-81/7758/2 of 23.10.80. 
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The CADA Administrator's request to select suitable distributaries for warabandi pilot 
schemes was sent down the Irrigation Department hierarchy in the system. The answer that 
came back was that no suitable distributaries existed. The reason that no suitable pilot canals 
could be found is that the CADA irrigation engineer who wrote the request for selection had 
put rather stringent technical conditions for the pilot distributaries. These conditions were that 
there should be control/measurement devices (like V-notches) in the pipe outlets, that all 
cross drainage works should be in working condition, and that soil and cadastral maps should 
be available. One wonders why the CADA irrigation engineer, deputed from the Irrigation 
Department, should put a condition like a measuring device at pipe outlet level, as this was 
never even planned to be a design element of the Tungabhadra system. Whatever may have 
been the reason, this and the other conditions made it very easy for the Irrigation Department 
to claim non-implementability. 
However, other factors than protection of its own territory may also have played a role 
in the attitude of the Irrigation Department. The Chief Engineer of the Tungabhadra project 
also informed the CADA Administrator, that it would be very difficult to implement 
warabandi. 
It is learnt from them [the Executive Engineers, PPM] that whereas the tail-enders of 
distributaries, where water supply is very unsatisfactory are very enthusiastic about 
warabandi system which ensures equitable distribution of water on the basis of land 
holding, the irrigators at higher reaches where gross indiscipline, such as unauthorised 
irrigation and violation of cropping pattern is prevalent, are not agreeing for any new 
method of irrigation, such as warabandi, to be introduced, since naturally it will end 
the indiscipline by which they are now benefitted. It is, therefore very difficult to 
introduce warabandi system unless the irrigators under the entire distributary agree for 
introducing such a system. 
As discussed in chapter 7, the Irrigation Department in interaction with farmers had 
developed rotation systems at distributary level in several distributaries, which created some 
regularity in the distribution schedules in these canals, even when these were highly unequal. 
It is understandable that the Irrigation Department was not very keen on others to come and -
in their view - upset these routines. It knew very well that implementation of warabandi on 
a serious scale would require the confrontation of inequality problems at distributary and 
main canal level. 
The administrative ping-pong game between the Irrigation Department and the Command 
Area Development Authority was concluded in 1982 after the Secretary to Government 
(Irrigation) sent the instruction to introduce warabandi to the Chief Engineer of the 
Tungabhadra Project directly in September 1981. Warabandi then acquired the meaning it 
would keep to the end of the decade. In the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal the concept had 
the following elements. 
1) At the outlet level the introduction of rotational water supply completely became a 
Command Area Development Authority activity. This effort was necessarily on a very 
small scale because the CADA hardly had any presence at field level. The 
implementation of warabandi at outlet level therefore met with very little success. 
The same is true for the establishment of Water Users Associations which during the 
1980s were increasingly seen as important for successfully introducing warabandi. 
In the places where the policy was formally implemented (according to the CADA 
annual reports) it seems mainly to have been a paper exercise. For example, the 
1986-87 annual report of CADA Tungabhadra Project mentions the introduction of 
warabandi and the establishment of a Water Users Association in a particular outlet 
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in a subdistributary investigated in this research project. In 1991-92 not a trace could 
be found of either, and also there was no sediment in the farmers' memory.18* When 
a CAD A official in the middle reach of the system in 1992 showed me a list of about 
80 officially established Water Users Associations, and I asked about their status, he 
replied that "it only takes the stroke of a pen to abolish them". The warabandi 
signboard with the rotation schedules painted on them were standing in his office 
unused. The Tungabhadra project is no exception to the rule that water users 
associations created in a top-down administrative manner generally have a short life. 
2) At the distributary level, warabandi in the larger distributaries came to mean a 
rotation system over subdistributaries and pipe outlets, as discussed in the chapter 7. 
These rotations had often emerged earlier than the formal introduction of warabandi. 
Warabandi became a label for something that already existed. During the 1980s 
orders to introduce warabandi in the bigger distributaries were routinely issued in 
times of increased scarcity and conflict. The Irrigation Department did not hurry to 
pass these orders down the hierarchy. 
3) At the main canal level, the Tungabhadra CADA in November 1982 issued a circular 
to introduce an on/off system for smaller distributaries. Small and very small 
distributaries were supposed to be closed for one or two days a week to push more 
water to the tail end of the main canal. This was thus an effort by the Command Area 
Development Authority to do something about unequal water distribution in the main 
canal. This document, though formally in force and regularly referred to in times of 
crisis, practically led a sleeping existence till the end of the decade. I have found no 
evidence of actual implementation of the rotation of the smaller distributaries in the 
main canal in the 1982-88 period.19' 
It may be concluded from the foregoing that the Tungabhadra Project Irrigation 
Department effectively neutralised the possible influence of the Command Area Development 
Authority on main system management in the first ten years after the CADA was established. 
The CADA was allocated a space in the pipe outlet command area, where the Irrigation 
Department itself did not work. The fact that the CADA staff consisted of staff deputed from 
other departments, including the Irrigation Department will not have made the execution of 
the authority formally given to the CADA easier. Because of the weakness of the CADAs 
in number of staff, the CADA remained extremely dependent on the Irrigation Department 
for the implementation of anything to do with water distribution. The effort to improve the 
Irrigation Department's irrigation management practices through the Command Area 
Development policy failed without ever having a serious chance of success. 
However, the story of the Command Area Development Authority's role in main canal 
management does not fully end here. The main canal on/off system circular became a 
resource in the process of change in main canal management in 1988-90. This change was 
generated from within the system itself, to which events I now turn. 
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 Personal communication Kees van Straaten, 1992. 
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 But I can't claim to have seen all possible evidence. 
CHANGING TABLES 227 
9.3 GETTING THE GAUGES RIGHT 
Despite many conferences and workshops, the establishment of new institutions, and pilot 
programmes not much changed in the actual management practices in the canal irrigation 
systems during the 1980s. In this period the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal witnessed a 
proliferation of main canal management problems as a result of increasing water scarcity (see 
section 9.1). These problems escalated in the years 1988-1989 and 1989-90. The escalation 
induced some institutional changes in main canal management which in my evaluation have 
improved it, and have perhaps created a small basis for further change. In this section I 
discuss how the events in these two years unrolled. 
Gauge and discharge tables 
The process of change in main canal management that took place in the period 1988-1990 
can be summarised in two gauge and discharge tables.20' These are tables that list the water 
levels and the related flows at different points along the main canal. When the level at one 
point is known, the corresponding levels (the proportionate gauges) at other points of the 
canal can be read from the table. The main canal is divided into four sections, managed by 
different Canal Divisions of the Irrigation Department. Each of these Divisions is headed by 
an Executive Engineer (EE) who is the senior officer for water management in the Division 
(see figure 3.1 for an organigram of the Irrigation Department in the Tungabhadra Left Bank 
Canal). 
The important gauge points, that is points for measurement of water levels, are those at 
the borders of the Divisions. These are the gauges at Mile 0, Mile 47, Mile 69 and Mile 104. 
In every division a gauge book or gauge register is kept, in which the gauges at the border 
points are noted hourly. The communication of these figures is done through the canal 
telephone network, that links the offices with the gauge locations along the canal. 
With the gauge and discharge table in hand an Executive Engineer can determine the water 
level he is entitled to receive by looking at the gauges in the upstream divisions. He can also 
read off the gauge he has to maintain at the downstream exit point of his division, to pass 
on to the next division. The activity of main canal management is thus basically the process 
of getting the gauges right, and the gauge and discharge table is a crucial instrument for 
this.2" 
The mode of calculation of the gauge and discharge table is extremely important. 
Particularly important is the relative position of the columns, that is which level at Mile X 
is seen to be proportionate to the level at Mile Y. When we look at the table in use in the 
Left Bank Canal in 1988 (see table 9.3), this table was calculated on the basis of the 
localisation pattern: the protective cropping pattern sanctioned by the government. Up to 
1988 the Irrigation Department formally used this table for main canal management. 
However, because of the actual cropping pattern, with large areas of rice in the head end 
divisions, this table had little practical value. The real management of the main canal took 
place on the basis of indents prepared by the Executive Engineers of the different divisions, 
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 The expression 'gauge and discharge table' is derived from the heading above one of the tables 
and used because it is more informative than the term 'working table' normally used by the 
Irrigation Department engineers. 
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 Because the Left Bank Canal has been designed as a supply oriented continuous flow system, 
without cross regulators water levels are and can be the main piece of information for canal 
management. 
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Table 9.3: Old gauge and discharge table for Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal 
Close to dam 
Depth 
(feet) 
11.55 
11.45 
11.35 
11.25 
11.20 
11.15 
11.05 
10.95 
10.85 
10.75 
10.65 
10.55 
10.45 
10.35 
10.30 
10.20 
10.10 
10.00 
9.90 
9.80 
9.70 
9.60 
9.50 
9.40 
9.30 
9.20 
9.10 
9.00 
8.85 
8.75 
8.65 
8.55 
8.45 
8.35 
8.25 
8.10 
8.00 
7.90 
7.85 
7.75 
7.55 
7.45 
7.30 
7.15 
7.05 
6.95 
6.80 
6.75 
Discharge 
(cusecs) 
3826 
3800 
3750 
3700 
3650 
3600 
3550 
3500 
3450 
3400 
3350 
3300 
3250 
3200 
3150 
3100 
3050 
3000 
2950 
2900 
2850 
2800 
2750 
2700 
2650 
2600 
2550 
2500 
2450 
2400 
2350 
2300 
2250 
2200 
2150 
2100 
2050 
2000 
1950 
1900 
1850 
1800 
1750 
1700 
1650 
1600 
1550 
1500 
Mile 47 
Depth 
(feet) 
12.10 
12.10 
12.00 
11.90 
11.80 
11.70 
11.60 
11.50 
11.40 
11.30 
11.20 
11.10 
11.00 
10.90 
10.80 
10.70 
I 10.60 
10.50 
10.40 
10.30 
10.20 
10.10 
10.05 
9.95 
9.85 
9.75 
9.65 
9.60 
9.55 
9.45 
9.35 
9.25 
9.15 
9.10 
9.05 
8.95 
8.85 
8.75 
8.65 
8.55 
8.45 
8.35 
8.25 
8.15 
8.05 
7.90 
7.80 
7.65 
Discharge 
(cusecs) 
2776 
2774 
2734 
2701 
2665 
2628 
2592 
2555 
2519 
2482 
2446 
2409 
2373 
2336 
2300 
2263 
2227 
2190 
2154 
2117 
2080 
2044 
2008 
1971 
1935 
1898 
1862 
1825 
1789 
1752 
1716 
1679 
1643 
1606 
1570 
1533 
1497 
1460 
1424 
1387 
1351 
1314 
1278 
1241 
1205 
1168 
1132 
1095 
Mile 69 
Depth 
(feet) 
9.95 
9.85 
9.75 
9.70 
9.65 
9.60 
9.45 
9.40 
9.35 
9.30 
9.20 
9.10 
9.05 
8.95 
8.85 
8.80 
8.75 
8.65 
8.55 
8.45 
8.40 
8.35 
8.25 
8.15 
8.05 
7.95 
7.85 
7.80 
7.70 
7.65 
7.55 
7.45 
7.35 
7.25 
7.15 
7.05 
7.00 
6.85 
6.75 
6.65 
6.55 
6.45 
6.35 
6.25 
6.15 
6.05 
5.95 
5.85 
Discharge 
(cusecs) 
1716 
1710 
1688 
1665 
1643 
1620 
1598 
1575 
1553 
1530 
1508 
1485 
1463 
1440 
1418 
1395 
1373 
1350 
1328 
1305 
1283 
1260 
1238 
1215 
1195 
1170 
1148 
1125 
1103 
1080 
1058 
1035 
1013 
990 
968 
945 
923 
900 
878 
855 
833 
810 
788 
765 
743 
720 
698 
675 
Mile 104 
Depth 
(feet) 
6.90 
6.85 
6.80 
6.75 
6.70 
6.65 
6.60 
6.55 
6.50 
6.45 
6.40 
6.35 
6.30 
6.25 
6.20 
6.15 
6.10 
6.05 
6.00 
5.95 
5.90 
5.85 
5.80 
5.75 
5.70 
5.65 
5.60 
5.55 
5.45 
5.40 
5.35 
5.30 
5.25 
5.15 
5.10 
5.00 
4.95 
4.90 
4.85 
4.75 
4.70 
4.65 
4.55 
4.45 
4.40 
4.35 
4.25 
4.20 
Discharge 
(cusecs) 
620 
608 
600 
592 
584 
576 
568 
560 
552 
544 
536 
528 
520 
512 
504 
496 
488 I 
480 
472 
464 
456 
448 
440 
432 
424 
416 
408 
400 
392 
384 
376 
368 
360 
352 
344 
336 
328 
320 
312 
304 
296 
288 
280 
272 
264 
256 
248 
240 
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Table 9.4: N e w gauge and 
Mile 
Depth 
(feet) 
11.60 
11.55 
11.50 
11.45 
11.40 
11.375 
11.350 
11.325 
11.300 
11.275 
11.250 
11.225 
11.200 
11.175 
11.150 
11.125 
11.100 
11.075 
11.050 
11.025 
11.000 
10.975 
10.975 
10.850 
10.75 
I 10.65 
47 
Discharge 
(cusecs) 
2592.00 
2573.00 
2555.00 
2537.00 
2519.00 
2516.00 
2513.00 
2510.00 
2507.00 
2496.25 
2485.50 
2474.75 
2464.00 
2452.50 
2441.00 
2430.50 
2420.00 
2409.00 
2398.00 
2387.00 
2376.00 
2366.63 
2357.25 
2319.75 
2282.25 
2244.75 
discharge table for Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal 
Mile 69 
Depth 
(feet) 
Discharge 
(cusecs) 
9.00 1455.31 
8.95 1440.33 
8.90 1425.35 
8.80 1397.73 
[_8.75 1383.5FJ 
8.73 1376.51 
8.70 1369.44 
8.675 1362.45 
8.650 1355.46 
8.625 1348.48 
8.600 1341.49 
8.575 1334.45 
8.550 1327.41 
8.525 1320.43 
8.500 1313.45 
8.475 1306.53 
8.450 1299.60 
8.425 1292.68 
8.400 1285.75 
8.375 1279.01 
8.350 1272.27 
8.325 1265.54 
8.300 1258.80 
8.200 1231.78 
8.100 1205.09 
8.00 1178.74 
Mile 104 
Depth 
(feet) 
Discharge 
(cusecs) 
L6.15 476.50 j 
6.00 469.00 
5.95 461.50 
5.80 439.00 
5.700 425.00 
5.675 421.50 
5.650 418.00 
5.625 414.50 
5.600 411.00 
5.575 407.50 
5.550 404.00 
5.525 400.50 
5.500 397.00 
5.475 393.75 
5.450 390.50 
5.425 387.25 
5.400 384.00 
5.375 380.75 
5.350 377.50 
5.325 374.25 
5.300 371.00 
5.275 367.75 
5.25 364.50 
5./5 352.00 
5.05 340.00 
4.95 327.001 
which reflected actual cropping patterns.22' The allocations to the divisions were thus 
regularly renegotiated within the Irrigation Department.23' From these allocations were 
derived particular relations between the gauge levels at different points in the canal, which 
varied from occasion to occasion. 
In 1990 a different gauge and discharge table came into use (see table 9.4). In this table 
the downstream columns have been shifted upwards. This means that a lower water level is 
now seen to be corresponding to a particular upstream level than before. The new gauge and 
discharge table can be seen as an institutional consolidation of the already existing unequal 
water distribution pattern in the main canal. The change of tables might be interpreted as a 
defeat of the tailenders, and a defeat of the irrigation administration, by the head end rice 
farmers. Finally, one might analyse, the actual unequal pattern of water distribution and the 
rice dominated cropping pattern related to it, have received some sort of institutional 
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 Within limits imposed by the distributary canal capacities. 
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 The frequency of meetings of the Executive Engineers on the indents varied with the degree of 
water scarcity and concomitant level of conflict on the canal. 
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sanction.24> This sentiment was indeed expressed by irrigation officials when they described 
the new table to me as being 'unscientific'. Unscientific is the code word for politically 
mediated or enforced. However, if we take a closer look at the social process that produced 
this change of tables, a different interpretation than defeat emerges. 
Main canal management in 1988-89 
The 1988-89 irrigation season started badly. In the first week of July 1988 the lowest levels 
of the Tungabhadra reservoir in 35 years were recorded. Only a very small amount of 
drinking water for Raichur town, the district capital located at the tail end of the canal, could 
be released into the Left Bank Canal, but no water for irrigation purposes. In the course of 
July inflows into the reservoir increased, but in the beginning of August there was a breach 
in the main canal, because of which the full canal had to be closed for a week. By the end 
of August reservoir levels were higher than the previous year, but the damage had been 
done: the start of the irrigation season had been delayed, a delay that would automatically 
affect the sowing dates for the second irrigation season. This implied that the second 
irrigation season would extend further into the hot summer season of March and April, when 
water is short and the canal is scheduled to be closed. 
In September and October 1988 there were the usual scarcity problems, as this is both the 
peak period for crops like rice, and the overlap period of the rainfed cropping seasons (see 
chapter 7). In the tail end region of the main canal processions were organised to protest 
against headenders who took too much water, and Irrigation Department officials started 
night controls on the distributaries and main canal with police protection. But, experience had 
taught that the real problematic season would be the second season, particularly the months 
of February, March and April. In anticipation of the problems in the months to come, the 
Irrigation Department launched an administrative effort to avoid them. In November 1988 
it was already clear that a limited quantity of water would be available for the second season 
because of the poor reservoir situation, which, according to the Chief Engineer, would not 
be sufficient even for 'irrigated dry' crops. Lower officials were instructed to announce this 
in all villages through loudspeakers, and press statements were released. In November the 
Irrigation Consultative Committee (ICC, see above) decided to close the Left Bank Canal 
between 25 November and 15 December (and thus limit rice cultivation in the rabi season). 
However, the decision was reversed in the same month under pressure of appeals from 
farmers and legislators.25' In December 1988 the Irrigation Department distributed notices 
that only 'irrigated dry' crops should be grown. In the same month canal officials were 
instructed to introduce warabandi as per the 1982 CADA notification. In January 1989 the 
gauge and discharge table based on the localisation pattern was sent to all Executive 
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 Though the new gauge and discharge table was prepared on the instruction of the Chief 
Engineer, it does not seem to be a fully public document. When I asked for a gauge and discharge 
table in the Irrigation Department office near the dam in spring 1992, I was given the old table 
based on the localisation pattern, and the same thing happened to us, unasked, in 1997. 
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 In the previous year, 1987-1988 a canal closure in November/December had been implemented 
for the first time (from 22 November to 13 December there was no discharge into the main canal 
that year). In 1987-88 the water situation and the timing of the crops must have been more 
favourable than in 1988-89 because no extreme things seems to have happened in that year. 
However, Anagol wrote in 1969 that "the canal which used to be closed for one month during 
December in the past is now proposed to be closed during May." (Anagol, 1969:A116) There may 
thus have been November/December closures in the earlier history of the canal. 
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Engineers.26' But, neither the notices, the gauge and discharge table, nor the efforts to 
introduce an on/off system at main canal level were very successful. A lot of rice was grown 
in the second season, and with the increasing temperature in February and March, the Left 
Bank Canal area also got heated up socially and politically. 
The issue was, as usual, the closure date of the main canal. The Left Bank Canal was 
scheduled to be closed for at least two months, April and May, for repairs and because of 
lack of water in the reservoir. The decision making on the closure date of the canal takes 
place in the Irrigation Consultative Committee. This body is chaired and convened by the 
CADA Administrator, and has members from the Irrigation Department and other technical 
departments, the district administration (Deputy and Assistant Commissioners), and the 
Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs) from the command area. Farmers are not 
independently represented on the committee. 
The committee usually finds it very difficult, as already suggested by the cancellation of 
the November/December closure, not to yield to short term pressures exerted on it, but to 
look at the long term planning and problems. Another example of this is that in December 
1988 the ICC decided on a canal closure on 20 April when it saw that reservoir levels were 
higher than the previous year, but it ignored the low inflows that would made the date 
unrealistic. As a result, the ICC soon had to correct the decision. From February 1989 the 
reservoir levels were lower than in any other year in the period 1982-83 to 1991-92. By the 
end of February 1989 the ICC had to prepone the closure date to 23 March, in view of the 
reservoir situation. 
As a further response to scarcity, orders to introduce warabandi in the bigger distributaries 
were issued once again in the first week of March. By this time the agitation of farmers over 
water shortage in the tail end areas had reached such an intensity that on 8 March a 
Prohibitory Order was clamped on the dam site by the government. As a response to the 
agitation it was decided on 10 March to postpone the closure of the canal till the end of 
March, notwithstanding the fact that by 10 March the reservoir had reached the level that is 
normally taken as the minimum level for the start of releases at the beginning of the season. 
In the month of March a frantic succession of meetings of farmer leaders, irrigation 
officials, district administrators, MLAs, cabinet ministers, and finally the Chief Minister of 
the State took place. At one point the MLAs of the opposition party threatened to resign if 
the closure date was not postponed. Hunger strikes were undertaken, irrigation officials 
locked up in their offices for days surrounded by farmers, roads were blocked, and 
shopkeepers in the district headquarters called a bandh (a strike) in support of farmer 
demands. Police firing during riots was reported, but denied by the police. 
On 20 March the government decided to release water from the upstream Bhadra reservoir 
to supplement supply in the Left Bank Canal, but this took some days to arrive and was 
equivalent to 6 days full canal supply only. From 23 March an on/off system was 
implemented in the main canal. For 1 week all distributaries in the first half of the main 
canal were to be closed, in the second week all distributaries in the second half of the main 
canal would stay dry. To implement this, prohibitory orders were promulgated for the main 
canal area. One head end MLA was reported to have posted on a distributary gate with a 
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 Because the localised cropping patterns are different in the kharif and rabi seasons, the gauge 
and discharge table should be different for the two seasons. However, the table used is an 
approximate average of the two seasons. There is some suggestion that the gauge and discharge 
table based on the localisation pattern was prepared for the first time in 1988, but this is not 
certain. 
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group of women and children to prevent closure of the distributary in the on/off rotation. The 
situation was so chaotic that this rotation is very unlikely to have been implemented.27' 
The water from the upstream reservoir arrived on 29 March and the discharge into the 
Left Bank Canal was increased. The first half of the main canal consumed the larger part of 
the available water. Early April most of the rice was nearing the harvesting stage. From 8 
April the discharge in the Left Bank Canal slowly went down to zero, and stopped 
completely on 21 April. 
Main canal management in 1989-90 
The dramatic events of rabi 1989 created institutional and political space for new approaches 
to the problem of water management in the Left Bank Canal. There was a clear concern on 
the government side to avoid similar problems in the future, and a High Power Committee 
was appointed to make proposals to achieve this. From the farming community there were 
calls for abolishing the localisation policy: let the government supply a fixed amount of water 
to farmers, and leave crop choice to cultivators is what they suggested.28' Suggestions were 
put forward to construct a balancing reservoir in the tail end section of the main canal, and 
to create a separate administrative division for checking the gauges in the main canal. Tail 
end farmers argued for a shift of the closure period from May to December, to curb rice 
cultivation in the rabi season. Zilla Parishad2^ members called for decentralisation of the 
management of irrigation and to bring it under the umbrella of that body. And, the State 
government adopted a different management style for some time, as we shall see below. At 
the same time there was an effort by the Irrigation Department to get magisterial powers in 
water management, through a change in the Irrigation Act. 
Many of the proposals and ideas put forward in this period were not new in themselves, 
but now there was an opening to try to get them accepted. After the events of the 1989-90 
agricultural year, some of the changes got consolidated and others got (re-)shelved. 
The 1989-90 agricultural year was inaugurated with a number of meetings in which the 
proposals of the High Power Commitee were accepted as the guideline for water 
management. These meetings were attended by high level government officials like the 
Development Commissioner and relevant Secretaries to Government. This political 
commitment to implement a different approach was soon overtaken by events. 
Like the previous year, the irrigation had a difficult start. There were two breaches 
halfway along the main canal early in the year. Soon after this, the recommendation of the 
High Power Committee to implement an on/off system in the main canal got strongly 
opposed by farmers, and was not implemented. 
In September protest started against the decided closure of the main canal from 15 
November to 10 December. In the same month it was decided to postpone the closure till 1 
December, but to reduce the discharge in the period before the closure. The latter was not 
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 Also the discharge data for the main canal at the division boundaries give no indication of this 
rotation. Closure of the distributaries on the upstream half of main canal should have led to 
significantly higher discharges in the downstream half of main canal. These did not occur according 
to the Irrigation Department register (data collected in 1997 by R. Doraiswamy). 
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 In May 1989 President's rule was instituted in the State and the parliament dissolved. There 
were therefore no MLAs to fill the seats in the ICC. Farmers movements argued that they could 
become ICC members. They did not succeed to get such participation, but were relatively directly 
involved for a period of about 6 months. 
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implemented. A new decision was taken to close the main canal from 1 to 25 December. 
Attached to that was the decision that the summer closure would be on 15 March. Farmer 
opposition to the November/December closure increased, but the Irrigation Department still 
(almost fully) closed the main canal from 1 December. 
Right after the canal was closed farmers appealed to the newly appointed Chief Minister 
of the State.30) The government agreed to re-open the canal on 10 December, with the 
summer closure set at 10 March (3 months release), under the condition that farmers 
promised not to grow rice in the rabi season. This promise was made by farmer leaders and 
MLAs. The December closure as recommended by the High Power Committee, thus half 
survived. 
After having observed that rice nurseries still came up in the Left Bank Canal, the 
government put an ultimatum to remove them within 48 hours, and threatened to close the 
Left Bank Canal if this did not happen. This move brought the difference of interest between 
head end farmers and tail end farmers out in the open and on the political agenda. Tail end 
farmers started to write memoranda against head end rice farmers. 
On midnight 24 December the main canal was closed because the rice nurseries had not 
been removed by the cultivators. However, this closure not only caused problems for rice 
farmers, but also for non-rice farmers.31'Widespread agitation started, and the head end/tail 
end conflict of interest disappeared again. 
On 30 December a Superintending Engineer and an Executive Engineer were assaulted and 
wounded by farmers in the tail end area of the main canal. In an emergency meeting chaired 
by the Deputy Commissioner on 31 December, it was decided to re-open the canal on 1 
January. However, on that day 300 engineers took mass casual leave in protest against the 
molesting of their colleagues, and the canal remained closed. The engineers put forward a 
series of demands, which included magisterial powers to Irrigation Department officials to 
address violations of the cropping pattern and water management rules. After some high level 
meetings, water was released into the canal on 5 January. 
But, the government did not yet give up its battle against the rice nurseries. On 11 January 
an ordinance was issued by the government that announced the destruction of rice nurseries. 
For this purpose a number of platoons of armed police were deployed. Not more than 10 ha 
of nurseries actually got destroyed. The Chief Minister had to call off the destruction drive 
after two days because of fierce opposition.32' Herewith another recommendation of the 
High Power Committee, to abolish rice cultivation in rabi through legislation, had 
floundered. 
In January the Irrigation Ministry also announced that the carry-over storage of 8 TMCft., 
scheduled to be used for early sowing in the 1990-91 season, and another High Power 
Committee recommendation, would be used to alleviate tail end problems in the current 
season. In the course of the rabi season the closure date of the main canal got postponed till 
10 April amidst the usual turmoil. 
One way to read these events is to see them as the ultimate administrative effort to 
implement protective irrigation, in at least the rabi season. It is an ultimate effort because 
30lElections were held in November, so the MLAs were 'back in business' as well. 
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 Farmers with a rabi crop sown in October required water in December/January as the crop then 
is in a crucial phase. Farmers planning/cultivating a second irrigated dry crop wanted to sow in this 
period or give the first irrigation. 
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 Including MLAs who blocked roads, and women and children who slept on roads to the rice 
fields when the squads tried to work at night. 
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it is personally overseen by the Irrigation Minister and the Chief Minister. It is administrative 
because of its emphasis, finally, on legislation and its strict implementation. Drama is added 
through the effort to implement the law by force. However, the administrative effort must 
yield to the rice interest. 
[The] paddy growing ayacutdars' lobby is very powerful economically and politically 
and all the Governments in the past, whether Congress(I) or Janata Dal have yielded 
to [its] pressures. (Raichur District Zilla Parishad president, quoted in Deccan Herald, 
31.1.90) 
The adoption of a new discharge table for the main canal in the beginning on the 1990-91 
season, can in this interpretation be seen as the closing piece of the victory of the rice lobby, 
and the last nail in the coffin of protective irrigation. This reading is certainly partly true, 
but some positive effects of the events became visible in the years that followed this dramatic 
episode. 
The consolidation of change 
Some of the ideas put forward in the 1988-90 period did get consolidated in the following 
years. I list and discuss the changes that took place. 
The closure of the main canal in November/December has not become a permanent feature 
of main canal management, but it the idea had some effect for some years. In 1992-93 there 
was a reduced discharge into the main canal between (approximately) 21 November and 9 
December 1992. In 1993-94 this was a longer period, between (approximately) 22 November 
and 24 December 1993. In 1994-95 there actually was a closure, for one week in December 
1994, but no reduced discharges before or after it. In 1995-96 there was no reduced 
discharge or closure in the November/December period. And lastly, in 1996-97 there was 
a breach in the main canal near the dam, which caused several weeks of canal closure in 
September/October 1996. There was no closure or reduced discharge in November/December 
1996 as a consequence.33' The practice thus seems to have been watered down. 
The idea of the balancing reservoir became a sanctioned project in 1992 during a visit of -
another- Chief Minister to the district. A politician from the tail end area of the Left Bank 
Canal had become CADA chairman by 1992, and in that capacity convinced the government 
of the need for the balancing reservoir project. The construction is scheduled to be completed 
by the end of 1997. 
The sources of support for the balancing reservoir idea were complex. For the Irrigation 
Department it will relieve, at least in theory, the tensions in water management in the tail end 
section of the main canal, because it creates a two week buffer capacity. This can make 
supply more regular and rotation systems more feasible, and bridge periods of acute water 
shortage. Another Irrigation Department interest was undoubtedly that any new construction 
activity was welcome because it is what engineers like to do most. It may also appeal to the 
engineers' desire for technical solutions to social problems. For the politician/CADA 
chairman there was, apart from concern about the problems as such, the reproduction of 
support in his base area, necessary for his further political career. For the Chief Minister and 
the Irrigation Minister similar considerations applied. All these factors are always there, but 
it requires particular circumstances (a crisis) and particular actors (an ambitious tail end 
politician/CADA chairman and a Chief Minister who needs to distribute favours) to knit them 
together and produce a concrete project, as happened in this case. 
Discharge data for these years were collected in 1997 by R. Doraiswamy. 
CHANGING TABLES 235 
The on/off water distribution proposed by the High Power Committee survived to some 
extent. It got its major application in the fourth division of the Left Bank Canal. From 
October 1989 a rotation system was introduced in the fourth division in which half of the 
distributaries are closed for a week while the other half receives the full discharge. From 
rabi 1990 the system worked reasonably well, and in 1997 we could observe that it had been 
continuously practised since then. According to both farmers and irrigation department 
officials this has measurably improved the situation in this section of the main canal. 
In 1991-92 considerable land development activity could be observed in the tail end region 
of the main canal. This was probably a reflection of improved water availability and 
improved predictability of water supply, through the rotation, because of favourable rains and 
as a result of the change in main canal management generally. Obviously, land development 
will create a higher demand for water, and therefore the relaxation in water management 
problems may be shortlived. On the other hand, new vested interests in more equitable water 
distribution in the main canal are created in this way. 
The rotation system as described in the CAD A circular from 1982 was also implemented 
in the first three Canal Divisions. This increased and stabilised the supply to the Fourth 
Canal Division, and made the implementation of the on/off system in that division 
possible.34' The effort to get the gauges right as described in the new gauge and discharge 
table was reasonably successful. This fact is generally attributed to the efforts of a committed 
Executive and later Superintending Engineer based in the tail end Division.35' In October 
1988 an inspection report was produced by this officer that clearly documented the excess 
water use in the Second and Third Divisions.36' The inspection was followed by a series 
of meetings that finally resulted in the new gauge table, the implementation of the on/off 
system in the Fourth Division and the main canal rotation as outlined in the 1982 CADA 
circular. 
Maintenance of the gauges at the Division borders requires active intervention of higher 
level officials in the work of their subordinates. The gauges and rotation systems are more 
or less maintained through a monitoring and intervention process involving an intense flow 
of express telegrams, urgent telephone messages and letters between the Division offices and 
with the Superintending Engineer's and Chief Engineer's offices. A sample of the resulting 
interactions is given in Box 9.2. 
To conclude, my interpretation of the changes in main canal management that I just 
described, is that the new gauge table for the main canal that was produced in 1990 created 
341
 That the upstream distributaries were actually closed can be observed in the gauge registers kept 
in the Division offices, by looking at the daily distributary discharges recorded for each distributary. 
The evidence is too voluminous to present here. The increase in discharge can be derived from the 
same data. 
351
 When, in 1992, I asked a third division engineer about the engineer that introduced the rotation 
in the fourth division he replied that "the tail enders consider him as their god". 
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 What is unusual is that the Executive Engineer of the Fourth Division undertook the inspection 
(with assistance from staff of the Superintending Engineer's office). This means that the inspector 
directly checked the performance of colleagues who occupied the same level in the hierarchy. The 
inpection did not include the First Division, which comes under a different Superintending Engineer. 
The creation of a separate Subdivision (under control of the Executive Engineer of the Second 
Division, and thereby the Superintending Engineer of the three downstream Divisions) to operate 
the distributary offtakes in the First Division failed. First Division officers referred all problems in 
their distributaries to this Subdivision. It received insufficient backing and was abolished in 1992. 
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Box 9.2: Extracts from internal communication in the Irrigation Department on main canal 
management 
The Chief Engineer in presence of all the officers of [the Left Bank Canal] fixed the gauges 
to be maintained during last Kharif 1990 as under. (...) Therefore all Executive Engineers are 
requested to see that water management is done smoothly by adopting rotation system of 
water supply in the distributaries. The Executive Engineer [Fourth Division] is also requested 
to arrange to adopt weekly 'on & off' system of irrigation in the main canal as per last year 
to have smooth water management upto tail-end. (Letter SE to EEs Second, Third and Fourth 
Divisions, July 1991) 
I therefore request you to please insist all the concerned staff to move on the canal, 
distributaries upto tail end areas daily and watch the daily movement and diaries of your staff. 
You can also move along with them, frequently, so that, problems can be easened at your 
end only. The fortnight diaries of Assistant Executive Engineers from July 1991 onwards may 
also be submitted to this office along with your spot checks for verification. (Letter SE to EE 
Fourth Division, August 1991) 
The gauge at Mile 104 at 5 p.m. is 4.85 ft. The gauges at Mile 104 are fluctuating and 
causing difficulties to this Division in maintenance of irrigation management. Therefore you 
are requested to maintain 6.30 ft. gauge at Mile 104 constantly. Failure to maintain the 
required gauge on your part will lead to law and order situation for which you alone will be 
responsible. The situation is most critical and explosive in this Division command area. I 
request you will realise the gravity of the situation and extend your cooperation in proper 
maintenance of the gauge. Please acknowledge the receipt of this message. (Urgent 
telephone message of EE Fourth Division to EE Third Division, August 1991) 
[Following excess drawal by one distributary.] This sort of management is far from 
satisfactory. You have to curb such tendency on the part of concerned. Let me know what 
your Sectional Officers were doing. The explanation of concerned should be submitted to this 
office to take further action. If this tendency is not stopped, it will be difficult for undersigned 
to remain as a mere spectator. Action should be taken to close all distributaries as agreed 
upon during lower rotation is in progress. (Letter EE Fourth Division to an AEE, August 1991) 
Today at 1.00 p.m. gauge at Mile 104 is 5.15. Next irrigation management rotation 
system collapsed around chaotic conditions. Myself, Assistant Executive Engineer staff not 
in position to attend irrigation management duties. Jeeps are being stopped on roads. Unruly 
mobs not permitting to move. Life miserable. Living under continuous threat. None to rescue. 
(Express telegram EE Fourth Division to CE, September 1991) 
It is impressed on all concerned that based on net available discharge with reference to 
gauges at Mile 104, it is to be equitably distributed without affecting interest of any ryots at 
any distributary. Necessary regulation chart at various depth of flow at Mile 104 is herewith 
enclosed for ready reference. Any violation will be viewed with displeasure and will be 
reported to higher authorities. (Letter EE Fourth Division to AEEs Fourth Division, September 
1991) 
Even after my hours together convincing to them, and persuasion stating that to allow the 
water to the tailend areas the rotation system is a must for this Division. But they were not 
ready to hear or accept the same. The situation was very critical and they talked in all types 
of nonsense and abusing words and their intention is to manhandle the undersigned in his 
own chamber. (...) In view of the above, to provide adequate water to tailend atchkat under 
lower rotation, protection of District Armed Police to avoid tampering of head sluices and 
illegal opening etc. (Letter EE Fourth Division to SE, September 1991) 
You are hereby directed to arrange for staff for patrolling round the clock (..). The 
necessary trucks, van, and Police protection may be taken during the patrolling period. (Letter 
EE Fourth Division to an AEE, September 1991) 
Irrigation management has become uncontrollable even with Police assistance (...) Ryots 
are agitating, staff is reluctant to [work] under above situation, (Express telegram EE Fourth 
Division to CE, September 1991) 
It appears that present Executive Engineer [Third Division] is not in a mood to maintain 6,2 
A KM 
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The on/off water distribution proposed by the High Power Committee survived to some 
extent. It got its major application in the fourth division of the Left Bank Canal. From 
October 1989 a rotation system was introduced in the fourth division in which half of the 
distributaries are closed for a week while the other half receives the full discharge. From 
rabi 1990 the system worked reasonably well, and in 1997 we could observe that it had been 
continuously practised since then. According to both farmers and irrigation department 
officials this has measurably improved the situation in this section of the main canal. 
In 1991-92 considerable land development activity could be observed in the tail end region 
of the main canal. This was probably a reflection of improved water availability and 
improved predictability of water supply, through the rotation, because of favourable rains and 
as a result of the change in main canal management generally. Obviously, land development 
will create a higher demand for water, and therefore the relaxation in water management 
problems may be shortlived. On the other hand, new vested interests in more equitable water 
distribution in the main canal are created in this way. 
The rotation system as described in the CADA circular from 1982 was also implemented 
in the first three Canal Divisions. This increased and stabilised the supply to the Fourth 
Canal Division, and made the implementation of the on/off system in that division 
possible.34> The effort to get the gauges right as described in the new gauge and discharge 
table was reasonably successful. This fact is generally attributed to the efforts of a committed 
Executive and later Superintending Engineer based in the tail end Division.35' In October 
1988 an inspection report was produced by this officer that clearly documented the excess 
water use in the Second and Third Divisions.36' The inspection was followed by a series 
of meetings that finally resulted in the new gauge table, the implementation of the on/off 
system in the Fourth Division and the main canal rotation as outlined in the 1982 CADA 
circular. 
Maintenance of the gauges at the Division borders requires active intervention of higher 
level officials in the work of their subordinates. The gauges and rotation systems are more 
or less maintained through a monitoring and intervention process involving an intense flow 
of express telegrams, urgent telephone messages and letters between the Division offices and 
with the Superintending Engineer's and Chief Engineer's offices. A sample of the resulting 
interactions is given in Box 9.2. 
To conclude, my interpretation of the changes in main canal management that I just 
described, is that the new gauge table for the main canal that was produced in 1990 created 
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 That the upstream distributaries were actually closed can be observed in the gauge registers kept 
in the Division offices, by looking at the daily distributary discharges recorded for each distributary. 
The evidence is too voluminous to present here. The increase in discharge can be derived from the 
same data. 
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 When, in 1992, I asked a third division engineer about the engineer that introduced the rotation 
in the fourth division he replied that "the tail enders consider him as their god". 
361
 What is unusual is that the Executive Engineer of the Fourth Division undertook the inspection 
(with assistance from staff of the Superintending Engineer's office). This means that the inspector 
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Box 9.2: Extracts from internal communication in the Irrigation Department on main canal 
management 
The Chief Engineer in presence of all the officers of [the Left Bank Canal] fixed the gauges 
to be maintained during last Kharif 1990 as under. (...) Therefore all Executive Engineers are 
requested to see that water management is done smoothly by adopting rotation system of 
water supply in the distributaries. The Executive Engineer [Fourth Division] is also requested 
to arrange to adopt weekly 'on & of f system of irrigation in the main canal as per last year 
to have smooth water management upto tail-end. (Letter SE to EEs Second, Third and Fourth 
Divisions, July 1991) 
I therefore request you to please insist all the concerned staff to move on the canal, 
distributaries upto tail end areas daily and watch the daily movement and diaries of your staff. 
You can also move along with them, frequently, so that, problems can be easened at your 
end only. The fortnight diaries of Assistant Executive Engineers from July 1991 onwards may 
also be submitted to this office along with your spot checks for verification. (Letter SE to EE 
Fourth Division, August 1991) 
The gauge at Mile 104 at 5 p.m. is 4.85 ft. The gauges at Mile 104 are fluctuating and 
causing difficulties to this Division in maintenance of irrigation management. Therefore you 
are requested to maintain 6.30 ft. gauge at Mile 104 constantly. Failure to maintain the 
required gauge on your part will lead to law and order situation for which you alone will be 
responsible. The situation is most critical and explosive in this Division command area. I 
request you will realise the gravity of the situation and extend your cooperation in proper 
maintenance of the gauge. Please acknowledge the receipt of this message. (Urgent 
telephone message of EE Fourth Division to EE Third Division, August 1991) 
[Following excess drawal by one distributary.] This sort of management is far from 
satisfactory. You have to curb such tendency on the part of concerned. Let me know what 
your Sectional Officers were doing. The explanation of concerned should be submitted to this 
office to take further action. If this tendency is not stopped, it will be difficult for undersigned 
to remain as a mere spectator. Action should be taken to close all distributaries as agreed 
upon during lower rotation is in progress. (Letter EE Fourth Division to an AEE, August 1991) 
Today at 1.00 p.m. gauge at Mile 104 is 5.15. Next irrigation management rotation 
system collapsed around chaotic conditions. Myself, Assistant Executive Engineer staff not 
in position to attend irrigation management duties. Jeeps are being stopped on roads. Unruly 
mobs not permitting to move. Life miserable. Living under continuous threat. None to rescue. 
(Express telegram EE Fourth Division to CE, September 1991) 
It is impressed on all concerned that based on net available discharge with reference to 
gauges at Mile 104, it is to be equitably distributed without affecting interest of any ryots at 
any distributary. Necessary regulation chart at various depth of flow at Mile 104 is herewith 
enclosed for ready reference. Any violation will be viewed with displeasure and will be 
reported to higher authorities. (Letter EE Fourth Division to AEEs Fourth Division, September 
1991) 
Even after my hours together convincing to them, and persuasion stating that to allow the 
water to the tailend areas the rotation system is a must for this Division. But they were not 
ready to hear or accept the same. The situation was very critical and they talked in all types 
of nonsense and abusing words and their intention is to manhandle the undersigned in his 
own chamber. (...) In view of the above, to provide adequate water to tailend atchkat under 
lower rotation, protection of District Armed Police to avoid tampering of head sluices and 
illegal opening etc. (Letter EE Fourth Division to SE, September 1991) 
You are hereby directed to arrange for staff for patrolling round the clock (..). The 
necessary trucks, van, and Police protection may be taken during the patrolling period. (Letter 
EE Fourth Division to an AEE, September 1991) 
Irrigation management has become uncontrollable even with Police assistance (...) Ryots 
are agitating, staff is reluctant to [work] under above situation. (Express telegram EE Fourth 
Division to CE, September 1991) 
It appears that present Executive Engineer [Third Division] is not in a mood to maintain 6.2 
feet gauge. Due to lack of action situation is becoming grim. Kindly intervene. (Express 
telegram EE Fourth Division to CE). 
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a more realistic base for the internal negotiation of water distribution among divisions in the 
Irrigation Department. The earlier table, based on the localisation pattern, was so far 
removed from the actual releases to the tail end section of the canal, that it served no 
practical purpose. As a result, there was no firm ground for compromising on proportionate 
gauges, and these had to be renegotiated time and again. The new table has provided a new 
institutional form (a new set of operational rules) within which main canal management can 
take place. It seems to produce better and more stable results. Problems in water distribution 
have not gone away, but the social interaction around it within the Irrigation Department 
seems to be more productive than before. 
This positive judgement must however be a tentative judgement. The first years following 
the introduction have not been characterised by great overall water scarcity. An important 
weakness of the system is that the feedback or sanction mechanism for non-adherence is the 
authority of the Superintending Engineers and Chief Engineer towards Executive Engineers 
only. A lot thus depends on the personal qualities of and the pressures put on the two 
Superintending Engineers and the single Chief Engineer. Accountability relations in the 
Irrigation Department have remained one-sided. The Command Area Development Authority 
and Irrigation Consultative Committee are, as discussed, only partially able to establish an 
accountability mechanism vis a vis the Irrigation Department as a whole. The new 
management routine thus remains to be tested. 
9.4 CONCLUSION 
The events and developments discussed above allow a number of general observations and 
conclusions regarding the dynamics of main canal management in the Tungabhadra Left Bank 
Canal and other protective irrigation systems. I first summarise, briefly, the relevance of the 
water control concept (see chapter 2) for the understanding of main canal management. After 
that I discuss, at greater length, the substantive conclusions that can be drawn from the case 
study. 
Water control: political contestation 
At main canal level water distribution became an issue from around 1980. The gradually 
increasing demand for water at main canal level could no longer be met by an increase of 
the supply from the reservoir, and water scarcity came to be felt. The occurrence of water 
scarcity induced the articulation of new forms of social interaction at main canal level. Other 
people than the formally responsible Irrigation Department officials started to get involved 
in it too. Officials of the Command Area Development Authority were added to the 
distributary level set of actors - farmers, Irrigation Department officials and MLAs. 
Occasionally, senior government officials and politicians up to and including the State's Chief 
Minister were forced to actively engage in conflict resolution and crisis management. 
Sections of the government like the judiciary and the police were more actively, or better 
put, more dramatically involved at the main canal level than at the distributary level. Part 
of the bargaining on water distribution has been institutionalised in the Irrigation Consultative 
Committee at project level, in which officials and non-officials (MLAs) have seats. 
In the years 1988-89 and 1989-90 new negotiation practices between the Canal Divisions 
responsible for water distribution in the main canal were established. These changes within 
the Irrigation Department apparatus were interpreted as a relatively successful effort to 
constitute a more reliable and less conflictuous (but still unequal) mode of main canal water 
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distribution. This institutional change did not come easy however. Formal policy efforts by 
the Command Area Development Authority to reform main canal management in earlier 
years had failed. It required the escalation of water distribution problems at main canal level 
to a situation where extreme measures like the issue of prohibitory orders for the dam and 
main canal area had to be taken, to create the space and impetus for the institutional change 
within the Irrigation Department. 
That water distribution at main canal level is a political process, in the narrow as well as 
the broad sense of that term, and heavily contested, should be evident from this. 
Water control: multi-dimensionality 
The gauge and discharge tables for the main canal, which gave the chapter its title, vividly 
illustrate the intimate relations of the three dimensions of water control. The tables are 
technical instruments, which structure main canal management routines and express the 
balance of political, economic and administrative power in the command area. The new 
gauge and discharge table for the main canal that was put into use in 1990 and which departs 
from the old table based on the localisation pattern, both enables and constrains the 
reproduction of unequal water distribution. It institutionalises inequality by attaching numbers 
to the skewed distribution of the available water supply over the four Canal Divisions. At the 
same time it has provided a basis for implementation of a more reliable and stable, and 
higher water supply to the tail end Canal Division, at least in the first years after its 
introduction. Another example of the relationship between the technical and the social 
dimensions of main canal management is the phenomenon already observed in previous 
chapters, that it is the nature of conflicts in water distribution to pass over even if you don't 
do anything about them. They have by their nature time limits: farmers may press for more 
water to sow their crops, but a certain moment it is too late to sow, and the problem 
disappears; farmers may press for water to mature their crops, but if they don't get it, the 
crop eventually dies, and the problem, in a cynical way, solves itself. For this reason, an 
important strategy of Irrigation Department officials is to find means to get over the shortage 
period, the duration of which they know is by nature limited. The ultimate way to do this is 
to find extra water for this period, as happened in 1988-89 by the release of water from the 
Bhadra system, and in 1989-90 by not using the carry-over storage for its intended purpose. 
Another way is the introduction of tightly controlled rotation systems for a short period, as 
was also done in the period described above. This phenomenon may explain why main canal 
management looks like an 'adhocracy'37* or totally chaotic, with strong pejorative 
connotations, in the eyes of some observers. The fact of the matter is that many problems 
can be solved by ad hoc measures because they are ad hoc problems. That not everyone is 
happy with the situation that causes the occurrence of these ad hoc problems, is another 
matter.38' The case discussed suggests that considerable escalation and mounting of pressure 
on the Irrigation Department and other actors is necessary before the routine of ad hoc 
problem solving develops into more systematic routines that can to some extent prevent the 
occurrence of these problems.3" 
371
 The term is taken from Nijman (1993). 
381
 In this sense the problems are structural, because they appear time and again. But, from the 
perspective of an individual engineer, it may rain more next year and he may be transfered. 
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 What I implicitly suggest here is a kind of balancing of the various costs and benefits of different 
management alternatives by Irrigation Department officials. I don't think it is possible or useful to 
(continued...) 
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Other examples of sociotechnical relationships can be found in the chapter, but this should 
suffice to make the general point of the multi-dimensionality of water control at the main 
canal level. I now proceed to draw more specific conclusions from the material presented in 
this chapter. 
Policy as prescription, policy as process 
The chapter contrasted two attempts to change main canal water management routines. One 
was a national policy initiative that reached the command area through the CADA. The other 
was grounded in events as these developed in the command area.40' 
The CADA-based initiative for water management reform is a clear example of what 
Mackintosh calls the 'policy as prescription' model of planned intervention by government 
agencies (Mackintosh, 1992).41) Two of the main features of the prescriptive model are a 
standardised approach and a top-down legalistic bias. The Command Area Development 
programme provides a good example of this. 
A striking characteristic of the Command Area Development approach is its degree of 
standardisation. The Command Area Development policy was conceived at the central 
government level, influenced by national and international policy makers and advisors. The 
State governments made only limited adaptations to the central government model, certainly 
as far as system-level activities like on farm development, warabandi, and the establishment 
of Water Users Associations were concerned. The Command Area Development policy was 
a standard policy recipe or formula derived from the existing body of knowledge, experience 
and opinion on canal irrigation, and experimentation with some of the policy's elements in 
a number of irrigation systems. It was intended to be implemented in all canal irrigation 
systems in a similar fashion. 
The second outstanding characteristic of the Command Area Development policy is that 
its recommendations have a highly directive character. Put differently, the policy has a strong 
bias towards bringing about change through legislation and its (correct) implementation. The 
government tells farmers and irrigation officials what to do and how to do it in an Act, rules, 
procedures, bye-laws and other instructions. It also defines the legal machinery of fines and 
other punishments to control non-adherence to the policy prescriptions, particularly as far as 
39l(...continued) 
try to measure these costs and benefits very precisely (as for example rational choice theorists 
might want to do). More interesting, because it provides more insights into the dynamics of main 
canal management and more concrete entries for intervention and change, is the question how and 
why the costs and benefits are differently perceived/felt by different officials within the 
department. This suggests an area of research usually described as the issue of the 'motivation of 
managers' (Chambers, 1988: chapter 9), or 'management styles' as mentioned in chapter 7. My 
analysis of main canal management suggests that this issue is not only linked to institutional 
constraints, conditions and incentives, but also to the nature of the water distribution problem 
itself. 
401A recent government attempt to improve main system management has been the National Water 
Management Programme (NWMP) (Berkoff, 1988). In the distributaries where it was implemented 
in the Tungabhadra system it has left no noticeable impact on the management of these canals. 
Activities were limited to physical interventions, mainly repair od structures and lining. 
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 Mackintosh describes 'policy as prescription' as follows. It "proposes appropriate government 
policy for development, based on a set of assumptions about the benevolence of government. It 
is largely ahistorical. Typical question: What public services should the government provide?" 
(Mackintosh, 1992:4, box 2). 
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farmers are concerned. There typically is a strong law and order element in this type of 
approach to reform (also see CADA/TBP, 1979 for example). 
Though the Command Area Development policy was based on an interpretation of existing 
experience, documentation and opinion on water management problems in different canal 
irrigation systems, the policy remained external to the irrigation systems in which it was to 
be implemented. With this I mean to say that the implementation process was not structured 
in such a way that learning from local factors would be possible, in order to shape the policy 
to system-specific problems and circumstances.42' 
In the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal the pressure of circumstances has forced the 
occurrence of some locally specific discussion on water management reform. The Ryots 
Grievances Committee report (CADA/TBP, 1979) which immediately preceded the 
implementation of the Command Area Development programme in the Tungabhadra Left 
Bank Canal, might, in a positive interpretation, be considered as a system-specific problem 
identification that involved farmer participation. The committee collected almost 3000 
representations of farmers, and held a series of public hearings on the basis of them. The 
committee does make (or rather repeats) one important locally-specific recommendation and 
that is to replace the Left Bank system of localisation with the Right Bank localisation in 
blocks with similar crops, to be irrigated for one season and closed (cemented) for the other 
season (see chapter 3). 
However, participation remained at the level of consultation and the committee's work 
cannot be regarded as a conscious attempt to design a locally specific approach in the context 
of the overall Command Area Development policy.43' It recommends the implementation 
of the CAD policy in an equally prescriptive way as the Command Area Development policy 
makers themselves. It contains no suggestions to try a more adaptive mode of policy 
implementation. 
The events in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal command area in the years 1988-1990 
were presented as a contrast to the Command Area Development policy implementation 
effort. These events were interpreted as the occurrence of institutional change in response 
to the main canal management problems as these actually occurred in the command area. A 
new policy for main canal management emerged in the social process of the negotiation of 
water distribution by the different actors concerned. This course of events exhibits some of 
the characteristics of what Mackintosh calls the 'policy as process' model of change 
(Mackintosh, 1992).44> 
In this case the design of the policy was not a planned and methodologically thought-
through effort at reform, but an unplanned and methodologically unreflected process of 
making the best of the circumstances by trying to seize the opportunities that the situation 
created. Nevertheless, it contains an important lesson for the design of better planned 
421
 The quality of the analysis on which the policy was based may also be questioned, as suggested 
in the chapter, but my point here is about the mode of implementation. Incomplete analysis can be 
remedied when a learning process is part of the approach to implementation. 
431
 This can be derived from the terms of reference of the Committee that are included in the report, 
and from how the report is written in general. 
441
 Mackintosh describes 'policy as process' as follows. It "seeks to explain the actions of public 
institutions, governmental and non-governmental, and their effects, as outcomes of social 
processes. It takes a historical and evolutionary approach. Typical question: How can non-
governmental action improve public service provision?" (Mackintosh, 1992:4, box 2) 
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interventions. This lesson is that efforts at management reform need to be grounded, both 
in analysis and strategy, in existing, locally specific management practices and social reality. 
I conclude that policies for irrigation reform, including main canal management reform, 
should be conceived and implemented in a different manner than the 'policy as prescription' 
model that has been used so far. A stronger process orientation, that is more participatory 
policy conception and more adaptive policy implementation, is certainly not a sufficient 
condition for success, but it is, so I want to argue, a necessary one. Starting from detailed 
insight in local circumstances, histories and processes to identify existing spaces and strategic 
actors for reform seems to be an advisable approach. In the final analysis it are those directly 
involved in irrigation management, particularly farmers and Irrigation Department staff, who 
have to carry a changed modus operandi, and not the relatively distant policy reform 
initiators. To start change from the lived experience of those directly involved therefore 
seems the logical thing to do. 
Two additional conclusions that can be drawn from the main canal case study that are 
relevant to the discussion above are 1) that there is no dearth of ideas for change, and 2) that 
these ideas can potentially be mobilised in crisis situations. 
During the escalation of water management problems in 1988-89 and 1989-90 many ideas 
surfaced for changing the existing organisational structure of (main) canal management. As 
mentioned above, many of these ideas were not new. The proposal to construct balancing 
reservoirs was already included in the 1934 project report. The introduction of the block 
system of localisation as practised in the Right Bank Canal and the idea of wholesaling water 
to farmers by volume had also existed for decades. 
What is important is when and how some of these ideas can be mobilised more effectively. 
The case study above clearly shows that crisis situations are occasions when such ideas are 
brought forward by the different actors concerned. In crises existing certainties and 
relationships are questioned and in flux, and this creates space for more drastic change than 
when things are relatively quiet on the waterfront.45' Most of the ideas that surface quickly 
go under again after the crisis is over. Some reach the stage of implementation on a trial 
basis but may be stopped 
by farmers action. This was the fate of the block system of localisation for example, for 
which farmers got a stay order in the Karnataka High Court. Some ideas do stick, like the 
change in the gauge tables. It is this process of getting ideas on the reform-agenda and 
consolidating them in new institutional and technical structures which is, in my view, the 
essence of policy making and implementation. 
This view implies a recognition that behind ideas lie interests of different groups of 
people, and that the mobilisation of ideas means the mobilisation of people. Depending on 
the force different groups are able to generate, policy and practice change in different 
451
 The Tungabhadra case study perhaps also suggests that particular conditions of state 
governance create space for change. A factor in the 1988-1990 events seems to have been the 
dissolution of the State parliament and Governor's rule after that in the period May-November 
1989, and the fact that a newly elected government had to deal with the crisis emerging from 
December 1989. The situation of Governor's rule seems to have allowed quick and firm decisions 
on the policy changes to be implemented, and the new government seems to have tried to use its 
fresh electoral mandate to confront the rice interest more radically than had been tried before (for 
a similar analysis of opportunities for change with newly elected governments in the India-
Bangladesh negotiations on the Ganges river water, see Crow, Lindquist and Wilson, 1995). More 
detailed research would be required to make stronger statements on this issue. 
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directions. Policy formulation and implementation are contested, like water distribution, and 
involve strategic political behaviour to create and utilise spaces for change. 
At the level of day-to-day practices those involved in irrigation policy formulation and 
implementation usually recognise, and adopt, such a perspective. However, at the level of 
ideology policy practitioners usually express the view that policies should perhaps be defined 
politically, but implemented rigorously and rationally, or as engineers like to say, 
scientifically and without political interference. This gap between what should be and what 
is has so far not generated a fundamental rethinking of the 'policy as prescription' model in 
the field of canal irrigation. Which movements for change are taking place in Karnataka is 
elaborated in the next chapter. 
10 
BACK TO THE FUTURE 
An agenda for management reform in protective irrigation 
In part II of the Spielberg and Zemeckis' cinematic trilogy Back to the future the scientist 
Doc Emmett Brown, inventor of a time machine, proclaims that "the intent here is to gain 
a clearer perception of humanity, where we've been, where we're going, the pitfalls and the 
possibilities, the perils and the promiss, perhaps even an answer to that universal question: 
why?" His efforts to gain wisdom in past, present and future involve great havoc and drama. 
Whether his ambition is fulfilled remains uncertain, but in true Hollywood style the heros 
live happily ever after. 
In the real world it is - of course - impossible to change the past, and our capacity to 
shape the future is heavily constrained. Whether all water users and other actors involved in 
the havoc and drama in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal will live happily ever after can be 
the subject of serious concern. But even if we can't travel in time, we can travel in our 
minds. How we understand the present and the past influences the future that we try to build. 
It is to that theme that this concluding chapter returns: how to shape the future of protective 
irrigation. 
Canal irrigation is not the heartland of progressive politics. Despite passionate arguments 
about its potential to secure the livelihoods of not only the relatively well-to-do green 
revolution farmers, but also of small peasants and agricultural labourers (Chambers, 1994), 
canal irrigation has not caught the imagination of environmental, anti-poverty and other 
progressive social movements. Canal irrigation has mainly been criticised for its negative 
social and ecological effects and the technocratic megalomania of its advocates. Whatever the 
merits and importance of this critique, it leaves the problems in existing large-scale canal 
irrigation unaddressed (for exceptions, see below). 
Canal irrigation has been the birthplace of other social movements however. The 
Karnataka Rajya Raita Sangha (KRRS, Karnataka State Farmers Movement) was formed in 
the resistance of farmers against the introduction of betterment levy in the Ghataprabha and 
Malaprabha irrigation systems (see Nadkarni, 1987:84-100). The KRRS is one of the new 
farmers movements in India (Brass, 1995), which to a large extent focus on tax, price and 
subsidy issues. It also has a strong anti-corruption profile. The KRRS uses populist images 
of the rural/urban divide, and positions 'the farmers' against 'the state' and other actors. As 
a result it has hardly addressed distributional issues within the category of 'the farmers' (for 
discussion see Nadkarni, 1987; Krishnarajulu, 1989; Assadi, 1995; also see chapter 3). 
In government policy the approach to canal irrigation has consistently been of the 
prescriptive kind. In the past decades, a lot of time and energy has been spent on the design 
243 
244 ON THE WATERFRONT 
of new laws, policies and programmes at the international, national and State level. However, 
these reform initiatives were largely neutralised on their way from top to bottom. A major 
example is the Command Area Development programme, as was discussed in chapter 9. It 
seems to have achieved a considerable part of its physical targets, but it has been virtually 
powerless in terms of irrigation management reform. 
Canal irrigation policy also has a large deja vu content. Those who read the Report of the 
Indian Irrigation Commission (1901-03) will recognise that many reform proposals have been 
in discussion for the last hundred years. But, as it seems, without much of an effect. For 
those who want to act and don't want to wait (Chambers, 1988) the situation in canal 
irrigation is not the most stimulating of environments. Cynicism is a not uncommon 
sentiment among irrigation professionals and observers of the canal irrigation scene. 
In my first effort to come to grips with actually existing protective irrigation, I 
characterised the situation in these systems as a deadlock, where none of the parties involved 
could fully get what they wanted, and none of them was in a position to force substantive 
change, while disaster was on the horizon (Mollinga, 1992). Throughout this research project 
I have tried to investigate whether the gloomy picture of the policy and public action 
environment of canal irrigation sketched above is too simplified, and I have attempted to 
identify entry points for breaking the deadlock. 
The focus in the concluding chapter is - therefore - on possibilities for management reform 
in protective irrigation. I discuss this topic in four different ways. 
In section 10.11 identify constraints and opportunities for management reform on the basis 
of the analysis of water distribution practices in the preceding chapters. I argue that a more 
diversified and hopeful picture of the dynamics of canal irrigation is warranted than 
suggested by notions like cynicism, deja vu, and deadlock (and more substantive ones like 
rent-seeking). This section is also a summary answer to the central research question of the 
book. 
In section 10.2 I look at different perspectives on management reform in protective 
irrigation. I discuss the different grounds that have been and are given for the - generally 
acknowledged - need of that reform, and outline the policy instruments related to these 
different grounds. I argue that management reform approaches need to move away from a 
sectoral 'canals and irrigation water' focus, and need to be part of a broader perspective on 
integrated water resources management, rural development and ecological sustainability. I 
briefly discuss an example of such a more comprehensive approach. 
In section 10.3 I focus on the process dimension of the formulation and implementation 
of reform policies, by looking at recent developments in Karnataka. The main argument is 
that the policy process that is now designing 'participatory irrigation management' 
programmes, should be much more 'participatory' itself. There is a lack of a well articulated 
public demand for policy change, and no efforts to involve the different interest groups in 
the policy process. 
In the last section, 10.4, I return to the world of research. I conclude the chapter and the 
book with an outline of a research agenda that could support management reform initiatives. 
I focus on three issues that I consider of particular importance. These are canal irrigation 
technology and its design process, the politics of irrigation, and the rights and entitlements 
structure with regard to water use and distribution. 
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10.1 CONTESTED WATER CONTROL IN THE TUNGABHADRA LEFT 
BANK CANAL: CONSTRAINTS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR 
MANAGEMENT REFORM 
In this section I identify constraints and opportunities for management reform in protective 
irrigation. This discussion is based on the analysis of water distribution practices in the 
Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal in the preceding chapters. 
I first identify a set of constraints for management reform by looking at the overall 
structure of water control in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal. I discuss the social 
relationships that shape management practices. These are the relationship between farmers 
and Irrigation Department officials, the position of politicians in resource distribution, and 
the characteristics of the agrarian structure. I also discuss how the technical infrastructure 
shapes water control. 
After that I shift attention to the opportunities for management reform that can be derived 
from the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal case study. These can be identified by looking at the 
day-to-day water distribution practices. The actual situation is more dynamic than a 
'structural' picture might suggest. I discuss the potential for self-governance, the negotiation 
of rule systems between farmers and the Irrigation Department, and the scope for institutional 
and technological learning within the Irrigation Department. 
The discussion of constraints and opportunities for management reform is simultaneously 
the formulation of the answer to the central research question of the book. That went as 
follows (see chapter 2). 
How do the pattern of commoditisation, the form of state regulation and the 
characteristics of the technical infrastructure shape, and how are they in turn 
shaped by, the forms of organisation of water distribution in the Tungabhadra 
Left Bank Canal irrigation system? 
The management reform focus implies that not all empirical findings and conceptual points 
are summarised. For these I refer to the earlier chapters. 
Constraints: the structure of water control 
The theory of protective irrigation contains a very simple water management model. In this 
model there are only two actors involved in water distribution, farmers and Irrigation 
Department officials, and their relationship is one sided: water is to be supplied to the 
farmers by the officials. This book has shown that the actual situation is far more complex. 
A more realistic, though still simplified, model of the social relationships that shape day-to-
day water management in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal is given in box 10.1. 
Regulation 1: farmer-Irrigation Department relations 
The model in box 10.1 shows that the relation between farmers and Irrigation Department 
officials is not one-sided. Water is scarce and some farmers appropriate shares larger than 
their protective entitlement. This implies extensive involvement of farmers in main system 
management, which involves intensive interaction between farmers and Irrigation Department 
officials around unequal distribution of the resource. 
The involvement of farmers in water distribution takes direct and indirect forms (see 
particularly chapters 7 and 8). Direct involvement means self-management of the 
infrastructure, particularly the distributary canal infrastructure, by water users. It includes 
the adjustment of gates, the 'remodelling' of outlet structures, the creation of obstructions 
in some canals and outlets, and the removal of these in others, and the guarding of canal 
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Box 10.1: The structure of water control in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal 
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sections, either by individual farmers, groups of farmers or labourers hired by farmers for 
this purpose. These activities are concentrated during the night time, but some parts of the 
command area are completely self-managed by farmers. 
Indirect involvement consists of the exertion of pressure on the Irrigation Department to 
supply sufficient water at the right time. Different techniques are used. These include written 
or personal representations of farmers to Irrigation Department officials, demonstrations 
(road and railway blocks, surrounding officials' houses, and other stratagems), the payment 
of larger or smaller sums of money to irrigation officials, and physical threats. 
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The Irrigation Department bureaucracy is characterised by a top-down hierarchical 
structure of operation." A structural property that is important for water distribution 
practices is that there are no practical formal accountability mechanisms between water users 
and irrigation officials. Farmers in principle have the possibility to go to court to contest 
management decisions of the Irrigation Department, but this is an ineffective mechanism for 
structuring water distribution. The most farmers are able to achieve in this way is the 
paralysis of the legal efforts at regulation of water distribution by the Irrigation Department 
(see chapters 3 and 7). There are no fora for joint decision making, or even consultation, of 
farmers and irrigation officials on either management or design issues.2' The Irrigation 
Consultative Committee at project level is only a partial exception. It is mostly relevant in 
situations of extreme water crises. Farmers are not directly represented in it (see chapter 9). 
The lack of institutions for joint management, and for the design of joint management, 
constitutes the first constraint for management reform. 
Regulation 2: politicians and resource distribution 
The second addition to the management model of protective water is that more actors are 
involved in water distribution than farmers and Irrigation Department officials alone. The 
third important party are politicians, particularly MLAs. The role of MLAs in their 
constituencies was decribed as that of resource brokers. Water may, under particular 
conditions, be an important resource for a politician to engage with (see chapters 3 and 7). 
Politicians can influence the management decisions of Irrigation Department officials through 
their influence on the transfers of these government officials. 
The relation between politicians and officials is two sided as well. The literature suggests 
that officials have to pay politicians for keeping good relations with them. This money is 
supposedly generated through bribes paid by contractors and farmers (see Wade, 1982a). The 
contractor side of this argument is confirmed by the limited evidence that I have collected 
on this. However, I do not think that the collection of bribes by Irrigation Department 
officials is very important in water distribution. I have found examples of it, but in the water 
distribution domain it is not the structuring relationship between the farmers and Irrigation 
Department officials. 
The relationship between politicians and farmers is an electoral one. An MLA needs votes 
to secure his or her re-election, and votes are secured by channelling resources to voters. 
Farmers exchange their electoral support for the politician's influence on the resource 
managers, the Irrigation Department. 
The lack of accountability relationships between farmers and the Irrigation Department is 
filled in by the political process. Via politicians farmers create an indirect mechanism to 
negotiate water distribution with the Irrigation Department.3) The constitution of this 
11
 I have left the Command Area Development Authority out of the figure in box 10.1 because of 
its limited influence on water distribution. However, this is a simplification, particularly with regard 
to main canal management (see chapter 9). 
21
 In the conceptual terms of rule-making: there are no institutionalised fora for operational, 
collective choice, and constitutional rule making (see chapter 6). 
311 call this relationship a mechanism rather than an institution. It is an institution in the broad sense 
of that term: a regular and repeated pattern of behaviour, but it has a low degree of consolidation. 
It occurs only under some conditions, which are locally specific, and it doesn't have any 'formal' 
dimension like, for example, rules of conduct agreed upon by those involved. I have discussed it 
under the heading of 'forms of organisation' in chapter 7, but perhaps it would be more accurate 
to describe it as a 'form of organising'. 
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mechanism is possible because of the influence that politicians have on the administration, 
as discussed above. There clearly is no separation of legislative and executive powers (and 
judicial powers for that matter). However, the access to political influence is as unequal as 
that to irrigation water. The constituency-based political system implies that a politician has 
to please as many categories of voters as possible, but the dependencies inherent to the 
agrarian structure make that a politician should certainly not displease the powerful among 
them. 
This undemocratic political configuration is the second constraint for management reform. 
Commoditisation and the agrarian structure 
The third amendment to the protective management model is that the category of 'farmers' 
needs to be unpacked to be able to understand water distribution practices and unequal 
distribution properly (see chapters 5 and 6 particularly). 
The agrarian structure is characterised by strong social differentiation of agrarian 
producers as a result of the commoditisation process that accompanied the development of 
irrigated agriculture. The introduction of irrigation has led to the emergence of a group of 
head end farmers in the command area who could establish and expand a water-intensive and 
highly commoditised farming system through excess appropriation of water. This process was 
induced by well-endowed migrant farmers from the coastal areas of Andhra Pradesh who 
acquired land in favourable locations in the command area to start a rice-based farming 
system. Others followed suit. What has emerged is a class-related geographical pattern of 
water and land distribution, which roughly follows the head-tail locational pattern. 
Mechanisms for further land concentration in favourable locations include the purchase of 
land on the land market, land transfers through dowries, and strategic provision of loans with 
land as the collateral (see chapter 5). Apart from location other factors that influence the 
geography of social differentiation are the history of settlement and the design characteristics 
of the canal infrastructure (see chapters 5 and 7). 
The 'economically and politically sound' farmers, the rich peasants, and to a lesser extent 
the middle peasants, dominate the interactions with Irrigation Department officials and 
politicians. Small and poor peasants depend on them to secure water supply when the 
quantity and/or timing of the supply by the Irrigation Department is unsatisfactory. 
This relation of dependency is in some respects similar to that between politicians and rich 
and middle peasants. Particularly rich peasants act as local leaders in a much broader sense 
than only with regard to water distribution. Also they have to reproduce their support base 
even when they are not elected leaders. The acquisition of extra resources like water is one 
way to reproduce their social and political capital. 
Another part of the relationship between the two groups of farmers is more 
straightforwardly economic. Rich and middle peasants supply credit and employment to many 
small and poor peasants. The configuration of relations between different categories of 
farmers explains the unequal but relatively conflict-poor water distribution at outlet command 
area level. Because water rights are unclearly defined, small and poor peasants cannot openly 
contest unequal distribution (see chapter 5 and the discussion below on self-governance). 
The socio-geographical dimensions of the differentiation of agrarian producers are the third 
constraint for management reform. 
Technology 
The last structural factor that I want to discuss, and which is not visible in the model in box 
10.1, is the role of the technical infrastructure in shaping water management practices. One 
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aspect of that role was already referred to above in the discussion of the geography of social 
differentiation. The layout of the canal infrastructure is the grid on which the spatial pattern 
of class-related land and water distribution is made and remade. 
Technical features of the system that were found to be of particular importance were the 
following two (see particularly chapters 4 and 8). 
1) The combination of supply-orientation of the canal design, its continuous flow character, 
the size of the system, and the absence of cross regulators and/or intermediate storage make 
the system technically very difficult to manage. More precisely, it makes management that 
has to deal with demand for water that exceeds supply, and management that wants or needs 
to respond to changes in demand for water, very difficult, and practically speaking, 
impossible. 
At main canal level the Irrigation Department tries to deal with this situation by keeping 
the proportional distribution over the canal divisions constant, but the limitations of this are 
clearly felt in the tail end division (see chapter 9). The Irrigation Department also tries to 
stabilise the releases into the distributaries. This is not too difficult in the head end 
distributaries, where design capacity limits the maximum supply. Further downstream the 
distributary releases are the subject of negotiation with and intervention by farmers. 
The main terrain of management interactions is the distributary canal system however (see 
chapter 7). Apart from the rotation schedules discussed above, different pseudo-calculated 
rules have been negotiated between irrigation officials and farmers on gate openings and 
water levels. Where subdistributary canals exist their design capacities are an important 
factor in the spread of irrigation water over the command area. 
2) The choice of non-modular pipe outlet structures to supply water to outlet command areas 
enhances these problems (see chapters 4 and 8). These devices are extremely difficult to 
regulate with any precision. Moreover, they have been over-dimensioned, for reasons that 
are not fully clear. This makes excess appropriation of water technically very simple. The 
pipe outlet structure is therefore a strategic point of control in the system. Many of the 
farmer-farmer and farmer-irrigation official interactions take place around this structure. As 
a result the structures are subject to a continuous cycle of manipulation, damage, destruction, 
repair, rebuilding and redesign. The variation in the characteristics of the pipe outlet artefacts 
expresses the balance of power between farmers and between farmers and the Irrigation 
Department in water distribution, just like the precise characteristics of the rotation schedules 
express this balance. 
These technical features of the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal system constitute the fourth 
constraint for management reform. 
Opportunities: starting points for change in everyday practice 
The picture of water control in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal sketched above is 
inevitably a simplified picture. The flavour of the relationships lies in their detail, and in the 
variations on the general theme described. For these I refer to the earlier chapters. More 
importantly, the picture is also incomplete. The interaction of the different actors within an 
evolving social structure has produced particular forms of organisation that institutionally 
consolidate the relationships of these actors. These forms of organisation are not static but 
dynamic, and apart from constraints also provide opportunities for management reform. Also 
the technical infrastructure has not been a static, given factor, but has exhibited some 
dynamism. This points to another entry point for change. 
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Self-governance capacity 
The examples of rule making and implementation at outlet command area level given in 
chapter 6 and at subdistributary level in chapter 7 show that indeed water users are 
knowledgeable and capable actors (see chapter 2 for this concept). They show that supply-
side rules for water distribution are made, sometimes in great detail, and always with the 
equity concept of irrigation time per acre incorporated in them. However, from an equity 
perspective the weak point are the processes that constitute the demand for water. In chapter 
5 it was shown that small and poor peasants in the tail end anticipate unequal distribution in 
their crop choice. They plant less water-intensive and less remunerative crops because they 
know they are unable to gain the upper hand, or at least an equal hand, in confrontations 
with rich and middle peasants in the head end. Nevertheless, and this is the first opportunity 
for management reform, it seems to me that there is substantial potential for an increased 
level of self-governance by farmers. 
Joint rule-making and implementation 
At distributary level rotation schedules were the main form of organisation discussed. They 
were analysed as jointly constituted by farmers and irrigation officials, and as an expression 
of the balance of power between head enders and tail enders as well as that between farmers 
and Irrigation Department staff. I have argued that the distributary level rotation schedules 
signify a different relationship between water users and the state than that portrayed in the 
increasingly dominant rent-seeking perspective. There the image is one of a relation 
dominated by bribe payments, reinforced with political lobby activities, leading to anarchy 
on the canals. I interpret the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal situation more positively. I 
consider the rotation schedules as the emergent properties of conflicting interests, and as 
institutions that, despite the inequalities inherent in them, provide a better starting point for 
the renegotiation of water distribution than the 'syndrome of anarchy' perceived elsewhere. 
This is the second opportunity for management reform. 
Institutional and technical learning in the Irrigation Department 
Forms of organisation internal to the Irrigation Department were discussed in chapter 9 with 
regard to main canal management. I showed how in the severe water crisis in the period 
1988-1990 the Irrigation Department adapted the procedures for main canal management. It 
designed a new gauge table for main canal management, which gave the water levels to be 
maintained at the divisional borders with particular releases from the reservoir. This new 
gauge table diverged from the old, localisation based table. It institutionalised inequality in 
water distribution at main canal level, but at the same time provided a more realistic basis 
for the negotiation of water distribution at this level.4' The example shows that even under 
the very difficult circumstances prevalent in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal some degree 
of institutional learning and development was possible. I interpret this as another, third, 
opportunity for management reform. 
It was observed (see chapter 8) that there was considerable technical creativity of the 
engineers at the distributary canal level with regard to pipe outlet structure design. However 
this creativity is muzzled by a hierarchical structure of authority and by the absence of fora 
41
 Part of the change was the introduction of rotation over distributaries in the tail end division of 
the main canal, and regular weekly closure of smaller distributaries in the other divisions to push 
water to the tail end. 
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for the discussion of the technical features of the system between farmers and irrigation 
engineers. In addition, the professional orientation in the irrigation engineering community 
is not toward the small-scale day-to-day problems of existing technologies, but towards the 
creation of new, large-scale and more spectacular structures. Nevertheless, I conclude that 
the technical professionalism of engineers provides a fourth entry point for management 
reform, because that reform creates technical challenges. 
Conclusion 
The cynicism with regard to irrigation reform that I referred to in the introduction of this 
chapter finds part of its rationale in the overwhelming nature of the constraints outlined 
above. Restructuring the state-farmers relationship, redefinition of the role of politicians, 
changing the agrarian structure and an overhaul of the technical infrastructure seem to be 
impossible tasks to accomplish. And indeed, it would be naive to underestimate the 
importance of these conditions of impossibility. 
However, such general and structuralist views can overlook opportunities for change and 
reform. The detailed analysis of water distribution practices in this book which was 
summarised above, shows that there is considerable diversity and dynamism within the 
overall structure. There is capacity for self-governance by farmers, there is joint rule making 
and implementation by farmers and Irrigation Department staff mediated by politicians, there 
is institutional change within the Irrigation Department, and there is technical creativity of 
engineers. 
In the introductory chapter of the book I stated that a larger number of 'grounded' studies 
on management practices in canal irrigation might provide a more realistic basis for debates 
on reform. I hope to have shown that the basis for that realism is provided by an 
understanding of the contested nature of water control and the interrelation of its different 
dimensions (see chapter 2 for these theoretical starting points). Apart from allowing an 
analysis of why things are as they are, contestation implies room to manoeuvre and 
multidimensionality implies that changes in one aspect may induce or facilitate changes in 
other aspects. This is not intended to sound overly optimistic. But unless it is assumed that 
dramatic structural changes are in the offing, strategic analysis of present conditions to 
identify entry points for change will have to be the basis of reform initiatives in canal 
irrigation. 
10.2 REFORM PERSPECTIVES FOR PROTECTIVE IRRIGATION 
The discussion above identified constraints and opportunities for management reform in 
protective irrigation. It implicitly assumed the need for such reform. This need is recognised 
by almost all actors involved in protective irrigation management. Even most head-end water 
users would, I suspect, acknowledge it.5) 
However, the need for management reform can be argued on a variety of grounds. These 
different grounds represent different perspectives on what the problem in protective irrigation 
is. Different problem formulations in their turn imply different policy instruments to achieve 
reform. Below I briefly summarise the different problem definitions and the policy 
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 Reasons for this expectation are the conflictuous nature of present management and the potential 
to reduce - in neo-institutional economics terms - transaction costs also for this group. 
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instruments associated with them and indicate which role they play in policy debates in 
Karnataka. Towards the end of the summary review I question, paradoxically, the focus on 
water and its management in discussions on water management reform. To conclude I give 
my own perspective on the matter. 
Manage as planned 
The first perspective on management reform in protective irrigation starts from the 
observation that protective irrigation systems are not used as planned. This itself can be 
considered sufficient reason to advocate reform. Reform in this perspective means taking 
measures that guarantee that the systems are used as planned. This position implies no 
reflection on the model of protective irrigation as such, but addresses either design and 
technical or planning and implementation deficiencies. 
In the 1990s this technocratic view of management reform seems, at the policy level, no 
longer to be held by many people. It was however the dominant policy view in the early 
decades of the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal's existence (see the discussions on the best 
cropping pattern referred to in chapter 3 for example). The perspective does define part of 
the attitude of many irrigation engineers working in the systems. Many of them feel that 
when politicians would not 'interfere' in management, and farmers would be 'educated' and 
follow the rules of 'scientific management', the system could be operated as planned. 
However, the same engineers realise that this 'if only' position is not very helpful in day-to-
day management and in thinking about possibilities for change. 
The policy instruments associated with this perspective typically are a combination of 
upgrading of the technical infrastructure, the enforcement of farmer discipline (adherence to 
the rules) by legal action and if necessary police action, and extension activities towards and 
training of farmers (see for example Madarkal, 1968; Tungabhadra Project, 1970; UAS, 
1973; CADA/TBP, 1979). When engineers formulate proposals for change they usually 
include magisterial powers for irrigation officials, and good transport and communication 
facilities as elements of the strategy to be adopted. Box 10.2 gives a letter signed by 21 
Section Officers which was written in the context of a public discussion organised by CADA 
in 1992, in which they formulated their reform management perspective (also see Ahmed, 
n.d.). 
The economic benefits of protective irrigation 
The second perspective on the need for management reform is an economic argument about 
the maximisation of the overall economic benefits of irrigation (also see Chambers, 1994 on 
'production thinking'). It has been argued, given that water is scarce relative to land, that a 
strategy to maximise the production per unit of water gives higher total economic returns 
than a strategy to maximise production per unit of land (see Dhawan, 1989; Rath and Mitra, 
1989).6) It has also been argued that the labour requirement of the crops grown with a unit 
of water, under protective irrigation is higher for most 'irrigated dry' crops than for 
sugarcane and similar to that of rice (Rath and Mitra, 1989; Bolding, Mollinga and van 
Straaten, 1995: footnote 32). 
There is also a counter argument. The direct production achieved with irrigation is a rather 
limited basis for economic evaluation. A more comprehensive analysis would also look at the 
second order economic effects of irrigation. One example is the effect of agricultural growth 
1
 The total production may be expressed in total calory content or total value of the crops. 
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Box 10 .2 : A Section Officers' perspective on management reform 
To: the Chief Engineer/Date: May 1992/Subject: Problems of Section Officers engaged in water 
management- Regarding 
Sir, 
We, the following section officers engaged in water management of Distributaries, request your 
kindself to consider the problems briefed below. 
1) The cropping pattern localised in the distributaries has become 'the talk of the town' in the state. 
Hence, separate kharif and rabi blocks pipe-outlet wise to be re-organised and got approved by the 
Government for efficient water management (as in the case of high level canal). 
2) The Irrigation Department is unable to control the un-authorised and outside localisation development. 
The prevention of the same is to be implemented with a separate staff of Revenue, Police and Irrigation 
Departments. Collection of water rate and penalty collection to be entrusted to Irrigation Department. 
3) With the existing rotation system, it is difficult to push water to tail end. Avoiding all the hurdles in 
closing and controlling PO's and subdistributaries with great struggle, the tail end ayacutdars are feeded 
three days in a week. When any ayacutdars in the Upper reach manhandled the staff, there is nobody 
to help. 
Now it is intended to adopt on & off system. Basic impression of ayacutdars is not for this 
procedure. With 50 ricemills in Gangavathi Taluka and with a strong Paddy Growers lobby, is our 
Irrigation Department capable of adopting 'on &o f f which directly influences the plantation of paddy 
and sugarcane. The adoption of this procedure, to be taken after caraful change in cropping pattern, 
mass meeting among the ayacutdars and strong protection to the field staff. 
4) The political interference of MLAs, MPs, ZP (Zilla Parishad) members and Ryot Sangha pressurise the 
unauthorised operation of POs and subdistributaries, which directly affects the water management. The 
operation of sluices should be free from such pressure. This point is to be clarified with political leaders. 
5) The contractors. Now, the Section Officers are facing difficulty to extract work from the contractors. 
Either they bring political pressure or official pressure or even blackmail us with our personal matters. 
Hence, we request our Higher Officers to use the Clause of Black-listing of contractors who misbehave 
and violate the Agreement executed. To safe-guard the interest of government work, the Executive 
Engineer should check measure the works exceeding Rs. 15,000 invariably. 
6. Police squad for ID. A separate police force is required for maintaining law & order in implementing 
the Rotation and New Systems introduced. Even, we find difficult to stop the ayacutdars damaging the 
structures in front of us. Police requires witness, for which the local people are not ready. Hence, a 
permanent separate police squad is required. 
7. Fresh appointments of gangmen, sowdies, work inspectors and Irrigation Inspectors to be done 
urgently. The sanctioned strength pattern to be revised practically and necessary job opportunities to 
be increased to meet the demand of ayacutdars. 
8. Proper communication system is required and quick operation of sluices both on main canal and 
distributaries. Preferably wireless system as in UKP (Upper Krishna Project) is required. 
9. Sufficient trainings regarding management in the Institutions like KERS KRSagara and WALMI 
Dharwad to be conducted and each Section Officer to be deputed compulsorily. 
10. Regular grants allotted to each Division is equal to the payment wages of staff. For works 
separate additional grant is requested every year to government. This may be avoided by impressing the 
government the actual requirement of grants for canal maintenance works. 
1 1 . The I.D. has ayacut roads maintained at Rs. 1000/- per kilometer for annual maintenance. It is 
requested to increase AME cost to Rs.6000/- per km to meet present hike in prices. It is pity that our 
I.D. is unable to get either HKDB (Hyderabad-Karnataka Development Board) funds or other development 
funds for the roads. We are facing difficulty to answer the questions of ayacutdars and MLAs to 
maintain the roads fit for vehicle movement. This may be viewed seriously. 
12. T.A. admissable per month for each Section Officer and below is not sufficient to meet the 
vehicle expenditure like petrol, oil, repairs, etc. This may be increased to keeping in view the petrol rate 
and the jurisdiction of the Section Officer and below. 
13. Sufficient survey instruments, machineries like Zerox copiers, computers, well conditioned 
Tipper, lorries and all Diesel Jeeps to be made available in each Division. To attend emergency works 
like breaches, bongas and night water management, the present vehicles are not in good condition. 
O&M subdivisions are not capable of repairing the vehicles quickly and many vehicles are kept idle for 
want of repairs. 
The above points are for your kind consideration. Sir, with good faith, we have envisaged the above to 
implement as soon as possible. Thanking you, Sir, 
Yours faithfully <21 Section Officers > 
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on the input, output and processing business sectors, in terms of economic growth and 
employment generation. These may be expected to be larger in the case of 'productive 
irrigation' than for protective irrigation.7' The overall benefits (and poverty alleviation 
effects) of 'productive irrigation' may thus be larger than those of protective irrigation.8' 
A problem with the evaluation of these different views is that the data base for it is 
extremely small. To my knowledge the references given exhaust the material available that 
directly addresses this issue. Moreover, apart from the quantitative question, which is 
complicated enough, there is a qualitative question on the type of agrarian change that a 
government or any other agent desires to promote. In this different factors than growth and 
employment effects may play a role (also see the discussion of equity and sustainability 
below). 
In the maximisation of benefits perspective, the problem to be solved is the contradiction 
between the government objective to spread water and maximise production per unit of 
water, and the farmer's objective to maximise production per unit of land (see chapter 3). 
The policy instruments logically associated with this perspective, with private ownership of 
land taken as given, would be price and market regulation in favour of 'irrigated dry' crops. 
On the whole however, the policy emphasis is exactly the reverse. Rice, together with 
wheat, is an essential commodity in the government's Public Distribution System (PDS), 
which intends to guarantee a base supply of foodgrains (and other commodities) to poor 
households. This involves support prices and procurement by the government of these 
foodgrains (see Mooij, 1996). The existence of the PDS system is one factor that explains 
the attractiveness of rice cultivation as against other foodgrains. To my knowledge 
considerations of water management reform have not played an important role in decision 
making on agricultural prices and marketing policies. 
Perverse incentive structures 
The third perspective on the need for management reform in protective irrigation focuses on 
the incentive structure for water use and its management. The common denominators of the 
problem definition in this perspective are inefficiency and low performance. There are 
several strands in the argument about incentive structures, efficiency and performance. 
One strand is that the State governments can no longer continue to finance the operation 
and maintenance of the canal irrigation systems in the way that they do now. The systems 
are under-financed, and management quality suffers from this. Cost recovery from the 
farmers is a must to manage the systems better in the future, so goes the argument (Report 
of the Committee on Pricing of Irrigation Water, 1992/1994:2.2 and 3.3; Svendsen, 1991; 
Svendsen and Gulati, 1994; World Bank, 1991). 
This argument may be combined with the hope or assumption that higher payments for 
water will induce farmers to use it more efficiently. Advocacy of volumetric pricing is 
therefore often part of the argument." It is however very doubtful whether water prices can 
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 For example in the case of the emergence of cooperative sugar factories (see Attwood, 1993). 
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 A limitation of Rath and Mitra's argument that is relevant in this respect is that they do not 
distinguish between family labour and wage labour in their estimation of labour required for crop 
cultivation. For the overall economic effect it is important whether irrigation mainly generates self-
employment for farming households or wage employment for agricultural labourers. 
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 Calls for volumetric pricing go back at least 100 years (see chapters 3 and 8). Scattered calls for 
it can be traced in later periods. One example is Azeemuddin (1947) who preferred volumetric 
(continued...) 
BA CK TO THE FUTURE 255 
be increased to such a level that they will influence farmers' decisions on the quantity of 
water use (see R. Bhatia, 1992 for a critical review of the arguments; also see Oorthuizen 
and Kloezen, 1995 for general discussion). 
Financially autonomous irrigation agencies are another element of this line of thought 
{Report of the Committee on Pricing of Irrigation Water, 4.5; also see Merrey, 1995 for 
general discussion). Then the focus is on accountability relations: the management 
institution's survival depends on the payments made by farmers, and farmers need to pay to 
get a service. It is argued, in my view very plausibly, that financial relations can be a very 
strong mechanism in the creation of stronger and more balanced accountability mechanisms 
between managers and users.10' 
However, the ability to pay and withhold payment is not distributed equally over different 
categories of farmers, and therefore a financial perspective on accountability may be 
insufficient to address accountability and distribution issues within the community of water 
users. 
Yet another strand of the financial reform argument focuses on rent seeking activities by 
the bureaucracy, that is corruption. Because water is a scarce resource that in India's canal 
irrigation systems is priced far below its economic value, system managers can capitalise on 
their control over the distribution system and extract illegal payments from farmers. In this 
way a vested interest on the management side is created in uncertainty of water supply and 
generally in poor management as compared to the formal distribution policy (Repetto, 1986; 
Wade, 1982a). 
Some people believe that rent-seeking can only be eradicated by pricing water at its 
economic value (and thus remove the rent's economic base) or by the removal of water 
scarcity. The most radical reform proposal in this respect has been forwarded in Burns 
(1993). This author proposes to eradicate rent seeking activities by the removal of water 
scarcity. He suggests to define and physically concentrate a group of core water users who 
receive sufficient water also under conditions of drought, and who pay water charges that 
cover operation and maintenance costs. The non-core part of the system will only receive the 
surplus water after the core area has taken its share. This implies zero supply in situations 
of drought. 
Less radical reform strategies would favour financially autonomous irrigation agencies with 
increased water charges to cover at least operation and maintenance cost, and would argue 
that through increased accountability the management performance of the managing 
institutions would be improved and rent-seeking reduced. 
The Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal case suggests that rent-seeking may, in some cases, not 
be the major issue in water distribution, at least not in the direct sense that bribe payments 
are the dominant mechanism in resource distribution (see chapter 7). It thus fundamentally 
9,(...continued) 
delivery and pricing in new projects in Hyderabad State, but he feared that the Indian farmer was 
not 'advanced' enough for this. Instead he argued for a betterment levy, and to avoid wastage he 
wanted payment per watering or per crop. 
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 The first effort with a financially autonomous irrigation agency in Karnataka, the Krishna Bhagya 
Jala Nigam Limited (Nigam for short) does not seem to be very promising. It should be noted that 
this company was primarily established to attract investment funds for the construction of the 
Upper Krishna Project (Times of India, 20 March 1995), that the staff of the Nigam is deputed from 
government agencies, and that the government has guaranteed the returns to the shareholders' 
investments. 
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questions whether the rent-seeking argument can be the basis for water management reform 
proposals. However, acceptance of the rent-seeking argumentis not a condition for the 
recognition of the importance of financial incentive structures. 
Equity 
The fourth perspective on the need for management reform in protective irrigation focuses 
on the equity issue. It argues that unequal water distribution and unequal spread of the 
benefits of irrigation (either regionally or over categories of people) is unacceptable. In 
chapter 3 I analysed how concerns of famine prevention and social stability lay at the basis 
of the concept of protective irrigation, and how these have been taken up in the post 
Independence development discourse. Poverty alleviation, the regional spread of development 
efforts and resources, and the reproduction of the state's legitimacy are arguments that can 
be used in favour of protective irrigation. For tailenders equity is also a highly relevant 
argument. To them it is not clear why others should get a larger share of the water.n) 
Equity has become a prominent element in the irrigation policy discourse since the first 
wave of national and international management reform debate in the 1970s and 1980s. The 
policy initiative in which equity objectives have been most prominent is the organisation of 
water users in water users associations at outlet command area level as part of the Command 
Area Development (CAD) programme in the 1970s and 1980s (see chapter 9 and below). Its 
resonance with the populist nature of the Indian polity should be evident (see chapter 3). 
However, or maybe because of this, the equity objective has not been operationalised very 
clearly. Noticeable about the Indian irrigation management reform debate is that the issues 
of water rights reform and/or land rights reform have hardly been taken up (see Chambers, 
1994). Such reforms would directly affect the entitlement structure with regard to water, and 
thus very directly confront equity issues. It is undoubtedly true that in the Indian context 
these are very difficult avenues for change, particularly in canal irrigation. However, when 
equity is a central concern or stated objective, more discussion on strategies to achieve it 
would be warranted.12) 
Democratisation 
A fifth argument for management reform in protective irrigation focuses on the 
democratisation dimension of decentralisation. Advocacy of decentralisation is often 
associated with equity, efficiency and cost recovery objectives. In those approaches 
decentralisation serves as an instrument to achieve other objectives. Decentralisation can also 
be an argument in its own right. In such a perspective the political dimensions of 
decentralisation are emphasised. It is seen as a way to institutionalise more democratic and 
more localised forms of development policy making, planning and implementation.13' 
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 A continuation of the present management practices in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal is likely 
to lead to slow but steady further concentration of water use in head end regions at outlet, 
distributary and main canal level. That this process is ongoing at main canal and distributary level 
is suggested by our fieldwork in 1996-97 in a larger number of distributaries spread over the 
Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal command area. 
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 There are examples of delinking water rights and land rights for example, but these have not 
been able to put the property rights issue on the canal irrigation policy agenda. Also see footnote 
46. 
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 This can be further illustrated with Meinzen-Dick's discussion of the terminology and policy 
trends in the debates on the devolution of irrigation management (Meinzen-Dick, 1996). She gives 
(continued...) 
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Democratisation might be considered a particularly relevant issue in Karnataka, because 
Karnataka has a relatively strong tradition of decentralised governance (for discussion see 
Aziz, Nelson and Babu, 1996). However, to my knowledge this perspective on 
decentralisation does not play an important role in discussion on irrigation policy in the 
State.14) 
The main policy instruments associated with this perspective would be the creation of a 
multi-tier system of federated water users association, or other organisations, to which real 
powers would be devolved (rather than being an extension of the government bureaucracy). 
Even when this structure could be created an important question would be whether and how 
the possibilities for more constructive and balanced negotiation of water resource distribution 
would be captured.15' 
An important, but in my view underemphasised, dimension of decentralisation (whether 
it is advocated from political or more instrumental perspectives) is the technology required 
to make instititutional decentralisation possible. Put differently, how can supply-oriented 
large canal systems be decentralised hydraulically? I have argued that the present technical 
infrastructure of the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal is not particularly suitable for the 
regulation of scarcity distribution and flexible types of management (see section 10.1).16) 
Ecological sustainability 
A sixth argument for management reform has to do with the ecological effects of large scale 
irrigation systems. Over the last two decades these have been heavily criticised for their 
negative environmental impact (Dhawan, 1990; Singh, 1997). When we look at existing canal 
irrigation systems, the ecological critique concerns two main issues: (i) waterlogging and 
"'(...continued) 
the following definitions. "Decentralization attempts to improve the management of natural and 
fiscal resources by moving both decision-making authority and payment responsibility to lower 
levels of government (...) Privatization refers to the transfer of ownership of resources from the 
public sector to groups or individuals (including for-profit firms). Participation and democratization 
seek the involvement of citizens affected by programs, for social goals of empowering local people 
as well as goals of improving program performance. Within the irrigation sector, irrigation 
management transfer (IMT) or turnover generally refer to programs that shift responsibility and 
authority from the state to non-governmental bodies (...) - a 'rolling back the boundaries of the 
state'. (...) Participatory irigation management (PIM) refers to programs that seek to increase 
farmer's direct involvement in system management-either as a complement or substitute for the 
state role. (...) Either approach leads to some form of joint management of irrigation systems, with 
the state responsible for more tasks at higher levels of the system, and farmers' organizations 
responsible for more at lower levels (...)." (ibid. :2-3) 
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 The only instance I know in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal was referred to in chapter 9. In 
1989-90 the elected District Council (Zilla Parishad) president called for putting irrigation 
management under the control of "that and lower bodies. 
151
 For an example of a multi-tier organisational structure of Water Users Associations see 
Shanmugham (1991) on the Lower Bhavani project in Tamil Nadu. 
161
 The most comprehensive attempt at the re-design of a large scale canal irrigation system that 
I know is Paranjape and Joy (1995). It refers to the Sardar Sarovar Project in Gujarat, and one of 
its most original features is the combination of large scale canal irrigation with local watershed 
management. Also see the discussion below. 
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salinisation, and (ii) the negative environmental effects of high external input agriculture (for 
discussion of these issues, see for example Shiva, 1988 and Nanda, 1991).I7) 
The solution of both issues involves management reform. Waterlogging and salinisation 
are related to poor maintenance of canal infrastructure, the absence or poor state of drainage, 
overirrigation and other factors. In many cases waterlogging and salinisation can be 
controlled by proper management practices in operation and maintenance.18' 
The control or prevention of the negative environmental impact of high external input 
agriculture (with regard to soil fertility, health, pollution and ecological diversity) requires 
changes in farming system management. These are partly related to irrigation management. 
For example, water availability influences crop choice and the occurrence of pests and 
diseases, and the double cropping that reservoir-fed canal irrigation allows reduces fallow 
periods, which negatively affects nutrient balances.19' 
The policy instruments associated with this argument for reform are the same as in the 
previous reform perspectives and depend on how one thinks that 'good water management' 
can be accomplished. For the stimulation of ecological agricultural practices separate policy 
instruments are required. 
Towards a comprehensive view 
The different reform perspectives outlined above are associated with different concepts of 
development and different 'political projects'. The 'manage as planned' and 'economic 
benefits' perspective are both associated with strong concepts of planned development by the 
state, with technocratic and meritocratic overtones. It was dominant in the first decades after 
Independence, but is now under question. 
The 'perverse incentive structures' perspective is associated with the neo-liberal 
development programme, which emphasises a reduced role of state institutions, and the 
introduction of the market mechanism. It is on the rise, though more so at the level of policy 
discourse than policy practice. The importance of water pricing and the potential benefits of 
contractual arrangements for water delivery are also increasingly acknowledged by people 
who do not subscribe to the neo-liberal development programme. 
The 'equity', 'democratisation' and 'ecological sustainability' perspectives could be seen 
as the progressive agenda for canal irrigation reform. They have appeared in the order that 
they were discussed. Though the situation varies from State to State, I would like to argue 
that this progressive agenda has not or insufficiently translated into a coherent concept or 
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 Much of the environmental critique is directed against the construction of new projects, like the 
Sardar Sarovar project referred to above. Additional issues like the submergence of agricultural 
land, forest and settlements with the related displacement of people, then occur. 
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 Also in this case the problems and their solutions are locally specific. For example the situation 
in an alluvial plain like Haryana (North India) with some parts located in a basin from which drainage 
is impossible, and a gradual import of salts by irrigation water (see Jacobs, de Jong, Mollinga and 
Bastiaanssen, 1997), is totally different from a situation like the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal, with 
considerable relief and in principle sufficient drainage capacity, and the salts being mainly resident 
salts which are mobilised by irrigation (see Report of the external review, 1997). Improved 
drainage, which is part of the solution in both cases, has received comparatively little attention in 
India. 
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 The NGO AME (Agriculture Man Ecology) has documented the effects of intensive irrigation on 
soil fertility in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal. A presentation of their results in December 1997 
(in Bangalore and Munirabad) showed that the situation is worrying. I did not have access to the 
final report of their work at the time of writing this chapter. 
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approach at the level of management reform discourse and practice. Only the equity concept 
has been incorporated in the official Indian canal irrigation policy discourse in a visible way. 
The ecological issue is mainly seen as a problem. The initiatives that have been taken in this 
regard by governmental and non-governmental organisations have remained rather localised 
and isolated.20' 
However, there is change in this respect. On the basis of experiments with (canal) 
irrigation development and reform that have been done in the States of Maharashtra and 
Gujarat, and the opposition to the Sardar Sarovar project, a more comprehensive formulation 
of a progressive agenda for canal irrigation reform has been undertaken. I refer to the 
approach that has been published under the title 'banking on biomass' (see Paranjape and 
Joy, 1995; Datye, 1997). I briefly discuss the main elements of the approach, to suggest 
along which lines progressive theory and practice regarding canal irrigation might be 
developed.2" 
The first element of the approach can be derived from the following quotation. 
It is generally found that in watershed development schemes local groups as well as 
development administration tend to concentrate on the in situ measures to the exclusion 
of water source development for water application. On the other hand irrigation 
projects give scant attention to local resource management and exogenous water is seen 
not as supplement to primary ecosystem productivity that it should be but as a 
substitute for it. The need is to integrate them both within a coherent perspective. 
(Datye, 1997:57) 
The dichotomy between rainfed agriculture and (canal) irrigated agriculture needs to be 
transcended. In this approach the sustainable (in Datye's terms regenerative) management of 
local resources should be a precondition for the availability and use of 'exogenous water' like 
that provided by a canal irrigation system. Such an integrated approach to water resources 
development can lead to substantial increases in resource use efficiency.22' 
The second element of the approach refers to the social dimensions of sustainable resource 
use. It can be derived from the following quotation. 
Equitable access to water necessary for ensuring livelihood needs to be treated on par 
with employment guarantee and the right to work as part of the larger right to an 
adequate livelihood. (...) water necessary for drinking and domestic use, for 
regeneration and tor the livelihood component including special measures for the 
disadvantaged sections represents a priority claim on water resources in the area, and 
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 It is significant that most publications that could be classified under the 'progressive agenda' are 
case studies of local initiatives and experiments (see for example Singh, 1991; Sivamohan and 
Scott, 1994). There is hardly a more generalised debate. Maloney and Raju (1994) and Ambler 
(1994) could be considered as exceptions. More significant is that in canal irrigation there is to my 
knowledge no example of local initiatives and experiments that have developed into a broader 
movement, like, for example and as comparison, the well recharge movements in Gujarat (see 
Shah, 1997). 
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 For the summary below I made use of Linden Vincent's discussion notes on the paper based on 
the Banking on biomass book (Datye et al., 1997). The paper and notes were presented during the 
IDPAD (Indo-Dutch Programme on Alternatives in Development) 'Managing water scarcity: 
experiences and prospects' conference in Amersfoort, the Netherlands in October 1997. 
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 The author claims that "by the integration of external sources of irrigation water with 'local' 
water harnessed from the watersheds and conserved in situ, it is possible to raise the productivity 
level of total available water for productive use to levels three times that of 'external' irrigation 
water." (Datye, 1997:142) These and other statements are backed up by empirical evidence and 
calculations on the basis of existing technologies. 
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only after these claims have been met can the water be available for commercial use. 
The policy is to ensure a minimum livelihood for all and to regulate all resources 
necessary for this, and leave the rest of the resources to be freely utilised by the 
enterprising. (ibid.:5K) 
The approach defines a basic water right for all, and delinks water rights from land rights. 
In strategic terms the approach wants to allocate 'new water', that is water that has become 
available through efficiency gains and ecosystem development, to the resource poor. The 
approach is a positive-sum variant of hydraulic property creation (Coward, 1986a&b). Those 
who have (collectively) invested in the generation of new resources by optimising existing 
resource use, gain rights in these new resources.23' 
The third element is the ecological sustainability-with-growth element. Characteristic of 
the approach is that it not only advocates ecologically sound techniques for agricultural 
production, but conceptualises agriculture as a system of 'regenerative biomass production' 
that provides the bio-energy not only for sustainable agriculture but also for dispersed 
industrialisation.24' The production strategy emphasises production of crops that can serve 
as the inputs for small industries, like tree crops. The approach wants to 'move beyond 
subsistence' and wants to provide an agricultural cum industrial perspective of sustainable 
growth.25' Part of the approach is an argument for non-subsidised prices for external inputs 
in agriculture, subsidies that help the detrimental effects of high external input agriculture 
to pertain. The approach proposes the (gradual) removal of subsidies on electric power and 
the introduction of a progressive tariff system, volumetric water supply and cost recovery, 
while price support for coarse grains is advocated. 
The fourth element is the methodological one. There is a strong emphasis on decentralised 
and interactive planning and decision-making, including an emphasis on elements like 
people's science, participatory technology development, and resource literacy.26' However, 
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 The authors recognise that the acceptability of equitable access to water is a "most troublesome 
point" (Datye, 1997:130), but several examples are cited where this has been achieved in practice. 
The general finding in the cases reported is "that where access to water resource is seen to come 
about clearly through collective action, and where there are no previous entrenched water rights, 
farmers are not averse to equitable sharing arrangements." {ibid.: 132) In terms of social reform the 
approach chooses to move away from a primary focus on land reform as a precondition for agrarian 
change. "The alternative paradigm presented here suggests another route -- that of augmenting the 
subsistence base by harnessing and generating new productive assets and ensuring access to them 
in the course of development in building up common resource pools through the development of 
wastelands and water, and by a policy of tying availability of public funds with the conditionalities 
of creating rights and access for the rural poor to the common pool resources of water and 
biomass. Combined with an overall improvement in the availability of water and efficiency of water 
use along with increased productivity of land and water, conflicts can be minimised though, of 
course, not entirely eliminated." (ibid.:261) This aspect of the approach is likely to spark a lot of 
discussion, particularly from a gender perspective. For the importance of control over land for 
gender equality see Agarwal (1998). Also see NEDA (1997). 
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 The publications referred to contain descriptions and calculations of biomass based power 
generation, in relation to the power required for lift irrigation that is part of the agricultural system 
for example. In general, the approach also emphasises the use of local materials, for example in 
canal lining and weir and small dam construction (see Gore, 1998). 
251
 In this respect it goes one step further than approaches like those described in Chambers, 
Saxena and Shah (1989) for example, though many of the individual elements are similar. There 
is also a greater emphasis on the technological prerequisites in Datye et al.'s approach. 
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 The publications referred to do not discuss these methodologies in detail. For more elaborate 
treatment see for example Chambers, Saxena and Shah (1989), Shah (n.d). 
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despite the statement that "the policy framework and implementation of the post-
Independence programme in the water, energy and infrastructure sectors lack all the 
components of the policy frame proposed here." (ibid.:266), the publications contain no 
description of a strategy to achieve the policy reform and/or broad-based social activism that 
is necessary to create more favourable conditions for large(r)-scale implementation of the 
approach. 
Elements of Datye et al. 's approach can certainly be questioned, and some of these 
questions have been hinted at above. However, it makes an in my view highly original 
attempt to combine the concepts of integrated water resources management, ecologically 
sustainable agriculture, agro-industrial growth, equity/poverty alleviation/social security and 
decentralisation/democratisation. It broadens the Indian debate on canal irrigation reform in 
the following way. 
1) It situates canal irrigation reform in a broader rural development strategy, and doesn't 
look at canal irrigation as a self-contained phenomenon.27> 
2) It links canal irrigation development and watershed development (it takes an 
integrated water resources management perspective), and links this to decentralised 
and democratic forms of planning and decision making. 
3) It emphasises the importance of water rights (and property rights in resources in 
general) as central for a development strategy that targets the resource poor. 
4) It gives detailed attention to the technological dimensions of the development strategy. 
Conclusion 
The main conclusion that I draw from this review of irrigation management reform 
perspectives is not only that there are good reasons to advocate reform in protective 
irrigation, but also that, in contrast to what some observers think (see Burns, 1993), these 
reforms are not impossible to achieve. 
The difficult question to be answered remains "what the conditions [are] in which a group 
of people will voluntarily subscribe to a rule of restrained access to irrigation water?" (Wade, 
1988b:489) The discussion of Datye et al.'s approach suggests that this problem can be 
addressed, but that it should not be addressed in the context of canal irrigation management 
alone. The problem should be situated in a broader approach that looks at the role of water 
in rural development, and employs strategies that address water rights issues and moves 
beyond subsistence and agriculture. 
Interesting about Datye et al. 's approach is also that it incorporates elements of several 
of the other reform perspectives: an emphasis on productivity growth, employment cration, 
resource use efficiency, and non-subsidised pricing. This implies that it can possibly speak 
to the concerns of a number of different political constituencies. The major strategic question 
it seems to me, is how an approach along lines like Datye et al. 's can be linked to the 
concerns of these different constituencies, and linked with, be taken up by, or develop into 
wider movements for social transformation. This is discussed in some more detail below after 
looking at the process dimensions of the irrigation policy (reform) process in Karnataka. 
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 It can also be noticed that Datye et al.'s approach incorporates some of the opportunities for 
reform identified in section 10.1, most prominently the self-governance and technological creativity 
elements. 
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10.3 THE IMPORTANCE OF PROCESS: THE PIM REFORM INITIATIVE IN 
KARNATAKA 
In this section I shift focus from what should happen to what is happening at the level of 
policy reform. I discuss the recent policy reform process in the State of Karnataka that aims 
to introduce the concept of Participatory Irrigation Management (PIM) in canal irrigation.28' 
In Karnataka a reformulation of irrigation policy is in the making that may signify a 
qualitative departure from earlier approaches to management reform. In October 1995 the 
Government of Karnataka appointed an Expert Committee to "study the requirement of 
amendments to relevant Acts and Rules for constitution of CAD [Command Area 
Development] Boards, State CAD Council and Farmers Associations." (Government Order 
ID 35 CAM 95 of 27.10.1995) The main assignment of the Expert Committee was to prepare 
proposals for the implementation of Participatory Irrigation Management (PIM).29) The core 
elements of the Committee's proposals, published in an interim report in May 1996, were 
the following {Interim Report, 1996).30) 
1) The establishment of contractual relations between the Irrigation Department as a 
supplier of water and WUAs (Water Users Associations) as buyers of water through 
volumetric supply and charging, and explicit water rights to be given to WUAs. 
2) A much higher degree of self-governance for WUAs than previously considered. This 
involves, among other things, that powers regarding canal construction and 
maintenance and the regulation of water supply previously with the Irrigation 
Department are to be delegated to the WUAs for the area covered by them, that 
larger units of organisation than the pipe outlet command area are envisaged, that 
assessment and collection of water fees is to be done by WUAs, and that there will 
be freedom of crop choice within the WUA area. Federation of WUAs is foreseen. 
3) A reorganisation of the CADA (Command Area Development Authority) governing 
bodies and the Irrigation Consultative Committee, to increase participation of water 
users representatives. 
In June 1996 a High Level Working Group was appointed to initiate action on the 
recommendations of the Expert Committee. Mid-1997, when this section was drafted, the 
proposals for amendments to the relevant Acts and Rules and implementation of a PIM 
programme through pilot projects were very close to formal acceptance, but were not yet 
confirmed fully at Cabinet and Parliament level. The discussion below may therefore run 
ahead of events. 
I interpret these proposals as a qualitative break with the past because some of the basic 
characteristics of irrigation management are rethought.3" Payment for water is related to 
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 The concept is popularised at the international and national level by the PIM programme of the 
Economic Development Institute (EDI) of the Worldbank, and the INPIM (International Network for 
Participatory Irrigation Management), an NGO established under the patronage of the EDI. In India 
there is also a national INPIM chapter, registered as an NGO. The present policy reform process in 
Karnataka has partly been induced by the national level PIM concept, but also has its own 
dynamics (see below). On PIM, see the INPIM Newsletter. 
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 Also see Government Order ID 137 CAM 95 (P) of 13 March 1996 that reconstitutes the 
Committee and adds terms of reference to this effect. 
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 The final report was published in 1997 and contained few changes. I refer to the interim report 
because my copy of the final report was stolen. 
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 In this respect developments in Karnataka are in line with those in other States. For a review of 
such efforts, see Raju (1997). 
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the quantum used, the powers of the Irrigation Department are reduced and those of water 
users increased, and localisation is officially abandoned, but replaced with a different system 
of water rights. There are many ifs and buts in the concrete operationalisation of these 
proposals, but these are not the focus of my attention in this discussion.32' I want to zoom 
in on the process of policy formulation and implementation.33) 
The policy formulation process 
With regard to the process of the formulation of this new policy it is remarkable how few 
people are involved in it, and how strong the element of contingency seems to be. This can 
be clarified by looking at where the PIM policy initiative came from. A number of factors 
have contributed to its existence. 
One factor is the pressure for management reform from actors outside the State, notably 
the Government of India and the World Bank. Mechanisms to influence State policies by 
these outside agents include policy agreements by conferences of State Ministers at all-India 
level, the allocation of funds for the CAD programme (which is a central government 
supported programme), and conditions attached to financial support for the implementation 
of construction projects and other financial assistance. 
The National Water Policy formulated in 1987 which advocates participatory forms of 
management was accepted by a conference of State Irrigation Ministers. The possibility to 
levy water charges on a volumetric basis was included in Karnataka law as part of the 
agreement for World Bank funding for the Upper Krishna Project, a large scale canal 
irrigation system under construction in north Karnataka.34> The appointment of the Expert 
Committee in Karnataka seems to have been triggered by the Government of India's linkage 
of the continuation of funding for the CAD programme to the implementation of a PIM 
programme. 
In a more general sense, and this is the second factor, there is a constant inflow of ideas 
on management reform into the State through the actors mentioned above, and through other 
mechanisms like visits to other parts of India, or countries like Mexico, by senior 
government officials to study experiments with irrigation management turnover.35' Also 
NGOs play a role in the dissemination of knowledge about reform processes and experiments 
in other States. Finally, numerous conferences and seminars are held on management reform. 
Thirdly, to explain how and when such external and general ideas and initiatives are 
internalised in the State policy process, the most important factor seems to be that a few 
people who are motivated to carry these ideas forward occupy the right positions at the right 
moment. The process of the PIM policy formulation seems to take place in a very small 
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 It is too early to discuss them in detail because the arrangements finally agreed upon are not yet 
clear. The details have been negotiated at length and thus contain many compromises. The 
proposals are more the possible beginning of a new direction to irrigation policy than a full-scale 
overhaul of the present situation. 
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 The discussion below is based on interviews and discussions in 1996 and 1997 with people 
involved in the policy process, study of the documentation of the process as far as available to me, 
and some field observations. 
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 See Karnataka Act No. 16 and No.21 of 1995, which amend The Karnataka Irrigation (Levy of 
betterment contribution and water rate) Act, 1957. 
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 Such study visits in India were undertaken by members of the Expert Committee. A CADA 
Administrator visited Mexico and wrote a paper on the Mexican model (Ujjankop, 1995). 
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circle at a high level in the government administration.36' There is no public debate 
accompanying it, and there seems to be no organised lobby for it from within the 
administration, nor from civil society by groups of water users, farmers movements, NGOs 
or other actors. The policy formulation process for the Participatory Irrigation Management 
programme thus is highly non-participatory, in the sense that some of the major stakeholders, 
particularly farmers, are not involved in it. 
As a result, the policy initiative in my view is a very fragile initiative. A few unfortunate 
transfers or replacements may in fact paralyse it. There is a kind of catch-22 situation. Policy 
changes are required to create space for greater involvement of stakeholders in water 
management policy making and implementation (at all levels), while such greater involvement 
is itself a precondition for the creation and particularly the consolidation of that space. The 
ways out of this situation are 1) to hope that a fortunate constellation of people and ideas 
lasts long enough to translate the initiative into Acts, Rules, government orders and a 
sufficient number of experiments to trigger an ongoing process of change, and/or 2) to try 
to contribute to the emergence of an articulated demand (from the field and the executing 
institutions) for policy change, that is a bottom-up policy or policy support initiative. 
The neighbouring State of Andhra Pradesh may be providing an example of the first way 
out. Since 1996 a prescriptive process of irrigation reform is implemented in that State with 
great vigour. The reform process involved the adoption of a new law on participatory 
irrigation management (the Andhra Pradesh Farmers' Management of Irrigation Systems Act, 
1997). According to one of its authors, the central elements of the act are the following. 
(a) Gives water rights and control of the irrigation systems [to farmers 
organisations]; 
(b) Provides for functional and administrative autonomy to the associations; 
(c) Makes irrigation department (ID) accountable to the WUAs. The competent 
authority, who is a person from ID and attached to a group of WUA has to 
implement the decisions of the WUA; 
(d) Enables WUAs to resolve conflicts within themselves; 
(e) Attempts to improve the irrigation systems to become more effective as it is 
to be done by the WUAs only; 
(f) Allows access to information to the WUA on scheme operations; 
(g) [Allows farmer influence on] preparation of the operational plan and the 
maintenance; 
(h) Provides freedom of cropping pattern to farmers. (Peter, 1998:10) 
Elections have been held for more than 12,000 Water Users Associations, and a 
rehabilitation programme controlled by farmers is being implemented. There will be a three-
tiered system of WUA federation in each canal irrigation system (WUA, Distributary 
Committee, and Apex Committee). A massive media and training programme is part of the 
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 The Expert Committee consisted of the Additional Chief Secretary and Development 
Commissioner (chairman), an Assistant Professor of the Water and Land Management Institute 
(WALMI) was the member-convenor, and members included (deputy) Secretaries to Government 
from different departments (Law, Finance, Cooperation, Planning, Agriculture and Irrigation), some 
of the CADA Administrators and some CADA Land Development Officers (Engineering). When the 
Committee was reconstituted in March 1996 some Chief Engineers also became members. An 
Advisor to the Government on water and irrigation issues also attended the meetings. See 
Chambers, Saxena and Shah (1989:239-241) on the alienation of policy making from practice, and 
for proposals to remedy this. 
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process. The formulation and introduction of the programme was accompanied by intense 
campaigning within both the ruling and the opposition parties. 
The political support for this programme comes from the Chief Minister of the State, and 
it is one of the elements of the present Andhra Pradesh government's 'new people's 
movement' Janmabhoomi. It is described as a new freedom struggle "to liberate our people 
from morass and despair, restore the lost values and build an egalitarian society based on the 
principles of equity and sustainability." {Janmabhoomi brochure of Government of Andhra 
Pradesh, p.4) 
The interesting point for the discussion in this chapter is that the Andhra Pradesh case 
seems to show that it is possible to make canal irrigation reform part of a populist, and 
Gandhian, political agenda for social transformation. The process of implementation was not 
longer than one year at the moment this was written, and therefore evaluations of the 
effectiveness of the programme can not yet be given, but considerable expansion of irrigated 
area seems to be the result of the devolution of power and resources to WUAs (Peter, 
1998:6). The architects of the policy hope to make the process irreversible in a period of 2-3 
years. How the programme will attempt to address distributional issues is unclear. Apart 
from prescription of the constitution of the WUA on a territorial basis, the internal processes 
in WUAs do not seem to be the major focus of attention. Whether equity and sustainability 
issues are addressed is therefore a question. 
It would be interesting to know the pre-history of to this drastic policy change and 
vigorous implementation (see Peter, 1998 for the sequence of events once the initiative was 
taken). There seems to have been a strong element of contingency, that is, some individuals 
who captured the possibility for such a programme when the opportunity was there. 
There are few indications that a similar process might happen in Karnataka, though it is 
the nature of this type of policy initiative that it is somewhat unpredictable. Therefore a 
process of coalition-building to create a support basis for a canal irrigation reform agenda 
seems the only way forward in Karnataka, and perhaps in other places as well (see below for 
more discussion). 
The policy implementation process 
The effect of the isolated policy making at the top in Karnataka is that a prescriptive style 
of implementation can easily persist. This can be illustrated by the way the new PIM 
initiative was implemented in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal. 
Mid-1997 the first practical steps were taken to start the implementation of pilot 
experiments with PIM in Karnataka. A summary of our observation of a field-level meeting 
on PIM in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal command area is given in box 10.3.37) 
Box 10.3 shows that the prescriptive style of policy implementation was very apparent. 
Lower level field staff was instructed to bring the PIM message to the farmers in the usual 
mode of top-down explanation and instruction. While at the level of policy making there is 
an awareness of the complexities that are part of the process of water users organisation, this 
awareness does not seem to exist at field level. There was no careful consideration of the unit 
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 The conclusions drawn from this single observation were confirmed by later visits to other 
locations where such meetings were held. The fieldwork was done by R. Doraiswamy. For a critical 
evaluation of attempts to establish water users associations in the Upper Krishna Project, see Patil, 
Lele and Patil (1992). 
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Box 10.3: A PIM meeting in a tail end distributary 
The Under Secretary to Government Irrigation Department (Command Area Development) in 
May 1997 issued guidelines for the implementation of PIM on a pilot basis to the Chief 
Engineers and CADA Administrators of the different projects in the State. As the first step 
in the implementation of the PIM programme in the Tungabhadra Project (Left Bank and Right 
Bank) ten pilot villages cum command areas were selected. Six of these ten sites had been 
part of earlier programmes to establish WUAs, and had formally registered WUAs already. 
Four were new villages/command areas. The selection criteria were, as far as we could 
ascertain, the size of the command area, and particularly the existence of a 'cooperative 
attitude' of the farmers. For one case it was reported to us that the village/command area 
was included on the specific request of the local MLA. 
The CADA took swift action and organised meetings in the villages concerned in June and 
July 1997. We were able to be present at one such a meeting. The village/distributary 
command area was located in the tail end of the main canal. This was in contradiction with 
the intention at policy level that sites with not too problematic water supply conditions should 
be chosen. Furthermore, the meeting took place in the head end village, while the existing 
association was based in and had a chairman from the tail end village. The meeting place 
seemed to have been determined by the practical reason of accessibility by jeep. The meeting 
place was appropriate in so far that most farmers who irrigated in this distributary were from 
the head end village. The tail end village area hardly received any water. Apart from the 
chairman only head end farmers, about 20, were present at the meeting. 
The farmers had been informed about the meeting a few days earlier. The Irrigation 
Department officer present at the meeting had heard about it the night before. This was due 
to the speedy implementation of the higher level instructions by CADA combined with leave 
of absence of his superior. The meeting was chaired by a CADA officer. Initially the meeting 
was rather one-directional. The chairman explained the contents of the new policy. It was 
clear that he was not very well informed about its content. This was hardly his fault because 
not all the details of the policy were decided at that point of time (one example was the 
composition of the management board of the new WUA). 
The farmers were very quick to notice the problem of the quantity and the stability of 
water supply from the main canal. The Irrigation Department officer correctly argued that a 
stable supply could not be delivered because of interventions upstream in the system that his 
division was unable to influence. The chairman told him to determine a supply that he could 
guarantee, and thus more or less ignored the issue. The head end farmers had some fear that 
they would lose water in the new situation, but the head-tail issue was not appreciated and 
left undiscussed. 
A large part of the discussion focussed on the most concrete aspect of the policy: the 
need to make an estimate of the costs of the necessary technical repairs and improvements 
of the canal system before the management would be turned over to the farmers. The only 
concrete result of the meeting was that the chairman told the Irrigation Department officer 
to prepare such an estimate together with the farmers within a few weeks. 
At the end of the meeting we asked whether a copy of the guidelines could be provided 
to the farmers in Kannada, the State's language. The chairman first reacted by stating that 
these guidelines were meant for the government officials and that farmers had no need for 
them. In the second instance he argued that there was a stationery problem in his office. He 
was clearly totally unprepared for this question. After the meeting we had some discussions 
with farmers that had attended the meeting, and it was clear that they had only very partially 
picked up the content of the PIM policy. Self-governance is a novel idea, and it takes time to 
explain it. However, when after the meeting we asked the CADA officers whether they would 
return to the village for further explanation and discussion, the answer was negative. They 
only intended to return at the occasion of a formally called meeting. 
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Box 10.4: Learning from farmers 
Jaska: The irrigation engineer and myself visited this village, in the command area of a large 
irrigation project Dharoi in Gujarat, India, to find out if the farmers would be interested in PIM. 
As soon as the farmers collected I asked the first question, as I always do: "First let me 
understand what is irrigation system that serves the farm lands of your village." Promptly the 
irrigation engineer unrolled his maps, three of them, one for each sub-minor. I said it would 
be difficult to understand the problems of this village if we have to look into 3 maps. In any 
case I wanted PRA approach to understand the local situation as farmers perceived it. I 
therefore suggested to prepare an irrigation map of the village. I always carry chart papers 
and sketch pens with me. 
Farmers' first reaction usually is that they do not know how to draw maps. I then take up 
the pen and make a small round somewhere in the lower middle of the chart paper and tell 
them if this is the village site (housing area) let me know by which road we reached the 
village. Somebody would indicate by finger and someone else will take up the pen and draw 
it. At our prompting, more roads will be drawn and then the canals. 
At this stage I found that one leader who was apparently more educated and articulate 
was speaking on behalf of all and therefore was a barrier to participation by more farmers. 
I therefore put my finger on a particular minor and asked who are the farmers at the tail end? 
A farmer raised his hand, I asked him to come forward and explain what was his situation 
about adequacy of water. He said he never got water! Obviously the leader could not speak 
on his behalf. Then I asked who else had land served by that canal. More farmers raised their 
hand and I asked them to come forward. The leader had to make room for them. 
Farmer after farmer pointing out the location of his farm, narrated the problems they faced 
- problem of uneven canal bed, farmers in earlier reaches taking more water than their share, 
wrong location of outlet, gate in oulet missing etc. The leader only nodding his agreement 
with views being expressed by the farmers. 
The second round of discussion was about PIM and to what extent the benefit that may 
be obtained from the scheme and whether the responsibility that would devolve on farmers 
was worth its while. That led to the issue - what needs to be done for rehabilitation of the 
scheme before turn over was considered between the farmers and the irrigation engineers. 
When the agreement was reached the issue came up about contribution towards the cost of 
rehabilitation. According to rough estimate by the irrigation engineer for the rehabilitation as 
indicated by the farmers may cost around Rs400,000 and expected 10% contribution would 
mean Rs.40,000. 
The first reaction of the farmers is always that they were poor and they cannot raise such 
large amount. I then entered into discussion about the additional production that would result 
on account of rehabilitation and due to improvement in the water delivery system when 
managed by the farmers organisation that will be more sensitive to the changing needs of 
specific farmers. The rough calculation indicated that the value of additional production would 
be Rs. 1 20,000 per year. This showed that the farmers would get back more than the amount 
of their contribution in the first year itself and thereafter they will have the benefit of 
additional income year after year. One of the farmers has business experience. I asked him 
"is there any honest business where you get back your investment in less than two years?" 
The farmers could see the implications of this discussion on cost benefit. 
No major decisions can be taken about PIM in a three hours session of initial dialogue. It 
only prepares the ground for the 2nd, 3rd and the 4th round leading to acceptance of PIM 
with full understanding of benefits and costs not only of money but of responsibilities. 
Source: Shah (n.d.: 4-5) 
of organisation or the composition of the water users group in relation to the head-tail water 
distribution pattern in the distributary concerned. There was no attention to the 
communication process with farmers, and not a trace of an effort to start a process of joint 
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problem definition and learning from past experience. The problem of reliable supply from 
the main system was more or less ignored.38* 
If these events are any indication for how the new PIM policy will be implemented, the 
worst must be feared for its viability. We should be very careful however not to simply put 
the blame on the field level staff. The problem is one of general approach. The whole 
concept of prescriptive policy implementation needs to be questioned. This means that reform 
of the mode of operation of the government institutions should have a prominent place on the 
policy agenda.39' 
That things can be done differently is illustrated in box 10.4, which describes the approach 
of an NGO working on PIM in Gujarat (also see Gosselink and Thompson, 1997 for a review 
of the use of participatory approaches in irrigation). However, not all NGOs active in canal 
irrigation follow such interactive approaches (see van Ommen, 1997 and Buggi, Hulagur and 
Shivamurthy, 1997 for critiques of NGO activities in Karnataka). 
Though NGOs probably have a better record with regard to field level methodologies than 
government agencies, there are some limitations to their approaches in canal irrigation as 
well. The major one it seems to me, is the exclusive focus on local organisation, of farmers 
and other water users, at outlet or subdistributary level. This leaves the issues of main system 
management and institutional reform within the irrigation bureaucracy unaddressed.40) One 
dimension of this is the isolated nature of pilot experiments when undertaken on a relatively 
small scale (a small number in scattered locations, limited to outlet of subdistributary level), 
so that cumulative effects cannot occur.41' With regard to the role of NGOs in irrigation 
management reform there seems to be considerable potential to be tapped. However, NGO 
work should focus more than it seems to be now on building local countervailing power to 
address the problems located at higher levels of the system and in the policy making and 
implementing bureaucracy. 
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 On the positive side it must be observed that the CADA took up the implementation of the PIM 
initiative with great speed and enthousiasm. A cynical mind would perhaps suggest that this was 
due more to the possibility of new resource flows than the content of the policy. There was some 
indirect evidence for this in this particular case. The WUA chairman's role seems to have been that 
of a middleman with regard to the securing of subsidies for lift irrigation for individual farmers 
through a CADA programme. 
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 This issue is under discussion in the policy formulation process, but it is in my view not as 
prominent as it should be. 
401
 It may happen that NGOs successfully function as a third party (a resource broker, see chapter 
3 and 7) that mediates between water users and the Irrigation Department and is able to exert 
sufficient pressure to improve and stabilise main system water supply during the period that it is 
active in a particular locality. However, it is sometimes difficult to consolidate this after the NGO 
leaves the locality. Access to administrative and political circles that NGOs may have to secure 
water supply, may not easily be taken over by local persons and institutions (but for an exception, 
see van Ommen, 1997). 
411
 The isolated pilot experiments are partly an artefact of irrigation policy. The Command Area 
Development programme that has provided funds for WUA formation by NGOs has defined the type 
and level of experiments to be undertaken in this way (see also chapter 9). The PIM initiative in 
Karnataka is designed along the same lines, although the unit of organisation is meant to be larger 
(several hundreds of hectares) than in the Command Area Development approach, where the unit 
was often the outlet command area (several tens of hectares). 
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Conclusion 
The main conclusion that I draw from this section is that the policy process that is now 
designing 'participatory irrigation management' initiatives, should itself be more 
participatory. Interest groups should not only be involved in the local, implementation part 
of policies and programmes, but also in the process of policy formulation and programme 
design. Actors who work 'bottom up' , like many NGOs, should make this a more prominent 
part of their approach and partly 'delocalise' their efforts. This could also contribute to the 
constitution of an articulated field level demand for policy reform. 
Bottrall (1992) has formulated this course of action as follows. He argues that 
there could be a possibility of [an irrigation reform] agenda being incorporated into -
and thereby reinforcing - broader-based movements for democratic reform. (Bottrall, 
1992:245) 
He argues that support for a reform agenda for the irrigation sector and bureaucracy might 
be found in different corners. 
Those currently opposed to the status quo, or with good reasons to oppose it, include 
finance ministries (concerned about IDs' never-ending demands on public funds); 
politicians and their constituents in regions disadvantaged by present patterns of water 
development (either through direct damage, as in waterlogged areas, or through long 
neglect, as in tank areas); environmental action groups; local issue-based groups (such 
as opponents of state water policies in Maharashtra); and non-agricultural water users, 
including urban domestic and industrial users, who suffer from the absence of efficient 
methods of inter-sectoral water allocation, {ibid. :244) 
To conclude this section I reflect on the type of public action and leadership required to 
achieve a reform process that also addresses explicitly the issues of equity, democracy and 
ecological sustainability in local and supro-local resource use practices. The reflection consist 
of a quotation. 
The primary bottleneck [in superseding the private property interests of landlords and 
'waterlords'], as with many other development problems in India, is organizational and 
political. Even the leftist parties in India, which in a few areas have some history of 
organizing peasants, are more oriented to price-tax-rent campaigns, limited land 
redistribution movements, and more recently to recording of rights of tenants and 
agitation for agricultural wage increases. Seldom is their attention directed toward 
developing productivity-oriented local cooperative organizations (for water management 
or for credit and social insurance). Even at the level of slogans the focus is on issues 
like 'land to the tiller' (and hence a perpetuation of the private property system) and 
not on the need for building cooperative institutions. It is, of course, far easier to 
agitate against existing inequality and oppression than to build from the ground up 
viable community organizations and to sustain them. The latter require a completely 
different kind of organizational resources and political-entrepreneurial skills which the 
present leadership of these parties is often ill-equipped to provide. Yet the need 
remains desperate. (Bardhan, 1984b:219) 
What is stated here about the leftist parties can, mutatis mutandis, also be applied to other 
political actors. What I hope to have shown is that a progressive agenda for canal irrigation 
reform is possible and required. Who will come forward to occupy the political space created 
by macro-shifts in the Indian economy and polity, and integrate and expand localised efforts 
into a broader process of public action and institutional reform, is an open question. 
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10.4 A RESEARCH AGENDA FOR REFORM 
The previous sections have tried to bring the 'water control as politically contested resource 
use' perspective to its logical conclusion with regard to its implications for action. I have 
questioned conventional concepts of planned intervention (on these see Long and van der 
Ploeg, 1989), and advocated a process-focused approach and outlined a particular standpoint 
on the nature of the reform required. In this concluding section I discuss which contributions 
academic research might make to the further development of this perspective and change 
processes by the presentation of a research agenda for reform. 
I do not want to conclude with a long list of topics and questions that need further 
investigation. Instead, I briefly describe three thematic areas that in my view deserve more 
attention, and which need conceptual innovation as well.42) 
Canal irrigation technology and its design process 
The first thematic area is that of the canal irrigation technology and its design process. The 
research started with a concept of technology that wanted to identify the social dimensions 
of physical artefacts. Particularly chapter 8 shows that this perspective can improve our 
understanding of water management practices. However, this is little more than a beginning 
that establishes the possibility of a social perspective on canal irrigation technology. More 
research on topics like intermediate storage and the choice of outlet structures (in relation to 
water management and water rights issues and on a comparative basis across the 
subcontinent) can help to address the technical challenges that irrigation reform is going to 
present. 
With regard to the design process the starting assumption was based on social 
constructivist analyses of design processes in farmer managed irrigation systems in which 
NGOs or other irrigation agencies intervened.43' The finding of that research has been that 
design processes generally are social processes in which different interests groups interact 
to negotiate the technical design. Though this was partly confirmed by the analysis of the 
design process of the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal (see chapters 4 and 8). The analysis also 
showed that there is a lot on non-contested, top-down, engineer-dominated design work in 
canal irrigation, that there are no institutions for discussion and negotiation of design issues 
by the different interest groups, and that the professional orientation of engineers is not 
towards field level problems but the 'high tech' frontier of engineering. 
I believe that any initiative for reform in canal irrigation, to have a chance of success, 
requires enrolment of the Irrigation Department engineers that manage the systems. One 
possible starting point for that enrolment is their technical professional expertise. The 
421
 There is a fourth important thematic area, and that is the development of a social or political 
ecology approach to canal irrigation, at field and farm level as well as higher levels (the latter in 
relation to integrated water resources management). One of the important topics for research 
would be farmer responses to waterlogging and salinisation. However, this book does not provide 
material to elaborate this thematic area, and therefore I only mention it. 
431
 Social constructivist analyses have so far hardly been applied to agency managed large scale 
systems. See chapter 2 for references. 
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features, history and meaning of that expertise need to be understood much better to be able 
to rethink it.44) 
The politics of irrigation 
The second thematic area of research that I want to highlight is what might be called the 
politics of irrigation, or irrigation as a political process. It was mentioned in chapter 7 that 
one of the weaknesses of this research is that the political networks relevant for water 
management were not investigated in full detail. Also here the analysis presented is more the 
identification of a research terrain than a comprehensive statement on the issue. Comparative 
research on the role of MLAs and other political actors in irrigation management, the 
intersection of political, administrative and hydraulic boundaries, and the functioning of local 
political networks would be obvious topics for further research. 
Also the internal institutional workings of the irrigation bureaucracy were only partly 
analysed (see chapter 9). Particularly the coping strategies and styles of management of 
departmental staff who operate at the interface of the water users and bureaucracy are an 
important topic. 
From a reform perspective these are questions about the forms of and possibilities for 
institutions in which different interest groups can discuss and negotiate the planning, design 
and management of the irrigation system.45' It is particularly relevant also for the emerging 
emphasis on integrated water resources management, where ways have to be found to 
negotiate the allocation and management of water with different functions and values. 
Rights and entitlements 
The third thematic area is that of the conditions for resource access and use. It includes the 
'interlinked entitlements' situation with regard to canal irrigation water that was identified 
in chapter 6, questions about property rights in land, water and infrastructure, and the effects 
of these phenomena on poverty, social security, and class and gender relations. Research on 
these issues has developed strongly for farmer managed irrigation, but much less so for canal 
441
 For critiques of the water supply augmentation and infrastructure creation orientation of the 
Irrigation Department, see for example Santhakumar and Rajagopalan (1993) and Santhakumar, 
Rajagopalan and Ambirajan (1995). 
4511 implicitly advocate what could be called a 'social contract' approach to reform here. During the 
IDPAD conference referred to above a trinity of models for reform was distinguished in the 
discussions. The two other models identified were li) integrated water resources planning 
dominated by water resources specialists, involving, at the most, consultation of resource users, 
and (Hi the market and litigation oriented model which relies on the allocative efficiency of market 
or market-like mechanisms, and the force of law and jurisprudence. When it is accepted that the 
institutional structure and the behaviour of the water bureaucracy is part of the problem, the first 
model can hardly be relied on. It creates no mechanisms to question that structure and behaviour. 
The second model is also not a very attractive avenue. The introduction of water markets in South 
Asian canal irrigation does not seem a feasible proposition (see Moore, 1989 for detailed 
discussion; also see Wade, 1982a:320), and the paralysis of the legal system with regard to 
irrigation management has been referred to in chapters 3 and 7. The 'social contract' model seems 
to have more to speak for it. In other domains, like forestry, watershed management under rainfed 
conditions and minor irrigation, it has been experimented with with some success (see Chambers, 
Saxena and Shah, 1989). It is not a defence of a populist view of participation (see Scoones and 
Thompson, 1994). 
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irrigation.46' Also here a comparative approach, across the subcontinent, would be needed, 
in consideration of socio-economic, political, agro-ecological and technical diversity (see 
chapter 3 for a first step towards a regional typology). A specific topic that emerges from 
this book is the role of migrant farmers in agricultural innovation and resource management. 
From a reform perspective research on these topics would enable elaboration of the 
generally rather vague equity objective, and more insight in these phenomena may also affect 
the local level methodologies for irrigation reform by 'grounding' them more profoundly in 
local level social realities. 
Conclusion 
In 1997 a senior and highly placed irrigation engineer made the remark to me that what was 
required in Karnataka was not more research, but studies. Research to him was an activity 
of academics which generally had little relevance to the practical problems he and his 
colleagues faced in the irrigation systems. Studies in his mind were activities oriented 
towards practical problems with the aim to suggest practical solutions for these problems. My 
guess is that, had we continued the discussion, we would have been unable to agree on which 
exactly were the most pressing practical problems, how these should be perceived, and how 
the studies should be undertaken. There are still many gaps to bridge, both in theory and in 
practice. But on one point we fully agreed. Research and studies must be located on the 
waterfront. 
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 See Saleth (1996) on a property rights perspective on irrigation. I thank Vishal Narain for 
bringing this work to my notice (also see Narain, forthcoming). I became aware of the existence 
of this literature too late to be able to integrate it into the discussion in this chapter. 
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NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING 
Dutch Summary 
DE WATERLINIE 
Waterverdeling, technologie en agrarische verandering in een 
kanaal-irrigatiesysteem in Zuid India 
Dit boek bespreekt waterverdeling in het Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal irrigatiesysteem in Raichur 
district, Karnataka, India. Het is gelegen in het binnenland van Zuid India, waar de regenval laag is 
(ongeveer 600 mm per jaar) en zeer variabel. In het verleden werd het gebied geteisterd door mislukte 
oogsten en hongersnoden. Een grootschalig irrigatiesysteem werd geconstrueerd ter oplossing van 
deze problemen. Het systeem is operationeel sinds 1953 en was volledig gereed in 1968. Het te 
irrigeren areaal is 240.000 ha. 
Het Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal is een zogenaamd 'protective' ('beschermend') irrigatiestelsel. 
Het is ontworpen om het beschikbare water dun te spreiden over een grote oppervlakte. Er is sprake 
van supplementaire en partiele irrigatie. De gewas-waterbehoefte wordt niet geheel gedekt en in een 
bepaald seizoen wordt slechts een gedeelte van het areaal ge'irrigeerd. Niet de produktie per eenheid 
land wordt gemaximaliseerd, maar die per eenheid water. 
In het laatste punt ligt een fundamentele tegenstrijdigheid besloten. Voor een boer met een gegeven 
hoeveelheid land ligt het meer voor de hand om per eenheid land te maximaliseren, in plaats van bij 
te dragen aan het maximale totale produkt gegeven de hoeveelheid water. De meest rendabele 
gewassen, rijst en suikerriet, vragen veel water. Daarom eigenen boeren die daartoe de mogelijkheid 
hebben zich meer water toe dan hun 'beschermende' deel, waardoor anderen te weinig krijgen. Het 
irrigatiewater in het Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal wordt in de praktijk net als in veel andere 
irrigatiesystemen zeer ongelijk verdeeld. 
Hoe deze ongelijke verdeling van dag tot dag tot stand komt is het centrale thema van het 
proefschrift. Het beoogt een interdisciplinaire analyse van 'water control' (waterbeheersing) op 
verschillende nivo's: het tertiaire vak, het secundaire kanaal, en het hoofdkanaal. De 
technisch/fysische, organisatorische en sociaal-economisch/politieke dimensies van de problematiek 
worden met elkaar in verband gebracht. De centrale onderzoeksvraag is de volgende. 
Hoe worden de organisatievormen voor waterverdeling in het Tungabhadra Left Bank 
Canal beinvloed door 1) het patroon van de commercialisering van de landbouw, 2) 
de vorm van overheidsregulatie en 3) de technische infrastructuur, en hoe beinvloeden 
die organisatievormen op hun beurt dezefaktoren ? 
De gevolgde methode is die van een intensieve gevalstudie. Het onderzoek is gestart op lokaal nivo 
met de bestudering van de waterverdeling in een aantal tertiaire vakken (lokale irrigatie-eenheden 
waar boeren onderling het water verdelen), gelegen in het bovenstroomse en het benedenstroomse deel 
van het irrigatiestelsel, waar een zekere mate van waterschaarste heerstte. De veronderstelling was 
dat waterschaarste organisatie zou induceren. 
Na het onderzoek op dit nivo bewogen de onderzoekingen zich geleidelijk tegen de stroom in het 
kanaalstelsel op naar de daar gelegen verdeelpunten, naar de kantoren van de ambtenaren van het 
Irrigatie Departement die dit gedeelte van het stelsel beheren, naar de huizen van politici, naar de 
winkels van de handelaren in zaaigoed en kunstmest, en zelfs naar het Hooggerechtshof en Parlement 
van Karnataka. Er zijn vooral sociaal-antropologische onderzoekstechnieken gebruikt. 
Het boek bestaat uit tien hootdstukken. Na een inleiding bespreekt hoofdstuk 2 het theoretische 
raamwerk van de analyse. Hoofdstuk 3 t/m 5 geven achtergrondsinformatie over het verschijnsel 
'beschermende' irrigatie, het ontwerp van het systeem, en de sociaal-economische ontwikkeling in de 
regio als gevolg van de irrigatie. De kern van het proefschrift wordt gevormd door hoofdstuk 6 t/m 
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9 waarin de waterverdelingspraktijken op de verschillende nivo's besproken worden. Hoofdstuk 10 
geeft de konklusies en bespreekt de mogelijkheid van hervorming van de huidige situatie m.b.t. het 
waterbeheer. 
Hoofdstuk 2 introduceert de twee analytische kernbegrippen. Het eerste is de notie dat 
irrigatiesystemen sociaaltechnische systemen zijn. Ze zijn heterogeen en complex omdat ze bestaan 
uit een groot aantal verschillende typen elementen, die op complexe wijze met elkaar verbonden zijn. 
Het tweede begrip is 'water control' of waterbeheersing. Er worden drie dimensies van 'water 
control' onderscheiden: de technisch/fysische dimensie, de organisatorische dimensie en de sociaal-
economisch/politieke dimensie. De centrale aanname is dat deze drie dimensies onlosmakelijk met 
elkaar verbonden zijn. 'Water control' in irrigatie wordt beschreven als een voorbeeld van politiek 
betwist gebruik van een natuurlijke hulpbron ('politically contested resource use'). Hiermee wordt het 
belang van sociale machtsverhoudingen in het gebruik van irrigatiewater benadrukt. 
In hoofdstuk 3 worden de begrippen 'bescherming en lokalisatie' ('protection and localisation') 
besproken. 'Bescherming' is een begrip dat stamt uit het Britse koloniale irrigatiebeleid. Drie 
betekenissen worden geidentificeerd: 1) de algemene betekenis van de funktie van irrigatie als 
bescherming tegen droogte/oogstmislukking en hongersnood, 2) beschermende irrigatie als een 
financieel-administratieve categorie van irrigatiewerken in de koloniale tijd, en 3) beschermende 
irrigatie als een speciflek type irrigatie in de technische, organisatorische en sociaal-
economisch/politieke zin. Onderdeel van 'bescherming' is in Zuid India de zogenaamde lokalisatie. 
Dit is een vorm van landgebruiksplanning waarin de overheid wettelijk aan boeren voorschrijft welke 
gewassen zij wel en niet met het irrigatiewater mogen verbouwen. 
Het is opvallend dat de beschermingsdoelstelling een centraal element in het Indiase irrigatiebeleid 
is gebleven, ook na de onafhankelijkheid van India, ondanks de (erkende) praktijk van ongelijke 
waterverdeling. De verklaring hiervoor wordt gevonden in het populistische karakter van het Indiase 
politieke systeem. Politici handelen als 'resource brokers' ('hulpbron-makelaars') die hun politieke 
steun zeker kunnen stellen o.a. door te zorgen dat er irrigatiekanalen naar hun kiesdistrict aangelegd 
worden. Tegelijkertijd zijn ze binnen hun kiesdistrict vooral afhankelijk van de categorie van grote 
boeren, die nu juist zichzelf teveel water toeeigenen. Daarom ondernemen dezelfde politici geen aktie 
tegen ongelijke verdeling. Vanwege de invloed van politici op de uitvoering van hun werk zitten de 
ambtenaren van het Irrigatie Departement ook in een moeilijk parket. 
Het tot stand komen van het Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal wordt besproken in hoofdstuk 4. De 
geschiedenis van het stelsel begint in de periode 1850-1860. De uitvoering van de plannen die toen 
en daarna zijn gemaakt voor een kanaal in Raichur district, werd bemoeilijkt door de verhouding 
tussen Madras Presidency, direkt bestuurd door een Britse koloniale regering, en de Nizam's 
Dominions, een formeel onafhankelijke 'Princely State'. De Tungabhadra rivier was de grensrivier 
tussen deze gebieden en de konstruktie van een dam voor het reservoir vereiste toestemming van beide 
overheden. Langdurige politieke onderhandelingen waren nodig om een verdeling van het beschikbare 
water overeen te komen. Uiteindelijk werd besloten, ondanks de dominantie van Madras Presidency, 
tot een 50/50 verdeling van het water. In 1944 was er een principe-overeenkomst, maar de 
onderhandelingen duurden nog voort tot 1976, onder andere als gevolg van de herindeling van de 
Indiase Staten na de onafhankelijkheid. 
In 1945 werd begonnen met de constructie van het project. Toen de beschikbare hoeveelheid water 
eenmaal was vastgesteld was het verdere ontwerp vooral een aangelegenheid van ingenieurs, met 
weinig externe invloed. Het gewaspatroon was vanaf het begin 'protective', en vooral kosten faktoren 
hebben een rol gespeeld bij het bepalen van de tracers van de kanalen. Er is geen rekening gehouden 
met sociale grenzen zoals die van dorpen en boerenbedrijven; topografie en bodemsoort zijn bepalend 
geweest voor het ontwerp. De verklaring hiervoor ligt in de zeer hoge sociale status van ingenieurs 
in die periode die het betwijfelen van hun technische keuzes onmogelijk maakte, en het ontbreken van 
instituties voor overleg en onderhandeling over ontwerp elementen. 
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De komst van irrigatie in Raichur district heeft gezorgd voor een zeer sterke economische 
ontwikkeling, die beschreven wordt in hoofdstuk 5. Irrigatie heeft geleid tot het ontstaan van een 
intensieve gecommercialiseerde landbouw met een hoge produktiviteit. De migratie van boeren uit 
de naburige deelstaat Andhra Pradesh naar het nieuwe irrigatiestelsel heeft een sleutelrol gespeeld in 
deze ontwikkeling. Zij brachten voldoende investeringskapitaal en kennis van de gei'rrigeerde 
landbouw mee, en begonnen een landbouwbedrijfssysteem gebaseerd op de verbouw van rijst, en in 
mindere mate suikerriet. De lokale bevolking ontbrak het in eerste instantie in het algemeen aan 
investeringsmiddelen. De migranten kochten land van de lokale boeren; de groteren onder de laatsten 
gebruikten de opbrengst van de verkoop om ook te investeren in de ontwikkeling van hun land voor 
irrigatie (egalisatie, aanleggen van dijkjes rond de velden). Er heeft een massale overdracht van land 
aan migranten plaatsgevonden. Na verloop van tijd is ook geinvesteerd, zowel door migranten als 
lokale boeren, in irrigatie met pompen, vanuit de rivier en de natuurlijke afvoerkanalen. 
Er is een geografisch patroon ontstaan waarin grote en middelgrote boeren vooral land hebben in 
de bovenstroomse delen van de kanalen, en kleine en marginale boeren vooral in de benedenstroomse 
delen (in het hoofdstuk wordt eerst een typologie van deze vier categorieen ontwikkeld). 
Niettegenstaande deze algemene correlatie tussen lokatie en sociaal-economische klasse, verschilt de 
preciese relatie van geval tot geval. Migranten konden niet altijd land verwerven in de geografisch 
meest gunstige lokaties, en ook ontstond soms waterschaarste in gebieden waar eerder voldoende 
water beschikbaar was. Het proces van relokatie van landbezit met het oog op toegang tot water gaat 
nog steeds door via de mechanismen van aan- en verkoop van land, via de overdracht van land in 
bruidschatten, en via het verkrijgen van land doorhet uitzetten van leningen met land als onderpand. 
Het proces van agrarische verandering kan niet goed begrepen worden zonder deze inherente 
ruimtelijke dimensie. 
Hoofdstuk 6 is het eerste hoofdstuk over de dagelijkse waterverdelingspraktijk. Het analyseert de 
gebeurtenissen op het nivo van het tertiaire vak, waar boeren onderling de waterverdeling bepalen. 
Er blijken in veel gevallen gedetailleerde stelsels van regels te bestaan voor roterende 
waterverstrekking. Deze zijn gebaseerd op de principes van het verdelen van de irrigatie-eenheid in 
zones, het vaststellen van een volgorde in de irrigatie, en een vaste irrigatietijd per eenheid 
oppervlakte. De regels worden gebruikt in tijden van schaarste; daarbuiten vindt irrigatie plaats op 
basis van onderlinge afspraken. 
Ondanks het bestaan van regels gebaseerd op een gelijkheidsprincipe kan sterk ongelijke 
waterverdeling geobserveerd worden. Dit komt doordat de regels slechts het aanbod van water 
betreffen, en niet continu worden toegepast. De vraag naar water is gedifferentieerd. Kleine, 
benedenstroomse boeren anticiperen op het verliezen van konflikten over water met grotere, 
bovenstroomse boeren door gewassen te verbouwen die minder water vergen, maar die ook minder 
rendabel zijn. De anticipatie komt voort uit hun afhankelijkheid van de grotere boeren voor het 
verkrijgen van krediet en werkgelegenheid voor henzelf en hun familieleden. Ook treden de grotere 
boeren op als vertegenwoordigers van de lokale irrigatie-eenheid in diskussies met het Irrigatie 
Departement en andere aktiviteiten om de watervoorziening veilig te stellen. 
De waterverdeling op het nivo van het secundaire kanaal, in India 'distributary' genoemd, wordt 
behandeld in hoofdstuk 7 (de organisatorische aspekten) en hoofdstuk 8 (de technische aspekten). 
Hoofdstuk 7 bespreekt welke regels voor roterende waterverstrekking er ontstaan zijn in de interactie 
tussen de ambtenaren van het Irrigatie Departement die deze kanalen beheren, en de watergebruikers. 
In veel secundaire kanalen bestaan regels voor rotatie, die ook weer gemobiliseerd worden in tijden 
van schaarste. Ook hier bewerkstelligen de regels geen gelijkheid in waterverdeling. Ze drukken de 
machtsverhouding uit tussen groepen gebruikers in verschillende delen van het gei'rrigeerde gebied, 
en die tussen watergebruikers en overheid. 
In tegenstelling tot wat vaak gedacht wordt is corruptie niet het dominante mechanisme in de 
waterverdeling op secundair nivo in het Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal. De moeizame relatie tussen 
overheidsbeheerders en watergebruikers wordt niet ingevuld door middel van financiele transacties, 
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maar door politieke bemiddeling. Lokale politici (parlementsleden) kunnen onder bepaalde 
omstandigheden een belangrijke rol spelen in de waterverdeling. De politici zijn afhankelijk van de 
politieke steun van boeren, die hen in rail voor stemmen kunnen vragen het gedrag van de Irrigatie 
Departement staf te beinvloeden. De lokale parlementsleden hebben macht over de Irrigatie 
Departement staf omdat zij veel invloed hebben op de driejaarlijkse (of eerdere) overplaatsing van 
ambtenaren. Zo ontstaat een 'driehoek van aanpassing' ('triangle of accommodation'), waarin geen 
van de partijen (boeren, ambtenaren en politici) de absolute overhand heeft, en waar voortdurend 
onderhandeld moet worden over de verdeling van het water. 
Hoofdstuk 8 concentreert zich op het kunstwerk dat het secundaire kanaal verbindt met de lokale 
irrigatie-eenheid: de 'pipe outlet structure'. Omdat het debiet dat door de pijp van het secundaire 
kanaal naar de veldleiding stroomt afhangt van zowel de bovenstroomse als de benedenstroomse 
waterstand, en van de doorsnede van de opening van de pijp (die aangepast kan worden met een 
schuif), is het praktisch onmogelijk het debiet met enige nauwkeurigheid te regelen. Ook is het 
daardoor onbekend hoeveel water er precies afgetapt wordt. Waarom tot de dag van vandaag dit 
kunstwerk gebruikt wordt, en niet andere elders in India gebruikte kunstwerken die meer toegesneden 
zijn op de taak van gelijke waterverdeling, is niet geheel duidelijk. 
Er bestaat in de praktijk een grote variatie in de preciese karakteristieken van de 'pipe outlet 
structure': stevigheid van konstruktie (beton/metselwerk), de plaats van de schuif (wel of niet 
zichtbaar en toegankelijk), het type slot of sloten dat bevestigd is en andere kenmerken. Deze variatie 
is een afspiegeling van de waterverdelingspraktijken en -problemen langs het betreffende kanaal. De 
kenmerken en de staat van de kunstwerken zijn een uitdrukking van de verhoudingen tussen 
verschillende groepen boeren en tussen boeren en de Irrigatie Departement. 
Het laatste hoofdstuk over waterverdelingspraktijken, hoofdstuk 9, gaat over veranderingsprocessen 
binnen het Irrigatie Departement m.b.t. het beheer van het hoofdkanaal. In een tweejarige periode van 
extreem watertekort (1988-1990) hebben een aantal institutionele veranderingen plaatsgevonden die 
de watervoorziening naar het benedenstroomse deel van het kanaal verbeterd hebben. De 
oorspronkelijke regels voor verdeling van het water op basis van het voorgeschreven gewaspatroon 
zijn losgelaten. Daarvoor in de plaats zijn regels gekomen die aan de ene kant ongelijkheid 
bestendigen, maar aan de andere kant een realistischer basis vormen voor het onderhandelen over de 
waterverstrekking aan het benedenstroomse gedeelte van het kanaal. Als gevolg van het invoeren van 
deze nieuwe regels is de watervoorziening aan het benedenstroomse gedeelte van het hoofdkanaal 
verbeterd, en vooral stabieler geworden. 
Het slothoofdstuk, hoofdstuk 10, geeft een samenvattend antwoord op de onderzoeksvraag, en 
bespreekt de implicaties van de analyse voor hervorming van het waterbeheer. Er wordt betoogd dat 
de analyse zowel een aantal structurele beperkingen of struikelblokken heeft gei'dentificeerd voor 
hervorming, maar dat de dagelijkse praktijk van de waterverdeling ook openingen biedt voor 
verandering. De laatste liggen in de kapaciteit voor zelfbeheer door watergebruikers, de gezamenlijke 
formulering van regels voor waterverdeling door watergebruikers en Irrigatie Departement staf, en 
de technische creativiteit en de mogelijkheid van institutionele verandering binnen het Irrigatie 
Departement. 
Vervolgens wordt besproken welke perspectieven er bestaan op de door bijna iedereen gevoelde 
noodzaak van hervorming. Deze varieren van technische en management argumenten voor 'goed 
beheer', economische argumenten voor 'efficient beheer', ecologische argumenten voor 'duurzaam 
beheer', tot politieke argumenten voor 'egalitair en democratisch beheer'. Gepoogd wordt een 
beschrijving te geven van een omvattende benadering waarin technische, organisatorische, 
economische en politieke elementen verweven zijn. 
Wat betreft de situatie in Karnataka m.b.t. de hervorming van irrigatiebeleid wordt gesteld dat 
meer aandacht voor de participatie van gebraikers en andere belangengroepen in de formulering van 
beleid nodig is. Nu vinden pogingen tot verandering tamelijk gei'soleerd plaats op hoge nivo's binnen 
305 
de overheid, of in individuele, lokale situaties in de irrigatiestelsels. Het werken aan een breed 
maatschappelijk draagvlak wordt als prioriteit genoemd. 
Tenslotte worden een aantal onderzoeksonderwerpen genoemd en kort besproken die zouden 
kunnen bijdragen aan de hervormingsagenda. Dit zijn het ontwerpproces van de kanaalirrigatie 
technologic de politieke dimensie van irrigatie, en de kwestie van gebruiksrechten. Dit onderzoek 
moet gesitueerd zijn in de dagelijkse problematiek van waterbeheer, d.w.z. aan de waterlinie. 
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